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times,	 almost	 always	 in	 a	negative	 context.	 In	Homily	12	on	the	Song	of	Songs,	
Gregory	 calls	 pleasure	 the	 ‘instigator	 of	 all	 vicious	 actions’.	 Thus,	 I	 set	 out	 to	
investigate	 what	 gives	 pleasure	 such	 a	 fundamental	 role	 in	 Gregory’s	
understanding	 of	 sin.	 Casting	 Gregory’s	 thought	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 ancient	
eudaimonistic	 ethics,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	main	 problem	with	 pleasure	 lies	 in	 the	
way	 in	 which	 it	 obscures	 that	 which	 is	 truly	 good:	 the	 life	 of	 virtue	 and	 the	
attainment	of	the	divine	likeness.	Through	its	sensual	appeal,	pleasure	projects	
a	 false	appearance	of	beauty	and	goodness	and	confuses	 the	mind’s	 judgment.	
This,	for	Gregory,	is	the	origin	of	all	sin,	both	in	Paradise	and	in	the	life	of	every	
postlapsarian	individual.	I	will	show	that	in	Gregory’s	works	the	life	of	pleasure	
comes	 to	 denote	 a	 fundamental	 misorientation	 of	 the	 human	 faculties,	 the	
antithesis	of	the	good	Christian	life.	By	pursuing	sensual	pleasure,	the	individual	
mistakes	the	sensible	creation	for	the	final	level	of	reality	and	fails	to	access	the	
most	 fulfilling	 forms	 of	 enjoyment.	 True	 insatiable	 enjoyment	 can	 only	 be	
attained	in	a	spiritual	communion	with	the	limitless	God.	
	
The	 thesis	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 main	 parts:	 In	 Part	 I,	 I	 investigate	 Gregory’s	
notion	 of	 pleasure	 and	 lay	 the	 anthropological	 groundwork	 for	 his	 ethical	
considerations.	Part	II	looks	at	the	junction	between	pleasure	and	sin,	showing	
how	pleasure	as	the	 false	good	obscures	higher	ends,	such	as	the	 life	of	virtue	
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For	 some	 pleasure	 (ἡδονή	 τις)	 or	 other	 is	 the	 instigator	 (καθηγεῖται)	 of	 all	 vicious	
actions	 that	 get	 carried	 out	 (πάντων	 τῶν	 διὰ	 κακίας	 ἐνεργουμένων),	 and	 there	 is	 no	




above	 come	 from	De	virginitate	and	 In	Canticum	canticorum	 –	 the	works	 that	
bookend	 Gregory’s	 corpus	 –	 showing	 that	 a	 concern	 about	 the	 detrimental	
effects	 of	 pleasure	 spans	 Gregory’s	 literary	 career.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 set	 out	 to	
investigate	 what,	 specifically,	 makes	 pleasure	 such	 a	 potent	 enemy	 of	 the	
Christian	 life	 that	Gregory	mentions	ἡδονή	over	300	times,	almost	always	 in	a	
negative	context.3	I	will	argue	that	the	problem	with	pleasure	lies	in	the	way	in	
which	 it	 obscures	 that	 which	 is	 truly	 good.	 We	 shall	 see	 that,	 for	 Gregory,	
pleasure	 is	 not	 only	 one	 of	 the	 passions	 but	 it	 stands	 for	 a	 fundamentally	
mistaken	direction	of	life	in	which	the	sensible	world	is	treated	as	the	final	level	
of	 reality.	 This	 means	 that	 a	 pleasure	 seeker	 fails	 to	 access	 both	 the	 highest	
forms	of	knowledge	and	the	most	fulfilling	forms	of	enjoyment	
	
By	 warning	 his	 audience	 about	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 pleasure	 and	 drawing	
attention	to	the	pernicious	way	in	which	pleasure	prevents	the	soul’s	progress	
towards	the	good,	Gregory	joins	a	long	line	of	ancient	thinkers	and	taps	into	one	
of	 the	 most	 central	 problems	 of	 ancient	 ethics.	 As	 is	 well	 known,	 the	






contention	 between	 rationalist	 and	 hedonist	 philosophers.4	The	 foundational	
texts	 assessing,	 and	 rejecting,	 pleasure	 as	 the	 highest	 good	 include	 Plato’s	
Philebus	 and	 Chapter	 7	 of	 Aristotle’s	 Nicomachean	 Ethics.	 Neither	 Plato	 nor	
Aristotle	considers	pleasure	wholly	evil,	but	both	agree	it	cannot	be	called	good	
without	qualifications.	While	some	refined,	 intellectual	pleasures	belong	to	the	
philosopher’s	 life,	 not	 all	 pleasures	 are	 good	 and	 those	 that	 seem	 most	
appealing	to	our	senses	are	particularly	base	and	distracting.	The	good	person,	
then,	 takes	 pleasure	 in	 the	 right	 things	 and	 shuns	 others.5	For	 the	 Stoics	 and	
eclectic	 Stoic-influenced	 thinkers	 such	 as	 Philo	 and	 Clement	 of	 Alexandria,	
ἡδονή	 is	one	of	 the	main	passions	and	has	no	role	 to	play	 in	 the	soul	 that	has	
attained	apatheia.	Later	Graeco-Roman	tradition	includes	a	number	of	works	in	
which	 Stoic,	 Platonist,	 and	 eclectic	 philosophers	 reject	 pleasure	 as	 the	 good,	
often	 as	 a	 part	 of	 explicit	 anti-Epicurean	 polemic. 6 	Where	 Epicurus	 is	
mentioned,	 he	 is	 frequently	 represented	 as	 an	 advocate	 of	 unbridled	 bodily	
pleasure,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	he	valued	 tranquillity	of	 the	 soul	as	 the	highest	
form	of	pleasure	and	advocated	a	simple	lifestyle.7	
	
In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 will	 cast	 Gregory’s	 critique	 of	 pleasure	 in	 the	 framework	 of	
ancient	ethics	and	its	preoccupation	with	pleasure	as	the	false	good.	To	set	the	
scene,	 the	 introduction	 will	 first	 address	 some	 shared	 features	 of	 ancient	
conceptions	of	ethics,	in	particular	the	fundamental	idea	that	there	is	a	highest	
good	 which	 every	 human	 being	 ought	 to	 pursue	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 a	 state	 of	
happiness,	wellbeing,	 or	bliss,	 often	 conceptualised	with	 the	Aristotelian	 term	
εὐδαιμονία.	While	my	aim	 is	neither	 to	offer	a	 full	 account	of	Gregory’s	ethics	
nor	 of	 his	 relationship	 to	 the	 ancient	 ethical	 tradition,	 these	 overarching	



















While	modern	 ethical	 theories	 usually	 enquire	 after	 shared	obligations	 or	 the	
consequences	 of	 our	 actions,	 virtually	 all	 ancient	 thinking	 on	 morality	 and	
ethics	centred	on	the	 idea	that	the	human	life	had	a	 final	goal	(τέλος,	σκοπός)	
towards	 which	 it	 ought	 to	 be	 directed.8	Regardless	 of	 the	 specifics	 of	 their	
philosophical	affiliation,	most	ancient	thinkers	took	for	granted	that	the	human	
life	was	directed	at	some	highest	good	which	was	pursued	for	its	own	sake	and	
for	 which	 all	 other	 goods	 were	 pursued.9 	The	 goal	 was	 anthropologically	
determined:	 ancient	 authors	 sought	 to	 pin	 down	 the	 very	 essence	 of	 human	
beings	and	 then	asked	what	 the	 individual	had	 to	do	 in	order	 to	actualise	her	
true	 humanity.	 In	 other	words,	 being	 good	was	 synonymous	with	 being	 truly	
human.	In	Nicomachean	Ethics,	one	of	the	most	influential	and	ground-breaking	
treatments	of	ancient	ethics,	Aristotle	argued	that	the	highest	good	and	the	aim	
of	 philosophy	 was	 εὐδαιμονία,	 which	 is	 alternately	 rendered	 as	 ‘happiness’,	









final	 end	 and	 eschatological	 fulfilment	 of	 the	 human	 life,	 while	 σκοπός	 denotes	 a	 goal	 or	
principle	that	directs	action	especially	 in	ascetical	contexts.	For	the	notion	of	σκοπός	 in	Greek	
Christianity,	see	Marguerite	Harl,	‘Le	guetteur	et	la	cible :	les	deux	sens	de	skopos	dans	la	langue	




of	 ancient	 ethics	 as	 a	 whole.	 A	 scholarly	 introduction	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 final	 good	 and	 its	
philosophical	 rationale	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Ibid.,	 29–42.	 A	 locus	classicus	of	 the	 ancient	 notion	 of	
good	is	Book	1	of	NE.		
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supposedly	 achieved.	 Indeed,	 ancient	 authors	 held	 different	 and	 at	 times	
conflicting	views	about	the	true	good,	which	I	will	analyse	in	more	detail	in	the	
course	 of	 this	 thesis.	 Simply	 put,	 hedonists,	 such	 as	 the	 Epicureans	 and	 the	
Cyrenaics,	regarded	pleasure	(ἡδονή)	as	the	good,	while	non-hedonist	thinkers	
conceived	of	good	primarily	 in	terms	of	virtue	(ἀρετή),	which	was	understood	
as	 a	 perfected	 intellectual	 disposition.11	The	 latter	 was	 the	 opinion	 held	 by	
virtually	 all	 ancient	 Christian	 thinkers	 who	 thought	 that	 humans	 were	
inherently	disposed	to	seek	virtue,	but	at	the	same	time	their	virtuousness	was	
entirely	contingent	upon	and	relative	to	God	who	alone	was	virtuous	and	good	
by	 nature.	 Thus,	 the	 early	 Christians	 agreed	 with	 the	 mainstream	 of	 ancient	
authors	 that	 virtue	 did	 not	 simply	 unfold	 in	 human	 nature	 as	 the	 individual	
grew	up	but	had	to	be	sought	and	practised	with	conscious	effort.12	In	this	way,	




way	as	Aristotle	or	 even	 the	Christian	 teacher	Clement	of	Alexandria	 (c.	 150–
215)	who	explicitly	cites	and	compares	different	ancient	views	of	the	good	life.13	
In	this	 thesis,	 I	have	nonetheless	chosen	to	talk	about	Gregory’s	 ‘ethics’	rather	
than	 ‘morality’	 or	 ‘moral	 psychology’	 because	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 his	 view	 of	 the	
moral	progress	is	underpinned	by	general	principles	that	are	consistent	enough	
to	 suggest	 a	 more	 sustained	 reflection	 on	 the	 good	 life.14	In	 fact,	 Gregory’s	
conception	 of	 the	 good	 Christian	 life	 rests	 on	 a	 recognisably	 eudaimonistic	
foundation:	the	attainment	of	the	highest	good	informs	the	whole	spiritual	 life	
																																																								
11	Cicero’s	 De	 finibus	 presents	 and	 critiques	 the	 different	 notions	 of	 goodness	 of	 the	 main	
philosophical	schools	(Epicurean,	Stoic,	Academic).	On	the	Stoic	notion	of	good,	see	LS	60,	and	
also	58	and	63.	




Wayne	 A.	Meeks,	The	Origins	 of	 Christian	Morality:	The	First	Two	Centuries	 (New	Haven:	 Yale	
University	Press,	1993),	3–5.	As	Meeks,	who	prefers	 the	 term	 ‘morality’	 in	his	 investigation	of	
the	 first	 two	Christian	 centuries,	 explains:	 ‘I	 take	 “ethics”	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	 reflective,	 second-
order	activity:	 it	 is	morality	rendered	self-conscious;	it	asks	about	the	logic	of	moral	discourse	







word	does	not	denote	 the	ultimate	goal	of	 the	human	 life.	As	Friedhelm	Mann	
has	 showed,	 its	 use	 is	 limited	 to	 earthly	 wellbeing	 and	 health.15	Much	 more	
central	 is	 the	 word	 μακαριότης,	 which	 can	 also	 be	 translated	 as	 ‘happiness’,	
‘blessedness’,	 and	 ‘bliss’.16	In	 the	 specifically	 Christian	 usage,	 the	 adjective	
μακάριος	(‘blessed’,	‘happy’)	is	the	key	word	of	the	Beatitudes	to	which	Gregory	
dedicates	 a	 collection	 of	 sermons.	 Furthermore,	 μακαριότης	 is	 a	 fundamental	
characteristic	 of	 God’s	 own	 being:17	for	 Gregory,	 the	 divinity	 itself	 is	 ‘the	 one	
thing	 truly	 blessed’	 from	 whom	 humans	 as	 the	 image	 of	 God	 derive	 their	
blessedness.18	Consequently,	 the	 ‘blessed’	 or	 ‘happy’	 life	 (ὁ	 μακάριος	 βίος,	 ἡ	
μακαρία	ζωή)	denotes	the	divine	life	itself,	and	also	the	human	life	after	death	
and	 the	 renewed	 earthly	 life	 after	 death	 to	 sin.19	The	 latter	 is,	 of	 course,	








For	Gregory,	 the	 ideal	of	μακαριότης	sets	 the	course	of	 the	Christian	 life:	 ‘The	
goal	of	 the	 life	according	to	virtue	 is	blessedness’	(τέλος	τοῦ	κατ’	ἀρετὴν	βίου	
μακαριότης	 ἐστίν),	 Gregory	 argues	 in	 In	 inscriptiones	 psalmorum,	 one	 of	 his	
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notion	 that	 the	 life	 that	 leads	 up	 to	 it	 is	 a	 ‘life	 according	 to	 virtue’.	 In	 De	
beatitudinibus,	 Gregory	 makes	 another	 statement	 concerning	 the	 goal	 of	 life,	
which	offers	a	close	parallel:	‘The	goal	of	the	life	according	to	virtue	is	the	divine	
likeness’	 (τέλος	 τοῦ	 κατ’	 ἀρετὴν	 βίου	 ἐστὶν	 ἡ	 πρὸς	 τὸ	 Θεῖον	 ὁμοίωσις).23	For	
Gregory,	then,	God	himself	is	the	very	good	whom	advanced	Christians	love	for	
his	own	sake,	not	because	of	fear	of	punishment	or	hope	of	external	rewards.24	
The	 concept	 of	 virtue	 is	 anchored	 in	 God’s	 very	 being:	 in	 Oratio	 catechetica,	
Gregory	argues	explicitly	that	God	is	the	‘true	virtue.’25		
	
We	 have	 already	 seen	 that,	 for	 Gregory,	 μακαριότης	 is	 one	 of	 the	 key	
characteristics	 of	 God’s	 own	 nature	 and	 the	 divine	 likeness.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 no	
surprise	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 life	 according	 to	 virtue	 is	 defined	 both	 as	
blessedness	and	the	divine	likeness.	In	inscriptiones	psalmorum	Gregory	makes	
a	 related	 statement	 arguing	 that	 the	 ‘likeness	 of	 God’	 is	 the	 limit	 of	 man’s	
happiness	 (ὅρος	 ἐστὶ	 τῆς	 ἀνθρωπίνης	 μακαριότητος	 ἡ	 πρὸς	 τὸ	 θεῖον	
ὁμοίωσις).26	As	 Mann	 notes,	 such	 happiness	 through	 likeness	 is	 nothing	 else	
than	the	restoration	of	 the	 image	of	God	 in	man.27	Although	Gregory	discusses	
the	τέλος	of	the	human	life	in	a	Christian	context,	which	is	shaped	by	the	biblical	
uses	of	μακάριος	and	 the	Christian	doctrine	of	 the	 image	and	 likeness	of	God,	
conceptualising	 the	 τέλος	 of	 the	 virtuous	 life	 as	 a	 ‘likeness	 of	 God’	 is	 not	 an	
exclusively	 Christian	 phenomenon.	 This	 ideal	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 Plato	
himself,	and	 it	was	widely	accepted	as	 the	goal	of	 the	good	 life	by	Middle	and	
Neo-Platonist	thinkers.28	
	
From	 his	 Christian	 perspective	 Gregory	 argues	 that	 the	 divine	 likeness	 and,	















Boersma	 suggests	 that	 in	 Gregory’s	 works	 ‘virtue’	 denotes	 ‘the	 moral	 skills	
required	 for	 progressive	 participation	 (μετουσία)	 in	 the	 heavenly	 or	
eschatological	 reality	 of	 God’s	 life…	 For	 Gregory,	 every	 step	 in	 virtue	 is	 an	
advance	 in	 one’s	 participation	 in	 Christ,	 since	 “virtue”	 is	 a	 synonym	 for	
“Christ”.’29	This	progressive	participation	 in	virtue	and	Christ	 is	 the	essence	of	
the	Christian	life.30	
	
Before	 turning	 to	 the	 topic	 of	 pleasure,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	make	 a	 few	 general	
observations	on	Gregory’s	terminology	of	the	good	life:	To	discuss	the	notion	of	
goodness,	Gregory	makes	use	of	two	key	terms,	τὸ	κάλον	and	τὸ	ἀγαθόν.31	The	
latter	means	 ‘good’	 in	 the	 general	 sense	 and	 is	 the	 usual	 term	when	 Gregory	





to	 its	 attractive	 quality,	 and	 can	 also	 be	 rendered	 as	 the	 ‘fine’,	 the	 ‘noble’,	 or,	
simply,	the	‘good’.	We	shall	see	that	Gregory	tends	to	move	fluidly	between	the	
two	 terms	without	 drawing	 attention	 to	 their	 differences.	 In	 this	work,	 I	will	
translate	 both	 of	 them	 as	 ‘good’,	 except	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 aesthetic	 and	
attractive	 aspect	 is	 so	 crucial	 that	 ‘beautiful’	 becomes	 the	 more	 natural	
translation.	 Especially	 in	 my	 analysis	 of	 Gregory’s	 reading	 of	Genesis	3,	 mere	
convention	 requires	 the	 translation	 of	 κάλον	 as	 ‘good’	 in	 harmony	 with	 the	






31	For	 these	 terms	 in	 Gregory	 and	 their	 intellectual	 background	 in	 biblical	 and	 philosophical	
sources,	see	 Ilaria	Ramelli,	 ‘Good/Beauty’,	 in	The	Brill	Dictionary	of	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	ed.	Lucas	
Francisco	 Mateo-Seco	 and	 Giulio	 Maspero,	 trans.	 Seth	 Cherney,	 Supplements	 to	 Vigiliae	
Christianae	99	(Leiden:	Brill,	2010),	356–63.	
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good	 of	 humans	 lies	 in	 the	 divine	 likeness,	 which	 is	 actualised	 through	 a	
participation	in	the	divine	goods,	which	Gregory	often	equates	with	virtues.	This	
is	the	state	 in	which	humans	were	first	created	but	which	they	lose	in	the	fall.	







in	 God,	 ancient	 philosophers	 would	 also	 discuss	 the	 existence	 of	 lesser,	
instrumental	 goods	 that	 simply	 facilitated	 the	 actualisation	 of	 the	 final	 goal.	
And,	in	the	most	basic	sense,	 ‘good’	simply	denoted	that	which	each	individual	
had	 chosen	 as	 his	 or	 her	 highest	 goal.	 This	 is	 the	 notion	 Aristotle	 called	 the	
‘apparent	good’,	and	here	pleasure	was	the	chief	candidate:	 ‘[T]he	desired	and	
the	 wanted	 are	 either	 the	 good	 or	 the	 apparent	 good	 (ἢ	 τὸ	 ἀγαθὸν	 ἢ	 τὸ	
φαινόμενον	ἀγαθόν).	This	 is	why	 the	pleasant	 is	desired;	 for	 it	 is	an	apparent	
good	–	for	some	think	it	such,	and	to	some	it	appears	such	though	they	do	not	
think	 it	 so.’32	Gregory	 formulates	 a	 similar	 distinction	 in	Cant.	14:	 ‘”[G]ood”	 is	





32	EE	 1235b25–29;	 trans.	 Barnes	 &	 Kenny,	 162.	 For	 a	 comprehensive	 scholarly	 account,	 see	
Jessica	Moss,	Aristotle	on	the	Apparent	Good:	Perception,	Phantasia,	Thought,	and	Desire	(Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	2012).		
33	Cant.	14	 (GNO	VI,	 420);	 trans.	Norris,	 447.	 See	 also	Cant.	2	 (GNO	VI,	 55);	Eccl.	8.2	 (SC	 416,	
400);	 Op.	 hom.	 20	 (PG	 44,	 200B);	 Or.	 cat.	 21	 (SC	 453,	 242–244).	 On	 the	 apparent	 good	 in	




Regardless	 of	 philosophical	 affiliation,	 ancient	 thinkers	 argued	 that	 the	moral	
progress	entailed	a	constant	choice	between	that	which	 is	 truly	good	and	that	
which	simply	appeared	to	be	so.	The	purpose	of	philosophical	education	was	to	
provide	 people	 with	 the	 correct	 criteria	 for	making	 the	 choice	 and	 gradually	
instill	the	practice	of	virtuous	choice	so	that	it	became	a	habit.	Conversely,	most	
ancient	 thinkers	 agreed	 that	 people	 who	 lacked	 philosophical	 training	 would	
automatically	regard	pleasure	as	the	good.	Whereas	the	development	of	virtue	
required	 study	and	practice,	 pleasure	appeared	 instantly	 appealing.	While	 the	
Stoics	 argued	 that	 the	 attraction	 to	 pleasure	 was	 entirely	 based	 on	 a	 false	
judgment,	other	thinkers,	such	as	Plato	and	Aristotle,	 took	 its	appeal	seriously	
and	agreed	that	humans	had	an	innate	tendency	to	seek	it.34	However,	they,	too,	





the	 soul,	 Gregory	 explains	 the	 lure	 of	 the	 apparent	 good	 by	 appealing	 to	 the	
affinity	 between	 humans	 and	 animals.	While	 humans	 are	 created	 to	 actualise	
the	divine	likeness	through	the	use	of	their	rational	mind,	at	the	same	time	the	
lower,	 irrational	 parts	 of	 their	 souls	 naturally	 gravitate	 towards	 mere	 self-
preservation	 and	 self-gratification.	 Thus,	 Gregory	 argues	 that	 humans	 are	 at	
once	pulled	towards	two	different	and	often	conflicting	notions	of	the	good:	that	
of	the	mind	(virtue)	and	that	of	the	senses	(pleasure).35	In	fact,	we	can	argue,	as	
Smith	 does,	 that	 ‘the	 apparent	 good	 is	 that	 good	 which	 is	 apprehended	 by	
nonrational	creatures	by	the	senses.’36	The	attraction	to	pleasure	as	the	good	is	
a	characteristic	humans	share	with	animals,	whose	conception	of	the	good	life	is	
limited	 to	 fulfilling	 the	 immediate	 impulses	 of	 the	 body	 and	 ensuring	 its	








of	 our	 divine	 likeness.	 While	 sense	 perception	 can	 only	 grasp	 the	 goods	
available	to	us	in	the	present	moment,	the	representative	faculties	of	the	mind	–	
chiefly	memory	and	hope	–	enable	the	human	soul	to	compare	its	present	state	
to	goods	available	 in	 the	past	and	 in	 the	 future.	Thus	 it	can	assess	what	 it	has	
lost	and	what	it	may	gain	at	a	later	stage,	and	forego	present	goods	for	the	sake	




The	pull	 towards	 two	different	directions	 turns	 the	human	 life	 into	a	 struggle	
where	 the	 individual	must	 learn	 to	 pursue	 the	 real	 good	 and	 reject	 the	 false	
good	 that	 competes	 for	 her	 attention:	 ‘Virtue	 means	 to	 turn	 one's	 soul	 to	
nothing	here	on	earth,	but	to	have	one's	effort	directed	towards	what	through	




If	you	reckon	zeal	 for	 the	good	(τῶν	ἀγαθῶν	σπουδή)	to	be	 irksome,	 then	compare	 it	
with	 the	 opposite	 way	 of	 life	 (τῷ	 ἐναντίῳ	 βίῳ),	 and	 you	 will	 find	 how	 much	 more	
irksome	is	vice	(ἡ	κακία),	if	you	keep	your	eye	not	on	the	present	but	on	the	hereafter.	
The	one	who	hears	about	Gehenna	will	no	longer	avoid	the	pleasures	of	sin	(τῶν	κατὰ	





the	 good	 and	 evil	 life	 are	presented	 as	 opposing	 goals	 and	 a	 choice.40	Second,	
the	 good	 life	 appears	 toilsome	 while	 sin	 appears	 pleasurable	 and	 appealing.	







40	On	 these	 two-way	 conceptions	 of	 human	 life	 in	 Greek,	 Jewish,	 and	 Christian	 sources,	 see	
Meeks,	The	Origins	of	Christian	Morality,	69–71.	
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focus	 on	 the	 present	 life	 will	 reveal	 which	 of	 these	 goals	 is	 truly	 good	 and	
enjoyable,	and	which	truly	toilsome	and	painful.	Finally,	the	passage	alludes	to	
the	close	connection	between	pleasure	and	sin.	My	main	argument	in	this	thesis	
is	 that	 pleasure	 is	 not	 only	 one	 of	 the	 passions	 but	 pleasure	 seeking	 is,	 for	
Gregory,	a	result	and	sign	of	a	fundamental	misunderstanding	of	the	final	goal	of	
the	human	life	and	the	reality	as	a	whole.	Thus,	if	a	life	of	virtue	is	the	paradigm	
of	 the	 Christian	 life,	 life	 of	 pleasure	 stands	 as	 its	 sinful	 opposite,	 the	 life	 that	
leaves	 the	 individual	 untouched	by	 the	 truths	 of	 the	Christian	 faith	 and	binds	






pleasure.	 In	 fact,	 even	 minor	 scholarly	 works	 on	 the	 topic	 are	 close	 to	 non-
existent,	 as	 are	 comparable	 accounts	 of	 pleasure	 and	 anti-hedonism	 in	 other	
patristic	writers.	However,	the	topic	of	the	present	study	belongs	to	the	realm	of	
Nyssen’s	 ethics,	which	has	 garnered	 some	 attention	 especially	 in	more	 recent	
scholarship.	 So	 far,	 Sandra	 Leuenberger-Wenger’s	 monograph	 Ethik	 und	
christliche	Identität	bei	Gregor	von	Nyssa	remains	the	only	comprehensive	work	
dedicated	explicitly	 to	Gregory’s	ethics.41	Leuenberger-Wenger	approaches	 the	
topic	chiefly	 from	the	perspective	of	Christian	 identity	 formation:	by	asserting	
the	importance	of	certain	ethical	norms	and	rejecting	others,	Gregory	creates	a	
conception	of	a	good	Christian	 life	which	helps	him	define	who	Christians	are	
and	 who	 they	 are	 not	 vis-à-vis	 other	 groups.	 Leuenberger-Wenger	 draws	
particular	attention	to	the	way	in	which	Gregory	uses	Christian	education	in	the	
form	 of	 preaching,	 catechesis,	 and	 correspondence	 to	 support	 the	 gradual	
development	of	a	Christian	identity	in	his	audiences.	In	contrast	to	the	present	
study,	Leuenberger-Wenger’s	focus	is	on	social	history	and	Christian	formation	





However,	 she,	 too,	 frequently	highlights	Gregory’s	 affinity	 to	 and	place	within	
ancient	virtue	ethics.42	
	
While	 Leuenberger-Wenger’s	 work	 remains	 the	 only	 monograph	 explicitly	
dedicated	to	Gregory’s	ethics,	 it	 is	not	the	only	precursor	to	the	present	study.	
The	 eudaimonistic	 character	 of	 Gregory’s	 ethics	 has	 been	 noted	 in	 several	
works,	 especially	 in	 the	 supporting	 studies	 on	 the	Homilies	 on	 the	Beatitudes,	
published	in	the	proceedings	of	the	Eighth	International	Colloquium	on	Gregory	
of	Nyssa.43	I	have	already	highlighted	Friedhelm	Mann’s	 contribution.	To	offer	
another	 example,	 Robert	 Louis	 Wilken	 begins	 his	 article	 by	 noting	 the	
importance	 of	 the	 word	 ‘blessed’	 or	 ‘happy’	 as	 the	 key	 word	 of	 Gregory’s	




De	vita	beata).	 ‘Happiness’,	 says	Wilken,	was	 ‘a	 key	 term	 in	 ancient	morality’.	
Thus,	 ‘[i]ts	 appearance	 in	 the	beatitudes	would	have	 triggered	 associations	 in	
the	 mind	 of	 ancient	 readers	 that	 are	 foreign	 to	 moderns	 unschooled	 in	 the	
eudaimonistic	ethics	of	the	ancient	world.’44	
	
The	 role	 of	 virtue	 and,	 implicitly,	 virtue	 ethics	 is	 also	 prominent	 in	 Hans	
Boersma’s	 Embodiment	 and	 Virtue	 in	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa.45	I	 have	 already	 cited	
Boersma’s	 observations	 on	 virtue	 and	 the	 divine	 likeness	 as	 the	 telos	 of	 the	
Christian	life.	I	will	return	to	Boersma’s	contribution	later	in	this	section	where	I	




An	 English	 Version	 with	 Contemporary	 and	 Supporting	 Studies :	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 Eighth	
International	Colloquium	on	Gregory	of	Nyssa	(Paderborn,	14-18	September	1998)	 (Leiden:	Brill,	
2000).	
44	Robert	 Louis	Wilken,	 ‘Gregory	 of	 Nyssa,	 De	 Beatitudinibus,	 Oratio	 VIII:	 “Blessed	 Are	 Those	
Who	Are	Persecuted	For	Righteousness’	Sake,	for	Theirs	Is	the	Kingdom	of	Heaven”	(Mt	5,10)’,	
in	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa,	 Homilies	 on	 the	 Beatitudes:	 An	 English	 Version	 with	 Contemporary	 and	
Supporting	 Studies :	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 Eighth	 International	 Colloquium	 on	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa	
(Paderborn,	14-18	September	1998),	ed.	Hubertus	R.	Drobner	and	Alberto	Viciano	(Leiden:	Brill,	
2000),	243.	
45	See	 especially	 the	 final	 chapter	 ‘Virtuous	 Body’	 (211–246)	where	 the	 author’s	 focus	 is	 not	
limited	solely	to	matters	of	embodiment.	
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Gregory’s	 conception	 of	 passions	 and	 what	 might	 be	 called	 his	 moral	
psychology.47 	Since	 Gregory	 understands	 pleasure	 not	 only	 as	 one	 of	 the	
passions	but	as	 the	 fundamental	passion,	 Smith’s	work	provides	an	 important	
conversation	 partner	 to	 the	 present	 study.	 Smith	 makes	 many	 valuable	







While	 the	 topic	 of	 pleasure	 has	 been	 left	 largely	 unattended	 within	 early	
Christian	 scholarship,	 specialists	 of	 ancient	 philosophy	 have	 offered	 more	
extensive	 treatments.	 Some	 of	 the	 earlier	 investigations	 of	 ancient	 notions	 of	
pleasure	 include	Jussi	Tenkku’s	The	Evaluation	of	Pleasure	in	Plato’s	Ethics	and	
Gosling	and	Taylor’s	The	Greeks	on	Pleasure.48	However,	the	past	two	decades	in	
particular	 have	 witnessed	 a	 burgeoning	 scholarly	 interest	 in	 the	 topic.	While	
David	Wolfsdorf	has	focussed	on	the	ancient	philosophers’	reply	to	what	he	calls	
‘the	 identity	 question	 of	 pleasure’	 (i.e.	 ‘what	 is	 pleasure?’),	 Gerd	 Van	Riel	 has	






48	Jussi	 Tenkku,	 The	 Evaluation	 of	 Pleasure	 in	 Plato’s	 Ethics	 (Helsinki:	 Societas	 Philosophica,	
1956);	 Justin	 Cyril	 Bertrand	 Gosling	 and	 Christopher	 Charles	 Whiston	 Taylor,	 The	 Greeks	 on	
Pleasure	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1982).	




and	 Aristotle.50	Furthermore,	 during	 the	 writing	 of	 this	 thesis,	 James	Warren	
published	 a	 monograph	 on	 ancient	 notions	 of	 intellectual	 pleasures.51	These	




Finally,	we	 should	 consider	 the	place	of	 this	 study	within	 the	broader	 field	of	









with	 the	 rise	of	 the	Neo-Patristic	movement	 in	Roman	Catholicism.	He	argues	
that	 the	 first	 two	 phases	 of	 this	 new	 scholarly	 interest	 concerned	 Gregory’s	
thought	‘as	a	philosophical	system	with	a	strong	mystical	component	and,	later,	
the	 sources	 of	 his	 thought	 in	 classical	 and	 Hellenistic	 philosophy.’52	The	 first,	
philosophical-mystical	trajectory	included	the	influential	works	of	Hans	Urs	von	
Balthasar	 (Présence	 et	 Pensée)	 and	 Jean	 Daniélou	 (Platonisme	 et	 théologie	
mystique)	whose	take	on	Gregory	as	a	judicious	synthetiser	of	(chiefly	Platonist)	









Nysse	 (Paris:	 Beauchesne,	 1942);	 Jean	 Daniélou,	 Platonisme	 et	 théologie	 mystique	 (Paris:	
Editions	Montaigne,	1944).	Among	later	works	in	the	same	trajectory,	see,	for	example,	Andrew	
Louth,	The	Origins	of	 the	Christian	Mystical	Tradition:	From	Plato	 to	Denys	 (Oxford:	 Clarendon	
Press,	1981).	
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However,	 as	 Smith	 notes,	 Gregory’s	 role	 as	 a	 synthesiser	 of	 ‘Greek’	 and	






characteristically	 Christian	 dogmas.54	This,	 in	 Cherniss’s	 view,	 resulted	 in	 a	
distorted	version	of	both.		
	
Whether	 the	 scholars	 were	 appreciative	 of	 Gregory’s	 theological	 project	 like	
Daniélou	 or	 critical	 like	 Cherniss,	 their	 assessments	 shared	 the	 general	
assumption	 that	 there	 was	 a	 clear	 line	 of	 demarcation	 between	 Gregory’s	
identity	 as	 a	 ‘Christian’	 and	 that	 as	 a	 ‘Platonist’.55	Furthermore,	 Smith	 argues	






The	 third	 trajectory	of	 scholarship	 is	 termed	by	Smith	 ‘the	Erotic	Phase’.	This	
group	of	works	reflects	the	general	interest	in	the	body	in	late	ancient	studies,	
which	has	flourished	ever	since	Peter	Brown	published	his	influential	work	The	
Body	and	Society	 in	 1988.57	For	 Smith,	 the	 phase	 includes	 a	 number	 of	works	
with	 varying	 methodologies	 that	 address	 aspects	 of	 embodiment,	 gender,	
																																																								




56	For	 a	 later	 critique	 of	 Cherniss’s	 method	 and	 assumptions,	 see	 Michel	 René	 Barnes,	 ‘The	
“Platonic”	 Character	 of	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa’s	 Psychology’	 (Unpublished),	 7–12,	 accessed	 6	
November	 2016,	 https://www.scribd.com/document/113647649/The-Platonic-Character-of-








positive	 evaluations	 of	 embodiment	 in	 ancient	 ascetical	 works	 and,	 more	
specifically,	 in	Gregory	of	Nyssa.	Often,	 they	 seek	 to	 counterbalance	Gregory’s	
supposed	 Platonism	 and	 consequent	 body–soul	 dualism	 that	 have	 been	
emphasised	 in	 earlier	 research.	 This	 is	 the	 trajectory	where	 Smith	 locates	 his	
own	monograph	Passion	and	Paradise.	 The	 interest	 in	 ‘The	Erotic	Nyssen’	 has	
not	diminished	since	Smith’s	study	was	published	 in	2004.	For	example	Sarah	
Coakley’s	 works	 at	 the	 crossroads	 of	 ancient	 Christianity	 and	 modern	




Despite	 locating	 his	 own	 book	 in	 the	 Erotic	 Phase,	 Smith	makes	 some	 astute	
observations	 concerning	 the	 potential	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 new	 trajectory.	
While	he	agrees	–	as	I	do,	too	–	that	Gregory’s	asceticism	is	not	extreme	by	the	
standards	of	his	time,	he	notes	that	the	recent	interest	in	the	body	and	emotions	
in	 Gregory’s	 theology	 has	 often	 led	 to	 ‘sanitized’	 and	 overly	 coherent	 and	
consistent	 interpretations	 of	 his	 thought.60	The	 focus	 on	 positive	 aspects	 of	
desire,	 sexuality	 and	 the	 like	 has	 overshadowed	 tensions	 and	 contradictions	
that	 are	 characteristic	 of	 Gregory’s	 treatments	 of	 these	 topics.	 At	 times,	 the	
authors	have	presented	conclusions	 that	are	 in	 line	with	 their	modern-day,	or	
postmodern,	 Christian	 sensibilities	 and	 could	 perhaps	 be	 derived	 from	
Gregory’s	 works,	 yet	 remain	 unarticulated	 in	 the	 original	 sources.	 In	 other	
words,	 the	 contemporary	 scholarly	 interest	 in	 the	body	and	 the	 irrational	has	
led	 to	 interpretations	 that	 overstate	 the	 positive	 value	 of	 these	 matters	 in	
ancient	 sources,	 often	 as	 a	 reaction	 to	 earlier	 scholarship.	 Smith	 seeks	 to	 set	
right	the	problems	of	tendentious	body-positive	readings	by	drawing	attention	
to	tensions	in	Gregory’s	evaluation	of	the	place	of	the	body	and	the	passions	and	
‘acknowledging	 his	 difference	 from	 us,	 as	 another	 voice	 that	 challenges	 our	
																																																								
58 	Much	 of	 this	 scholarship	 is	 critically	 surveyed	 in	 the	 part	 entitled	 ‘Sex,	 Gender,	 and	
Embodiment’	in	Morwenna	Ludlow,	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	Ancient	and	(Post)modern	(Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2007),	163–227.	




theological	 assumptions.’	 For	 Smith,	 these	 tensions	 are	 often	 due	 Gregory’s	
many	‘religious	commitments’	that	are	not	always	‘easily	integrated’	with	each	
other	 or	 with	 certain	 philosophical	 assumptions.61	Thus,	 he	 joins	 Balthasar,	
Daniélou,	 Boersma	 and	 many	 others	 who	 approach	 Gregory	 chiefly	 as	 a	
Christian	theological	thinker	as	opposed	to	a	quasi-Platonist	philosopher.	
	
I	 have	 cited	 Smith’s	 account	 of	 the	 different	 phases	 of	 Nyssen	 scholarship	
because	 I	 think	 it	 captures	 well	 the	 history	 and	 trends	 that	 have	 shaped	 the	
academic	 discourse	 in	 the	 field.	 Furthermore,	 it	 will	 help	 me	 place	 my	 own	
thesis	among	the	other	works.	However,	before	defining	my	own	position,	I	will	
suggest	that	since	the	writing	of	Passion	and	Paradise	in	2004,	there	have	been	
further	 developments	 in	 the	 field.	 Here,	 I	 am	 thinking	 particularly	 of	 Hans	
Boersma’s	Embodiment	and	Virtue	in	Gregory	of	Nyssa:	An	Anagogical	Approach,	
which	 joins	 the	 discussion	 on	 Gregory’s	 view	 of	 the	 body,	 but	 offers	 an	
important	 corrective.	 The	 overarching	 thesis	 of	 Boersma’s	 work	 is	 that	
Gregory’s	 theology	 is	 fundamentally	 ‘anagogical’.	 By	 this	 he	 means	 that	
Gregory’s	 focus	 rests	 at	 all	 times	 on	 the	 soul’s	 progress	 towards	 the	 divine,	
culminating	 in	a	participatory	union	which	restores	 the	divine	 likeness	 lost	 in	
the	 fall. 62 	This	 concern,	 argues	 Boersma,	 also	 informs	 Gregory’s	 view	 of	
embodiment	and	materiality:	both	are	useful	so	far	as	they	serve	the	anagogical	
ascent,	but	will	ultimately	be	found	only	instrumental	or	‘penultimate’.	The	final	
level	of	 reality	and	our	union	with	God	rest	on	 the	 intelligible	plane,	 removed	





















Thus,	 argues	 Boersma,	 it	 is	 ‘important	 to	 underscore	 that	 for	 Gregory	
embodiment	 and	 virtue	 stand	 in	 the	 service	 of	 the	 anagogical	 pursuit	 of	
otherworldly	realities,	since	recent	 trends	 in	contemporary	scholarship	go	too	
far	in	highlighting	Gregory’s	appreciation	of	the	goodness	of	the	created	order,	




share	 the	same	appreciation	of	 the	embodied	existence	 that	has	characterised	
scholarly	 interest	 in	 the	 late	 20th	 and	 early	 21st	 centuries.67	While	 Boersma	
remains	 mindful	 of	 Gregory’s	 positive	 remarks	 on	 the	 human	 body	 and	 its	
crucial	role	in	the	process	of	coming	to	know	the	divine,	he	points	out	that	the	
hierarchy	between	 the	 intelligible	and	 the	sensible,	 spirit	and	matter,	 remains	
highly	important	to	Gregory.	He	notes,	furthermore,	that	Gregory	often	finds	the	
concern	for	material	and	bodily	matters	‘a	hindrance	for	the	anagogical	pursuit	
of	 the	Christian	 life.’68	While	Gregory	 explicitly	 affirms	 the	 resurrection	of	 the	
body,	 the	 eschatological	 embodiment	 will	 take	 on	 a	 form	 that	 is	 radically	
different	from	our	earthly	existence.	To	sum	up,	Boersma	argues	that	Gregory’s	
works	and	his	remarks	on	the	role	of	the	human	body	ought	to	be	read	from	an	







that	 seek	 to	 offer	 fundamental	 revisions	 of	 earlier	 interpretations	 of	 his	 works.	 For	 a	






In	 my	 view,	 Boersma’s	 work	 cannot	 be	 dismissed	 as	 a	 lingering	 echo	 of	 the	
scholarship	 of	 Balthasar	 and	 Daniélou,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 explicitly	
expresses	his	admiration	of	their	theological	projects	and	his	affinity	to	nouvelle	
théologie.	 While	 he	may	 have	 one	 foot	 in	 this	 earlier	 tradition,	 his	 writing	 is	
thoroughly	informed	by	newer	scholarly	currents	whose	relevance	he	is	willing	
to	 acknowledge.	 Boersma’s	 remarks	 on	 Gregory’s	 anagogical	 focus	 and	 the	
penultimate	 character	 of	 the	 material	 world	 serve	 as	 a	 springboard	 for	 my	
treatment	 of	 Gregory’s	 view	 of	 pleasure.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	
pursuit	of	pleasure	as	the	final	good	entails	a	failure	to	recognise	the	non-final	
character	of	the	sensible	realm,	including	our	own	embodiment.	If,	as	Boersma	
argues,	 virtue	 ‘as	 participation	 in	 the	 life	 of	 God,	 means	 leaving	 behind	 the	
diastemic	 structures	 of	 embodiment’,	 then	 a	 life	 devoted	 to	 its	 opposite,	





A	 work	 that	 places	 Gregory	 in	 the	 ancient	 trajectory	 of	 eudaimonistic	 ethics	
must	also	make	explicit	how	the	protagonist	is	approached	as	a	representative	
of	 the	 Graeco-Roman	 intellectual	 world.	 As	 I	 have	 already	 noted,	 Gregory’s	
relationship	 to	 ancient	 philosophy	 has	 been	 the	 topic	 of	 many	 a	 scholarly	
investigation	and	the	conclusions	have	been	varied.70	In	this	section,	I	will	first	








philosophique	 dans	 la	 pensée	 de	 Grégoire	 de	 Nysse:	 Actes	 du	 colloque	 de	 Chevetogne	 (22-26	
septembre	 1969)	 organisé	 par	 le	 Centre	 de	 recherche	 sur	 l’Hellénisme	 tardif	 de	 la	 Sorbonne	
(Leiden:	Brill,	1971).	
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will	 briefly	 explain	 how	 I	 view	 Gregory’s	 relationship	 to	 the	 ancient	
philosophical	schools,	 including	Epicureanism,	which	 found	 itself	at	 the	centre	
of	the	ancient	debate	of	pleasure	as	the	good.	
	





to	 certain	 shared	 ideals:	 all	 espoused	 a	 life	 dedicated	 to	 the	 pursuit	 of	
intellectual	matters,	an	avoidance	of	excessive	material	attachments,	a	mastery	
of	 one’s	 inner	 life,	 and	 a	 simple	 lifestyle,	 often	 cited	 as	 being	 ‘according	 to	
nature’.	This	 ideal	was	actualised	through	the	discovery	of	one’s	true	self	with	
the	help	of	philosophical	education.	Even	Epicureans,	who	were	often	accused	
of	 crass	 hedonism,	 favoured	 a	 simple,	 peaceful,	 and	 intellectual	 life	 with	 few	
material	desires.	
	




believers	 and	 the	 difference	 between	 ‘the	 Church’	 and	 ‘the	 world’.72	While	
Gregory	 does	 employ	 the	 notion	 of	 pleasure	 to	 discuss	 the	 Church/world	
boundary,	 it	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 writing	 to	 Christian	 audiences	 in	 the	 4th	
century,	 he	 has	 little	 to	 say	 about	 the	 explicit	 relationship	 between	 Christian	
and	 non-Christian	 ethics.	 His	 aim	 is	 to	 provide	 guidance	 within	 Christian	
communities	rather	 than	 to	engage	 in	a	conversation	with	other	philosophical	
and	religious	groups.	However,	 if	we	examine	the	salient	moral	principles	that	
shape	 Gregory’s	 ideas	 on	 a	 good	 Christian	 life,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 at	 least	 their	
general	lines	conform	to	widely	shared	ideals	of	ancient	philosophy:	there	is	an	






focus	 on	 simplicity	 and	 self-control.	 The	 promotion	 of	 virginity	 as	 the	 most	
virtuous	 way	 of	 life	 is,	 of	 course,	 distinctively	 a	 product	 of	 ancient	 Christian	
discourse,	but,	as	we	shall	see,	it	is	not	Gregory’s	primary	focus	in	his	rejection	
of	 pleasure.	 Furthermore,	 the	 topic	 itself	 is	 largely	 conceptualised	 with	 the	
traditional	language	of	ancient	virtue	ethics.	Thus,	practically	speaking,	the	ideal	
lifestyle	 that	 emerges	 from	 Gregory’s	 writings	 is	 largely	 consonant	 with	 the	
recommendations	of	ancient	philosophers.73	Gregory	may	have	been	aware	that	
this	was	the	case.	Although	he	will	at	times	use	hard	words	about	non-Christian	
learning,	 it	 seems	 that	 he	 considers	 ethics	 one	 of	 the	 fields	 where	 pagan	
learning	may,	 in	 fact,	 be	 beneficial	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 virtue:	 In	Vita	Moysis,	
Gregory	 states	 clearly	 that	 ἡ	 ἠθική	 τε	 καὶ	 φυσικὴ	 φιλοσοφία	 is	 one	 of	 the	
branches	of	pagan	knowledge	that	may	assist	the	soul	in	its	virtuous	ascent.74	
	
However,	 Leuenberger-Wenger	also	observes	 that	Christians	 faced	 the	unique	
challenge	of	embedding	and	justifying	the	ancient	ideals	of	a	good	life	within	a	
remarkably	 different	 religious	 tradition	 that	 came	 with	 a	 new	 authoritative	
literary	corpus.	Whereas	the	non-Christian	philosophers	of	late	antiquity	could	
draw	on	 centuries	of	 rich	philosophical	 texts,	well	 known	popular	myths,	 and	
other	shared	narratives	of	the	Graeco-Roman	literary	culture,	Christians	had	to	












75	Leuenberger-Wenger,	 Ethik	 und	 christliche	 Identität	 bei	 Gregor	 von	 Nyssa,	 8.	 Analogous	






the	 life	 and	 death	 of	 Christ,	 and	 the	 eschatological	 fulfilment	 –	 provide	
important	avenues	for	making	ethical	ideals	understandable	and	meaningful	to	
a	Christian	audience.	Furthermore,	both	 the	 incarnate	Christ	 and	a	number	of	
characters	 both	 from	 the	 Old	 and	 the	 New	 Testament	 serve	 as	 exemplary	
figures	 who	 demonstrate	 to	 Christians	 what	 human	 perfection	 looks	 like.	 In	
Gregory’s	 teaching	 on	 pleasure,	 Moses	 and	 Solomon	 become	 particularly	
important	 exemplary	 figures	whose	 lives	 demonstrate	what	 detachment	 from	
matter	 and	 adherence	 to	 the	 true	 good	 ought	 to	 look	 like.77	In	 sum,	 we	 can	
simultaneously	 agree	 with	 Boersma’s	 observation	 that	 ‘biblical	 exposition	 on	
any	topic	must	take	virtue	as	its	starting-point	and	aim’78,	and	with	Ludlow	who	






overarching	 problem	 has	 been	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Gregory’s	 works	 have	 been	
read	in	direct	comparison	to	Plato’s	dialogues,	as	if	Gregory	had	the	dialogues	in	
front	of	him	and	dealt	with	them	more	or	less	like	Plato’s	contemporary.	Michel	


















to	Plato,	 I	do	 it	because	he	has	articulated	some	 fundamental	 idea	 that,	 in	my	




his	 sources	by	name.81	We	can,	on	 the	other	hand,	 confidently	assume	 that	he	
was	 familiar	 with	 the	 writings	 of	 Philo,	 Clement,	 and	 Origen,	 and,	 to	 some	
extent,	with	the	works	of	non-Christian	Middle	and	Neoplatonists.82	Indeed,	we	
shall	 see	 that	 while	 Gregory’s	 discourse	 on	 pleasure	 contains	 ‘Platonist’	
elements,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 he	 was	 acquainted	 with	 Plato’s	 influential	
treatments	 of	 pleasure	 in	Republic	and	Philebus.	The	most	 explicit	 parallels	 to	




Republic	 and	 Philebus.	 We	 should	 also	 keep	 in	 mind	 that	 the	 language	 of	
Platonism	was	the	language	of	Greek	education.83	Thus,	it	is	not	surprising	that	
as	an	educated	member	of	 the	Christian	elite,	Gregory	produces	 texts	 that	are	
peppered	 with	 Platonic	 concepts	 and	 images.	 We	 cannot	 always	 be	 sure	
whether	 he	 does	 this	 consciously	 or	 whether	 such	 usage	 simply	 reflects	 his	
cultural	context	and	the	general	categories	that	shape	his	thought.	
	
Gregory’s	 supposed	 links	 to	 other	 ancient	 philosophies	 have	 also	 been	





82	See	 the	 survey	 in	 Johannes	 Zachhuber,	 Human	 Nature	 in	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa:	 Philosophical	






early	 days	 of	 Gregory	 scholarship.84	More	 recently,	 Barnes	 and	 others	 have	
highlighted	 Aristotelian	 elements	 that	 have	 been	 overshadowed	 by	 the	
scholarly	interest	in	Gregory’s	Platonism.85	As	regards	Gregory’s	relationship	to	
Stoicism,	 it	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 most	 scholars	 take	 the	 view	 that	 the	 ‘Stoic’	
elements	 in	 Gregory’s	 thought	 are	 best	 understood	 as	 fruits	 of	 Gregory’s	
engagement	with	other	eclectic	thinkers	rather	than	with	Stoic	sources	per	se.86	
Many	of	 the	elements	 that	are	often	associated	with	Stoic	philosophy,	 such	as	
the	 ideal	 of	 a	 life	 according	 to	 nature	 or	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 self-sufficiency	 of	
virtue,	had	became	philosophical	commonplaces	well	before	Gregory’s	time	and	
integrated,	 for	 example,	 to	 later	 forms	 of	 Platonism	 and	 early	 Christian	
thought.87	Furthermore,	 it	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 the	 sharp	 distinction	 Gregory	





Especially	 a	 work	 dedicated	 to	 ethics	 must	 address	 Gregory’s	 relationship	 to	
Aristotle	whose	Nicomachean	Ethics	 is	 undoubtedly	not	 only	 the	 first	 but	 also	
the	most	influential	systematic	treatment	of	ancient	ethics.	It	is	an	oft-cited	view	
that	 in	 late	 antiquity	 Aristotle’s	 importance	 had	 greatly	 diminished,	 to	 be	
discovered	 again	 in	 the	 Middle	 Ages	 first	 by	 Islamic	 scholars	 and	 later	 by	
Christian	Europeans.	At	the	same	time,	even	if	Aristotle	may	not	be	the	explicit	
go-to	 authority	 of	 most	 late	 antique	 writers,	 his	 figure	 does	 loom	 in	 the	
background.	 As	 regards	 Gregory’s	 ethics,	 it	 seems	 that	 Aristotle	 remains	 an	
indirect	and	implicit	influence.	He	is	rarely	mentioned,	but	at	the	same	time	the	
shape	of	 almost	 all	 ancient	 thinking	on	 ethics	 bears	 the	 stamp	of	 his	 thought.	
Whether	 Gregory	 makes	 direct	 use	 of	 Aristotle	 or	 simply	 adopts	 views	
																																																								
84 	For	 a	 contested	 early	 study,	 see	 Karl	 Gronau,	 Poseidonios	 und	 die	 jüdisch-christliche	
Genesisexegese	(Leipzig:	Teubner,	1914).	
85	See	Barnes,	 ‘The	 “Platonic”	Character	of	Gregory	of	Nyssa’s	Psychology’.	The	article	offers	a	
critical	 survey	 of	 many	 of	 the	 earlier	 assessments	 of	 Gregory’s	 relationship	 to	 ancient	
philosophies.	
86	This	 is	 noted	 already	 by	 Cherniss,	 though	 his	 view	 is	 obviously	 motivated	 by	 his	 overall	
argument	 about	 Gregory’s	 Platonism.	 For	 a	 more	 recent	 assessment,	 see	 Zachhuber,	Human	
Nature	in	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	9–10.	
87	See	 Dillon,	The	Middle	Platonists,	 44;	 Salvatore	 R.	 C.	 Lilla,	Clement	 of	Alexandria:	A	 Study	 in	
Christian	Platonism	and	Gnosticism	(London:	Oxford	University	Press,	1971),	68–72.	
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transmitted	by	other	authors	 is	difficult	 to	estimate.	My	view	 is	 that	 the	 latter	
explanation	 is	usually	more	plausible.	At	any	rate,	Aristotle’s	 formal	definition	
of	pleasure	does	not	have	the	same	weight	in	Gregory’s	treatment	of	the	topic	as	
it	 does,	 for	 example,	 in	 De	 natura	 hominis	 written	 by	 Nemesius	 of	 Emesa,	
Gregory’s	Christian	contemporary.88	
	
As	 regards	 Gregory’s	 place	 within	 the	 hedonist/anti-hedonist	 debate,	 it	 is	
doubtful	that	his	criticism	of	pleasure	would	have	been	in	any	way	directed	at	




of	 such	 remarks	 occurs	 in	 his	 dogmatic	 treatises	 and	 mainly	 relates	 to	
Epicurean	 physics	 and	 presumed	 atheism,	 a	 common	 charge	 in	 ancient	
literature	that	sprung	from	the	Epicurean	denial	of	providence.90	No	mention	is	
made	of	Epicurean	hedonism	despite	Gregory’s	strong	opposition	to	pleasure	as	
the	 good	 in	 general.91	The	 closest	 we	 can	 get	 is	 a	 comment	 in	 De	 anima	 et	
resurrectione	 where	 Gregory	 has	Macrina	 criticise	 Epicurus	 and	 his	 followers	
for	failing	to	see	the	divine	power	which	inhabits	and	sustains	all	things.92	The	
passage,	 which	 I	 will	 cite	 in	 its	 entirety	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 has	 more	 to	 do	 with	






the	 only	 ultimate	 good	 (τέλειον	 δὲ	ἀγαθὸν	μόνον	 τὴν	ἡδονήν).’	 (See	 also	2.21.128.1.)	Ramelli	
credits	 Clement	 with	 a	 ‘relatively	 profound	 and	 direct,	 personal	 knowledge	 of	 Epicurean	
doctrines’	 in	 Ilaria	 Ramelli,	 ‘The	 Rejection	 of	 the	 Epicurean	 Ideal	 of	 Pleasure	 in	 Late	 Antique	
Sources:	Not	Only	Misunderstandings’,	Mirabilia,	no.	18	(2014):	10.	
90	See	Hex.	(PG	44,	80);	Deit.	fil.(PG	46,	561);	Eun.	2.1.410.	Epicurus	did	not,	 in	 fact,	 espouse	a	
complete	 non-existence	 of	 gods,	 but	 believed	 that	 the	 perfect	 happiness	 enjoyed	 by	 gods	
precluded	 any	 concern	 for	 or	 interference	 with	 the	 human	 realm.	 He	 argued	 that	 since	
happiness	 entails	 undisturbance,	 it	 requires	 perfect	 rest	 and	 leisure,	 which	 are	 incompatible	









Rather,	 it	 indicates	 the	 literary	Macrina’s	opposition	to	Epicurus’s	materialism	
and	 the	 Epicurean	 view	 that	 sensation	 was	 to	 be	 used	 as	 the	 ‘criterion’	 of	
truth.93	However,	 the	 charge	Macrina	 levels	 against	 Epicureanism	 is	 precisely	
the	same	that	we	shall	soon	find	in	many	of	Gregory’s	discussions	on	pleasure:	
for	Gregory,	it	is	the	pursuit	of	pleasure	that	locks	people	in	the	sensible	realm	
and	 leaves	 them	 unaware	 of	 the	 higher	 intelligible	 reality.	 A	 rejection	 of	
Epicurean	epistemology	 is	 thus	 implicitly	 followed	by	a	rejection	of	Epicurean	
ethics.	Furthermore,	I	will	show	that	the	epistemological	question	of	the	truth	of	








problem	 he	 associated	 with	 Epicureanism.	 We	 can	 assume	 that	 the	 lack	 of	
explicit	 references	 to	 Epicurus	 and	 his	 followers	 in	 Gregory’s	 discussions	 on	
pleasure	and	the	good	reflects	the	virtual	non-existence	of	Epicurean	groups	in	
the	fourth	century.	During	Clement’s	lifetime	in	the	second	century,	a	pleasure-
seeking	 Epicurean	 would	 have	 still	 been	 a	 stock	 example	 of	 Graeco-Roman	
philosophy.	 Among	 the	 non-Christian	 writers,	 for	 example	 the	 Platonist	
Maximus	 of	 Tyre	 –	 roughly	 Clement’s	 contemporary	 and	 another	 interesting	
reference	 point	 to	 Gregory’s	 writings	 –	 repeatedly	 attacks	 the	 Epicurean	
hedonists	in	his	Dissertationes.94	Thus,	it	is	no	surprise	that	Clement,	too,	makes	
use	of	 this	 trope	to	demonstrate	his	philosophical	 learnedness,	even	 if	he	may	
not	 have	 directly	 engaged	 in	 a	 debate	with	 Epicureans.	 Gregory,	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	 communicates	 in	 a	 predominantly	 Christian	 context	 to	 established	
Christian	 communities.	 His	 words	 against	 pleasure	 as	 the	 good	 are	 primarily	
																																																								
93	Epicurus	was	infamous	for	the	maxim	according	to	which	‘all	sense	impressions	are	true’	(see	















career.	 Thus,	 I	 have	 decided	 to	 approach	 the	 matter	 synthetically,	 drawing	
broadly	on	Gregory’s	works	without	a	strict	focus	on	genre,	chronology,	or	even	
the	sequence	of	 the	moral	progress.	This	approach	does	 justice	 to	 the	 topic	of	






will	 offer	 an	 explicit	 critique	 of	 the	 notion	 that	we	 can	 see	 Gregory’s	 thought	
evolve	from	a	more	dualistic	and	‘Platonist’	perspective	in	his	early	works	to	a	
more	 holistic	 and	 accepting	 conception	 of	 the	 embodied	 and	 material	
existence.96	This	 view	 has	 been	 frequently	 accepted	 and	 expounded	 based	 on	
Daniélou’s	chronology	of	Gregory’s	works,	but	a	closer	reading	will	reveal	both	
that	 Gregory’s	 early	 works	 are	 not	 as	 hostile	 to	 the	 irrational	 as	 they	 are	
sometimes	 claimed	 to	 be	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 that	 his	 late	works	 are	 not	
unreservedly	 positive	 towards	 embodiment. 97 	At	 all	 points	 of	 his	 career,	
																																																								
95	Of	course,	even	for	philosophers	who	wrote	before	Gregory’s	time,	the	pleasure-seeker	was	a	




a	 pre-existing	 notion	 that	 his	 thought	 develops	 in	 certain	 ways	 over	 time.	 See,	 for	 example,	
Zachhuber,	Human	Nature	in	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	7–8.	
97	Jean	Daniélou,	 ‘La	chronologie	des	oeuvres	de	Grégoire	de	Nysse’,	 in	Studia	Patristica,	vol.	7,	






While	 Leuenberger-Wenger’s	 work	 on	 Gregory’s	 ethics	 makes	 a	 distinction	
between	homilies	 to	 congregations	and	 treatises	and	correspondence	 to	more	















separates	 Gregory’s	 texts	 into	 the	 two	 main	 groups	 is	 not	 clear	 to	 me.	 For	
example,	On	Virginity	and	Homilies	on	Ecclesiastes	are	 frequently	 cited	 in	both	
sections,	 while	Homilies	 on	 the	Beatitudes	 is	mainly	 discussed	 under	 texts	 for	
advanced	 audiences,	 presumably	 because	 it	 is	 built	 around	 the	 notion	 of	
spiritual	progress.99	Furthermore,	as	Norris	points	out,	even	in	the	Homilies	on	
the	 Song	 of	 Songs,	 regarded	 by	 Leuenberger-Wenger	 as	 a	 work	written	 to	 an	
advanced	audience,	Gregory	notes	that	he	is	directing	his	words	to	the	 ‘fleshly	













sure	how	neatly	we	 can	 group	different	works	 and	 their	 presumed	 audiences	
under	the	different	stages	of	the	Christian	life.	
	
Since,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 dating	 Gregory’s	 works,	 assessing	 the	 level	 of	 their	
content,	 and	determining	 their	 audience	 is	 challenging	 and,	 on	 the	other,	 I	 do	
not	believe	that	such	distinctions	make	a	significant	difference	to	the	treatment	
of	the	present	topic,	I	have	chosen	to	discuss	Gregory’s	works	as	a	larger	whole,	
organising	 my	 analysis	 around	 what	 I	 perceive	 to	 be	 a	 distinct	 discourse	 on	
pleasure	as	the	false	good.	However,	since	my	interest	 is	on	Gregory’s	ethics,	 I	
have	 primarily	 focussed	 on	 works	 that	 are	 exhortative	 or	 paedagogical	 in	
nature.	 Thus,	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 my	 analysis	 arises	 from	 Gregory’s	 homilies	 and	
other	texts	in	which	he	offers	instruction	on	the	principles	of	the	good	Christian	
life,	 such	 as	De	 virginitate,	De	mortuis	 non	 esse	 dolendum,	and	 In	 inscriptiones	
psalmorum.	 In	 the	 first	 chapter	 I	 will	 also	 draw	 extensively	 on	 Gregory’s	
anthropological	 treatises,	 not	 least	 because	 the	 internal	 logic	 of	 ancient	
eudaimonistic	ethics	dictates	that	understanding	who	human	beings	are	is	vital	
for	 understanding	 their	 purpose	 in	 life.	 However,	 I	 have	 largely	 set	 aside	





Christiano,	 which	 is	 usually	 counted	 among	 Gregory’s	 ascetical	 works.	 My	
decision	 is	 due	 to	 the	 author’s	 unusual	 usage	 of	 ἡδονή,	 the	 key	 word	 of	 the	
thesis.	I	will	discuss	the	details	of	Gregory’s	terminology	of	pleasure	in	the	first	
main	 chapter.	 For	 now,	 I	 will	 simply	 note	 that	 in	 De	 instituto	 Christiano	 the	
author	repeatedly	discusses	a	positive	ἡδονή	which	results	from	the	practice	of	






meagre	 allusions	 to	positive	 ἡδονή;	 second,	 it	 occurs	 frequently	 in	 the	phrase	
μεθ’	 ἡδονῆς	 (‘with	 pleasure’)	 which	 is	 rare	 in	 Gregory’s	 corpus,	 often	 in	
reference	 to	 various	 duties	 and	practices	 that	 a	 Christian	must	 carry	 out	 as	 a	
member	of	his	community101;	and	third,	it	is	often	linked	to	‘hope’	(ἐλπίς),	which	
Gregory	 normally	 considers	 antithetical	 to	 pleasure. 102 	This	 frequent	 and	
unrestrained	positive	usage	of	ἡδονή	without	 any	qualifying	adjectives	 and	 in	
connection	to	willing	obedience	stands	out	from	the	rest	of	Gregory’s	corpus.	In	
my	 view,	 this	 offers	 further	 grounds	 to	 question	 the	 already	 contested	







ἡδονή	as	 ‘pleasure’	 and	ἀπόλαυσις	as	 ‘enjoyment’).	 Since	more	often	 than	not	
such	 minor	 modifications	 have	 been	 necessary,	 I	 have	 not	 mentioned	 them	
individually.	Thus,	the	reader	is	encouraged	to	consult	the	source	of	the	English	
text	 for	 the	 original	 wording.	 I	 have	 offered	 my	 own	 translation	 of	 a	 longer	
passage	 where	 I	 have	 felt	 that	 the	 existing	 translation	 has	 not	 sufficiently	
captured	 the	 essential	 point	 or	 where	 an	 English	 translation	 has	 simply	 not	
been	 available.	 In	 such	 cases,	 I	 have	 often	 benefitted	 from	 the	 French	
translations	in	the	Sources	Chrétiennes	series.	
	
In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 approach	 Gregory’s	 understanding	 of	 pleasure	 chiefly	 as	 a	
philosophical	 and	 theological	 problem	 through	 a	 close	 reading	 of	 the	 original	
																																																								





critique	 interne’,	 Revue	 des	 Études	 Grecques	 82,	 no.	 391	 (1969):	 404–23.	 Also	 other	 scholars	




sources.	 I	 am	 interested	 in	 the	 concepts	 and	 arguments	 that	 he	 puts	 forth	 to	
explain	the	role	of	pleasure	as	a	false	good,	and	their	connections	to	the	literary	
tradition	 of	 Graeco-Roman	 ethics.	 By	 adopting	 one	 approach,	 I	 am	 of	 course	
opting	out	of	others.	While	my	topic	occasionally	overlaps	with	matters	related	
to	 wealth	 and	 poverty,	 I	 have	 largely	 left	 untouched	 questions	 related	 to	
Gregory’s	 social	 world,	 including	 early	 Christian	 practices	 of	 philanthropy.	
Furthermore,	while	Gregory	uses	the	notion	of	pleasure	to	discuss	the	boundary	
between	the	church	and	the	world,	I	have	not	been	able	to	comment	extensively	
on	 Gregory’s	 use	 of	 the	 dichotomy	 as	 a	 rhetorical	 device	 or	 as	 a	 means	 of	
identity	formation.	
	
After	 the	 introduction,	 the	 thesis	 is	 divided	 into	 three	main	 parts:	 in	 the	 first	
part,	I	will	investigate	Gregory’s	notion	of	pleasure	and	lay	the	anthropological	
groundwork	 for	 his	 ethical	 considerations.	 I	 will	 briefly	 survey	 ancient	
definitions	 of	 pleasure	 and	 note	 Gregory’s	 affinity	 particularly	 to	 the	 Platonic	
definition	of	pleasure	as	a	replenishment	and	the	Stoic	notion	of	pleasure	as	a	
passion	 that	 comes	 about	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 mind’s	 judgment.	 In	 the	 second	
chapter,	I	will	turn	to	to	the	place	of	pleasure	in	the	human	constitution,	arguing	
that	 pleasure	 originates	 in	 our	 sensible	 nature	 but	 is	 crucially	 shaped	 by	 the	
intelligible	nature.		
	
Part	 II	 focuses	on	the	broad	ethical	question	of	pleasure	as	 the	 false	good	and	
the	primary	source	of	sin.	Chapter	3	will	address	the	question	in	the	context	of	
Gregory’s	 reading	 of	 the	 fall,	 while	 Chapter	 4	 examines	 the	 ways	 in	 which	
pleasure	obscures	the	true	good	in	the	life	of	the	postlapsarian	human	being.	I	
will	show	how	pleasure	emerges	as	a	result	of	a	fundamental	misunderstanding	
concerning	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 universe	 and	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 true	 good.	 In	










Despite	 Gregory’s	 negative	 attitude	 towards	 sensual	 pleasure,	 enjoyment	
appears	to	play	a	key	role	both	in	his	understanding	of	the	paradisiac	existence	
and	 the	 eschatological	 fulfilment.	 Thus,	 Part	 III	 addresses	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	
pleasures	 that	 belong	 to	 the	 good	 Christian	 life,	 asking	what	 sets	 them	 apart	
from	 detrimental	 sensual	 pleasures.	 In	 Chapter	 7,	 I	 examine	 Gregory’s	
vocabulary	of	spiritual	pleasure	and	the	sequence	in	which	spiritual	enjoyment	
emerges	 in	 the	 Christian	 life.	 In	 Chapter	 8,	 I	 introduce	 ancient	 notions	 of	
intellectual	 pleasure	 and	 then	 investigate	 the	 place	 of	 pleasure	 in	 Gregory’s	
understanding	of	 the	eschatological	 fulfilment,	pointing	out	his	peculiar	open-
mindedness	towards	pleasure	mixed	with	pain	even	at	the	highest	stages	of	the	
spiritual	 life.	 In	 Chapter	 9,	 I	 will	 ask	 whether	 the	 body	 has	 a	 role	 to	 play	 in	
spiritual	enjoyment	and	engage	critically	with	Sarah	Coakley’s	recent	article	on	
Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 the	 spiritual	 senses.	 Finally,	 Chapter	 10	 offers	 a	 brief	







To	provide	 the	necessary	 scaffolding	 for	 ethical	questions	 related	 to	pleasure,	
we	 must	 first	 investigate	 what	 the	 phenomenon	 called	 ‘pleasure’	 means	 to	
Gregory.	The	purpose	of	the	first	two	chapters	is	to	gain	some	insight	into	how	
Gregory	defines	pleasure	and	where	he	locates	it	in	the	human	constitution.	In	














Wolfsdorf’s	 work	 and	 introduce	 the	 three	 most	 prominent	 anti-hedonist	
definitions	of	pleasure	–	Platonic,	Aristotelian,	and	Stoic.	These	definitions	and	
their	 later	 eclectic	 combinations	 have	 shaped	 most	 ancient	 conceptions	 of	
pleasure.	I	will	go	on	to	suggest	that	Gregory	draws	on	all	three	definitions,	but	
the	 Platonic	 and	 the	 Stoic	 conception	 are	 particularly	 important:	 On	 the	 one	
hand,	it	is	clear	that	Gregory,	like	Plato	and	later	Platonists,	understands	desire	
as	a	 lack	and	pleasure	as	a	process	of	 filling.	On	 the	other,	 like	 the	Stoics	and	
Stoic-inspired	authors,	he	views	pleasure	as	a	passion	that	results	from	a	faulty	
judgment	of	the	mind.	Later,	in	the	final	part	of	this	thesis,	I	will	also	show	that	










to	 discuss	 the	 topic	 of	 pleasure.	 ἡδονή	 is,	 of	 course,	 the	 etymological	 root	 of	
‘hedonism’,	and	by	Gregory’s	time	it	already	had	long	history	as	the	key	term	of	
the	ancient	philosophical	debate	concerning	the	role	of	pleasure	in	the	good	life.	
Although	not	 frequent,	 ἡδονή	 also	 appears	 in	 the	New	Testament,	 in	which	 it	
has	 a	 clearly	 negative	 significance	 and	 is	 associated	 with	 base	 and	 sinful	
desires.105		
	
Gregory’s	 remarks	on	ἡδονή	are	embedded	 in	a	variety	of	 contexts.	Often,	 the	
term	 turns	 up	 in	 relation	 to	 ethics,	 as	 part	 of	 practical	 admonitions	 or	
philosophical	 reflections	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 good.	 Anthropological	
discussions,	which	may	of	 course	overlap	with	 the	ethical,	 are	another	 typical	
location.	 Sometimes	 ἡδονή	 is	 discussed	 extensively,	 though	 no	 one	 text	
addresses	 it	 as	 the	 main	 topic;	 other	 times	 it	 is	 merely	 included	 in	 lists	 of	
passions	that	were	a	common	feature	of	ancient	moral	instruction.106	
	
Gregory	 associates	 ἡδονή with	 irrationality	 and	 ignorance107,	 transiency108,	
excess109,	and	animality110.	It	is	antithetical	to	virtue	and,	most	problematically,	
obscures	the	good	towards	which	people	should	direct	their	lives.111	Key	actions	
that	 yield	 ἡδονή	 include	 over-eating	 and	 drinking,	 living	 lavishly,	 amassing	
																																																								









hom.	18	 (PG	 44,	 192B–C).	 For	 pleasure	 as	 a	 serpent:	Eccl.	4.5	 (SC	 416,	 250–252);	Or.	 dom.	 4	
(GNO	VII/2,	54).	
111	Among	 numerous	 examples,	 see:	Beat.	5	 (GNO	 VII/2,	 125);	Op.	 hom.	 20	 (PG	 44,	 200A–B);	
Virg.	4.5	(SC	119,	318),	8	(SC	119,	362),	11.1	(SC	119,	382).	
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material	 possessions,	 and	 engaging	 in	 sexual	 relations.112	Although	 the	 body	
clearly	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 pleasures	 of	 sex,	 food,	 comfort,	 and	 aesthetic	 delights,	
Gregory	 also	 talks	 about	 pleasures	 that	 do	 not	 have	 an	 obvious	 bodily	
component.	 In	 De	 virginitate,	 he	 notes	 that	 while	 most	 people	 fight	 ‘more	
shameful	 pleasures’	 (τὰς	 αἰσχροτέρας	 τῶν	 ἡδονῶν)	 with	 force,	 they	
nonetheless	 pursue	 ‘pleasure	 in	 honours	 and	 love	 of	 power’	 (τῆν	 ἠδονὴν	 ἐν	
τιμαῖς	 καὶ	φιλαρχίαις).113	The	 latter	do	not	pertain	 to	bodily	 enjoyment,	 but	 a	
mental	gratification	due	to	an	elevated	social	status.	We	shall	see,	however,	that	
Gregory	 considers	 the	 tendency	 towards	 bodily	 pleasure	 a	 fundamentally	
mistaken	 direction	 of	 human	 desire	 and	 action,	 which	 serves	 as	 a	 breeding	
ground	for	other,	less	tangible	pleasures.	
	
Despite	 the	markedly	negative	 connotations	of	 the	word,	Gregory	does	accept	
that	spiritual	things	can	yield	ἡδονή	that	is	appropriate	and	virtuous.	However,	
this	 usage	 is	 limited	 and	 the	word	 is	 almost	 always	 qualified	with	 a	 positive	








also	 a	 handful	 of	 other	 words	 deserve	 to	 be	 mentioned.	 ἀπόλαυσις	
(‘enjoyment’)	 refers	 both	 to	 the	 act	 and	 the	 outcome	 of	 enjoying.	 In	 the	 first	
sense,	ἡδονή	can	be	seen	one	of	the	possible	objects	or	outcomes	of	ἀπόλαυσις.	
This	 is	 the	 case,	 for	 example,	 in	De	anima	et	resurrectione	where	Gregory	 and	







καθ’	 ἡδονὴν	 ἀπολαύσεως).115	We	 should	 note	 that	 ἀπόλαυσις	 is	 a	 broader	
phenomenon	 than	 ἡδονή:	 there	 can	 be	 enjoyment	without	 pleasure	 but	 there	
cannot	be	pleasure	without	enjoyment.	This	 is	evident	 in	De	virginitate	where	
Gregory	argues	that	need,	not	pleasure,	must	define	the	limits	of	enjoyment.116	
When	Gregory	 refers	 to	 the	 acceptable	 enjoyment	of	 earthly	 things,	 he	nearly	
always	 employs	 the	word	 ἀπόλαυσις	 for,	 as	we	 shall	 soon	 see,	 ἡδονή	 implies	
pleasure	pursued	for	its	own	sake,	which	is	never	acceptable	when	it	comes	to	




understands	 as	 a	 life	 devoted	 to	 enjoyment,	 i.e.	 a	 hedonistic	 life.120	Finally,	




In	 addition	 to	ἡδονή	and	ἀπόλαυσις,	Gregory	 refers	 to	pleasure-like	 emotions	
with	 such	 words	 as	 τρυφή,	 χαρά,	 and	 εὐφροσύνη.	 Τρυφή,	 which	 is	 often	
translated	 as	 ‘luxury’	 or	 ‘delicacy’,	 is	 a	 frequent	 term	 in	 ancient	 critiques	 of	
excessive	desire	and	lavish	living.	For	Gregory,	it	carries	the	same	significance,	
but	 can	 also	 be	 employed	 to	 denote	 the	 abundant	 delight	 of	 Paradise	 and	
Heaven.	Indeed,	like	Philo,	Gregory	argues	that	the	Hebrew	word	‘Eden’	can	be	










118	In	 fact,	 the	LSJ	 suggests	 that	when	 intended	as	a	 result	of	enjoying,	ἀπόλαυσις,	 too,	 can	be	







Listing	 some	 of	 the	 main	 terms	 and	 contexts	 for	 Gregory’s	 discussions	 on	
pleasure	 does	 not	 tell	 us	 very	 much	 about	 how	 he	 conceptualises	 the	
phenomenon	of	pleasure.	Furthermore,	both	the	words	and	the	typical	contexts	
in	which	 they	 appear	 belong	 to	 the	 common	 stock	 of	 ancient	 philosophy	 and	
patristic	 theology,	 and,	 as	 such,	 do	 not	 help	 us	 place	 Gregory	 in	 the	 field	 of	
ancient	 anti-hedonist	 discourse.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 time	 to	 identify	 passages	 where	





To	 identify	 the	 salient	 features	 of	 Gregory’s	 conception	 of	 pleasure,	 it	will	 be	
useful	 to	 familiarise	 ourselves	with	 the	most	 influential	 ancient	 definitions	 of	





The	 most	 important	 anti-hedonist	 notions	 of	 pleasure	 can	 roughly	 be	
characterised	as	Platonic,	Aristotelian,	and	Stoic.	In	this	section,	I	will	introduce	
the	three	models	and	then	go	on	to	argue	that	the	Platonic	and	Stoic	conception	
offer	 the	 most	 useful	 parallels	 to	 Gregory’s	 thought.	 The	 Platonic	 definition	
states	 that	 pleasure	 entails	 a	 process	 of	 a	 replenishment	 or	 restoration;	 the	
Stoic	view	emphasises	pleasure	as	one	of	the	four	principal	passions	–	alongside	










earlier	 Greek	 philosophy	 in	 ways	 that	 influenced	 later	 thinkers,	 no	 formal	
definitions	 had	 been	 offered.122	Nonetheless,	 Wolfsdorf	 suggests	 that	 Plato’s	




[a]jmong	Plato’s	various	 treatments	of	pleasure	 [chiefly	 in	Gorgias,	Republic,	Timaeus,	
and	Philebus],	we	 find	 the	 following	persistent	view:	pleasure	 is	a	 replenishment	or	a	




is	 the	 approach	 that	 Plato	 takes	 in	 Gorgias	 where	 the	 pleasures	 related	 to	
quenching	hunger	and	slaking	thirst	are	used	as	paradigmatic	examples	of	 the	







When	Plato	states	 that	pleasure	entails	 the	restoration	of	 the	natural	state,	he	
means	 that	 the	 organism	 undergoing	 pleasure	 returns	 to	 a	 state	 that	 is	
intrinsically	good	for	it.	In	the	body,	this	is	the	state	of	perfect	health;	in	the	soul,	
it	is	psychological	wellbeing.	Restored	to	the	natural	state,	the	entity	exists	in	a	











state	 of	 balance	 also	 by	 removing	 something	 excessive	 or	 nocive.	 Indeed,	
Wolfsdorf	argues	that	Plato	develops	his	theory	from	mere	replenishment	in	the	








Plato’s	conception	of	pleasure	as	a	 replenishment	or	a	 restoration	 is	explicitly	
criticised	 and	 rejected	 by	 Aristotle.	 The	 latter	 contends	 that	 it	 is	 untenable	
because	not	all	pleasures	are	preceded	by	lacks.131	He	also	denies	that	pleasure	
is	a	movement	arguing	that	all	pleasures	are	complete	at	once.132	Furthermore,	
Aristotle	 argues	 against	 Plato	 that	 the	 best,	 true,	 and	 natural	 pleasures	 are	
found	in	rest.133	Here,	he	is	thinking	particularly	of	pleasures	of	contemplation	
which	 arise	 in	 a	 state	 of	 perfect	 fulfilment.	 To	 address	 these	 shortcomings	 of	
Plato’s	 view,	 Aristotle	 redefines	 pleasure	 as	 an	 ἐνέργεια	 (EE	 6)	 or	 as	 a	
culmination	 of	 an	 ἐνέργεια	 (NE	10).134	As	Wolfsdorf	 explains,	 ἐνέργεια	 ‘is	 the	
condition	of	being	in	use,	deployed,	exercised,	or	at	work.’135	Thus,	his	preferred	
translation	 is	 ‘activation’,	 though	many	other	 translators	speak	of	an	 ‘activity’.	










Nicomachean	 Ethics.	 However,	 Book	 7	 of	Nicomachean	 Ethics	 is,	 in	 fact,	 Book	 6	 of	 Eudemian	
Ethics.	Following	Wolfsdorf,	 I	shall	be	alluding	to	these	accounts	as	EE	6	and	NE	10.	Wolfsdorf	
argues	 that	 Aristotle	 develops	 his	 view	 arguing	 first	 in	Eudemian	Ethics	6	 that	 pleasure	 is	 an	
activation	and	then,	with	more	nuance,	in	Nicomachean	Ethics	10	that	pleasure	accompanies	or	
culminates	 an	 activation.	 Thus,	 on	Wolfsdorf’s	 reading,	 this	 seeming	 self-contradiction	within	






More	 precisely,	 Aristotle	 defines	 pleasure	 as	 an	 unimpeded	 (ἀνεμπόδιστον)	
activation	 of	 a	 natural	 disposition	 (ἐνέργειαν	 τῆς	 κατὰ	 φύσιν	 ἕξεως),	 or	 as	
something	that	‘completes’	(τελειοῖ)	such	an	activation.136	Wolfsdorf	argues	that	
here	 ‘disposition’	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 a	 broad	 sense	 as	 a	 psychic	 –	 sense-
perceptual,	 character-related,	 or	 intellectual	 –	 capacity.	 The	 word	 ‘natural’	 is	
used	in	the	normative	sense	to	denote	the	goal	or	endpoint	of	development.137	
‘Unimpeded’	 means	 that	 the	 disposition	 in	 question	 is	 able	 to	 perform	 its	
characteristic	function	perfectly	without	any	hindrance,	i.e.	reach	its	telos.	This	
occurs,	 for	 example,	 when	 sense	 perception	 is	 not	 impaired	 or	 physically	
restricted,	or	when	the	intellect	has	been	sufficiently	honed	for	contemplation.	
In	 these	 cases,	 Aristotle	 says,	 pleasure	will	 ‘supervene’	 (ἐπιγινόμενόν)	 on	 the	
activation.138	In	other	words,	a	natural	pleasure	 for	Aristotle	comes	about	 in	a	
state	where	no	lack,	change,	or	generation	is	present	but	the	entity	is	activated	
in	 its	 perfect	 state	 without	 impediments. 139 	In	 his	 view,	 some	 lesser,	
‘coincidental’	pleasures	may	accompany	a	restoration	–	as	 is	 the	case	with	the	




boils	 down	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 pleasure	 and	 the	 good.	 As	 we	 have	
already	 seen,	 Aristotle	 holds	 that	 the	 attainment	 of	 the	 final	 good	 will	 yield	
happiness.	By	arguing	in	EE	6	that	pleasure	itself	is	an	unimpeded	activation	of	
some	natural	disposition,	Aristotle	makes	pleasure	synonymous	with	happiness	
which	 he	 understands	 as	 a	 perfect	 activation.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 all	
pleasures	 can	 vie	 for	 the	 place	 of	 the	 highest	 good,	 but	 some	 can,	 chiefly	 the	
ones	 related	 to	 contemplation	 which	 entails	 the	 perfect	 activation	 of	 the	
















Finally,	we	should	 turn	 to	 the	Stoic	definition	of	pleasure,	which,	as	Wolfsdorf	
remarks,	was	developed	and	reshaped	by	a	number	of	individuals	over	several	
centuries,	 and	 thus	 involves	 even	 more	 changes	 and	 ambiguities	 than	 the	
Platonic	and	Aristotelian	counterparts.143	Here	I	can	only	offer	a	sketch	of	some	
general	 features.	 The	 Stoics	 regard	 pleasure	 as	 one	 of	 the	 four	 fundamental	




Desire	and	 fear	go	 first.	The	 former	 is	 toward	 the	apparent	good;	 the	 latter	 is	 toward	
the	apparent	bad.	Pleasure	and	pain	 follow	upon	these.	Pleasure	occurs	whenever	we	
obtain	 what	 we	 were	 desiring	 or	 escape	 from	 what	 we	 were	 fearing.	 Pain	 occurs	











of	 earlier	 anti-hedonist	 philosophy.	 The	 Stoics	 are	 not	 the	 only	 philosophical	











To	 understand	what	 the	 Stoics	mean	when	 they	 label	 pleasure	 as	 one	 of	 the	
primary	passions,	we	must	 first	clarify	the	meaning	of	 the	word	 ‘passion’.	 It	 is	
important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 details	 of	 Stoic	 ethics	 and	 theory	 of	 action	 are	
numerous	and	intricate;	thus,	I	will	only	comment	on	the	parts	that	have	direct	
relevance	 for	 Gregory’s	 understanding	 and	 provide	 a	 springboard	 for	 an	 in-
depth	discussion	of	passions	in	the	next	chapter	where	I	will	also	return	to	Stoic	
concepts.	The	Old	Stoics	conceptualise	all	passions	as	irrational	disturbances	in	
the	 soul,	 which	 are	 caused	 by	 an	 excessive	 impulse	 to	 which	 the	 mind	
mistakenly	gives	 its	assent.	Wolfsdorf	cautions	us	not	 to	 interpret	 ‘impulse’	 in	
the	modern	English	sense	of	the	word,	which	implies	a	sudden	and	spontaneous	
incitement	 to	 action.	 For	 the	 Stoics,	 an	 impulse	 may	 arise	 from	 lengthy	






rational	 depends	 on	 the	 truthfulness	 of	 the	 underlying	 evaluative	 notion,	 i.e.	
whether	the	thing	considered	good	(or	bad	or	indifferent)	actually	is	such.148	As	




are	 a	 product	 of	 false	 judgments.	 They	 occur	 when	 the	 mind	 overvalues	 the	
goodness	 or	 badness	 of	 an	 object	 and	 thus	 shrinks	 from	 it	 or	 strives	 for	 it	








an	 excessive	 impulse	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	 transgression	 of	 the	 bounds	 of	Nature	
which,	for	the	Stoics,	sets	the	norm	of	the	good	life.150		
	
What,	 then,	 is	 the	 relevance	 of	 these	 three	models	 to	Gregory’s	 conception	 of	
pleasure?	In	the	section	that	follows,	I	will	examine	some	of	Gregory’s	remarks	








pleasure.	 We	 shall	 see	 that	 also	 the	 Stoic	 view	 of	 pleasure	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	
mistaken	 judgment	 of	 the	 mind	 will	 be	 helpful	 in	 making	 sense	 of	 Gregory’s	
comments	 on	 the	 topic.	 However,	 understanding	 the	 latter	 perspective	 will	
require	 a	more	 thorough	 introduction	 to	 Gregory’s	 anthropology.	 Thus,	 I	will	





For	Gregory,	 pleasure	 is	 not	 an	 object	 of	 philosophical	 enquiry,	 but	 a	 topic	 of	
ascetical	 exhortation.	 Thus,	 there	 is	 neither	 a	 text	 that	would	 offer	 a	 detailed	












The	sentence	prompts	 two	 immediate	observations.	First,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 there	
are,	at	least	implicitly,	two	kinds	of	pleasure:	that	of	the	good	person,	which	is	in	
fact	 ‘gladness’	 (εὐφροσύνη),	 and	 that	 of	 the	 body.	 The	 connection	 between	
pleasure	and	the	human	body	is	evident	in	Gregory’s	writings.	Pleasure	is	seen	
as	 a	 priority	 of	 people	 who	 care	 about	 their	 bodies	 instead	 of	 intelligible	
matters.	 It	 operates	 through	 the	 bodily	 senses,	 which	 Gregory	 elsewhere	
describes	 as	water	 channels	 or	windows	 through	which	 pleasurable	 impulses	
inundate	and	destroy	the	soul.152		
	
When	Gregory	says	 that	 the	pleasure	of	 the	good	person	 is	not	 the	customary	
pleasure	 (i.e.	 pleasure	 of	 the	 body)	 but	 ‘gladness’,	 he	 may	 be	 interpreted	 to	
mean	that	the	good	kind	of	pleasure	is	actually	pleasure	only	nominally	by	way	
of	 analogy.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	 possible	 reading.	 Despite	 the	
predominantly	 negative	 value	 of	 ἡδονή	 throughout	 Gregory’s	 whole	 corpus,	
some	passages	indicate	that	ἡδονή	does	have	a	positive	spiritual	manifestation.	
For	example,	in	De	virginitate	and	De	anima	et	resurrectione	we	find	mentions	of	
‘the	 divine	 and	 undefiled	 pleasure’	 (θείας	 τε	 καὶ	 ἀκηράτου	 ...	 ἡδονῆς),153	‘the	
divine	and	blessed	pleasure’	 (θείαν	τε	καὶ	μακαρίαν	ἡδονὴν),154	and	 ‘the	most	
beautiful	 and	 purest	 pleasure’	 (ἡδονὴν	 τὴν	 καλλίστην	 καὶ	 καθαρωτάτην).155	
The	most	 explicit	 statement	 concerning	 the	 two	 directions	 of	 pleasure	 comes	
from	Gregory’s	Homilies	on	the	Song	of	Songs,	where	he	 alludes	 to	 a	 ‘a	 double	
pleasure	 (διπλῆς	 ...	 ἡδονῆς),	 one	 that	 is	 in	 the	 soul	 and	 is	 activated	 by	
impassibility	 and	 another	 that	 is	 occasioned	 in	 the	 body	 by	 passion.’156	I	 will	
briefly	discuss	 the	possibility	of	positive	pleasure	 in	 the	next	 chapter	where	 I	
																																																								
151	Eccl.	5.8	(SC	416,	296).	Here,	 I	am	offering	my	own	translation	because	Hall	and	Moriarty’s	
rendering	 of	 ἡ	 περὶ	 τὸ	 καταθύμιον	 σχέσις	 is	 somewhat	 too	 vague:	 ‘[H]is	 pleasure	 is	 not	 the	
body’s	 pleasure,	 like	 the	habit	of	doing	as	one	pleases…’	 (Hall	&	Moriarty,	 98).	 I	 have	partially	





















and	 entail	 some	 form	 of	 intentionality.	 Indeed,	 Wolfsdorf	 explains	 that	 most	
Greek	 authors,	 regardless	 of	 their	 specific	 philosophical	 affiliations,	 do	 not	
conceive	pleasure	as	a	mere	 feeling	 in	 the	body	but	as	an	attitude	 towards	an	
object.157 	This	 is	 what	 Gregory	 likely	 intends	 with	 ἡ	 περὶ	 τὸ	 καταθύμιον	
σχέσις.158	While	 the	 word	 σχέσις	 (‘attitude’,	 ‘disposition’,	 ‘relation’)	 is	 a	 key	
term	of	both	Aristotelian	and	Stoic	ontology,	the	notion	of	pleasure	as	σχέσις	is	
not	central	to	earlier	ancient	writers.	Here,	it	is	perhaps	best	to	understand	the	




157	David	 Wolfsdorf,	 Pleasure	 in	 Ancient	 Greek	 Philosophy	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	
Press,	2013),	189.	Nemesius	of	Emesa,	Gregory’s	Christian	contemporary,	states	explicitly	in	his	
anthropological	treatise	De	natura	hominis	(18,	BT	76)	that	no	pleasure	belongs	only	to	the	body	
since	 pleasure	 requires	 sensation,	 which	 Nemesius,	 like	 Gregory	 and	 most	 other	 ancient	
thinkers,	understands	as	a	psychic	matter.	
158	In	 its	basic	Stoic	sense,	σχέσις	denoted	a	relation	 that	a	 thing	had	 to	something	other	 than	
itself,	which	 included	both	social	relations	and	psychological	attitudes.	Lampe	suggests	that	 in	
patristic	 use	 the	word	 can	 simply	 refer	 to	 a	 relationship	 or	 attachment	 between	persons	 and	
things,	 ‘especially	 of	 the	 soul	 to	 earthly	 or	 heavenly	 things’	 (see	 σχέσις,	PGL,	 1357–58,	 8).	 In	
Gregory’s	own	works,	σχέσις	appears	frequently	in	the	context	of	intra-Trinitarian	relations.	For	
example,	 in	Contra	Eunomium	 the	word	 appears	 numerous	 times	 to	 denote	 the	 relationships	
between	 the	 persons	 of	 the	Trinity.	 Consider,	 for	 example,	 Gregory’s	 comment	 that	when	 the	
names	 ‘Father’	 and	 ‘Son’	 are	 spoken,	 everyone	 is	 able	 to	 recognise	 the	 ‘proper	 and	 natural	




own.159	The	 same	 pair	 of	 words	 appears	 in	 two	 other	 passages	 in	 relatively	
similar	contexts.	The	first	one,	which	also	mentions	pleasure,	occurs	in	Homily	8	
on	 the	Ecclesiastes,	 where	 Gregory	 defines	 affection	 or	 love	 (φίλτρον)	 as	 ‘the	
inner	 disposition	 towards	 what	 is	 desired,	 functioning	 through	 pleasure	 and	
passionate	 feeling’	 (ἡ	 ἐνδιάθετος	 περὶ	 τὸ	 καταθύμιον	 σχέσις	 δι’	 ἡδονῆς	 καὶ	
προσπαθείας	 ἐνεργουμένη).160	The	 second	 instance	bears	 a	 close	 resemblance	
to	 the	 first:	 In	 On	 the	 Soul	 and	 the	 Resurrection,	 Gregory	 defines	 love	 (now,	
ἀγάπη)	 as	 ‘the	 innate	 disposition	 for	 the	 object	 of	 one’s	 desire’	 (ἡ	 πρὸς	 τὸ	
καταθύμιον	ἐνδιάθετος	σχέσις).161 In	 its	most	basic	sense	καταθύμιος	denotes	
something	that	is	in	one’s	mind	or	in	one’s	heart.162	It	is	not	a	technical	term	but	
a	derivative	of	θυμός,	which	can	 refer	 to	both	 the	 soul	 in	general,	 its	 thinking	
part,	and	the	seat	of	emotions	and	appetites.	Thus,	we	must	look	at	the	context	





catechetica,	 Gregory	discusses	people	who	want	 to	 spend	 their	 lives	 ‘enjoying	
what	is	pleasing’	(διὰ	τὴν	τῶν	καταθυμίων	ἀπόλαυσιν)	and	thus	falsely	judge	a	





the	 close	 connection	 between	 pleasure	 and	 desire.	 In	 my	 view,	 this	 is	 the	
junction	we	ought	to	explore.		
																																																								
159	The	 latter	 word	 is	 disproportionately	 represented	 in	 in	 his	 corpus	 compared	 to	 earlier	
sources.	The	TLG	lists	66	occurrences	before	Gregory	and	50	in	his	works	alone.	










Saying	 that	 pleasure	 is	 linked	 to	 desire	 does	 not	 tell	 us	 very	much	 about	 the	
intellectual	currents	that	might	inform	Gregory’s	thinking.	Most	ancient	authors	
made	 the	 connection;	 we	 have	 already	 encountered	 it	 in	 Plato’s	 definition	 as	
well	 as	 in	 Arius’s	 Stoic	 conception.	 Also	 Aristotle	 argues	 that	 appetite	 is	
concerned	with	pleasure.165	The	question	 is,	 then,	how	Gregory	conceptualises	
this	 link.	 I	 will	 suggest	 that	 here	 we	 can	 benefit	 from	 drawing	 a	 parallel	 to	
Plato’s	basic	understanding	of	desire	and	pleasure	as	a	lack	and	replenishment.	










Pleasure	 is	mentioned	 twice	 in	Macrina’s	 definition	 of	 desire:	 she	 argues	 that	
desire	(ἐπιθυμία)	 is	a	yearning	 for	 the	enjoyment	of	pleasure	(πόθον	τῆς	καθ’	
ἡδονὴν	 ἀπολαύσεως),	 or	 a	 ‘disposition’	 (σχέσιν)	 towards	 some	 unattainable	
pleasure.	Here,	we	encounter	again	the	word	σχέσις	which	we	have	previously	
seen	associated	with	pleasure	and	love.	The	fact	that	Gregory	regards	all	three	
as	 σχέσεις	 indicates	 that	 the	 word	 refers	 quite	 generally	 to	 an	 affective	







165	‘ἡ	 γὰρ	 ἐπιθυμία	 τοῦ	 ἡδέος	 ἐστὶν	 ὄρεξις,’	 Aristotle	 argues	 in	Rhet.	1370a,	 in	 which	 he	 still	
follows	 the	 Platonic	 lack-and-replenishment	 model	 of	 pleasure.	 Also	 in	 EE	 and	 NE,	 where	






one	 lacks’	 (τοῦ	 ἐνδέοντος).	 The	 conception	 of	 desire	 as	 a	 lack	 is	 famously	






definition	 that	 I	 cited	 above:	 ‘Again,	 if	 we	 were	 to	 define	 what	 desire	
(ἐπιθυμίαν)	 is	 in	 itself,	 we	 shall	 call	 it	 a	 seeking	 for	 what	 one	 lacks	 (τοῦ	
ἐνδέοντος),	or	a	yearning	for	the	enjoyment	of	some	pleasure	(πόθον	τῆς	καθ’	
ἡδονὴν	 ἀπολαύσεως)…’	 Although	 Macrina	 does	 not	 explicitly	 equate	 the	 two	
but	separates	them	with	the	conjunction	‘or’,	I	suggest	we	should	read	‘a	seeking	
for	what	 one	 lacks’	 and	 ‘a	 yearning	 for	 some	 pleasure’	 as	 descriptions	 of	 the	
same	 phenomenon.	 If,	 as	 Clement	 says,	 every	 desire	 ‘yearns	 for	 something	 it	










too,	 understands	 ἐπιθυμία	 as	 a	 lack	 and	 a	 pain	 and	 argues	 that	 it	 seeks	 that	
which	is	pleasurable.169	However,	for	Aristotle,	this	does	not	entail	that	pleasure	
is	 by	 definition	 a	 replenishment;	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 two	 is	 not	
necessary.	 As	 I	 understand	 it,	 for	 Aristotle	 appetite,	 lack,	 and	 pleasure	 are	
connected	only	so	far	as	quenching	the	appetite	entails	bringing	the	entity	to	its	
																																																								






natural	 condition	and	 thus	enables	 its	perfect	 activation	which,	 in	 turn,	 yields	
pleasure.	The	 fact	 that	pleasure	happens	 in	conjunction	with	replenishment	 is	
accidental;	 it	 does	 not	 result	 from	 the	 replenishment	 but	 from	 the	 natural	
condition	 to	which	 the	 entity	 is	 restored.	We	 can	 imagine	 natural	 conditions,	
chiefly	 contemplation,	 that	 yield	 pleasure	 without	 the	 presence	 of	 any	
appetite/lack	simply	because	a	disposition	is	activated	without	impediment.	But	
while	Macrina’s	definition	of	pleasure	could	allude	to	the	Aristotelian	viewpoint,	
Gregory’s	 other	 works	 provide	 sufficient	 grounds	 for	 supposing	 that	 he	
understands	 pleasure	 in	 the	 loosely	 Platonic	 framework	 as	 a	 replenishment,	
whereas	the	Aristotelian	definition	of	perfect	activation	is	never	cited	and	rarely	
implied.	 To	 offer	 further	 evidence,	 I	 will	 turn	 to	 Gregory’s	 Homily	 4	 on	 the	
Beatitudes	 and	 draw	 a	 point	 of	 comparison	 from	 Gorgias,	 in	 which	 Plato	
presents	 an	 early	 form	 of	 the	 replenishment	 theory.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	





Within	Plato’s	 corpus,	Gorgias	presents	 a	 somewhat	 rudimentary	definition	of	
pleasure	as	a	filling,	which	owes	to	physiological	definitions	of	pleasure	in	early	
Greek	philosophy	and	lacks	some	of	the	nuances	of	Plato’s	 later	discussions	in	
Republic	 and	 Philebus.	 However,	 it	 is	 precisely	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 I	 want	 to	




direct	 familiarity	with	 these	 texts.	However,	 as	 regards	Gorgias,	 the	parallel	 is	
close.	In	Homily	4	on	the	Beatitudes,	Gregory	makes	use	of	a	phrase	that	figures	
prominently	 in	the	dialogue	of	Socrates	and	Callicles:	the	insatiable	appetite	 is	









entails	 an	 unbridled	 gratification	 of	 one’s	 appetites.171	Instead,	 he	 defends	 a	
notion	 of	 happiness	 that	 is	 based	 on	 virtue	 and	 self-discipline:	 a	 person	 is	
happier	when	he	is	not	at	the	mercy	of	his	limitless	appetites	which	inevitably	
lead	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 pain	 in	 the	 soul.	 Socrates	 alludes	 to	 a	 Pythagorean	
account	according	to	which	the	appetitive	part	of	the	souls	(τοῦτο	τῆς	ψυχῆς	οὗ	
αἱ	 ἐπιθυμίαι	 εἰσί)	 of	 fools	 is	 undisciplined	 and	 like	 a	 ‘leaky	 jar’	
(τετρημένος…πίθος)	which	 is	 unable	 to	 retain	 anything.172	Thus,	 fools	 lead	 an	
insatiable	and	undisciplined	life,	(τοῦ	ἀπλήστως	καὶ	ἀκολάστως	ἔχοντος	βίου)	
because	 they	 are	 constantly	 seeking	 to	 fill	 their	 leaky	 appetites	 with	 new	










jars	 is	 the	 happier	 one.	 He	 argues	 that	 a	 person	 who	 has	 filled	 himself	 up	
(πληρωσαμένῳ)	no	 longer	experiences	pleasure	 (ἡδονή),	 for	 ‘living	pleasantly	
(τὸ	 ἡδέως	 ζῆν)	 consists	 in	 this:	 having	 as	much	 as	 possible	 flow	 in.’	 For	 him,	
being	 able	 to	 fill	 one’s	 appetites	 (ἐπιθυμίας)	 and	 derive	 enjoyment	 from	 it	
																																																								
170	See	Wolfsdorf,	 Pleasure	 in	 Ancient	 Greek	 Philosophy,	 44–47.	 My	 paraphrase	 of	 pleasure	 in	
Gorgias	follows	Wolfsdorf’s	account.	
171	Gorg.	492d–e.	





(χαίροντα)	 is	 necessary	 for	 a	 happy	 life	 (εὐδαιμόνως	 ζῆν).175	Socrates	 is	 not	
convinced.	He	points	out	 that	not	 all	 fillings	 are	 good	and	 the	precondition	of	
any	filling	 is	a	 lack,	which	manifests	 itself	as	pain;	hunger,	 thirst,	and	all	other	
deficiencies	 (ἔνδειαν)	 and	 appetites	 (ἐπιθυμίαν)	 are	 painful.176	Thus,	 a	 person	
who	is	filling	his	appetites	finds	himself	in	a	paradoxical	situation:	he	is	at	once	






is	 in	 pain	 (λυπούμενον)’,	while	 ‘drinking	 is	 a	 filling	 of	 the	 deficiency,	 and	 is	 a	
pleasure	 (πλήρωσίς	 τε	 τῆς	 ἐνδείας	 καὶ	 ἡδονή).’	 Thus,	 when	 a	 thirsty	 person	
drinks,	 ‘a	 person	 who’s	 in	 pain	 simultaneously	 feels	 enjoyment	 (λυπούμενον	
χαίρειν).’177	Since	a	person	cannot	be	doing	well	and	badly	at	the	same	time	but	
pleasure	and	pain	are	always	bound	together,	pleasure	cannot	be	good	and	its	
opposite,	 pain,	 cannot	 be	 evil,	 Socrates	 argues. 178 	Furthermore,	 having	
unbridled	appetites	cannot	be	desirable	as	Callicles	claims,	 for	 the	greater	 the	
pleasure,	the	greater	also	the	pain	that	accompanies	it.	
	
Socrates	 and	 Callicles’	 dialogue	 reveals	 a	 basic	 notion	 of	 desire	 as	 a	 lack	 and	
pleasure	as	a	 filling.	According	 to	Callicles,	pleasure	cannot	occur	 in	a	 state	of	
perfect	fulfilment	since	it	depends	on	an	active	process	of	filling.	Though	Plato	
would	 disagree	 with	 Callicles’	 understanding	 of	 happiness,	 the	 definition	 of	













examples	 of	 appetite	 and	 pleasure.	 But	 even	 if	 hunger	 and	 thirst	 can	 be	











as	Wisdom	 says	 somewhere	metaphorically,	A	cask	 full	of	holes	 is	 the	occupation	with	
the	 pleasures	 of	 sense	 (Πίθος	 τετρημένος	 ἐστὶν	 ἡ	 περὶ	 τὰς	 ἡδονὰς	 ἀσχολία)	 [Prov.	
23:27].	 For	 those	 who	 are	 always	 anxiously	 busy	 filling	 it	 show	 that	 their	 unending	
labour	is	fruitless.	All	the	time	they	are	pouring	something	into	the	abyss	of	desire	(τῷ	
βυθῷ	τῆς	ἐπιθυμίας),	 they	add	pleasure	to	pleasure	(τὸ	πρὸς	ἡδονὴν	ἐπεμβάλλοντες),	
yet	never	bring	desire	 to	 its	 satisfaction	 (εἰς	κόρον	δὲ	τὴν	ἐπιθυμίαν	οὐκ	ἄγοντες).181	
Who	has	known	avarice	come	to	an	end	because	the	man	afflicted	with	it	had	got	what	
he	 wanted?	 Who	 has	 ceased	 to	 run	 after	 fame	 because	 he	 had	 attained	 his	 heart’s	
desire?	But	 if	 anyone	has	 indulged	 to	 the	 full	what	pleases	his	 ears	or	eyes	 (ὁ	δὲ	τὴν	
ἡδονὴν	ἐκπλήσας),	his	mad	craze	 for	 the	 things	of	 the	stomach	and	what	comes	after	
the	 stomach	 –	what	 has	 he	 found	 to	 be	 the	 result	 of	 this	 enjoyment?	Does	 not	 every	




Above,	Gregory	conceptualises	 the	 futility	of	pleasure	seeking	as	 filling	a	 ‘cask	
full	of	holes’	(or	a	 ‘leaky	jar’),	employing	the	same	phrase	πίθος	τετρημένος	as	









23:27.	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 Septuagint	version,	 the	 verse	 contains	 the	 same	 pair	 of	
words:	 ‘For	 a	 pierced	 cask	 is	 a	 strange	 house	 (πίθος	 γὰρ	 τετρημένος	 ἐστὶν	
ἀλλότριος	οἶκος),	and	a	strange	well	is	narrow.’183	Gregory	cites	the	whole	verse	
in	his	consolatory	speech	 In	Flacillam	where	he	uses	 it	 to	describe	the	cyclical	
life	of	the	body	and	its	insatiable	desires,	which	confirms	that	Proverbs	23:27	is	
indeed	his	reference	point	for	the	metaphor	of	a	leaky	jar.184	However,	while	in	
the	 Septuagint	 the	 verse	 appears	 in	 a	 context	 that	 can	 be	 understood	 as	
instruction	 on	 the	 proper	 control	 of	 appetites,	 it	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 pleasure	
seeking	 as	 explicitly	 as	 Gregory’s	 account	 of	 it	 implies.	 In	 fact,	 Gregory’s	
commentary	on	the	filling	of	unbridled	appetites	for	the	sake	of	pleasure	comes	
much	 closer	 to	 Plato’s	 account	 in	Gorgias.	 Like	 Plato,	 Gregory	 argues	 that	 the	
filling	 of	 a	 ‘leaky	 jar’	 leads	 to	 constant	 anxiety	 and	 dissatisfaction;	 in	 other	
words,	pleasure	is	mixed	with	pain.	
	
The	allusion	 to	 the	 leaky	 jar	occurs	also	 in	De	mortuis	non	esse	dolendum,	 and	
other	works	contain	similar	 images	without	the	exact	phrase.185	In	De	mortuis,	
Gregory	 contrasts	 physical	 needs	 with	 luxurious	 pleasure	 seeking,	 arguing:	
‘greed	 (πλεονεξία)	 has	 opened	 the	 entrance	 to	 insatiable	 desire	 (ἀπληστίᾳ),	
which,	 according	 to	 Solomon,	 is	 a	 leaky	 jar	 (τετρημένος	 πίθος),	 always	 found	
lacking	and	empty	by	 those	who	pour	 things	 into	 it.’186	Again,	Gregory	 implies	
that	 his	 reasoning	 follows	 a	 biblical	 teaching,	 likely	 the	 same	 passage	 in	
Proverbs	23:27.	And	 again,	 in	 terms	of	 content,	 the	 treatment	 of	 pleasure	 and	
insatiable	 desire	 comes	 much	 closer	 to	 Plato’s	 Gorgias	 than	 to	 the	 biblical	
passage.	Thus,	we	have	a	 reason	 to	 think	 that	Gregory	 is	not	only	drawing	on	
biblical	material,	but	is	familiar	with	some	version	of	the	Platonic	account.	
	
Had	 Gregory	 read	 the	 dialogue	 or	 did	 he	 receive	 the	metaphor	with	 its	 exact	
Platonic	 phrasing	 from	 later	 sources?	 Plato’s	 phrase	 πίθος	 τετρημένος	 is	 not	
																																																								










and	 Iamblichus	 who	 would	 have	 been	 well	 known,	 if	 controversial,	 to	 a	 4th-
century	 Christian	 intellectual. 187 	Iamblichus,	 in	 particular,	 offers	 a	 close	
paraphrase	of	the	two	related	jar	narratives	of	Gorgias.	Furthermore,	the	image	
is	used	by	Gregory’s	own	brother	Basil	who	cites	 it	 to	 contrast	necessity	with	
pleasure	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 ascetical	 care	 of	 the	 body.188	
Considering	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 phrase	 in	 several	 late	 antique	 sources	 with	
which	Gregory	may	well	have	been	acquainted,	we	do	not	have	to	assume	that	it	







There	 are	 further	 reasons	 to	 think	 that	 Gregory	 is	 drawing	 mainly	 on	 later	
formulations	of	the	Platonic	conception	of	pleasure	as	a	replenishment.	His	late	
work	 In	 Canticum	 canticorum	 provides	 a	 particularly	 illuminating	 passage,	
which	 at	 once	 contains	 a	 clear	 trace	of	Plato’s	definition	of	 pleasure	 and	 calls	
into	 question	Gregory’s	 awareness	 of	 Plato’s	 original	 treatments	 on	 the	 topic,	






the	 organism	 has	 been	 restored	 to	 its	 natural	 state	 (ἐπανέλθοι	 πάλιν	 ἡ	 φύσις)	 after	
some	distasteful	illness;	and	in	the	same	way	the	good	Bridegroom	effects	intensity	and	
superabundance	 of	 joy	 over	 good	 things	 in	 the	 soul	 that	 is	 climbing	 toward	 him,	 not	
only	by	showing	the	Bride	her	own	beauty	but	also	by	recalling	to	her	mind	the	awful	
																																																								
187	Porphyry,	De	abstinentia	 3.27;	 Iamblichus,	Protrepticus	 (Pistelli,	 84).	 Plutarch	 employs	 the	
image	of	a	leaky	vessel	in	an	anti-hedonist	argument	in	Non	posse	(1088e),	but	uses	a	different	
Greek	phrase	(μὴ	στέγοντος	ἀγγείου).	






Above,	 Gregory	 links	 pleasure	 to	 a	 restoration	 to	 the	 natural	 state,	 both	 on	 a	
social,	bodily,	and	spiritual	level.	Norris’s	decision	to	render	ἐπανέλθοι	πάλιν	ἡ	
φύσις	 as	 ‘restored	 to	 its	 natural	 state’	 closely	 resembles	 Plato’s	 definition	 of	
pleasure,	 even	 if	 Plato	 employs	 slightly	 different	Greek	 phrases	 to	 denote	 the	
process	 of	 restoration.190 	Among	 earlier	 ancient	 authors,	 Galen	 frequently	
employs	 the	 verb	 ἐπανέρχομαι	 (normally	 in	 the	 phrase	 εἰς	 τὸ	 κατὰ	 φύσιν	
ἐπανέρχομαι)	when	he	 explains,	 on	 deliberately	 Platonic	 terms,	 how	pleasure	
occurs	in	the	senses.191	In	the	passage	above,	the	‘natural	state’	is	understood	as	
a	state	of	optimal	wellbeing,	harmony,	and	balance.	Thus,	we	can	conclude	that	
at	 least	 on	 some	occasions	Gregory	 conceives	pleasure	not	 only	 as	 a	 concrete	
replenishment	but,	more	abstractly,	as	a	restoration.		
	
However,	despite	 the	shared	conception	of	pleasure	as	a	return	 to	 the	natural	
state,	the	main	argument	in	the	passage	from	Cant.	8	is,	in	fact,	in	contradiction	
with	 some	 of	 Plato’s	 most	 influential	 treatments	 of	 pleasure.	 Simply	 put,	
Gregory	argues	above	that	preceding	pain	makes	pleasure	greater	and	sweeter	
both	 in	 bodily	 and	 spiritual	 matters.	 This	 is	 precisely	 what	 Plato	 denies	 in	
Republic	and	Philebus.	While	Plato	accepts	that	preceding	pain	makes	pleasure	
















Thus,	 it	 cannot	 be	 truly	 either. 192 	These	 statements	 boil	 down	 to	 Plato’s	
understanding	that	the	greatest	and	truest	pleasures	are	not	the	pleasures	that	
appear	the	most	intense	due	to	past	pain,	but	pleasures	that	entail	restorations	




thesis	 where	 we	 shall	 see	 that	 also	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 pure	 pleasures	 is	
somewhat	 different	 from	 Plato’s.	 For	 now,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 Gregory’s	
conception	 of	 pleasure	 and	past	 pain	 in	Cant.	8	would	 in	 Plato’s	 eyes	 entail	 a	
false	 pleasure	 and	 an	 illusion,	 certainly	 not	 an	 appropriate	 analogy	 for	 the	
highest	possible	enjoyment.	This	gives	us	a	reason	to	suspect	that	Gregory	is	not	
directly	 influenced	 by	 Plato’s	 definitions	 of	 pleasure	 in	Philebus	and	Republic,	
though	he	 has	 adopted	 the	 Platonic	 stance	 of	 pleasure	 as	 a	 restoration	 of	 the	
natural	 state.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 he	 is	 influenced	 by	 Timaeus,	 where	 Plato	
discusses	pleasure	as	a	return	to	the	natural	condition	but	does	less	to	highlight	
the	 falsity	 of	 pleasures	 that	 are	 preceded	 by	 pain.193	Alternatively,	 Gregory	 is	





receptacle.	 Verna	 Harrison	 has	 noted	 the	 centrality	 of	 receptacle	 imagery	 in	
Gregory’s	 descriptions	 of	 human	 finitude.194	She	 points	 out	 that	 in	 Gregory’s	
																																																								
192	Compare	 especially	 to	 Plato,	Rep.	9,	583c–586c.	 On	 the	 calm	 intermediate	 state	 as	 a	 false	




193 	See	 Tim.	 64d.	 Plato	 does	 point	 out	 that	 bodies	 that	 experience	 only	 gradual	 (i.e.	
imperceptible)	departures	from	their	normal	state	but	intense	and	substantial	replenishments,	
undergo	 ‘very	 substantial	 pleasures’	 and	 ‘not	 any	pains’	 (Tim.	 65a).	While	 this	 (imperceptible	
depletion,	perceptible	replenishment)	is	the	definition	of	a	pure	or	true	pleasure	in	Republic	and	
Philebus	(see	e.g.	Phil.	51b),	 in	Timaeus	 the	emphasis	 in	the	wider	context	(64a–65b)	 is	on	the	
fact	that	the	replenishments	need	to	be	intense	and	perceptible	in	order	to	yield	pleasure,	rather	
than	on	a	systematic	ranking	on	true	and	false	pleasures.	





the	 soul	 and	 to	 the	 body.	 We	 should	 note	 that	 although	 in	 Beat.	 4	 Gregory	
laments	 the	transiency	of	bodily	pleasures	and	elsewhere	employs	hunger	and	
thirst	as	the	paradigmatic	examples	of	lack	and	fulfilment,	the	phenomenon	he	
discusses	 is	 not	 only	 physiological.	 The	 lacks	 he	 describes	 occur	 in	 ἐπιθυμία	
which	 belongs	 to	 the	 soul.	 Furthermore,	 the	 passage	 from	 Cant.	 8	 above	
indicates	 that	 the	 restoration	 can	 pertain	 to	 more	 abstract	 matters	 than	 just	
eating	and	drinking.	 In	 fact,	when	we	turn	to	the	topic	of	pleasure	as	the	 false	






anti-hedonist	 schools	 of	 philosophy	 and	 noted	 that	 at	 least	 Plato’s	
replenishment	 model	 has	 left	 a	 trace	 in	 Gregory’s	 works.	 I	 have	 chosen	 to	
highlight	the	similarity	between	Gregory	and	the	Platonist	conception	because	I	
think	it	is	particularly	clear	and	will	help	us	understand	Gregory’s	account	of	the	




fillings	 that	 occur	 in	 the	 human	 life	 that	 appear	 at	 least	 innocuous	 or	 even	
virtuous.	 In	 fact,	Plato	himself	 argues	 that	 the	 replenishment	model	 is	equally	
adaptable	 to	 the	 virtuous	 pleasures	 of	 the	 intellect	when	 our	minds	 are	 filled	
with	knowledge.	Furthermore,	we	shall	see	 in	Chapter	5	that	Gregory,	 like	the	



















Stoics	 who	 defined	 ἡδονἠ	 exclusively	 as	 a	 passion	 that	 results	 from	 the	
attainment	of	 a	 present	 apparent	 good.	 Furthermore,	we	 shall	 see	 in	 the	next	
chapter	 that	 Gregory	 emphasises	 the	 role	 of	 the	 mind	 in	 pronouncing	 the	
judgment	 that	 a	 pleasurable	 thing	 is	 a	 good	 thing.	 In	 Chapter	 5	 we	 will	
encounter	also	the	idea	that	passions,	and	pleasure	in	particular,	are	excessive	
and	 extend	 beyond	 the	 limits	 of	 nature.	 However,	 just	 as	 the	 presence	 of	 the	








conception	 of	 pleasure.	 However,	 he	 becomes	 particularly	 relevant	 when	 I	
discuss	 Gregory’s	 conception	 of	 intellectual	 pleasure	 in	 De	 anima	 et	
resurrectione	 in	 the	 final	 part	 of	 this	 thesis.	We	 can	 also	 find	 certain	 isolated	
instances	where	Gregory	conceptualises	bodily	pleasure	as	an	accompaniment	
of	an	activity,	which	I	will	point	out	as	they	become	relevant	to	my	discussion.	
Furthermore,	 Aristotle	 remains	 an	 important	 if	 often	 implicit	 authority	 in	
Hellenistic	 and	 late	 antique	 discourse	 on	 moral	 progress,	 which	 underpins	
Gregory’s	thought.	These	parallels	will	be	noted	as	they	occur.	 	
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2.	 Locating	 Pleasure:	 An	 Animal	 Impulse	 Moderated	 by	
Reason	
		
So	 far	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 Gregory	 understands	 pleasure	 as	 a	
replenishment,	 and	adumbrated	 the	 role	of	pleasure	as	a	detrimental	passion.	
As	we	have	already	seen,	both	of	these	definitions	connect	pleasure	to	ἐπιθυμία,	
the	passion	of	desire	or	the	desiring	part	of	the	soul.	In	this	second	foundational	
chapter,	 I	 will	 seek	 to	 determine	 pleasure’s	 anthropological	 location	 and	
relationship	to	other	anthropological	entities,	including	desire	and	the	rational	
faculty.	By	investigating	pleasure	from	an	anthropological	perspective,	I	will	lay	
ground	 for	 the	 ethical	 focus	 of	 the	 subsequent	 chapters,	 for,	 as	 Leuenberger-
Wenger	 remarks:	 ‘The	question	about	 the	good	 life	 is	 the	question	about	who	
the	 human	 being	 is	 and	 what	 constitutes	 the	 goal	 and	 meaning	 of	 his	
existence.’195	In	this	chapter	I	will	begin	from	the	first	sub-question	to	move	on	
to	 the	 second	 in	 the	 following	 chapters.	My	 focus	will	 be	 chiefly	 on	Gregory’s	
two	 anthropological	 treatises,	 De	 opificio	 hominis	 and	 De	 anima	 et	
resurrectione.196	I	will	also	examine	a	variety	of	anthropological	distinctions	 in	
Gregory’s	 discussions	 on	 pleasure,	 which	 reflect	 a	 certain	 eclecticism	 that	
pervades	his	understanding	of	human	beings.	We	will	 find	pleasure	embedded	
in	threefold	models	of	the	soul,	cited	in	the	context	of	soul–body	interaction,	and	
counted	among	 the	animal	drives	 that	undermine	 the	unified	mind.	While	 the	















pleasure	 is	 fundamentally	 shaped	 by	 this	 twofold	 ontological	 and	
anthropological	distinction	into	the	rational	and	the	irrational,	the	God-like	and	
the	 animalistic,	 the	 intelligible	 and	 the	 sensible.	 Pleasure	 is	 located	 in	 the	
former,	but	influences	and	is	influenced	by	the	latter.	My	argument	is	not	only	
motivated	by	an	attempt	to	group	various	anthropological	distinctions	under	a	
simpler	 twofold	 model.	 More	 importantly,	 φύσις,	 ‘nature’,	 is	 a	 key	 term	 that	
Gregory	himself	employs	when	he	explains	the	origin	and	workings	of	pleasure.	
By	 focussing	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 nature,	 I	 am	 in	 agreement	with	 scholars	who	
have	drawn	attention	to	φύσις	as	a	key	term	of	Gregory’s	anthropology.197	My	
interest,	however,	is	less	on	the	general	concept	of	‘human	nature’	and	more	on	
the	 two	 different	 natures	 that	 constitute	 humanity:198	the	 intelligible	 nature	
that,	for	Gregory,	is	the	seat	of	the	image	of	God,	and	the	sensate	bodily	nature	
that	 humans	 share	with	 irrational	 animals.	 I	will	 show	how	 the	 tension-laden	
interaction	 between	 the	 two	 natures	 forms	 the	 backdrop	 for	 Gregory’s	
anthropological	discussions	on	pleasure.		
	
Many	 previous	 studies	 have	 pointed	 out	 that	 Gregory’s	 primary	 ontological	
distinction	does	not	go	between	the	 intelligible	and	the	sensible	realm	like	 for	
many	 other	 ancient	 thinkers,	 but	 between	 the	 uncreated	 Creator	 and	 the	
creation.	While	this	is	undoubtedly	the	case	if	we	look	at	Gregory’s	theological	
system	as	a	whole,	 in	ethical	questions	 the	distinction	between	the	 intelligible	
and	 the	 sensible	 and,	 correspondingly,	 the	 rational	 and	 irrational	 remains	
highly	important.199	The	question	is,	after	all,	how	humans	can	become	the	best	
and	truest	versions	of	themselves,	not	how	they	can	join	the	divine	rank.	Even	




198	Whether	or	not	Gregory	 thinks	 the	 two	natures	constitute	one	 ‘human	nature’	 is	not	clear-
cut.	As	we	shall	see,	‘human	nature’	can	indeed	denote	the	composite	nature	that	consists	of	the	
intelligible	 and	 the	 sensible,	 but	 at	 times	 it	 only	 refers	 to	 that	which	 separates	 humans	 from	
other	embodied	creatures,	namely	the	rational	mind.	
199 	Boersma	 makes	 a	 similar	 observation	 concerning	 the	 high	 relevance	 of	 spirit–matter	
distinction	in	Gregory.	See	Boersma,	Embodiment	and	Virtue	in	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	8.	
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life	 dedicated	 to	 our	 sensible	 faculties	 and	 a	 life	 that	 is	 aligned	 with	 our	
intellectual	abilities.	
	
Let	us	now	 turn	 to	 textual	evidence	 to	 see	what	Gregory	has	 to	 say	about	 the	
two	constituent	parts	of	the	human	nature	and	their	relationship	to	pleasure.	I	
will	begin	from	De	hominis	opificio,	in	which	Gregory	offers	his	interpretation	on	
the	 creation	of	 human	beings	 and	 also	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	place	 of	 pleasure	 in	
God’s	 creative	 plan.	 In	 this	 work,	 two	 chapters	 merit	 particular	 attention:	 In	



























does	not	have	 to	acquire	anything	but	 is	 simply	assigned	 the	 task	 to	enjoy	all	
things	present	(τὴν	ἀπόλαυσιν	τῶν	παρόντων).202	For	this	 twofold	enjoyment,	
he	 is	given	a	twofold	nature,	a	blend	of	the	divine	with	the	earthly,	so	that	 ‘by	
means	 of	 both	 he	may	be	 naturally	 and	properly	 disposed	 to	 each	 enjoyment	
(πρὸς	 ἑκατέραν	ἀπόλαυσιν),	 enjoying	 (ἀπολαύων)	God	by	means	 of	 his	more	
divine	nature	(διὰ	τῆς	θειοτέρας	φύσεως),	and	the	good	things	of	earth	by	the	
sense	 that	 is	 akin	 to	 them	 (διὰ	 τῆς	 ὁμογενοῦς	 αἰσθήσεως).’203	Banquet	 as	 a	




The	account	 in	De	opificio	hominis	reveals	a	 striking	 statement	 concerning	 the	
human	 being’s	 original	 purpose:	 he	 was	 created	 to	 enjoy.	 In	 fact,	 like	 Philo,	
Gregory	 interprets	the	Hebrew	name	 ‘Eden’	 itself	 to	mean	τρυφή,	 ‘delicacy’	or	
‘luxury’. 205 	The	 passage	 on	 original	 enjoyment	 will	 provide	 a	 contrast	 to	
Gregory’s	 account	 of	 the	 role	 of	 pleasure	 in	 the	 Fall	 and	 in	 the	 postlapsarian	
reality.	 For	now	a	 couple	of	 further	observations	will	 suffice.	 First,	we	 should	




enjoyment	 increases	 knowledge,	 and	 the	 sensible	 is	 a	 stepping-stone	 towards	
the	 intelligible.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 sensible	 realm	 is	 an	 instrument	 which	
through	 enjoyment	 leads	 the	 human	 being	 towards	 the	 Creator	 of	 the	 whole	
universe.	
	
Finally,	 the	 passage	 introduces	 an	 anthropological	 distinction	 that	 will	 have	
significant	 implications	 for	 Gregory’s	 understanding	 of	 pleasure:	 Just	 as	 the	
universe	consists	of	 two	kinds	of	phenomena,	 sensible	and	 intelligible,	 so	also	
man	 has	 two	 natures	 (φύσις)	 that	 correspond	 to	 them	 ontologically	 and	
																																																								






epistemologically.	 The	 ‘more	 divine	 nature’	 is	 located	 in	 the	 immaterial	mind	
(νοῦς,	 διάνοια),	 the	 seat	 of	 reason	 (λόγος)	 which	 is	 capable	 of	 acquiring	
knowledge	of	intelligible	things,	including	God.	The	sensate	nature,	on	the	other	
hand,	 is	 given	 to	 humans	 to	 learn	 about	 the	 material	 world.	 Underlying	 this	
distinction	is	the	idea	that	enjoyment	requires	an	ontological	similarity	between	
the	subject	and	the	object.	The	principle	is	affirmed	in	Oratio	catechetica	where	








While	 the	 God-like	 rational	 nature	 is	 the	 higher	 principle	 and	 the	 mark	 of	





the	 sensible	 world,	 it	 required	 a	 body	 and	 its	 senses	 as	 an	 epistemological	
aid.208	However,	some	questions	may	be	raised	about	the	nature	of	prelapsarian	
knowledge	 and	 enjoyment.	 Granted,	 Gregory’s	 account	 of	 the	 original	
enjoyment	 is	 preceded	by	 a	 description	 of	 the	material	wonders	 of	 the	world	
and	 he	 specifically	 states	 that	 the	 human	 faculty	 of	 sensation	was	 given	 for	 a	
good	purpose.	At	 the	same	 time,	other	passages	 in	De	hominis	opificio	and	 the	
rest	 of	 Gregory’s	 works	 indicate	 that	 the	 prelapsarian	 enjoyment	 of	 creation	












In	 Homilies	 on	 the	 Beatitudes,	 Gregory	 notes	 that	 man	 lived	 in	 Paradise,	
‘enjoying	 (κατατρυφᾷν)	 the	 things	 that	were	 growing	 there’,	 but	 immediately	
goes	on	to	specify	that	the	fruit	of	those	plants	was	‘life,	knowledge,	and	things	
like	 that’,	 i.e.	 the	 divine	 goods.210	And	 in	De	virginitate	we	 learn	 that	 the	 first	
man	 lived	 in	Paradise	 ‘looking	 freely	upon	the	 face	of	God,	not	yet	 judging	the	
beautiful	(τὸ	καλὸν	κρίνων)	by	taste	and	sight,	but	only	enjoying	(κατατρυφῶν)	




human	 being’s	 identity	 as	 the	 image	 of	 God.	 In	De	hominis	opificio	5,	 Gregory	
compares	 the	 human	 faculty	 of	 perception	 to	God	who	 ‘beholds	 and	hears	 all	
things.’212	This	makes	 Smith	 conclude	 that	 Gregory	 compares	 ‘the	 faculties	 of	
perception	proper	to	the	nonrational	soul’	to	the	‘divine	power	of	apprehension’	
and,	 thus,	 the	 divine	 image	 is	 not	 confined	 to	 the	 intellectual	 faculties	 but	
resides	in	the	‘psychosomatic	unity’	of	the	whole	person.213	However,	we	should	
note	that	Gregory	is	quick	to	specify	that	the	divine	image	is	not	reflected	in	the	




















his	 account	 of	 creation	 as	 a	 normative	 statement	 concerning	 the	 appropriate	
use	of	the	sensible	nature	even	though	the	context	is	decidedly	prelapsarian.	We	
should	 also	 note	 that	 although	 the	 prelapsarian	 relevance	 of	 sensation	 seems	
meagre,	 for	 Gregory	 the	 creation	 of	 humans	 as	 sensate	 beings	 has	 broader	
cosmic	scope.	As	sensate	embodied	creatures	humans	participate	in	the	sensible	
nature	of	 the	rest	of	 the	creation.	 In	 this	way	they	connect	 the	 intelligible	and	
the	 sensible	 into	 a	 harmonious	 whole,	 and	 bring	 the	 whole	 creation	 into	 a	
communion	with	the	intelligible	good.216	
	
As	 Gregory’s	 account	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 enjoyment	 reveals,	 the	 embodied	 and	
sensate	 nature	 was	 part	 of	 humanity	 from	 the	 very	 beginning.	 But	 while	
Gregory	stresses	the	original	harmony	between	the	intelligible	and	the	sensible	
nature,	it	is	clear	that	from	the	very	beginning	the	sensible	nature	was	not	only	
the	 inferior	 principle,	 but	 also	 the	 locus	 of	 potential	 tension	 in	 the	 human	
constitution.	Aligned	with	 the	will	 of	God	and	 the	 rule	of	 the	mind,	 it	 had	 the	
potential	to	assist	the	intelligible	nature	in	the	pursuit	of	knowledge	and	virtue.	





To	 find	 out	 how	humans	 became	 subject	 to	 the	 passion	 of	 pleasure,	we	must	
read	on	and	turn	to	chapters	16	and	18	of	De	hominis	opificio.	In	chapter	16	we	
find	 Gregory’s	 interpretation	 of	 an	 idea	 that	 became	 widespread	 in	 ancient	
Jewish	and	Christian	readings	of	Genesis:	the	creation	of	humanity	consisted	of	
two	 separate	 stages.	 This	 conclusion	 had	 first	 been	 reached	 as	 some	 early	
exegetes,	 most	 notably	 Philo	 and	 Origen,	 sought	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 opening	
chapters	 of	 Genesis	 seemed	 to	 contain	 two	 separate	 creation	 narratives,	







human	 nature.	 The	 second	 act,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 endowed	 humans	 with	
properties	that	made	them	suited	to	material	embodied	life.	For	Philo,	this	two-
stage	process	consisted	of	the	creation	of	the	general	human	nature,	followed	by	
the	 creation	 of	 particular	 embodied	 individuals.217	More	 problematic	 was	 the	
interpretation	 of	 Origen,	 arguing	 that	 the	 humans	 were	 first	 created	 as	
intelligible	beings	and	fell	into	bodies	as	a	consequence	of	sin.218		
	
Writing	 in	 the	 fourth	 century,	 Gregory	was	 aware	 of	 the	 theological	 tensions	
that	 earlier	 interpreters	 had	 caused	 by	 incorporating	 excessive	 body–soul	
dualism	 into	 the	 Christian	 doctrine.	 Thus,	 in	De	hominis	opificio	 he	 alludes	 to	
Origen	 and	 rejects	 his	 notion	 of	 the	 pre-existence	 of	 souls.219	Instead,	 he	 puts	
forth	 the	 view	 that	 the	 double	 creation	 entails	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 universal	
human	 nature	 followed	 by	 the	 creation	 of	 particular	 human	 beings.220	For	





arrangement,	 where	 it	 first	 says,	 “God	 created	man,	 in	 the	 image	 of	 God	 created	 He	






mentioned,	 –	 of	 the	 Divine,	 the	 rational	 and	 the	 intelligent	 element,	 which	 does	 not	
admit	 the	 distinction	 of	 male	 and	 female;	 of	 the	 irrational,	 our	 bodily	 form	 and	
structure,	 divided	 into	male	 and	 female:	 for	 each	 of	 these	 elements	 is	 certainly	 to	 be	
																																																								
217	For	 the	 double	 creation	 in	 Philo,	 see	 Opif.	mun.	46;	 Leg.	 I.12.	 See	 also	 Smith,	 Passion	 and	
Paradise,	33.	
218	See	Princ.	2.9;	Gen.	1.13.	For	a	 recent	assessment	of	 the	relevant	passages	and	 their	earlier	
scholarly	 interpretations,	 see	 Peter	 W.	 Martens,	 ‘Origen’s	 Doctrine	 of	 Pre-Existence	 and	 the	
Opening	Chapters	of	Genesis’,	Zeitschrift	Für	Antikes	Christentum,	no.	16	(2013):	516–49.	
219	See	 Gregory’s	 rejection	 of	 the	 pre-existence	 of	 souls	 in	 Op.	 hom.	 28	 (PG	 44,	 229).	 Here,	
Gregory	 reports	 that	 ‘[s]ome	 of	 those	 before	 our	 time	 who	 have	 dealt	 with	 the	 question	 of	
‘principles’	 (Περὶ	 τῶν	 ἀρχῶν)	 think	 it	 right	 to	 say	 that	 souls	 have	 a	 previous	 existence	 as	 a	
people	 in	a	society	of	 their	own…’	(trans.	NPNF,	419).	This	 is	a	 likely	reference	to	Origen’s	De	
principiis/Περὶ	ἀρχῶν,	and	indeed	the	phrase	is	capitalised	in	the	Greek	text	of	PG	as	in	a	title.	
220	On	 Gregory’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 human	 nature,	 see	 Zachhuber,	Human	
Nature	in	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	154–74.	
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female):	 then	 he	 adds	 the	 peculiar	 attributes	 of	 human	 nature,	 “male	 and	 female	 He	
created	them.”221	
	
On	Gregory’s	view,	 then,	what	God	created	 first	was	 the	universal	and	unified	
human	nature,	 free	 from	physical	reproduction	and	sexual	differentiation.	The	
universal	human	nature	of	the	first	creation	constituted	the	true	identity	of	all	
human	 beings	 as	 the	 image	 of	 God	 and	 contained	 only	 features	 that	 directly	
reflected	 the	 Creator. 222 	In	 Passion	 and	 Paradise,	 Smith	 divides	 Gregory’s	
conception	of	 the	divine	 likeness	 into	structural	and	moral	kinds:	Structurally,	
the	divine	likeness	is	manifested	in	the	soul’s	rational	faculties.	The	pinnacle	of	
being	made	in	the	image	of	God	resides	in	our	free	will,	which	Gregory	usually	
conceptualises	with	 the	word	 προαίρεσις	 (‘choice’).223	The	 human	 freedom	 of	
choice	 reflects	 God’s	 own	 freedom	 from	 necessity	 and	 is	 the	 prerequisite	 of	
virtuous	agency:	like	many	ancient	writers	before	him,	Gregory	emphasises	that	




by-product	of	 the	soul’s	 rational	nature	and	 therefore	a	capacity	of	 the	soul’s	 rational	
faculty.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 soul’s	 intellectual	 capacities	 for	 reasoning	 (logos),	
discriminating	 (diakrisis),	 and	 contemplation	 (theoria	 or	 dianoia)	 enable	 the	 soul	 to	
have	 knowledge	 of	 both	 the	 sensible	 goods	 of	 the	material	world	 and	 the	 intelligible	
goods	of	the	divine	and	heavenly	realm.	From	this	knowledge	the	soul	is	able	to	judge	





223	The	 term	 is	 prominent	 both	 in	 Aristotle	 and	 Stoics,	 frequently	 employed	 by	 later	 non-
Christian	Platonists,	and	adopted	by	both	Clement	and	Origen	 in	early	Christian	 literature.	On	
the	 term	 and	 its	 development	 and	 uses	 in	 antiquity,	 see	 John	 M.	 Rist,	 ‘Prohairesis:	 Proclus,	






This	 is	 the	basis	of	moral	agency	 to	which	we	will	 return	several	 times	as	we	
investigate	 why	 human	 beings	 tend	 to	 give	 in	 to	 the	 sinful	 lure	 of	 sensual	
pleasure.	 Smith	 also	 draws	 attention	 to	 De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione	 where	
Macrina	lists	intellect,	incorporeal	nature,	weightlessness,	and	transcendence	of	
spatial	 limitation	 as	 key	 features	 that	 the	 soul	 shares	 with	 its	 divine	
archetype.226		
	
Since	 likeness	 is	 a	 crucial	 condition	 for	 knowledge	 and	 participation,	 a	
structural	 similarity	 is	 required	 for	 human	 beings	 to	 be	 able	 to	 take	 part	 in	
God’s	 absolute	 goodness,	 which	 belongs	 to	 humans	 only	 indirectly.	 In	 other	
words,	the	soul’s	structural	likeness	to	God	makes	possible	its	moral	likeness	by	
enabling	 its	 a	participation	 in	 the	divine	 goods.227	The	moral	 likeness	 is	made	





more	 specifically,	 purity	 (καθαρότης),	 freedom	 from	 passion	 (ἀπάθεια),	




them	with	 their	 fundamental	 identity	 as	 the	 image	 of	 God.	What,	 then,	 of	 the	
second	 creation?	Whereas	 the	 first	 act	 of	 creation	 endows	humans	with	 their	
intelligible	nature,	in	the	second	act	of	creation	God	gives	humans	the	qualities	











after	 the	 fall	 when	 immortality	 through	 a	 direct	 communion	 with	 the	 divine	
goods	is	lost.229	However,	sexual	reproduction	does	not	occur	in	isolation	from	
the	rest	of	 the	animal	nature;	 it	 is	accompanied	by	all	 the	drives	and	 instincts	
that	 support	 self-preservation	 in	 animals.	 These	 are	 what	 Gregory	 calls	
‘passions’,	including	fear,	anger,	desire,	and,	crucially,	pleasure.	
	
The	origin	of	 passions	 is	 described	 in	Chapter	18	of	De	hominis	opificio.	Here,	
Gregory	 reiterates	 that	 passions	 have	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 the	 image	 of	 God,	
which	 is	 located	 in	 the	 superior,	 rational	 nature.	 They	 only	 become	 a	 part	 of	
humanity	 in	 the	second	act	of	 the	twofold	creation,	 for	as	humans	take	on	the	
animal	nature	 (φύσις)	 for	 reproductive	purposes,	 they	also	 receive	 a	 share	 in	
the	other	attributes	of	that	nature.230	As	Gregory	explains:	
	











with	 their	 reproductive	 ability.	 Unlike	 the	 prelapsarian	 enjoyment	 that	
permeated	both	the	intelligible	and	the	sensible	nature,	the	passion	of	pleasure	
was	from	the	very	beginning	foreign	to	the	divine	nature	and	secondary	to	the	
constitution	of	man.	 In	animals,	pleasure	 is	one	of	 the	many	qualities	 that	 aid	
the	self-preservation	of	the	species	by	ensuring	reproduction	or	protecting	the	










humans,	 then,	 both	 are	 turned	 into	 passions	 disposed	 towards	 an	 irrational,	
animal-like	 life.	 By	 linking	 pleasure	 to	 bodily	 survival,	 Gregory	 follows	 a	
common	 ancient	 trajectory	 which	 views	 pleasure	 as	 an	 incentive	 to	 self-
preservation	 through	 needs-satisfaction.	 In	 Letter	 116,	 Seneca	 explains	 the	
original	purpose	of	pleasure:	
	
Nature	 has	 intermingled	 pleasure	 (voluptatem)	 with	 necessary	 things	 –	 not	 in	 order	
that	we	should	seek	pleasure,	but	in	order	that	the	addition	of	pleasure	may	make	the	
indispensable	 means	 of	 existence	 attractive	 to	 our	 eyes.	 Should	 it	 claim	 rights	 of	 its	
own,	it	is	luxury.232	
	
Much	 in	 the	 same	 vein,	 Clement	 of	 Alexandria	 emphasises	 that	 pleasure	 is	 a	
secondary	 property	 that	 accompanies	 fulfilled	 needs	 to	motivate	 and	 support	
our	survival:	
	
There	 is	 not	 absolute	 necessity	 for	 the	 passion	 of	 pleasure	 (οὐκ	 ἀναγκαῖον	 τὸ	 τῆς	
ἡδονῆς	 πάθος).	 It	 follows	 on	 certain	 natural	 needs	 (ἐπακολούθημα	 δὲ	 χρείαις	 τισὶ	
φυσικαῖς)	–	hunger,	thirst,	cold,	marriage.	
	
At	 any	 rate,	 if	 it	 were	 possible	 to	 drink	 or	 take	 food	 or	 produce	 children	 without	
pleasure	entering	in,	then	it	would	be	shown	that	there	was	no	other	need	of	it	(ἐδείχθη	
ἂν	οὐδεμία	ἑτέρα	χρεία	ταύτης).	Pleasure	is	not	an	activity,	not	a	disposition,	certainly	
not	a	part	of	us.	 It	entered	our	life	as	a	support,	 just	as	salt	 is	said	to	exist	to	help	the	
digestion	 of	 food.	 But	when	 it	 is	 unleashed	 and	dominates	 the	 home,	 it	 brings	 desire	





Chapter	 5.	 Now	 it	 suffices	 to	 note	 that	 both	 Seneca	 and	 Clement	 consider	
pleasure	an	incentive	to	needs-satisfaction.	For	both,	the	purpose	of	pleasure	is	







contingent	 upon	 needs-satisfaction	 and	 wellbeing,	 which	 in	 turn	 serve	 the	
highest	 goal	of	 virtue.	While	 some	self-interest	 is	natural	 and	acceptable,	 self-
seeking	 hedonism	 will	 be	 detrimental.	 Clement,	 in	 particular,	 seems	 to	 think	




survival	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 sensible	nature	 as	 a	whole.	 The	 first	 point	 is	 that	
although	 the	 division	 of	 sexes	 and	 physical	 reproduction	 are	 given	 to	 help	
humans	exist	 in	 the	postlapsarian	world,	 they	are	not	 in	 themselves	sinful,	 let	
alone	a	divine	punishment,	but	a	benevolent	foresight	to	ensure	the	survival	and	







to	pleasure	pursued	 for	 its	own	sake,	 in	other	words,	pleasure	pursued	as	 the	
good.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 mere	 potential	 for	 pleasure	 added	 in	 creation	 and	 its	
appropriate	 actualisation	 as	 an	 accompaniment	 of	 reproduction	 do	 not	 alone	
entail	the	presence	of	sin.	
	
Second,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	although	 in	De	hominis	opificio	Gregory	names	
sexual	reproduction	as	the	origin	of	pleasure,	 in	most	of	his	works	ἡδονή	does	
not	 primarily	 refer	 to	 sexual	 pleasure	 at	 all.235	Only	 in	 De	 virginitate	 does	
pleasure	 have	 largely	 sexual	 connotations,	 which	 is	 obviously	 due	 to	 the	
purpose	of	 the	book	as	a	defence	of	a	 life	of	sexual	continence.	 In	 In	Canticum	
																																																								
234	This	at	least	would	be	Gregory’s	explicit	view.	Implicitly,	the	creation	of	the	sensible	nature	
may	 carry	 undertones	 of	 a	 ‘punishment	 for	 a	 sin	 that	 has	 as	 yet	 not	 been	 committed.’	
(Zachhuber,	Human	Nature	in	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	173.)	





(τὸ	 σφοδρότατον	 τῶν	 καθ᾽ἡδονὴν	 ἐνεργουμένων)236,	 but	 even	 here,	 like	 in	
most	of	Gregory’s	 corpus,	 the	 focus	 is	on	 the	more	general	aesthetic	aspect	of	




any	 point	 particular	 humans	 devoid	 of	 sexual	 differentiation	 and	 other	
secondary	characteristics.	The	two	acts	of	creation	are	not	to	be	understood	as	a	
strict	 temporal	 sequence,	but	as	an	 illustration	of	what	 is	 truly	 constitutive	of	
humanity	 as	 the	 image	 of	 God	 and	 what	 characteristics	 belong	 to	 humans	
secondarily	by	virtue	of	their	kinship	with	other	created	beings.237	
	
Gregory’s	 account	 in	 De	 hominis	 opificio	 reveals	 that	 while	 enjoyment	 of	 the	
divine	goods	belonged	to	the	prelapsarian	existence,	the	passion	of	pleasure	is	a	
decidedly	 postlapsarian	 phenomenon.	 Since	 the	 passions	 are	 activated	 only	












animals,	 and	was	 increased	 by	 the	 transgressions	 of	men,	 becoming	 the	 parent	 of	 so	
																																																								














The	 twofold	human	nature	has	 important	ethical	 implications,	on	which	 I	will	
expand	 in	 the	 subsequent	 chapters.	 Here	 we	 can	 briefly	 turn	 to	 Gregory’s	
Homily	8	 on	 Ecclesiastes	 where	 he	 explains	 that	 just	 as	 the	 human	 nature	 is	
double,	 divided	 into	 the	 intelligible	 and	 the	 sensible,	 human	 life,	 too,	 takes	 a	
double	 form:	 there	 is	 the	physical	 life	 of	 the	 sensing	part	 and	 the	mental	 and	
non-physical	 life	 of	 the	 mind.241	From	 this	 separation	 it	 results	 that	 also	 the	
definition	of	the	good	and	non-good	(τὸ	καλόν	τε	καὶ	μὴ	τοιοῦτον)	is	different	
for	each	part:	mental	for	the	mental	part	(νοητὸν	μὲν	τῷ	νοητῷ),	and	‘whatever	
sense	 desires’	 (ἡ	 αἴσθησις	 βούλεται)	 for	 the	 sensual	 and	 bodily	 part	 (τῷ	 δὲ	























intellectual	 nature,	 though	 its	 necessity	 and	 uses	 in	 the	 prelapsarian	 reality	
remain	ambiguous.	 In	 the	 second	one,	 the	 lower,	 animal	nature	 is	 seen	as	 the	
source	of	a	potential	conflict,	and	 its	attributes	are	described	as	 foreign	to	the	
divine	 nature	 which	 shapes	 human	 identity	 as	 the	 image	 of	 God.	 Indeed,	 the	
sensible	nature	harbours	a	troubling	paradox:	On	the	one	hand	it	was	given	to	
ensure	the	survival	of	humankind	after	the	fall.	On	the	other,	it	is	the	very	drives	
of	 the	 sensible	 nature	 that	 lead	 to	 sin	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 even	 if	 Gregory	
emphasises	 that	 the	ultimate	 choice	 lies	with	 free	will	 of	 the	mind.	Thus,	 it	 is	
easy	 to	agree	with	Zachhuber	who	suggests	 that	 ‘the	 changes	made	 to	human	
beings	[in	the	second	creation]	would	seem	to	increase	the	danger	of	sinning	at	
least	as	much	as	they	might	prevent	its	worst	consequences.’244	Smith	notes	the	
same	 tension,	 but	 ultimately	 chooses	 to	 highlight	 the	 positive	 epistemological	
relevance	 Gregory	 grants	 to	 the	 body	 and	 its	 senses	 as	 part	 of	 God’s	 original	
creative	 plan.245	However,	 as	 I	 have	 already	 pointed	 out,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	
what	 the	positive	 relevance	of	 the	animal	nature	 is	 in	 the	prelapsarian	 reality	
where	 the	 soul	 still	 directly	 communes	 with	 the	 divine	 goods	 through	 its	
intellect.	
	
The	 tension	 in	Gregory’s	account	of	 the	 two	natures	 is	 further	reflected	 in	 the	
way	 in	 which	 Gregory	 employs	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘human	 nature’.	 Although	 the	
beginning	of	De	hominis	opificio	affirms	that	the	human	nature	is	composite	and	
the	middle	between	the	intelligible	and	the	sensible	nature,	later	chapters	of	the	
treatise	 see	 Gregory	 veer	 away	 from	 a	 unitive	 concept	 of	 ‘human	 nature’	
towards	a	more	disjunctive	emphasis	on	the	two	natures.	Gregory’s	 insistence	
that	man’s	primary	purpose	and	identity	was	to	be	created	in	the	image	of	God	
leads	 him	 to	 assert	 that,	 properly	 speaking,	 the	 soul	 consists	 only	 of	 those	
aspects	 that	 reflect	 the	 divine. 246 	Thus,	 ‘human	 nature’	 becomes	 largely	
synonymous	with	the	‘intelligible	nature’.	In	De	anima	et	resurrectione,	another	
anthropological	 treatise,	 this	 view	 is	 articulated	 clearly	 by	 Gregory’s	 sister	








of	reason	(νοῦς),	spirited	part	 (θυμός),	and	desiring	part	 (ἐπιθυμία).	Thus,	 for	




Ultimately,	 the	 narrative	 of	 double	 creation	 and	 Macrina’s	 definition	 of	 the	
human	nature	serve	 to	explain	how	humans	can	at	once	be	subject	 to	passion	
and	 made	 in	 the	 image	 of	 God	 who	 is	 by	 definition	 impassible	 (ἀπαθής).249	
Separating	 the	 two	 natures	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 locate	 the	 passions	 in	 a	 part	 of	
humanity	that	does	not	reflect	the	image	of	God	but	belongs	to	humans	so	far	as	
they	share	in	the	animal	nature.	In	this	way	humans	can	be	called	‘the	image	of	
God’,	 while	 the	 presence	 of	 passions	 is	 also	 acknowledged	 as	 stemming	 from	
humans	 themselves,	 not	 from	 God	 or	 any	 other	 external	 source.	 Elsewhere,	
Gregory	 explicitly	 names	 ἡδονή	 as	 one	 of	 the	 passions	 that	 have	 no	 place	 in	
God. 250 	This	 is	 particularly	 understandable	 if	 we	 recall	 that	 Gregory	
conceptualises	 pleasure	 as	 a	 filling	 of	 a	 lack	 and,	 thus,	 a	 generation	 –	 a	


















changeable.’	 (Zachhuber,	 Human	 Nature	 in	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa,	 147.)	 Furthermore,	 Zachhuber	
notes	that	in	Op.	hom.	16,	which	I	have	discussed	here,	Gregory	introduces	the	theory	of	double	




the	 spiritual	 life?	 Are	 they	 simply	 cut	 off	 or	 can	 they	 be	 redeemed?	 And	 if	
passions	are	completely	foreign	to	the	human	nature	as	the	image	of	God,	why	
does	 the	 Bible	 seem	 to	 talk	 about	 people	 who	 used	 their	 passions	 for	 godly	
purposes?	We	 shall	 see	 that	 while	 some	 tension	 remains,	 Gregory	 addresses	
these	 issues	 especially	 in	 his	 dissatisfied	 response	 to	Macrina	 in	De	anima	 et	
resurrectione.	 But	 before	 we	 turn	 to	 the	 fate	 of	 the	 passions,	 let	 us	 briefly	
investigate	 the	 place	 of	 pleasure	 in	 the	 threefold	 structure	 that	 Gregory	 and	
Macrina	 put	 forth	 in	 the	 same	 dialogue,	 and	 compare	 it	 to	 another	 threefold	






foundation	 for	 understanding	 the	 origin	 and	 function	 of	 pleasure,	 at	 times	
Gregory	 embeds	 pleasure	within	models	 where	 the	 human	 soul	 is	 divided	 in	
three	 instead	 of	 two.	 Here,	 I	 am	 thinking	 of	 two	 influential	 ways	 of	
conceptualising	the	soul	and	its	faculties	that	could	be	roughly	characterised	as	
‘Platonist’	 and	 ‘Peripatetic.’	 Although	 earlier	 scholarship	 often	 portrayed	
Gregory	as	an	heir	to	the	tripartite	Platonist	model	of	the	soul	–	consisting	of	the	
intellect	 (λογιστικόν),	 the	 spirited	 part	 (θυμοειδές)	 and	 the	 appetitive	 part	
(ἐπιθυμητικόν)	 –	 it	 has	 since	been	noted	 that	 his	 anthropology	 is	much	more	
varied	and	not	always	consistent.251	The	number	of	parts	into	which	the	soul	is	
divided,	and	whether	or	not	it	is	appropriate	to	talk	about	‘parts’	at	all,	has	been	
called	 into	 question.	 The	 specific	 nature	 of	 these	 entities,	 that	 is	 whether	we	
should	 talk	 about	 ‘parts’	 or	 ‘faculties’,	 will	 have	 little	 impact	 on	 my	 analysis.	
Furthermore,	 the	 observation	 that	 the	 threefold	 division	 often	 collapses	 into	
two	 is	 fully	 in	 line	 with	 what	 I	 am	 going	 to	 argue:	 ultimately	 both	 threefold	








the	 fundamental	 anthropological	 categories	 in	 Gregory’s	 discussions	 on	
pleasure.		
	
The	 ‘Platonist’	 threefold	 model	 receives	 the	 most	 complete	 treatment	 in	
Gregory’s	 long	 exposition	 on	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 soul	 in	 De	 anima	 et	
resurrectione.	 It	 informs	 Gregory	 and	 Macrina’s	 discussion	 on	 the	 origin	 of	









Smith	 interprets	 Macrina’s	 comment	 to	 mean	 that	 the	 ‘immediate	 reactions	
either	 of	 fear	 and	 anger	 (thymos)	 to	 painful	 or	 unappealing	 sensations	 or	 of	
desire	and	longing	(epithymia)	to	pleasing	sense	data	are	the	principal	emotions	
(pathê)	 by	 which	 all	 other	 emotions	 are	 derived.’254	In	 other	 words,	 behind	
every	passion	is	a	reaction	to	a	thing	as	pleasant	or	unpleasant.	This	highlights	
the	role	of	pleasure	and	 its	opposite,	pain	or	distress,	as	 the	 two	 fundamental	
emotions	 from	 which	 all	 other	 emotions	 are	 derived.	 However,	 Smith’s	
interpretation	does	not	explain	why	pleasure	 is	 said	 to	direct	both	θυμός	and	
ἐπιθυμία:	 he	 connects	 distress	 to	 θυμός	 and	 pleasure	 to	 ἐπιθυμία,	 although	
Macrina	 explains	 that	 both	 of	 these	 emotions	 concern	 both	 parts	 of	 the	 soul.	
What,	then,	is	the	connection	between	pleasure	and	θυμός?	
	
I	would	argue	 that	what	we	 find	here	 is	precisely	 the	distinction	between	 the	
‘more	 shameful	 pleasures’	 and	 ‘pleasure	 in	 honours	 and	 love	 of	 power’	 (τῆν	






chapter.255	While	 ἐπιθυμία,	 the	 lowest	part	of	 the	 soul	 and	as	 such	 the	 closest	
companion	of	the	body,	urges	people	to	seek	the	fulfilment	of	bodily	drives,	the	
soul	also	seeks	pleasure	in	ways	that	are	neither	bodily	nor	fully	intellectual.	In	
the	 Greek	 philosophical	 tradition,	 θυμός	 was	 often	 associated	 with	 fear	 and	
anger,	but	it	was	also	seen	as	a	seat	of	passions	that	were	not	characterised	by	
withdrawal	or	aggression	but	a	certain	kind	of	drive	and	gratification.	In	Book	9	
of	Plato’s	Republic,	we	 find	Socrates	and	Glaucon	discussing	 the	 three	parts	of	
the	 soul.	 After	 an	 attempt	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 soul	 is	 indeed	 tripartite,	
Socrates	 comes	 up	 with	 one	 more	 proof:	 there	 seem	 to	 exist	 three	 kinds	 of	
pleasures,	 each	 of	 them	 peculiar	 to	 a	 certain	 part	 of	 the	 soul. 256 	Here,	
ἐπιθυμητικόν	 is	 associated	 with	 pleasures	 of	 food,	 drink,	 sex,	 and	 money,	
whereas	θυμοειδές	pursues	 ‘control,	victory,	and	high	repute’	and	can	 thus	be	
called	 ‘victory-loving	 and	 honor-loving’	 (φιλόνικον	 αὐτὸ	 καὶ	 φιλότιμον).257	
Furthermore,	 Socrates	 goes	on	 to	note	 that	 in	 ignorant	people	 love	of	honour	
paves	the	way	to	envy,	and	love	of	victory	to	violence.258	In	this	way,	pleasures	
of	 θυμοειδές	 lead	 to	 a	 number	 of	 passions.	 The	 characteristic	 pleasures	 of	
ἐπιθυμητικόν	 and	 θυμοειδές	 resemble	 Gregory’s	 distinction	 between	 ‘more	
shameful	pleasures’	and	‘pleasure	in	honours	and	love	of	power’.	Thus,	we	have	
a	 good	 reason	 to	 assume	 that,	 for	 him,	 θυμός	 is	 not	 only	 associated	 with	
distress,	but	has	 its	 characteristic	pleasures	which	give	 rise	 to	other	passions.	
Gregory	 articulates	 something	 similar	 in	 the	 passage	 from	 Homily	 12	 on	 the	
Song	of	Songs,	the	passage	I	have	cited	in	the	title	of	this	thesis:		
	
For	 some	pleasure	or	other	 (ἡδονή	τις)	 is	 the	 instigator	of	all	 vicious	actions	 that	get	
carried	out,	and	there	is	no	such	thing	as	sin	that	is	disjoined	from	pleasure	(οὐκ	ἔστιν	




256	Rep.	 9,	 580d.	 I	 will	 cite	 here	 the	 part	 that	 pertains	 to	 pleasures	 of	 ἐπιθυμία	 and	 θυμός,	
although	the	dialogue	also	mentions	pleasures	of	the	intellect.	Intellectual	pleasures	will	be	the	
topic	of	the	final	part	of	this	thesis.	










primary	passion	that	 is	 the	source	of	all	other	passions	and	vicious	actions.	 In	
the	next	chapter,	we	shall	 investigate	just	how	pleasure	accomplishes	this.	For	






θυμός	 and	 its	 relationship	 to	 pleasure.	 Normally,	 the	 three	 parts	 of	 the	 soul	
collapse	 into	 two,	 so	 that	 the	 intellect	 is	 contrasted	 with	 the	 appetitive	 part.	
While	 the	 former	 delights	 in	 contemplation,	 the	 latter	 gravitates	 towards	 all	
material	pleasures,	 from	pleasures	of	eating	and	sex	to	the	aesthetic	pleasures	




soul,	 is	 discussed	 at	 length	 in	De	 hominis	 opificio	 8	 where	 Gregory	 uses	 it	 to	
explain	the	order	of	creation.	Here,	the	three	levels	are	three	different	kinds	of	
souls,	 of	 which	 each	 is	 characteristic	 to	 a	 certain	 rank	 of	 embodied	 beings:	
plants,	 irrational	 animals,	 and	 humans.	 Higher	 souls	 will	 comprise	 all	
characteristics	 of	 the	 lower	 souls,	with	 added	 powers	 (δυνάμεις)	 that	 are	 the	
defining	 feature	 of	 their	 category.	 	In	 this	 ranking	 of	 faculties,	 the	most	 basic	
level	 is	 the	 power	 of	 growth	 and	 nutrition,	 which	 is	 characteristic	 of	 plants.	
Second	 comes	 ‘the	 power	 of	management	 according	 to	 sense’,	 in	 other	words	
sensation	 and	 perception,	 which	 irrational	 animals	 possess	 in	 addition	 to	
nourishment	 and	 growth.	 The	 third	 and	perfect	manifestation	 of	 bodily	 life	 is	
the	rational	human	nature,	which	 ‘both	 is	nourished	and	endowed	with	sense,	
and	also	partakes	of	 reason	 (λόγου)	and	 is	ordered	by	mind	 (νῷ).’260	In	other	





vocabulary	 of	 body–soul–spirit	 (σῶμα–ψυχή–πνεῦμα)	 and	 heart–soul–mind	
(καρδία–ψυχή–διάνοια).261	
	
What	 does	 this	 anthropological	model	 have	 to	 do	with	 pleasure?	 The	 answer	
follows	 immediately:	 Gregory	 explains	 that	 just	 as	 Paul	 recognises	 a	 division	
between	 the	 body,	 the	 soul	 and	 the	 spirit,	 he	 also	 recognises	 three	 possible	
choices	 (προαιρέσεως)	 that	direct	people’s	actions:	carnal	 (σαρκικήν),	psychic	




nutritive	 aspect	 of	 their	 soul,	 who	 busy	 themselves	 ‘with	 the	 belly	 and	 the	
pleasures	connected	with	it’	(ἣ	περὶ	γαστέρα	καὶ	τὰς	περὶ	ταύτην	ἡδυπαθείας).	
According	 to	 Gregory,	 this	 is	 why	 Paul	 reproaches	 the	 Corinthians	 for	 their	
‘indulgence	 in	 pleasure	 (τὸ	 ἀπολαυστικόν)	 and	 passion’	 by	 calling	 them	
carnal.262		
	
The	 passage	 seems	 to	 imply,	 somewhat	 puzzlingly,	 that	 at	 least	 rudimentary	
pleasures	of	nutrition	are	a	feature	of	plants	and	of	the	nutritive	faculty	of	the	
soul,	 rather	 than	 of	 the	 higher	 order	 of	 animals	 who	 are	 endowed	 with	
sensation.	Such	a	view	 is	not	unheard	of	 in	ancient	philosophy,	but	we	should	
note	 that	 Aristotle	 himself	 does	 not	 endorse	 it.263	Both	 in	 De	 anima	 and	 in	
Aristotle’s	 ethical	 writings	 pleasure	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 capacity	 of	 sense-
perception,	 which	 plants	 lack	 and	 animals	 possess.	 Since	 a	 plant	 lacks	 both	
appetite	and	sense	perception,	it	is	neither	able	to	generate	a	representation	of	












Aristotle	 or	 by	 other	 Greek	 writers	 who	 argued	 that	 plants	 can	 partake	 in	
pleasure	 and	 pain.265	But	more	 importantly,	 the	 connection	 between	 pleasure	
and	 the	 plant	 soul	 ties	 together	 biblical	 elements	 which	 are	 undoubtedly	
Gregory’s	main	 interest	 in	 the	 passage.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 trichotomous	 soul	
reflects	the	order	of	creation	and	connects	it	to	the	three	governing	dispositions	































the	 tripartite	 ‘Platonist’	 notion	 of	 the	 soul. 267 	Thus,	 some	 scholars	 have	
suggested	 that	 Gregory	 unskilfully	 equates	 the	 Aristotelian	 model	 with	 the	
Platonist	one	that	occurs	more	frequently	in	his	writings.	I	would	argue	that	the	
appearance	 of	 the	 Aristotelian	 model	 in	 De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione	 is	 not	 so	
much	due	to	philosophical	confusion	as	related	to	Gregory’s	exegetical	concern:	
also	 in	 this	work,	 the	threefold	distinction	 is	 linked	to	 the	order	of	creation	 in	
Genesis.	 After	 explaining	 how	 both	 the	 nutritive	 faculty	 of	 the	 plants	 and	 the	
irrational	sensate	nature	of	the	animals	are	mixed	with	the	rational	part	of	the	
soul,	 Gregory	 drops	 the	 plant	 motive	 altogether	 and	 proceeds	 to	 discuss	 the	
animal	nature	and	its	relationship	to	reason	in	human	beings.	In	this	discussion,	
the	 animal	 nature	 remains	 the	 basic	 concept,	 which	 is	 at	 times	 divided	 into	
θυμός	 and	 ἐπιθυμία.268	Such	 a	 practical	 eclectic	 approach	 is	 not	 unusual	 of	




soul	 complicate	 our	 project	 of	 locating	 pleasure,	 underlying	 both	 threefold	
models,	 and	 on	 a	 larger	 scale	 both	 treatises,	 is	 the	 fundamental	 division	
between	man’s	two	natures:	the	rational	and	the	irrational,	the	intelligible	and	
the	 sensible,	 the	God-like	 and	 the	 creaturely.	 Gregory	 is	 not	 the	 first	 to	move	
fluidly	between	twofold	and	threefold	conceptions	of	the	soul.	Even	Plato	who	is	
usually	 cited	as	 the	original	proponent	of	 a	 tripartite	notion	of	 the	 soul,	 often	
discusses	 the	 soul	 as	 a	 dichotomous	 entity	 consisting	 of	 the	 intellect	 and	 the	
appetite.	 In	 fact,	Plato’s	ancient	commentators	frequently	associate	him	with	a	




269	This	 is	 in	 line	with	 Barnes’s	 general	 argument	 that	 Gregory’s	 use	 of	 psychological	models	
depends	on	his	theological	concerns.	Barnes	argues	that	the	broader	purpose	of	the	passage	in	






division	 between	 λόγος	 and	 ἄλογος.270	Thus,	 Barnes,	who	 cautions	 us	 against	
overestimating	Gregory’s	 Platonism	 (at	 least	 so	 far	 as	we	 are	 referring	 to	 the	
thought	 of	 Plato	 himself),	 notes	 that	 in	 many	 later	 authors	 ‘Plato's	 tripartite	
division	of	the	soul	was	subsumed	under	the	Aristotelian	bipartite	division,	such	
that	Plato's	moral	psychology	is	understood	to	consist	of	a	bipartite	division	in	












lower	 parts	 of	 the	 soul	 runs	 a	 constant	 risk	 of	 being	 reduced	 to	 the	 level	 of	
irrational	 beasts.274	However,	 even	 though	 pleasure	 stems	 from	 the	 animal	
nature,	it	does	not	operate	in	rational	souls	exactly	in	the	same	way	as	it	does	in	
irrational	 animals.	 Instead,	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 rational	mind	 both	 aggravates	
and	 edifies	 the	 soul’s	 tendency	 towards	 pleasure.275	I	 have	 already	 alluded	 to	
the	first	possibility	by	citing	the	text	from	De	hominis	opificio	in	which	Gregory	
notes	 that	 as	 rational	 beings	 humans	 become	 capable	 of	 sins	 that	 cannot	 be	
found	 in	 irrational	 animals.	 But	 just	 as	 the	 irrational	 parts	 of	 the	 soul	 can	
harness	the	weakened	mind	to	their	service	and	develop	passions	that	irrational	
animals	do	not	have,	the	interaction	can	also	be	reversed:	the	crucial	difference	










control,	 and	 redirect	 the	pleasurable	 impulses	 that	 arise	 in	 the	 lower	parts	of	
the	soul	 in	order	to	use	them	for	higher	ends	that	are	not	directly	available	to	
the	 senses	 but	 only	 accessible	 to	 the	 rational	 faculties.276	For	 Gregory,	 this	
activity	of	 the	mind	on	 the	 lower	 faculties	of	 the	soul	 is	not	 limited	 to	control	
and	suppression,	but	entails	a	 transformation	of	 the	 impulses	so	that	 they	can	
be	harnessed	for	the	pursuit	of	higher,	virtuous	ends.277	
	
Here	 we	 should	 recall	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 free	 will	 or,	 as	 Gregory	 puts	 it,	
‘choice’	(προαίρεσις)	as	the	key	function	that	makes	humans	independent	moral	





ancient	 ethical	 ideal	 of	metriopatheia,	 the	 moderation	 of	 emotions,	 and	 then	
examine	how	Gregory	applies	this	idea	to	the	interaction	between	the	mind	and	
irrational	 impulses.	 De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione	 offers	 the	 most	 detailed	
discussion	on	the	topic.	The	transformation	of	passions	is	a	well	known	feature	
of	 Gregory’s	 moral	 theology,	 which	 has	 received	 an	 extensive	 treatment	 in	
Warren	Smith’s	Passion	and	Paradise:	Human	and	Divine	Emotion	in	Gregory	of	
Nyssa.278	The	following	account	will	be	largely	consonant	with	Smith’s	analysis,	
but	 I	 will	 keep	 my	 focus	 on	 the	 passion	 of	 pleasure	 and	 offer	 a	 few	 further	
perspectives.	
	
Most	 ancient	 thinkers	 accepted	 the	 view	 that	 human	 behaviour	 ought	 to	 be	
directed	by	the	rational	interests	of	the	mind.	The	way	in	which	the	mind	was	to	
assert	 its	 superior	position	 took	 two	primary	 forms:	 it	was	expected	either	 to	
moderate	irrational	impulses	or	extinguish	all	forms	of	irrational	activity	in	the	









direct	 them	 towards	 rationally	 determined	 virtuous	 ends.	 The	 latter	 ideal,	
apatheia,	 was	 particularly	 well	 known	 from	 Stoic	 philosophy.	 The	 two	 ideals	
resulted	from	two	different	conceptions	of	the	place	of	the	irrational	in	the	soul:	
Since	the	Stoics	believed	that	the	soul	was	unitary	and	fully	rational,	they	could	
not	 accept	 any	 degree	 of	 irrationality	 in	 its	 operations:	 either	 the	 soul	 was	
functioning	 rationally	 as	 intended	or	 it	was	 distorted	by	passion.	No	 elevated	
irrationality	 existed,	 since	 irrationality	 was	 foreign	 to	 the	 unified	 rational	
nature	 of	 human	 beings.280	In	 contrast,	 Platonic	 and	 Peripatetic	 philosophers	
were	 more	 willing	 to	 include	 an	 element	 of	 irrationality,	 which	 could	 be	
harnessed	and	honed	 to	serve	 the	rational	mind.	Thus,	 there	could	be	various	
degrees	of	emotion,	reaching	from	base	and	irrational	to	rationally	refined.	
	
Both	 of	 these	 concepts	 became	 well	 known	 and	 influential	 far	 beyond	 the	
boundaries	 of	 the	 philosophical	 schools	 in	 which	 they	 originated.	 Many	 later	




or	 at	 least	misrepresented	 the	 Stoic	 ideal.281	In	 the	 Judaeo-Christian	 tradition,	
Philo,	 Clement	 of	 Alexandria,	 and	 Origen	 all	 envisioned	 the	 spiritual	 life	 as	 a	
development	 from	metriopatheia	 towards	 apatheia:	 the	 former	 was	 the	 first	
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step	 in	 the	 moral	 progress,	 the	 latter	 the	 aim	 of	 advanced	 believers	 and	 the	
culmination	of	the	divine	likeness.282	 	
	
As	 regards	 the	 two	 main	 attitudes	 towards	 emotions,	 Gregory	 considers	
apatheia	one	of	 the	key	characteristics	of	God	and,	consequently,	of	 the	divine	
likeness	 in	 human	 beings;283	the	 term	 metriopatheia	 does	 not	 appear	 in	 his	
works	 at	 all.	 However,	 the	 contrast	 between	 the	 two	 ideals	 is	 evident	 for	
example	in	Beat.	2	where	Gregory	argues	that	the	beatitude’s	call	for	meekness	
does	 not	 entail	 a	 complete	 extirpation	 of	 passions:	 ‘Hence	 the	 Beatitude	
commands	moderation	(τὸ	μέτριόν)	and	meekness,	but	not	complete	absence	of	
passion	(τὸ	παντάπασιν	ἀπαθές);	 for	 the	 latter	 is	outside	 the	scope	of	nature,	
whereas	 the	 former	 can	 be	 achieved	 by	 virtue.’284	At	 least	 in	 the	 earthly	 life,	
metriopatheia	 suffices	 as	 the	 Christian	 ideal	 since	 a	 complete	 extirpation	 of	
passions	would	 require	 humans	 to	 transcend	 their	 embodied	 state.	 However,	
even	 where	 Gregory	 advocates	 for	 apatheia,	 it	 does	 not	 always	 denote	 a	
complete	 eradication	 of	 passions	 but	 rather	 a	 detachment	 from	 the	 turbulent	
phenomena	of	the	sensible	world	and	a	state	in	which	the	passionate	impulses	
have	 been	 submitted	 to	 the	 control	 of	 the	 mind	 but	 not	 completely	
extinguished.285	Knuuttila	 notes	 that	 such	 usage	 is	 not	 uncommon	 in	 later	
Platonist	 writers	 who	 may	 criticise	 the	 Stoic	 notion	 of	 apatheia,	 but	




When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 spiritual	 fulfilment,	 Gregory’s	 vision	 oscillates	 between	
the	 two	 concepts.	 In	 De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione,	 where	 we	 find	 an	 extensive	
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as	De	mortuis	and	 In	Canticum,	 rationally	 regulated	emotion	remains	 the	 ideal	















However,	 in	 De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione,	 Gregory	 offers	 a	 more	 extensive	
reflection	on	the	spiritual	relevance	of	the	passions.	In	this	work,	we	are	at	first	
presented	with	a	similar	view,	as	Macrina	and	Gregory	begin	their	dialogue	on	
the	 nature	 of	 passions.	Unsatisfied	with	Macrina’s	 definition	 of	 the	 soul	 as	 an	
exclusively	 intellectual	entity,	Gregory	asks	what	what	we	should	make	of	 the	
movements	of	 ἐπιθυμία	and	θυμός	 that	 are	neither	bodily	nor	 intellectual.	He	
claims	that	Macrina’s	argument	can	only	lead	to	two	absurd	conclusions:	either	
ἐπιθυμία	and	θυμός	constitute	separate	souls,	 leading	to	a	plurality	of	souls	 in	
human	beings,	 or	 they	 are	 completely	 excluded	 from	 the	 definition	 of	 soul.288	







points	 out	 that	 the	 Bible	 provides	 illuminating	 examples	 of	 people	 who	
transformed	 their	 passions,	 such	 as	 desire,	 fear	 and	 anger,	 into	 vehicles	 of	
virtue.289	This	 remark	 persuades	 Macrina	 to	 offer	 a	 corrective	 to	 her	 earlier	
argument.	Now,	she	no	longer	describes	the	passions	as	external	 ‘warts’	of	the	
soul,	 but	 as	 phenomena	 that	 lie	 ‘on	 the	 borderland	 of	 the	 soul’,	 between	 the	
sensate	creation	and	the	intellectual	image	of	God.	In	other	words,	their	status	is	
liminal	 and	 ambivalent:	 each	 passion	 is	 ‘capable	 of	 inclining	 to	 either	 of	 two	
opposites	 according	 to	 its	 particular	 nature’,	 and	 thus	 ‘the	 way	 it	 is	 used	
determines	the	outcome	whether	for	the	good	or	its	opposite.’290	
	
Human	 passions,	 then,	 can	 serve	 different	 ends.	 Whereas	 in	 animals	 the	
irrational	 parts	 of	 the	 soul	 exist	 alone	 and	 are	 only	 directed	 towards	 the	
sensible,	 in	human	beings	 ‘all	that	is	proper	to	the	irrational	nature	is	mingled	
(κατεμίχθη)	with	 the	 intellectual	part	of	 the	soul.’291	Macrina	explains	 that	 the	
only	way	the	reasoning	power	(λογικὴν	δύναμιν)	can	enter	bodily	life	is	through	
being	 united	 with	 the	 senses,	 and	 thus	 our	 rational	 soul	 is	 in	 communion	
(κοινωνία)	with	all	that	accompanies	sensation	in	the	irrational	animals.292	She	





been	 allotted	 to	 human	 life	 for	 any	 bad	 purpose	 at	 all,	 for	 the	 Creator	would	 be	 the	
author	 of	 vices	 if	 compulsions	 to	 wrongdoing	 had	 been	 implanted	 along	 with	 our	
nature.	Instead,	these	movements	of	the	soul	(τὰ	τοιαῦτα	τῆς	ψυχῆς	κινήματα)	become	
















direct	 the	 passions	 leads	 to	 a	 crucial	 difference	 between	 human	 and	 animal	
passions.	The	mind	is	not	simply	a	separate	entity	that	sits,	as	it	were,	on	top	of	
the	 sensate	 animal	 soul	 and	 tries	 to	 bridle	 its	 irrational	 impulses.	 On	 the	
contrary,	 as	 Macrina’s	 vocabulary	 of	 ‘mingling’	 and	 ‘communion’	 implies,	 the	
mind	 imparts	 its	 rational	 qualities	 to	 the	 animal	 soul.	 This	 brings	 about	 a	
twofold	 transformation	of	 the	passions:	First,	 the	mind	can	ensure	 that	drives	
towards	the	material	world	are	kept	within	appropriate	limits.	Second,	the	mind	
can	 harness	 the	 power	 of	 passions	 and	 direct	 them	 towards	 intelligible	 ends,	
which	the	 lower	parts	of	 the	soul	alone	would	not	be	able	 to	grasp	since	such	
matters	extend	beyond	the	realm	of	the	senses.295	This	process	signifies	a	return	
to	the	original	harmony	in	which	the	sensible	nature	was	perfectly	governed	by	
the	 mind. 296 	As	 regards	 pleasure,	 the	 two-pronged	 moderation	 takes	 the	
following	forms:	First,	the	mind	must	ensure	that	the	soul	takes	pleasure	only	in	
appropriate	material	objects,	i.e.	things	used	to	satisfy	inevitable	physical	needs.	
Thus,	 pleasure	 returns	 to	 its	 original	 role	 as	 a	 facilitator	 of	 self-preservation	
instead	of	 growing	 into	 excessive,	 violent	proportions	and	becoming	a	 goal	 in	
itself.	Second,	by	directing	the	impulse	of	desire	towards	the	higher	intelligible	
reality,	the	mind	trains	the	lower	part	of	the	soul	to	take	pleasure	in	more	noble	












prevails	 over	 the	other.	Thus	 if	 one	 focuses	 attention	on	 sense	perception	 (αἴσθησιν)	
and	 seeks	 for	oneself	 the	pleasure	 (ἡδονήν)	 it	 grafts	 into	 the	body,	 one’s	 life	 is	 spent	





The	ways	 in	which	 the	mind	 fails	 and	 succeeds	 in	 controlling	 the	 impulse	 for	
pleasure,	both	as	regards	the	sensible	and	the	intelligible	realm,	will	be	the	topic	
of	 the	subsequent	chapters	of	 this	 thesis.	Now,	 I	will	 simply	draw	attention	 to	
some	 of	 the	 basic	 principles	 that	 guide	 the	 interaction	 of	 the	 mind	 and	 the	
irrational	elements	of	the	soul	when	a	pleasurable	stimulus	arises	and	is	either	
accepted	 or	 rejected.	 Let	 us	 turn	 again	 to	De	 opificio	 hominis	 where	 Gregory	
describes	 the	 opposing	 ways	 in	 which	 disordered	 and	 rightly	 ordered	 souls	
respond	to	pleasurable	impulses:	
 
There	 are	 cases,	 however,	 in	 which	 the	 mind	 even	 follows	 natural	 impulses	
(ἐπακολουθεῖ	ταῖς	φυσικαῖς	ὁρμαῖς	ὁ	νοῦς),	and	becomes,	as	it	were,	their	servant.	For	
often	the	bodily	nature	(ἡ	τοῦ	σώματος	φύσις)	takes	the	lead	by	introducing	either	the	
sense	of	 that	which	gives	pain	 (τοῦ	λυποῦντος	αἴσθησιν)	or	 the	desire	 for	 that	which	
gives	pleasure	(τοῦ	εὐφραίνοντος	ἐπιθυμίαν),	so	that	it	may	be	said	to	furnish	the	first	
beginnings	(τὰς	πρώτας…	ἀρχάς)	by	producing	 in	us	the	desire	 for	 food,	or,	generally	
the	 impulse	 towards	 some	 pleasant	 thing	 (καθ’	 ἡδονὴν	 τὴν	 ὁρμήν);	 while	 the	 mind,	
receiving	such	an	impulse	(ἐκδεχόμενον	τὰς	τοιαύτας	ὁρμάς),	furnishes	the	body	by	its	
own	 intelligence	with	 the	proper	means	 towards	 the	desired	object.	Such	a	condition,	
indeed,	does	not	occur	in	all,	save	in	those	of	a	somewhat	slavish	disposition,	who	bring	
the	reason	into	bondage	to	the	impulses	of	their	nature	(οἳ	δουλώσαντες	τὸν	λόγον	ταῖς	
ὁρμαῖς	 τῆς	 φύσεως)	 and	 pay	 servile	 homage	 to	 the	 pleasures	 of	 sense	 (τὸ	 κατὰ	 τὰς	












τοῦ	 σώματος	 φύσις)	 gains	 dominion	 over	 the	 mind	 by	 introducing	 a	 desire	
towards	 something	pleasurable	 and	prompting	 the	mind	 to	 strive	 for	 it.	 If,	 on	
the	 other	 hand,	 the	 mind	 operates	 as	 intended,	 it	 does	 not	 succumb	 to	
pleasurable	 impulses	uncritically,	but	 is	 able	 to	assess	 their	 content	 rationally	
and	 choose	 to	 accept	 or	 reject	 them.	 The	 dynamic	 between	 the	mind	 and	 the	
pleasurable	 impulses	 arising	 from	 the	 bodily	 nature	 through	 the	 senses	 is	 of	
utmost	 importance	 for	 Gregory’s	 understanding	 of	 pleasure.	 It	 captures	 the	
ambivalent	 relationship	 between	 man’s	 two	 natures	 and	 forms	 the	 core	 of	
Gregory’s	ethics	of	pleasure.	
	
The	 passage	 above	 provides	 an	 important	 verbal	 cue	 that	 highlights	 the	
cognitive	aspect	of	pleasure	and	helps	us	place	Gregory’s	theory	of	passions	in	
its	intellectual	context.	The	word	ὁρμή,	‘impulse’,	is	a	prominent	term	in	ancient	
theories	of	cognition.	 It	 is	perhaps	best	known	from	Stoic	sources	–	a	point	 to	
which	 I	 shall	 soon	 return.299	From	 the	 passage	 above,	 we	 learn	 that	 Gregory	
understands	ὁρμή as	a	prompt	 to	a	passionate	reaction	 that	 the	bodily	nature	
introduces	to	the	rational	mind.	Here,	Gregory	discusses	two	fundamental	kinds	
of	 ὁρμή:	 a	 painful	 sensation	 that,	 although	 Gregory	 does	 not	 say	 it,	 urges	 the	
mind	 to	 avoid	 an	 object,	 and	 a	 desire	 for	 something	 pleasurable	 which	
encourages	 pursuit.	 In	 people	who	 are	 ruled	by	 their	 bodily	 nature,	 the	mind	
accepts	the	impulse	and	lends	the	body	its	own	intelligence	to	avoid	or	pursue	
the	 object	 at	 hand.	 This	 is	 the	moment	when	 an	 impulse	 develops	 into	 a	 full-
fledged	passion,	leading	people	to	‘pay	servile	homage	to	the	pleasures	of	sense.’	
Gregory	 makes	 a	 distinction	 between	 ‘more	 perfect	 men’	 and	 ‘those	 of	 a	
somewhat	slavish	disposition’,	saying	that	the	bodily	nature	dominates	only	in	
the	latter.	Based	on	this	passage	alone,	it	is	unclear	whether	he	means	that	the	









The	 difference	 between	 an	 impulse	 of	 passionate	 action	 and	 a	 full-fledged	
passion	is	clearly	stated	in	De	anima	et	resurrectione.	After	Macrina	rejects	the	
view	 that	 passions	 must	 be	 completely	 eradicated	 in	 the	 Christian	 life,	 the	
rational	 moderation	 of	 the	 passionate	 impulses	 becomes	 the	 focus	 of	 her	
argument:	 If	 the	 mind	 is	 able	 to	 order	 its	 choice	 correctly	 and	 govern	 the	







such	 they	 are	 akin	 to	 what	 the	 Stoics	 called	 propatheia,	 involuntary	 morally	
neutral	 movements	 of	 the	 soul	 that	 only	 develop	 into	 passions	 if	 the	 mind	
assents	 to	 them. 302 	However,	 we	 should	 also	 note	 that	 in	 his	 extensive	
discussion	 on	 Gregory’s	 understanding	 of	 ὁρμή,	 Smith	 observes	 that	 the	
distinction	Gregory	makes	between	morally	neutral	ὁρμαί	and	morally	suspect	
πάθη	 is	 not	 consistent	 even	within	De	anima	 et	 resurrectione.303	In	 a	 passage	
that	I	have	already	quoted,	it	is,	in	fact,	at	first	the	‘passions’	themselves	that	are	
said	to	have	a	morally	neutral	character	and	can	be	transformed	into	virtues.304	
Despite	 the	 inconsistency	 in	 terminology,	 the	 idea	 remains	 the	 same:	 humans	





and	 Peace	 of	 Mind:	 From	 Stoic	 Agitation	 to	 Christian	 Temptation	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	
Press,	2002).	See	also	Smith,	Passion	and	Paradise,	90–91.	
303	Smith,	Passion	and	Paradise,	92–93.	Sorabji	notes	similar	inconsistencies	in	Origen	who	also	
at	 times	 refers	 to	 the	 first	 movements	 as	 πάθη.	 However,	 whereas	 Origen	 appears	 to	 do	 so	











thought.	 Smith	 argues	 that	 Gregory	 is	 more	 closely	 aligned	 with	 Zeno	 who	
argued	 that	 passions	 were	 results	 of	 judgments,	 as	 opposed	 to	 Chrysippus’s	
view	 that	 passions	 themselves	 were	 judgments. 305 	In	 my	 view,	 however,	
comparing	Gregory	 to	 the	Old	Stoics	who	wrote	half	 a	millennium	before	him	
and	 whose	 views	 have	 not	 been	 passed	 down	 in	 their	 entirety	 is	 not	 a	
particularly	 fruitful	 approach.306	Despite	 some	 conceptual	 and	 terminological	
similarities	we	should	note,	 first,	that	Gregory	operates	within	a	very	different	
anthropological	 framework,	and,	 second,	 that	 there	are	easier	ways	 to	explain	
the	occurrence	of	‘Stoic’	terminology	in	his	works.		
	
Let	 us	 first	 consider	 the	 anthropological	 differences:	 Despite	 emphasising	 the	
unitary	 character	 of	 the	 soul,	 Gregory	 acknowledges	 the	presence	 of	 different	
faculties,	some	of	which	are	irrational	and	shared	with	animals.	Thus,	he	places	
the	rational	and	irrational	beings	on	a	continuum,	warning	that	the	former	may	
be	 easily	 reduced	 to	 the	 level	 of	 the	 latter.	 The	 old	 Stoics,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
argued	 for	 a	 radical	 distinction	 between	 the	 two.307	In	 their	 view,	 the	 outer	
similarities	 between	 animal	 and	 human	 behaviour	 were	 due	 to	 completely	
different	cognitive	mechanisms.	The	human	soul	was	defined	by	the	presence	of	
a	rational	mind,	even	when	it	failed	to	carry	out	its	proper	functions.	Although	
the	 Stoics	 considered	 ὁρμή	 a	 characteristic	 principle	 of	 animal	 behaviour,	 its	





as	he	was	generally	highly	 critical	 of	Chrysippus.	As	Wolfsdorf	points	out,	 his	 report	 includes	
clear	mistakes,	and	even	if	they	are	set	right,	we	are	still	left	with	some	ambiguities	as	to	what,	
exactly,	 Zeno	 and	 Chrysippus	 intended	 with	 their	 respective	 definitions	 and	 where	 the	
differences	lie.	See	Wolfsdorf,	Pleasure	in	Ancient	Greek	Philosophy,	192–94.	
307	On	animal	and	human	cognition	 in	Stoicism,	 see	 Julia	Annas,	Hellenistic	Philosophy	of	Mind,	
Reprint	edition	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1994),	89–90.	
308	Concerning	ὁρμή in	 animal	 and	human	behaviour,	 see	 Inwood,	Ethics	and	Human	Action	in	
Early	Stoicism,	22.	See	also	Wolfsdorf,	Pleasure	in	Ancient	Greek	Philosophy,	191.	
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within	 the	mind	 itself.	 In	 the	unified	 soul	of	 the	Stoics,	 there	was	no	 separate	
irrational	 or	 animal	 part	 that	 would	 have	 reacted	 to	 its	 surroundings	 and	
transmitted	impulses	to	the	mind.	We	can	contrast	this	with	Gregory’s	account	




the	mind.309	In	 this	 sense	Gregory’s	model	differs	 from	 those	of	 the	old	 Stoics	





to	reject	or	accept	 impulses,	we	have	already	seen	that	 they	do	not	accept	 the	
view	that	passions	may	be	directed	at	good	or	bad	ends;	for	them,	passions	by	
definition	signal	a	 failure	of	 the	mind.	The	 idea	of	a	 transformed	or	measured	
emotion	is	much	more	central	to	Peripatetic	thinkers,	as	we	have	already	seen	
in	the	discussion	on	metriopatheia.310	And	third:	While	some	of	Gregory’s	terms	
were	 famously	employed	by	 the	Stoics,	many	related	 terms	of	Stoic	ethics	are	
missing	from	his	account	of	passions.	For	example,	Gregory	never	employs	the	
term	 συγκατάθεσις	 (‘assent’),	 a	 key	 word	 for	 the	 Stoics	 denoting	 the	 mind’s	
acceptance	of	an	impulse.	At	the	same	time,	the	term	ὁρμή	was	central	to	later	





Origen	 who	 similarly	 conceived	 the	 soul	 as	 a	 mix	 of	 rational	 and	 irrational	
elements.	 Many	 of	 them	 had	 a	 two-phase	 understanding	 of	 emotion	where	 a	
																																																								
309	See	 the	 citation	 from	 Op.	 hom.	14	 above.	 At	 times	 Gregory	 does	 appear	 to	 think	 that	 the	
impulse	originates	in	the	rational	part.	See	especially	Or.	dom.	5	(GNO	VII/2,	67.2).	
310	Equally,	 Barnes	 criticises	 earlier	 thinkers	 who	 have	 uncritically	 attributed	 this	 view	 to	





a	 full-fledged	passion	 accepted	 by	 the	mind.312	Furthermore,	 like	Gregory	 and	
unlike	the	Stoics,	they	accepted	the	ideal	of	metriopatheia	at	least	as	the	initial	
stage	 of	 the	 correct	 use	 of	 emotions.	 These	 later	 developments	 are	 largely	
ignored	 by	 Smith,	 who	 compares	 Gregory’s	 account	 of	 the	 moderation	 of	
passions	to	the	 ‘classical	views	of	passions’,	 that	 is,	 to	the	similar	notions	held	
by	 Plato,	 Aristotle,	 and	 Chrysippus	 and	 Zeno.313 	Only	 Seneca	 is	 chosen	 to	
represent	later	literature.	Thus,	Smith	goes	on	to	argue	–	in	line	with	the	main	
thesis	of	his	work	–	that	Gregory	does	not	fully	appropriate	any	of	the	classical	
views	 of	 passions,	 but	 adopts	 an	 eclectic	 combination	 of	 ideas	 to	 ‘serve	 his	
soteriological	 concerns’,	 in	 such	 a	 manner	 that	 the	 ideas	 are	 ‘radically	
reshape[d]’	 according	 to	 his	 theological	 understanding.	 Smith	 notes	 that	
Gregory’s	 account	 of	 passions	 ‘as	 both	 arising	 from	 our	 sensually	 oriented	
impulses	 as	 well	 as	 from	 mistaken	 judgments	 about	 the	 Good	 and	 the	 Real	
reflects	both	traditions’	–	the	Platonic	and	the	Stoic.314	I	do	not	want	to	contest	
Smith’s	 main	 argument	 that	 Gregory’s	 use	 of	 ancient	 philosophy	 is	 strongly	
shaped	by	his	 theological	 convictions.	However,	by	 comparing	Gregory	chiefly	





the	 intelligible	 nature	 enables	 humans	 to	 rise	 above	 the	 animal	 level	 by	
harnessing	 the	 animal	 drives	 to	 pursue	 higher	 ends.	 In	 irrational	 animals,	
impulses	 run	 their	 course	 without	 intellectual	 reflection.	 This	 means	 that	
animal	 actions	 can	 never	 be	 directed	 to	 virtuous	 ends	 and	 often	 lead	 to	
destructive	behaviour:	
	
The	activities	of	desire	and	pleasure	 in	 them	[animals]	are	not	directed	 to	any	higher	
realities,	 and	 no	 other	 impulse	 observed	 in	 them	 is	 directed	 by	 any	 reason	 to	 the	











However,	 if	 the	 mind	 operates	 successfully	 and	 rationally,	 it	 evaluates	 the	
content	 of	 the	 impulses	 against	 intelligible	principles.	 This	 has	 two	 important	
consquences:	first,	that	humans	can	choose	not	to	fulfil	their	irrational	desires	if	
they	are	not	aligned	with	what	is	truly	good,	and	second,	that	humans	–	unlike	
animals	 –	 are	 able	 to	 pursue	 abstract	 intelligible	 goals	 that	 do	 not	 bring	
immediate	 physical	 satisfaction.316	While	 animals,	who	only	 know	 the	 good	of	
the	body,	simply	act	on	a	pleasurable	impulse,	the	human	being	is	able	to	view	










and	counts	 it	 among	 the	animal	drives	 that	God	gives	humans	 to	ensure	 their	
survival	 after	 the	 fall.	 Originally,	 pleasure	 is	 given	 a	 secondary	 role	 as	 an	





At	 the	same	time,	humans	can	break	 free	 from	the	domination	of	 their	animal	
drives	 if	 they	gain	 an	understanding	of	 their	 true	nature	 as	 intelligible	beings	















At	 this	 point,	 we	 have	 already	 looked	 at	 some	 passages	 that	 suggest	 that	
pleasure	is	not	just	one	among	many	passions	but	a	primary	passion	from	which	





turns	 to	 the	mind’s	moderating	 role	 in	 limiting	 bodily	 pleasure	 strictly	 to	 its	
original	 purpose,	 an	 accompaniment	 of	 physical	 needs.	 Finally,	 in	 Chapters	 7	












For	 some	 pleasure	 (ἡδονή	 τις)	 or	 other	 is	 the	 instigator	 (καθηγεῖται)	 of	 all	 vicious	
actions	 that	 get	 carried	 out	 (πάντων	 τῶν	 διὰ	 κακίας	 ἐνεργουμένων),	 and	 there	 is	 no	
such	 thing	 as	 sin	 that	 is	 disjoined	 from	 pleasure	 (οὐκ	 ἔστιν	 εὑρεῖν	 ἁμαρτίαν	 ἡδονῆς	
διεζευγμένην)…317	
	
The	 citation	 above,	 taken	 from	 Homily	 12	 on	 the	 Song	 of	 Songs,	 leaves	 little	
doubt	about	 the	 central	 role	 that	pleasure	plays	 in	Gregory’s	hamartiology.	 In	
this	 part	 of	 the	 thesis,	 I	will	 set	 out	 to	 investigate	what	 gives	pleasure	 such	 a	
nefarious	 status	 as	 the	 ‘instigator	 of	 all	 vicious	 actions’	 and	 explains	 its	 close	
links	to	sin.	I	will	approach	the	primacy	of	pleasure	from	both	a	protological	and	
a	psychological	perspective:	In	the	first	chapter,	I	will	show	that	pleasure	plays	
a	 key	 role	 in	 Gregory’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 very	 first	 sin	 and	 the	 fall	 of	
humanity.	Then,	I	will	demonstrate	that	pleasure	is	not	just	the	instigator	of	all	
vicious	 actions	 at	 the	 dawn	 of	 humanity,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 life	 of	 every	







interpretation	of	Genesis	3	which	he	 then	applies	 to	other	 situations.	 In	 fact,	 I	
will	 argue	precisely	 the	 reverse	by	 showing	how	Gregory	 reads	a	pre-existing	









scenarios	 the	 primary	 location	 of	 Gregory’s	 critique	 of	 pleasure	 is	 the	
fundamental	 ethical	 question	 concerning	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 true	 good	 (τὸ	
καλόν/ἀγαθόν).	Since	the	attainment	of	the	good	is	the	goal	of	the	Christian	life,	
it	becomes	crucial	to	define	what	 it	 is	and	what	 it	 is	not.	 In	this	search	for	the	
good,	pleasure	plays	 the	 role	of	 the	archvillain.	 It	 both	motivates	 a	 turn	away	








the	 leading	 contemporary	 scholars	 on	 pleasure	 as	 the	 false	 good	 in	 ancient	
literature,	 sums	 up	 Plato’s	 position,	 which	 underpins	 Gregory’s	 take	 on	 the	
topic:	‘Pleasure	is	dangerous	because	it	is	a	deceiver.	It	leads	us	astray	with	false	
appearances,	 bewitching	 and	 beguiling	 us,	 cheating	 and	 tricking	 us.	 In	





of	 a	 falling	 away	 from	 life.	 Hence	 we	 can	 see	 why	 the	 One	 who	 has	 conveyed	 this	




the	 nature	 of	 sin	 (τῆς	 ἁμαρτίας).	 For	 some	 pleasure	 (ἡδονή	 τις)	 or	 other	 is	 the	









who	 identify	 the	 good	 with	 pleasure	 (τοῖς	 τὸ	 καλὸν	 ἐν	 ἡδονῇ	 τιθεμένοις).	 Later	 on,	
however,	it	occasions	sour	digestion	and	is	found	to	be	bad	(πονηρός),	just	as	Proverbs	
says:	 ‘For	 the	 lips’	 of	 vice	 ‘drip	 honey,	 which’	 at	 the	 time	 ‘is	 as	 smooth	 as	 oil	 in	 the	









which	 he	 touches	 on	 the	 link	 between	 pleasure	 and	 the	 fall.	 I	 will	 begin	 my	
investigation	from	another	text,	chapters	19	and	20	in	De	hominis	opificio,	which	
offer	 a	 longer	 but	 similar	 account	 of	 pleasure	 and	 the	 fall.	 Whereas	 Cant.	12	
focuses	on	 insubstantiality	of	evil,	a	point	to	which	I	shall	return	at	 the	end	of	
my	discussion,	De	hominis	opificio	lays	greater	emphasis	on	the	topic	of	pleasure	
as	 a	 false	 good,	which	makes	 it	 a	more	 fruitful	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 present	
analysis. 320 	Furthermore,	 the	 latter	 text	 can	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 deliberate	


















The	 word	 ἡδονή	 and	 its	 cognates	 do	 not	 appear	 in	 the	 climax	 of	 Genesis	 3.	
Instead,	we	encounter	a	number	of	visual	terms,	followed	by	acts	of	eating;	one	
could	easily	 think	 that	 it	 is	 the	senses	of	 sight	and	 taste	 that	are	at	 fault	here.	
Yet,	crucially,	Eve	does	not	only	see	and	taste	the	tree	and	its	fruit.	In	addition,	
she	 makes	 an	 evaluative	 judgment	 on	 what	 the	 senses	 convey:	 the	 tree	 is	
‘pleasing’	(ἀρεστόν),	‘beautiful’	(ὡραῖόν)	and,	most	importantly,	‘good’	(καλόν).	
To	 an	 ancient	 biblical	 interpreter,	 the	 word	 καλόν	 has	 immediate	 ethical	
connotations.	 One	 can	 suggest,	 as	 Gregory	 will,	 that	 here	 Eve	 is	 perceiving	
something	sensually	pleasing,	proclaiming	it	good,	and	acting	on	the	basis	of	her	
conclusion.	 Seen	 in	 light	 of	 ancient	 ethics,	 this	 is	 nothing	 other	 than	 hedonist	
behaviour.	 The	 weight	 of	 the	 term	 καλόν	 in	 Genesis	 3	 is,	 of	 course,	 further	
increased	by	the	fact	that	Scripture	calls	the	tree	itself	the	source	of	γινώσκειν	
καλὸν	καὶ	πονηρόν	(or,	in	Gregory’s	words,	τοῦ	καλοῦ	καὶ	κακοῦ	γνῶσίς322),	the	
knowledge	of	 good	 and	 evil.323	This	 poses	 an	 exegetical	 problem	 that	Gregory	




of	 the	 reasons	 that	 prompt	 Gregory	 to	 read	 the	 passage	 as	 an	 account	 of	
pleasure	as	the	false	good.	Furthermore,	Gregory	is	by	no	means	the	first	author	














sensation	 (Eve),	 and	 pleasure	 (the	 serpent).324	However,	 we	 shall	 see	 that	
Gregory’s	reading	is	not	a	mere	reproduction	of	Philo’s	account,	but	differs	from	
















all	 sin.	 In	what	 follows,	 I	will	 first	 investigate	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 two	 trees	 of	
Paradise,	which	Gregory	interprets	as	manifestations	of	true	and	false	goodness.	
For	Gregory,	 pleasure,	which	 envelops	 the	 fruit	 of	 knowledge,	 is	 a	 false	 good:	
while	 it	 appears	 good	 to	 people	 who	 simply	 trust	 their	 senses	 and	 do	 not	
investigate	the	nature	of	things,	it	turns	out	to	be	a	sorely	lacking	good	because	
it	 is	 mixed	 with	 pain	 and	 only	 offers	 momentary	 satisfaction.	 Drawing	 on	
Platonist	concepts,	Gregory	argues	that	pleasure	is	not	only	lacking	in	goodness,	
but	 also	 alienated	 from	 truth	 and	 being;	 it	 is	 deceptive	 and,	 ultimately,	 non-
existent.		
	






senses.	 The	 active	 role	 of	 the	mind	 is	 particularly	 important.	 First,	 it	 enables	
Gregory	to	argue	that	sin	is	due	to	ignorance,	not	to	wilful	wickedness;	the	first	
humans	 and	 all	 subsequent	 sinners	desire	what	 they	 think	 is	 good,	 but	 err	 in	
their	judgment	on	which	objects	are	truly	good.	Pleasure,	then,	is	‘the	instigator	
of	 all	 vicious	 actions’	 because	 it	 is	 what	 makes	 evil	 things	 appear	 good	 and	
disorients	the	mind	and	desire.	Second,	I	will	demonstrate	that	by	emphasising	
the	 conscious	 act	 of	 the	mind	 Gregory	 can	 conclude	 that	 humans	 chose	 their	








food	 in	Paradise.	This	view	seems	 to	be	 in	 contradiction	with	 the	biblical	 text	
(Gen.	2:9),	which	argues	that	God	gave	the	trees	of	Paradise	to	Adam	and	Eve	for	
nourishment.	 Thus,	 Gregory	 notes	 again	 the	 supposed	 etymology	 of	 Eden	 as	
‘delight’	(τρυφή),	and	argues	that	the	fruit	that	was	worthy	of	being	planted	by	
God	and	given	to	the	first	humans	to	eat	must	be	understood	as	something	else	
than	 ‘transitory	 and	 perishable	 nutriment.’	 The	 biblical	 passage	 does	 not	 talk	
about	 ‘bodily	 food,	 or	 the	 joy	 of	 flesh’	 (διὰ	 σαρκὸς	 εὐφροσύνην),	 but	 about	
‘another	 kind	 of	 food’,	 an	 analogous	 nourishment,	 ‘the	 enjoyment	 of	 which	
extends	 to	 the	soul	alone’	 (ἧς	ἡ	ἀπόλαυσις	ἐπὶ	μόνην	τὴν	ψυχὴν	διαβαίνει).325	
We	should	note	how	the	distinction	between	two	kinds	of	nourishment,	that	of	










How	should	we,	 then,	 understand	 the	 eating	 that	 took	place	 in	Paradise?	And	
why	did	God	 allow	humans	 to	 eat	 from	 ‘every	 tree’	 but	 one?	These	questions	
lead	Gregory	to	investigate	the	identity	of	the	two	trees,	the	tree	of	life	and	the	
tree	 of	 the	 knowledge	 of	 good	 and	 evil,	 which	 together	 reveal	 an	 important	
lesson	on	the	nature	of	the	good.	As	I	comment	on	Gregory’s	teaching	on	the	two	








On	Gregory’s	 reading,	 the	 two	 trees	of	Paradise	 stand	 for	 two	kinds	of	 goods:	
The	tree	of	 life	symbolises	 the	actual	good,	while	 the	tree	of	 the	knowledge	of	
good	and	evil	signifies	an	ambivalent	false	good,	which	appears	pleasing	on	the	
surface	but	hides	an	evil	core.	Here	we	come	to	the	ancient	distinction	between	
true	 and	 apparent	 good	which	 I	 touched	 on	 in	 the	 introduction	 of	 this	 thesis.	
Gregory	explains	that	the	tree	of	life	–	‘given	to	him	that	has	a	healthful	hunger’	




‘truth’,	 ‘justice’,	 and	 ‘incorruptibility’	 and	 which	 overlap	 at	 least	 partly	 with	
what	he	otherwise	lists	as	virtues.328	The	origin	of	goodness	is	God	himself,	who	





326	See	 section	 ‘The	Goods’	 in	Andrew	Radde-Gallwitz,	Basil	of	Caesarea,	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	and	






simplicity:	 since	God’s	nature	 is	 simple,	also	 the	goods	 that	belong	 to	his	very	
being	must	exist	in	perfect	unity.	Furthermore,	their	‘simplicity’	entails	that	they	
are	not	tainted	by	the	presence	of	evil.330	‘[T]he	very	actual	good	is	in	its	nature	
simple	 and	 uniform	 (τὸ	 ὄντως	 ἀγαθὸν	 ἁπλοῦν	 καὶ	 μονοειδές	 ἐστι	 τῇ	 φύσει),	






Wisdom	(‘the	Lord’,	 as	Gregory	notes)	 ‘a	 tree	of	 life’,	 to	 create	 the	 impression	
that	Christ	himself	 is	 the	one	delight	of	Paradise.	Through	his	depiction	of	 the	
tree	 of	 life	 as	 ‘every	 good’	 and,	 implicitly,	 as	 Christ,	 Gregory	 envisions	 the	
prelapsarian	state	as	a	participation	in	the	fullness	of	good	in	God.332	As	he	has	
already	 argued,	 this	 state	 does	 not	 involve	 actual	 eating	 but	 entails	 an	
intelligible	partaking	and	contemplation	of	the	divine	goods.	The	main	agent	of	
this	 form	of	knowing	 is	 the	human	mind,	 the	seat	of	 the	 image	of	God.	 In	 fact,	
earlier	in	the	treatise	Gregory	argues	that	when	Scripture	talks	about	the	divine	
resemblance,	 this	 is	 simply	 a	 concise	way	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 participation	 in	 the	
great	multitude	of	divine	goods.333	For	him,	then,	the	prelapsarian	human	being	
exists	 in	 a	 perfect	 unity	 of	 enjoyment;	 he	 delights	 only	 in	 God,	 mirroring	 the	
unity	 and	 simplicity	 of	 his	 creator.	 ‘The	 real	 good,	 which	 is	 every	 good’	 (τὸ	
ὄντως	ἀγαθὸν,	ὃ	δὴ	καὶ	πᾶν	ἐστιν	ἀγαθόν)	is	the	one	(μίαν)	‘permitted	delight’	
(τῆς	συγκεχωρημένης	τρυφῆς)	given	 for	man	 to	partake	 in	Paradise,’	Gregory	
explains.334	
																																																								
330	Op.	hom.	20	 (PG	 44,	 197B).	However,	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 God	 does	 not	 have	different	
properties.	The	gist	of	Gregory’s	argument	is	that	the	divine	goods	are	simple	so	far	as	they	are	
perfect	 goods	 and	 not	 blended	 with	 their	 opposites,	 and	 because	 they	 are	 reciprocal:	 the	













good,	 it	 becomes	 necessary	 to	 explain	 in	 what	 sense	 the	 opposing	 tree	 can	
nonetheless	be	said	to	be	the	source	of	the	knowledge	of	good	and	evil	(καλοῦ	
καὶ	 κακοῦ	 γνῶσίς).	 The	 notion	 of	 goodness	 in	 relation	 of	 a	 tree	 that	 will	
eventually	 bring	 about	 death	 seems	 particularly	 perplexing	 because	 Gregory	
counts	 among	 the	 divine	 goods	 immortality	 and	 incorruptibility	 –	 the	 very	
opposites	of	death.	To	solve	the	problem,	Gregory	suggests	that	in	the	Bible	the	
tree	is	called	‘good’	simply	because	it	appears	good	to	the	senses,	not	because	it	
is	good	 in	 its	 very	 nature.	 Also	 its	 fruit	 carries	 a	mix	 of	 opposing	 qualities:	 a	
seemingly	good	exterior	and	an	evil	core.335	A	number	of	phrases	show	that	this	
seeming	goodness	 is	nothing	else	than	pleasure:	 in	the	fruit,	sin	and	death	are	
covered	 with	 a	 ‘fair	 appearance	 and	 pleasure’	 (εὐχροίᾳ	 τινὶ	 καὶ	 ἡδονῇ)	 and	
‘decked	with	the	pleasures	of	sense’	(δι’	αἰσθήσεως	ἡδοναῖς	ἐπηνθισμένον),	so	








crucial	 for	Gregory’s	 understanding	of	 the	 fall.	 Sin	 comes	 into	 existence	when	
people	fail	to	tell	the	two	apart	and	rely	on	mere	appearances.	And	since	what	
appears	is	the	antithesis	of	what	is,	we	are	only	a	short	step	from	claiming	that	
appearances	 are	 non-existent.	 Indeed,	 in	 Homily	 11	 on	 the	 Song	 of	 Songs,	
Gregory	refers	to	transitory	earthly	goods	as	things	which	 ‘have	their	being	 in	
their	seeming’	(ἐν	τῷ	δοκεῖν	ἔχει	τὸ	εἷναι)	and	are	not	what	they	are	esteemed	
to	 be.337	In	 this	 homily,	 his	 list	 of	 deceptive	 goods	 includes	 both	 bewitching	






(ἀπολαυστικόν).338	Their	 non-existence	 stems	 from	 the	 transitory	 quality	 of	
material	 things	 which,	 in	 Gregory’s	 words,	 perish	 as	 soon	 as	 they	 come	 into	
being,	yet	are	chased	by	humans	in	a	state	of	dream-like	delusion.	In	Homily	12	
of	 the	same	collection,	Gregory	confirms	 that	such	unstable	existence	pertains	






Gregory	 contends	 that	 appearances	 do	 not	 exist,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 he	
considers	the	sensible	world	to	be	entirely	 illusory.	On	the	contrary,	there	is	a	
sensible	 realm	 that	 can	 be	 known	 and	 interacted	 with,	 one	 that	 has	 actual	
epistemic	value.	At	the	same	time,	the	sensible	world	can	be	described	as	‘non-










The	 fact	 that	 things	grasped	by	 the	 senses	are	always	on	 the	verge	of	 turning	
into	something	they	are	not	 is	precisely	the	problem	with	sensual	pleasure.	 In	












qualities’,	 and	 by	 doing	 so	 prepares	 an	 ‘entrance	 for	 death.’343	In	 the	 chapter	
that	follows,	he	compares	the	mixed	fruit	with	the	good	tree	of	life:	
	
[Scripture]	 speaks	 of	 the	 fruit	 of	 the	 forbidden	 tree	 not	 as	 a	 thing	 absolutely	 evil	
(because	it	is	decked	with	good)	(οὔτε	ἀπολύτως	κακὸν,	διότι	περιήνθισται	τῷ	καλῷ),	
nor	 as	 a	 thing	purely	 good	 (because	 evil	 is	 latent	 in	 it)	 (οὔτε	 καθαρῶς	ἀγαθὸν,	 διότι	
ὑποκέκρυπται	τὸ	κακόν),	but	as	compounded	of	both,	and	declares	that	the	tasting	of	it	
brings	 death	 to	 those	 who	 touch	 it	 (οὗ	 τὴν	 γεῦσιν	 εἰς	 θάνατον	 ἄγειν	 εἶπε	 τοὺς	
ἁψαμένους);	almost	proclaiming	aloud	 the	doctrine	 that	 the	very	actual	good	 is	 in	 its	




The	 juxtapositions	 that	 Gregory	 associates	 with	 the	 true	 and	 the	 false	 good	
(simplicity	vs.	multiplicity,	uniformity	vs.	mixing)	are	key	concepts	of	Platonist	
ontology.345	Above,	these	characteristics	seem	to	allude	mainly	to	the	aesthetic	
and	 epistemological	 properties	 of	 the	 fruit,	 which	 is	 a	 mix	 of	 an	 attractive	
surface	 and	 an	 evil	 core.	 But	 Gregory	 is	 simply	 using	 the	 tangible	 notion	 of	 a	
fruit	 to	 illustrate	a	much	more	abstract	 idea:	all	 false	goods	are	 in	some	ways	
diminished	by	the	presence	of	their	opposite.	Unlike	the	actual	goods,	they	are	
not	fully	good	but	mixed	with	vice.	One	of	Gregory’s	persistent	complaints	about	
pleasure,	 the	chief	offender	among	 false	goods,	 is	 that	 it	 is	always	mixed	with	
pain,	its	opposite,	and	can	therefore	never	offer	complete	satisfaction.346		
	
Gregory’s	 interpretation	 reflects	 the	 Platonist	 notion	 that	 the	 embodied	
existence	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 ‘compresence	 of	 opposites’,	 the	 presence	 of	
opposite	qualities	in	one	object.347	This	is	an	argument	for	both	its	imperfection	











also	 worse	 than	 others.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 furthermore,	 that	 the	
compresence	 of	 opposites	 does	 not	 render	 sensible	 things	 only	 quantitatively	
less	good	but	also	ontologically	unstable.	They	are	always	prone	 to	dissolving	
into	 their	 constituent	 components	 and	 turning	 into	 something	 else.	 Thus,	
sensible	 things	 exist	 less	 than	 the	 unmixed	 pure	 forms	 which	 exist	 in	 the	
absolute	sense.	The	latter	remain	always	the	same	regardless	of	what	they	are	




We	 have	 already	 seen	 that	 the	 idea	 that	 pleasure	 is	 mixed	 with	 pain	 is	 a	
common	argument	against	its	absolute	goodness	in	Plato	and	many	subsequent	
authors.349	The	 link	between	pain	and	pleasure	can	be	explained	 in	 two	ways:	
First,	we	should	keep	in	mind	the	definition	of	pleasure	as	a	replenishment	of	a	
lack	 and	 as	 a	 product	 of	 desire,	 both	 of	which	 entail	 the	 presence	 of	 pain.350	
Second,	 due	 to	 the	 instability	 of	 the	 material	 world,	 bodily	 pleasure,	 like	 all	
material	 phenomena,	 is	 always	 bound	 up	 with	 its	 opposite.	 Consider,	 for	
example,	 the	 words	 of	 Maximus	 of	 Tyre,	 a	 Platonist	 philosopher	 of	 the	 late	
second	century:	
	
If	 indeed	 it	 [pleasure]	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 change,	 then	 I	 will	 be	 happy	 to	 indulge	 in	 it	
without	 interruption,	and	to	have	no	 thought	 for	Virtue,	provided	you	can	show	me	a	




348	For	 the	 compresence	 of	 opposites	 in	 the	 goods	 of	 the	 sensible	 world	 contrasted	 with	 the	





accompanied	 by	 pain,	 either	 simultaneously	 with	 pleasure	 or	 sequentially	 before	 and	 after	
pleasure.	The	latter,	on	the	other	hand,	are	purely	pleasurable	because	they	are	not	preceded	or	
followed	by	pain.	These	include	visual	and	auditive	pleasures,	olfactory	pleasures	and	pleasures	
of	 learning.	Significantly	 for	 the	present	 thesis,	 things	 that	are	 ‘beautiful	by	 themselves’	 (καλὰ	
καθ’	αὑτὰ	πεφυκέναι)	yield	pleasures	unmixed	with	pain	(51c).	I	will	return	to	these	points	in	
the	 final	 chapters	 where	 I	 discuss	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 spiritual	 enjoyment.	 For	 a	 scholarly	








natural	 pair,	 each	 supervenes	 on	 the	 other,	 taking	 it	 in	 turn	 to	 come	 into	 being,	 and	
alternating	 their	 presence.	When	 the	 soul	 is	 tormented	by	 this	 ebb	 and	 flow,	 how	on	
earth	 could	 it	 get	 a	 grip	 on	 tranquillity	 (ἀλυπίας),	 consorting	 as	 it	 does	with	 ‘goods’	
(ἀγαθοῖς)	that	have	no	stability?351	
	
In	Gregory’s	works,	 the	mixing	 of	 pleasure	 and	pain	 takes	many	 forms:	 In	De	
opificio	 hominis,	 pleasure	 conceals	 death	 as	 the	 loss	 of	 immortality.	 In	 De	
virginitate,	 the	 pleasures	 of	 marriage	 are	 similarly	 tainted	 by	 death	 and	
sorrow.352	In	a	number	of	other	works,	Gregory	highlights	the	anxiety	that	takes	
hold	 of	 people	 who	 seek	 happiness	 in	 the	mutable	 phenomena	 of	 this	 world	
which	 can	 only	 offer	 brief	 and	 fleeting	 moments	 of	 satisfaction.353	Finally,	 all	
bodily	 pleasures	 are	 limited	 by	 ‘satiety’	 (κόρος),	which,	 for	 Gregory,	 does	 not	






time,	 place,	 age,	 and	 the	 natural	 fluctuations	 of	 the	 human	body	 all	 affect	 the	
enjoyment	of	earthly	things.355	Whereas	the	true	good	is	good	for	everyone	and	
available	 and	 desirable	 in	 every	 situation,	 the	 enjoyment	 offered	 by	 earthly	
things	 is	 relative.	 All	 people	 do	 not	 enjoy	 the	 same	 things,	 and	 even	 a	 single	
individual	 does	 not	 always	 derive	 pleasure	 from	 the	 same	 objects.356	In	 this	
regard	 pleasure	 and	 other	 false	 goods	 differ	 from	 the	 true	 goods,	 which	 are	
																																																								
351	Diss.	30.4;	trans.	Trapp,	248–249.	
352 	See	 my	 discussion	 in	 the	 next	 chapter	 and	 Radde-Gallwitz,	 Transformation	 of	 Divine	
Simplicity,	190–92.	










by	 its	 opposite	 but	 rendered	 unstable	 by	 the	 limits	 and	 flux	 of	 the	 sensible	




implications.	 Warren	 Smith	 summarises	 them	 succinctly	 in	 a	 discussion	 of	
Plato’s	view	of	ephemeral	material	beauty:	
	
[S]ince	 sense	 perceptions	 are	 no	 more	 reliable	 than	 the	 fluctuations	 of	 the	 material	
object	perceived,	the	judgments	based	on	sense	perception	are	equally	unreliable.	Thus	
one	cannot	trust	that	an	object	that	appears	beautiful	at	one	time	and	under	one	set	of	
circumstances	 will	 appear	 just	 as	 lovely	 at	 another	 time	 and	 under	 other	
circumstances.358		
	






by	 the	 tree	 of	 the	 knowledge	 of	 good	 and	 evil.	 But	 another	 problematic	 term	




357	Gregory	 appears	 to	 distinguish	 between	 pleasure	 that	 is	 limited	 by	 impassioned	 pain	 (i.e.	









actual	 truth. 359 	Thus,	 Gregory	 sets	 out	 to	 distinguish	 different	 kinds	 of	
knowledge	from	each	other	and	explain	which	one	is	mentioned	in	the	biblical	
text.	 His	 two	 main	 distinctions	 appear	 to	 be	 largely	 motivated	 by	 exegetical	
necessity	 rather	 than	 any	 consistent	 usage	 throughout	 his	 corpus.360	First,	
Gregory	claims	that	by	using	the	term	καλοῦ	καὶ	κακοῦ	γνῶσίς,	Scripture	is	not	
talking	about	actual	 ‘science’	 (ἐπιστήμη),	which	he	most	 likely	understands	as	
knowledge	 concerning	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 universe,	 but	 of	 a	 different	 sort	 of	
familiarity.	 Second,	 he	 makes	 a	 distinction	 between	 γνῶσις	 and	 διάκρισις,	
‘discernment’,	and	argues	that	the	latter	denotes	the	skill	of	separating	the	good	
from	 the	 evil;	 it	 is	 a	 sign	 of	 a	 ‘more	 perfect	 condition’	 and	 ‘exercised	 senses’	
(Heb.	 5:14)	and	belongs	 to	 the	 ‘spiritual	man’	 (1.	Cor.	2:15).	 It	 is	 important	 to	







senses.	 In	 the	 most	 rudimentary	 sense,	 knowing	 is	 desiring,	 or,	 as	 Gregory	
states	 later,	 the	 unanticipated	 experiential	 realisation	 of	 the	 state	 of	 things	
																																																								
359	The	 high	 positive	 value	 of	 the	 term	 is	 evident	 for	 example	 in	 the	 works	 of	 Clement	 of	
Alexandria,	for	whom	becoming	a	‘gnostic’	is	the	goal	of	the	Christian	life.	For	Gregory	γνῶσις	is	
a	 broad	 term	 that	 denotes	 various	 forms	 of	 knowing,	 ranging	 from	 sensory	 knowledge	 to	
spiritual	wisdom.	However,	 on	most	occasions	 it	denotes	a	positive	participation	 in	 the	 truth,	
even	if	at	times	partial	and	always	ultimately	limited.	See	LG,	‘γνῶσις.’	
360	The	ad	hoc	nature	 of	 the	 distinctions	 becomes	 obvious	 if	we	 compare	 them	 to	 other	 texts	
where	 Gregory	 discusses	 the	 definition	 of	 γνῶσις	 and	 its	 relationship	 to	 ἐπιστήμη	 and	
(διά)κρισις.	Cf.	e.g.	Eccl.	2.6	(SC	416,	172–174);	trans.	Hall	&	Moriarty,	55:	‘This	is	why	he	says,	
my	 heart	 saw	 many	 things,	 wisdom	 and	 knowledge	 (σοφίαν	 καὶ	 γνῶσιν),	 not	 because	 the	
knowledge	 (γνώσεως)	 of	 such	 things	 came	 of	 its	 own	 accord,	 without	 effort,	 but	 because	 he	
says,	 I	gave	my	heart	to	 learn	wisdom	and	knowledge	(τοῦ	γνῶναι	σοφίαν	καὶ	γνῶσιν),	 in	the	
sense	that	he	would	not	have	learned	them	if	effort	and	diligence	had	not	taught	the	knowledge	
(γνώσεως)	of	 them;	but	he	says	parables	and	science	(ἐπιστήμην)	 I	know	(ἔγνων),	 that	 is,	 the	
grasp	of	the	transcendent	which	is	gained	by	analogy…	‘And’,	he	says,	‘the	choice	of	spirit	has	in	
my	 case	 been	 this,	 that	 I	 should	 acquire	 the	 fullness	 of	 wisdom	 (πλῆθος	 σοφίας),	 so	 that	 in	
becoming	wise	 I	 should	not	 fail	 to	 gain	 knowledge	 of	what	 is	 (τῆς	 τῶν	ὄντων	 γνώσεως),	 nor	











‘῾Ο	 ὄφις	 ἠπάτησέν	 με,’	 –	 ‘The	 serpent	 deceived	 me’	 –	 Eve	 exclaims	 in	 the	
Septuagint	 version	 of	 Gen.	3:13	 when	 God	 demands	 an	 account	 of	 her	 sinful	
actions.	In	its	original	context,	this	‘deception’	does	not	have	to	entail	anything	
more	 than	 the	 serpent’s	 lie	 that	Eve	and	Adam	would	not	die	but	 simply	gain	
God-like	 powers	 of	 knowledge	 if	 they	 ate	 from	 the	 forbidden	 tree.	 But	 for	
Gregory	the	words	of	the	serpent	are	secondary	to	the	looks	of	the	fruit.	In	De	
hominis	opificio,	 it	 is	 the	ambiguous	 fruit	 that	 lies	 at	 the	 core	of	 the	deceptive	
ploy	which	the	serpent	devises	to	trick	Eve	to	sin.	In	this	section	I	will	show	that	
in	 De	 hominis	 opificio	 the	 notion	 of	 ἀπάτη	 (‘deception’)	 becomes	 the	




pleasure	 as	 the	medium	 of	 deception:	 the	 reptile	 covers	 the	 fruit	 with	 ‘a	 fair	
appearance	and	pleasure	(εὐχροίᾳ	τινὶ	καὶ	ἡδονῇ),	that	 it	might	be	pleasant	to	
see	 (ὀφθείη	 τε	 ἡδέως)	 and	 stimulate	 the	 desire	 to	 taste	 (τὴν	 ὄρεξιν	πρὸς	 τὴν	







keeping	 destruction	 like	 some	 snare	 concealed	 in	 its	 depths,	 and	 displaying	 some	















mind,	 and	 then	examine	 the	 rationale	behind	Gregory’s	view	 that	 ‘wickedness	
would	surely	fail	of	its	effect	were	it	not	painted	with	goodness.’		
	
In	 the	 passage	 above,	 Gregory	 notes	 that	 the	 evil	 disguised	 itself,	 keeping	 its	
destruction	hidden	 and	displaying	 ‘some	 appearance	 of	 good’.	 The	 expression	





partly	 that	 which	 is	 not	 such	 but	 decked	 out	 with	 a	 certain	 semblance	 of	 good	
(ἐπηνθισμένον	 τινὶ	 καλοῦ	 φαντασίᾳ).	 That	 which	 adjudicates	 (κριτήριον)	 between	






to	 ‘imagination’	 to	 ‘impression’	 to	 ‘representation’,	 is	 a	 central	 and	 often	
technical	 term	 in	 ancient	 philosophy.	 It	 figures	 prominently	 in	 Aristotle’s	
psychology	and	ethics	where	it	is	connected	to	pleasure,	and	is	famously	used	in	










key	vocabulary	of	Epicurean	epistemology:	various	 sources	 report	 the	 famous	
and	 controversial	Epicurean	maxim	according	 to	which	 ‘all	 sense	 impressions	
are	true.’369	Essentially	the	statement	meant	that,	in	Epicurus’s	view,	the	senses	
conveyed	 true	 and	 exact	 impressions	 of	 reality.	 This	 is	why	he	 advocated	 the	




on	 the	 content	 of	 the	 impression.	 As	 Gregory	 explains,	 the	 intellect	 can,	 and	
often	will,	go	wrong	in	its	judgment	and	accept	a	mere	appearance	of	goodness	
as	 a	 goal	worthy	of	 pursuing.	 For	Epicurus,	 the	potential	 for	wrong	 judgment	
had	been	the	very	reason	why	the	mind	was	an	insufficient	κριτήριον	compared	
to	 a	 sensory	 φαντασία,	 which,	 in	 his	 view,	 always	 conveyed	 true	 knowledge	
about	reality.	Gregory,	of	course,	does	not	even	consider	such	a	view.	For	him,	
the	 mind	 remains	 the	 correct	 κριτήριον	 of	 truth	 regardless	 of	 its	 potential	
shortcomings.	 The	 solution	 is	 to	 educate	 and	 strengthen	 the	 mind,	 not	 to	
dismiss	its	epistemic	primacy.	
	
How	 does	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 φαντασία	 relate	 to	 the	 broader	 tradition?	
Characteristically,	 he	 offers	 no	 formal	 definition,	 but	 based	 on	 his	 use	 of	 the	
term,	 φαντασία	 denotes	 a	 representation	 conveyed	 by	 the	 senses,	 which	
involves	 some	 kind	 of	 propositional	 content	 (e.g.	 that	 the	 fruit	 is	 good).	
Strikingly,	the	term	is	almost	always	negative,	and	the	proposition	conveyed	by	
φαντασία	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 false.	 Thus,	 in	 Gregory’s	 works,	 φαντασία	 is	 often	
related	to	dreams,	deceptive	 illusions,	and	mistaken	understanding,	 just	as	we	




have	 a	 been	 subject	 to	 different	 interpretations.	 Gisela	 Striker	 argues	 convincingly	 that	what	
Epicurus	 held	 true	 was	 indeed	 closer	 to	 a	 ‘sense	 impression’,	 φαντασία,	 than	 ‘sensation’	
αἴσθησις.	 See	 Gisela	 Striker,	 ‘Epicurus	 on	 the	 Truth	 of	 Sense	 Impressions’,	 in	 Essays	 on	
Hellenistic	Epistemology	and	Ethics	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996),	77–91.		
370	On	 these	 points,	 see	 Lucretius,	 Rer.	 nat.	 4.469–521;	 DL	 10.31–32;	 Sextus	 Empiricus	 Adv.	
math.	211–216.	





thought,	but	 it	 is	not	 identical	 to	any	one	of	 the	well-known	definitions	of	 the	
term,	 even	 in	 their	 later,	 more	 eclectic	 forms.373	The	 fact	 that	 φαντασία	 is	
associated	with	 low-level	 ‘knowledge’	 that	pertains	only	 to	superficial	sensory	
appearances	 connects	 Gregory	 to	 the	 Platonist	 tradition. 374 	For,	 as	 Gösta	
Grönroos	explains	regarding	Plato,	‘[o]ne	who	has	a	phantasia	about	something	
grasps	the	mere	appearance	of	the	thing.	It	is	formed	through	sense	perception,	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 how	 the	 thing	 strikes	 the	 person,	without	 considering	 its	 real	
nature.’375	This	 seems	 to	be	Gregory’s	 view,	 too.	 Since	both	Plato	and	Gregory	
agree	 that	 the	senses	can	only	grasp	what	 is	apparent	and	mutable,	φαντασία	
will	always	convey	a	partial	view	of	the	thing	that	is	being	perceived.	Plato,	too,	
connects	φαντασία	to	mimicry,	deception,	and	dreams.	This	does	not	mean	that	
it	 is	 necessarily	 false,	 for,	 as	 Grönroos	 notes,	 it	 may	 serve	 us	 well	 in	 our	
everyday	 dealings. 376 	But	 at	 times	 the	 appearance	 of	 a	 thing	 does	 not	
correspond	to	 its	nature	and	will	 lead	us	to	believe	something	that	 is	not	only	
partial	but	also	false.		
	
The	 exact	 phrase	 καλοῦ	 φαντασία	 does	 not	 appear	 in	 Plato,	 nor	 does	 Plato	
clearly	 spell	 out	 the	 relationship	 between	 pleasure	 and	 φαντασία,	 although	
both	are	associated	with	the	same	topics	of	illusion	and	deception,	and	pleasure	
is	 in	 general	 strongly	 linked	 to	 appearing.	 However,	 direct	 parallels	 can	 be	
found	 in	the	 later	Platonist	 tradition.	Perhaps	the	closest	example	comes	 from	
Maximus	of	Tyre,	who	dismisses	pleasure	 as	 the	 good	with	 the	 common	anti-
hedonist	argument	that	it	is	not	good	in	all	cases,	continuing:	
																																																																																																																																																													
καταληπτικὴ	 φαντασία.	 However,	 typically	 φαντασία	 arising	 directly	 from	 our	 senses	 is	
morally	and	epistemologically	questionable.	See,	LG,	‘φαντασία,	ας,	ἡ.’	
372	Ware,	 whose	 translation	 of	 the	 term	 as	 ‘imagination’	 is	 somewhat	 misleading,	 notes	 the	
pejorative	 tone	of	 almost	all	 references	 to	φαντασία	 in	Lampe’s	PGL.	 See	Kallistos	Ware,	 ‘The	
Soul	in	Greek	Christianity’,	in	From	Soul	to	Self,	ed.	James	Crabbe	(London;	New	York:	Routledge,	
2012),	61–62.	
373	For	 one	 later	 transformation	 of	 the	 term,	 see	 G.	 Watson,	 ‘Discovering	 the	 Imagination:	
Platonists	 and	 Stoics	 on	 Phantasia’,	 in	 The	 Question	 of	 ‘Eclecticism’:	 Studies	 in	 Later	 Greek	
Philosophy,	 ed.	 John	M.	Dillon	 and	A.	 A.	 Long	 (Berkeley:	University	 of	 California	 Press,	 1996),	
208–33.	
374	For	Plato’s	understanding	of	the	term,	see	especially	Soph.	260c,	264a–b;	Theaet.	152c.	





I	believe	that	nothing	 is	 to	be	pursued	unless	 it	 is	a	good	(ὅ	τι	μὴ	ἀγαθόν),	but	things	
that	are	not	good	(τὸ	μὴ	ἀγαθὸν)	are	pursued	in	the	place	of	goods	(ἐν	χώρᾳ	ἀγαθοῦ)	
due	 to	 the	 appearance	 of	 good	 (ἀγαθοῦ	 φαντασίᾳ)	 –	 just	 as	 counterfeit	 coins	 are	
acceptable	to	businessmen	not	because	they	are	counterfeit,	but	because	their	similarity	
to	 true	 coin	 conceals	 their	 counterfeit	 nature.	 In	 this	 latter	 case	 assayers	 use	 their	
science	to	separate	(διέκριναν)	the	fake	from	the	true,	but	in	the	case	of	the	distribution	
of	 goods,	may	 it	not	be	 that	 reason	 (λόγος)	 can	 fail	 to	 separate	 from	real	 goods	 (ἀπὸ	
τῶν	ὄντων	ἀγαθῶν)	those	that	are	not	real	but	apparent	(τὰ	φαινόμενα	μέν,	οὐκ	ὄντα	






we	 shall	 soon	 see.	 On	 the	 whole,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 tradition	 before	 Gregory	
prefers	the	term	ἀγαθοῦ	φαντασία	over	καλοῦ	φαντασία.378	Philo	employs	the	




be	 good	 (τοῦ	παρόντος	 καὶ	 νομισθέντος	 ἀγαθοῦ	φαντασία),	 arouses	 and	 awakes	 the	
soul	when	 at	 rest	 and	 like	 a	 light	 flashing	 upon	 the	 eyes	 raises	 it	 to	 a	 state	 of	 great	
elation	(μετέωρον).	This	sensation	of	the	soul	is	called	pleasure	(ἡδονή.).379	
	
Philo’s	 definition	 appears	 in	 a	 passage	 where	 he	 defines	 the	 four	 generic	
passions,	 and	 thus	 the	 context	 is	 perhaps	more	 akin	 to	 Stoic	 thought.	 Indeed,	
although	Plato’s	works	often	touch	on	the	idea	that	pleasure	appears	good	and	
																																																								
377	Diss.	 31.2;	 trans.	 Trapp,	 251.	 The	 phrase	 ἀγαθοῦ	 φαντασία	 occurs,	 among	 others,	 in	
Plutarch’s	critique	of	Epicurean	epistemology	and	ethics	in	Adv.	Col.	1122d.	Clement	employs	a	




but	 refers	 to	 an	 actual	 presence	 and	 consequent	 impression	 of	 something	 good	 or	 beautiful.	
Perhaps	 the	 closest	 use	 of	 καλοῦ	 φαντασία	 occurs	 in	 Origen’s	 De	 oratione	 (20.2.7),	 where	
Origen	rebukes	people	who	like	to	pray	visibly	in	synagogues	and	street	corners	to	be	perceived	
as	 good	 and	 pious	 individuals.	 Incidentally,	 Origen	 attributes	 this	 ‘seeming	 prayer’	 to	 people	










In	 fact,	 we	 should	 note	 that	 also	 Gregory’s	 use	 of	 φαντασία	 is	 in	 part	 more	
closely	 aligned	 with	 the	 Stoic	 notion	 than	 with	 Plato’s	 definition.	 For	 Plato,	
φαντασία	refers	to	an	already	formed	conception,	a	‘mixture	of	perception	with	
opinion’	(σύμμειξις	αἰσθήσεως	καὶ	δόξης),	which,	Grönroos	contends,	is	attained	
without	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 mind; 381 	for	 Gregory,	 φαντασία	 precedes	




Stoics,	 although	 he	 does	 not	 make	 use	 of	 the	 relevant	 Stoic	 term	 ‘assent’	
(συγκατάθεσις)	 to	 highlight	 the	 action	 of	 the	mind.382	But	whereas	 the	 Stoics	





Gregory’s	view	 that	 the	 first	humans	reach	 for	 the	 fruit	because	 it	projects	an	























acceptable	 (τὴν	ἡδονὴν	καλόν	τι	καὶ	αἱρετὸν	ᾤετο)?	So,	 too,	 the	other	 sins	 (τὰ	λοιπὰ	
τῶν	ἁμαρτημάτων)	keep	their	destruction	hidden,	and	seem	at	first	acceptable	(αἱρετὰ	
παρὰ	 τὴν	 πρώτην	 δοκεῖ),	 and	 some	 deceit	 (διά	 τινος	 ἀπάτης)	makes	 them	 earnestly	
sought	after	by	unwary	men	instead	of	what	is	good	(ἀντ’	ἀγαθοῦ).384	
	





echoes	 Plato	 more	 clearly,	 saying:	 ‘Pleasure	 is	 truly	 like	 the	 bait	 of	 all	 evil	
(πάσης	κακίας	οἷόν	τι	δέλεαρ	ἡ	ἡδονή);	when	it	 is	thrown	out	lightly,	 it	draws	
gluttonous	 souls	 to	 the	 fish	 hook	 (ἄγκιστρον)	 of	 destruction.’386	However,	 the	
closest	parallel	is	not	Plato’s	Timaeus,	but	Basil’s	Asceticon,	where	we	read:	‘For	
pleasure	is	the	great	snare	of	evil	(μέγα	τοῦ	κακοῦ	δέλεαρ)	–	by	means	of	which	
we	 human	 beings	 are	 especially	 drawn	 to	 sin.	 By	 it	 every	 soul	 is	 dragged	 to	
death	as	with	a	fish-hook	(ἀγκίστρου).’387	
	
While	 the	 passage	 in	 De	 vita	 Moysis	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 the	 fall	 directly,	 in	 a	
number	of	other	works	Gregory	uses	the	word	‘bait’	in	the	context	of	Genesis	3	
just	like	he	does	in	De	opificio	hominis:	In	Oratio	catechetica,	he	argues	that	the	
‘deception	 (ἀπάτη)	 would	 have	 proved	 ineffective,	 had	 not	 the	 semblance	 of	
good	 (τοῦ	 καλοῦ	 φαντασίας)	 been	 spread	 upon	 the	 hook	 of	 evil	 like	 a	 bait	
(δελέατος).’388	And	In	inscriptiones	psalmorum	he	alludes	briefly	to	the	events	of	
the	 fall	 and	 notes	 that	 the	 fruit	 of	 the	 ‘ambiguous’	 (ἐπαμφοτερίζοντος)	 tree,	








καλὸν	καὶ	πονηρόν),	 is	good	because	 it	hides	sin	 in	a	bait	of	pleasure	(ἡδονῆς	











with	 a	 sensually	 pleasing	 exterior.	 However,	 although	 pleasure	 seeking	 is	
characteristic	of	the	‘friends	of	the	body’	and	it	is	the	lower	part	of	the	soul	that	
is	 inclined	 towards	 pleasure	 as	 the	 good,	 the	 fall	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 an	
intellectual	 failure.	For	Gregory,	 the	body	 is	not	 capable	of	 any	action	without	
the	involvement	of	the	soul,	and	neither	can	the	lower	part	of	the	soul	instigate	
action	 if	 its	 goal	 is	not	 accepted	by	 the	mind.	 In	 the	previous	 chapter	we	 saw	
how	this	collaboration	occurs	as	an	impulse	originates	in	the	sensible	part	of	the	
soul	and	is	then	judged	by	the	mind.	The	same	dynamic	unfolds	when	the	mind	
pronounces	 a	 judgment	 on	 some	 appearance	 of	 goodness	 conveyed	 by	 the	
senses.	And	 this	 is	where	 the	 first	 humans	 go	wrong,	 just	 like	 all	 people	who	
















mind	 a	 ‘judge’	 (κριτήριον)	 between	 the	 good	 and	 the	 evil.	 Above	 Gregory	
employs	a	related	verb,	κρίνω,	which	further	highlights	that	pleasure	is	not	just	
an	unreflected	bodily	sensation,	but	it	includes	a	cognitive	aspect:	an	evaluative	
judgment	 concerning	 the	 goodness	 of	 its	 object.	 The	 idea	 is	 echoed	 in	 the	
passage	 from	Homilies	on	the	Song	of	Songs	with	which	 I	 opened	 this	 chapter:	
‘Hence	 the	 fruit	 is	 called	 “good”	because	of	 an	 erroneous	 judgment	 (κατὰ	τὴν	
ἡμαρτημένην	 τοῦ	 καλοῦ	 κρίσιν)	 regarding	 what	 is	 good,	 for	 such	 it	 seems	
people	who	identify	the	good	with	pleasure.’392	We	can	argue	that	here	lies	the	
rationale	for	the	persistent	negative	value	that	Gregory	assigns	to	ἡδονή	and	for	
his	 reluctance	 to	 use	 ἡδονή	 to	 refer	 to	 enjoyment	 in	 a	 neutral	 or	 positive	









…	 for	 this	 reason	 [because	 of	 the	 homonymous	 connection]	 that	 desire	which	 arises	





between	 pleasure	 and	 apparent	 goodness	 farther	 than	 Plato	 ever	 does,	 using	 the	 idea	 of	
apparent	 goodness	 to	 provide	 an	 analysis	 of	 pleasure.	 Pleasure	 is	 (in	 part)	 the	 appearance-











This	 is	 an	 important	 statement,	 which	 explains	 why	 Gregory	 considers	




is	 such.	 In	 the	 passage	 above	 the	 idea	 is	 treated	 in	 passing	 to	 offer	 a	 final	
definition	to	the	phrase	‘knowledge	of	good	and	evil’,	but	in	one	of	the	Homilies	
on	 the	 Beatitudes	 Gregory	 discusses	 the	 relationship	 between	 desire	 and	 the	
good	more	thoroughly:	
	
It	 is	 our	 aim	 not	 that	 we	 should	 be	 persuaded	 to	 desire	 the	 things	 that	 are	 good	
(ἀναπεισθείημεν	τῶν	καλῶν	ὀρέγεσθαι);	(for	to	incline	towards	the	good	is	one	of	the	
inherent	characteristics	of	human	nature	[αὐτομάτως	ἔγκειται	τῇ	ἀνθρωπίνῃ	φύσει,	τὸ	
πρὸς	 τὸ	 καλὸν	 ἐπιῤῥεπῶς	 ἔχειν])	 –	 but	 that	 we	 should	 not	 be	 mistaken	 in	 our	
judgement	as	 to	what	 is	good	(μὴ	ἁμάρτοιμεν	τῆς	τοῦ	καλοῦ	κρίσεως).	 It	 is	here	 that	
our	life	is	most	subject	to	error,	that	we	cannot	clearly	distinguish	(ἀκριβῶς	συνιέναι)	
what	 is	 good	 by	 nature	 (τί	 τὸ	 φύσει	 καλόν)	 and	 what	 is	 supposed	 as	 such	 through	
deception	(τί	τὸ	δι’	ἀπάτης	τοιοῦτον	ὑπονοούμενον).	For	 if	evil	was	presented	 to	our	





explicitly	 tied	 to	 the	 events	 of	 the	 fall,	 but	 the	 concepts	 of	 deception	 and	 the	




affirms	 that	desire	 is	 always	 inherently	directed	 to	 that	which	 is	perceived	as	
















ἡ	 τοῦ	 λείποντος	 ἔφεσις	 αὕτη)	 is	 the	 very	 disposition	 of	 desire	 (ἡ	 ἐπιθυμητικὴ…	
διάθεσις)	 in	 our	 nature,	 whether	 it	 is	 led	 astray	 by	 bad	 decisions	 from	 the	 truly	
beautiful	(δι’	ἀκρισίαν	τοῦ	ὄντος	καλοῦ),	or	even	comes	upon	it	by	chance.399	
	
While	 above	Macrina	does	not	mention	pleasure	 explicitly,	we	 should	keep	 in	
mind	 that	 pleasure	 results	 from	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 a	 lack	 and	 is	 the	 force	 that	
drives	 us	 to	 fulfil	 our	 desires.	 It	 is	 nothing	 else	 than	 pleasure	 that,	 ‘by	 bad	
decisions’,	leads	the	soul	astray	from	the	truly	beautiful.	Adam	and	Eve,	do	not,	
of	 course,	 lack	 any	 good	 in	 their	 original	 created	 state.	 This	 gives	 their	 sin	 a	
different	starting	point	compared	to	a	person	who	is	born	into	the	fallen	world.	
However,	 as	 Gregory	 alludes,	 desire	 can	 result	 from	 a	 perceived	 lack	 of	
goodness	 just	 as	well	 as	 from	 a	 real	 one,	 and	 there	 is	 one	 thing	 that	 the	 first	
humans	do	not	possess:	the	fruit	of	knowledge.	Since	it	 looks	appealing	on	the	
surface,	 Eve	makes	 the	mistaken	 judgment	 that	 it	 is	 a	missing	 –	 and	 perhaps	
greater	–	good,	and	reaches	for	it	to	remedy	the	lack.	
	
The	 idea	 that	 desire	 is	 naturally	 inclined	 towards	 the	 good	 and	 thus	 humans	
desire	 only	what	 they	 regard	 as	 good	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 Socrates’	 famous	
maxim:	 ‘No	 one	 errs	 willingly.’400	Jessica	 Moss	 sums	 up	 Plato’s	 position:	 ‘We	
desire	what	we	think	good;	but	what	is	pleasant	appears	to	be	good,	whether	or	













pleasure	(διὰ	τὴν	ἡδονὴν).	For	while	 it	 is	not	the	good,	 it	appears	to	be	(οὐ	γὰρ	οὖσα	
ἀγαθὸν	φαίνεται).403	
	
Although	 in	 De	 hominis	 opificio	Gregory	 uses	 καλόν	 for	 good	 and	 δοκέω	 for	
appearing,	Gregory	and	Aristotle	are	united	on	two	central	points:	First,	that	the	
‘the	 many’	 (οἱ	 πολλοί)	 mistake	 pleasure	 for	 the	 good.	 Second,	 that	 pleasure	
creates	 this	 impression	 by	 deceptive	 illusion:	 it	 appears	 to	 be	 good,	 but	 it	 is	
something	else.		
	
Thus,	 we	 come	 to	 one	 of	 the	 basic	 tenets	 of	 Gregory’s	 hamartiology:	 sin	 is	 a	
product	 of	 ignorance. 404 	It	 signals	 a	 failure	 to	 reflect	 properly	 on	 the	
impressions	conveyed	by	the	senses	and	distinguish	appearances	 from	reality,	
which	 leads	 to	 a	 false	 judgment	 concerning	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 good. 405	















404	This	 is	 also	a	 feature	of	Plato’s	understanding	of	 sin	 (see,	 e.g.,	Leg.	 863c),	which	 is	directly	
related	to	the	Socratic	maxim	that	no	one	errs	willingly.	Many	patristic	writers	understand	sin	
as	 a	 result	 of	 ignorance	 concerning	 the	 true	 good.	 For	 a	 contemporaneous	 example,	 see	
Nemesius,	De	natura	hominis	17	(BT,	75).	
405	As	Warren	Smith	notes,	 ‘Nyssen	shares	with	the	Stoics	and	Aristotle	 the	belief	 that	passion	
and	 sin	 are	 ultimately	 the	 product	 of	 errant	 judgment	 or	mistaken	 belief.’	 Smith,	Passion	and	
Paradise,	101.	
	 134	
have	 been	 deceived	 by	 manifest	 evil	 [τῷ	 προδήλῳ	 κακῷ]),	 but	 giving	 to	 what	 the	
woman	 beheld	 the	 glamour	 of	 a	 certain	 beauty	 (τὸ	 φαινόμενον	 ἀγλαΐσας),	 and	
conjuring	 into	 its	 taste	 the	 spell	 of	 a	 sensual	 pleasure	 (τὴν	 αἴσθησιν	 ἡδονὴν	
ἐγγοητεύσας	τῇ	γεύσει)	it	appeared	to	her	to	speak	convincingly:	‘and	the	woman	saw,’	





the	knowledge	of	good	and	evil	 (καλοῦ	τε	καὶ	κακοῦ	γνωστόν),’	because,	 like	 the	evil	
nature	 of	 poisons	 that	 are	 prepared	 with	 honey,	 it	 appears	 to	 be	 good	 (καλὸν	 εἶναι	
δοκεῖ)	 in	 so	 far	 as	 it	 affects	 the	 senses	with	 sweetness	 (καθὸ	 μὲν	 καταγλυκαίνει	 τὴν	
αἴσθησιν):	but	in	so	far	as	it	destroys	him	who	touches	it,	it	is	the	worst	of	all	evil.407	
	
We	 can	 speculate	 that	 Eve	 engages	 in	 hedonic	 calculus	 of	 sorts,	 in	which	 she	
judges	the	goodness	offered	by	the	fruit	to	be	more	significant	than	the	possible	
adverse	effects	that	result	from	eating	it	(in	fact,	the	serpent	promises	that	there	
will	 be	 none	 [Gen.	 3:4–5]).	 The	 complex	 and	 hidden	 reality	 of	 death	 is	 not	
available	to	the	senses	and	requires	careful	intellectual	reflection.	Therefore	it	is	
easily	 overridden	 by	 the	 instant	 gratification	 offered	 by	 the	 fruit,	 which	 is	
readily	accessible	to	the	senses.	
	
The	 straightforward	 connection	 between	 sin	 and	 ignorance	 leaves	 the	












408	See	NE	7	 for	Aristotle’s	 distinction	 between	ἀκολασία	(doing	 the	 base	 thing	 unknowingly)	
and	ἀκρασία	(doing	the	base	thing	knowingly),	and	his	criticism	of	Socrates.	
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how	 concern	 for	 intelligible	 things	 (ἡ	 τῶν	 νοητῶν	 ἐπιμέλεια)	 might	 overcome	 the	
inclinations	of	the	flesh	(τῶν	τῆς	σαρκὸς	κινημάτων),	so	that	our	nature	might	not	be	at	
war	with	 itself	 (μὴ	στασιάζειν	πρὸς	ἑαυτὴν	τὴν	φύσιν),	with	 the	mind	choosing	some	
things	 and	 the	 body	 pulling	 towards	 others	 (μὲν	 τῆς	 διανοίας	 προαιρουμένης,	 πρὸς	






the	 higher	 desires	 of	 the	 mind	 and	 the	 lower	 desires	 of	 the	 appetite.	 It	 also	
seems	 unlikely	 that	 Gregory	 would	 suddenly	 think	 that	 the	 appetite	 could	
initiate	action	independently	of	the	mind’s	judgment.	For	him,	there	is	only	one	
faculty	 of	 desire	which	 is	 directed	 according	 to	what	 the	mind	 accepts	 as	 the	
good.	 If	we	consider	 this	 in	 light	of	 the	distinction	Gregory	makes	 in	 the	same	
work	 between	 the	 good	 of	 the	 intellect	 (virtue)	 and	 the	 good	 of	 the	 body	
(sensual	 pleasure),	we	 can	 suggest	 that	 the	 sensible	 part,	which	 is	 inherently	
attracted	to	pleasure,	simply	proposes	to	the	mind	that	the	pleasurable	object	is	
good	 (with	 a	 καλοῦ	φαντασία	 as	 its	medium).	However,	 it	 remains	 up	 to	 the	
mind	 to	 reject	 or	 accept	 this	 proposition.	 If	 the	 mind	 is	 weak	 and	
underdeveloped,	 it	will	 lay	 aside	 its	 proper	 objects	 of	 choice	 in	 favour	 of	 the	
suggestion	 that	 pleasure	 is	 the	 good.	 If	 it	 knows	 better,	 it	 will	 reject	 the	




humans	 chose	 their	 own	 fall.	 This	 view	 is	 important	 for	 two	 reasons:	 First,	 it	
highlights	 the	 role	 of	 the	 free	will	 in	 the	pursuit	 of	 virtue	 and	vice.	 Second,	 it	
draws	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 evil	 did	 not	 exist	 as	 part	 of	 God’s	 original	
creation,	but	originated	in	the	human	choice	to	turn	away	from	the	actual	good.	





















to	 us’).	 The	 former	 is	 a	 key	 term	 to	 Aristotle	 who	 understands	 it	 as	 ‘the	
intersection	point	between	reason	and	desire	which	made	possible	rational	and	
reasonable	 behaviour.’412	The	 latter	 term,	 to	 which	 I	 will	 return	 in	 a	 later	
discussion	on	external	goods,	is	often	associated	with	Stoic	ethics	but	employed	
by	 a	 variety	 of	 ancient	writers	 from	Aristotle	 to	Clement	 and	Origen	who,	we	
should	note,	make	use	of	it	much	in	the	same	way	as	Gregory.413		
	
By	 locating	 the	 source	 of	 sin	 in	 the	 act	 of	 choosing,	 Gregory	 makes	 humans	
accountable	 for	 the	 existence	of	 evil.	 In	 the	passage	 just	 cited,	 he	defends	 the	
view	 that	 the	 evil	was	 not	 created	 by	God	 and	 has	 no	 independent	 existence.	
Only	 the	good	exists;	evil	 consists	of	a	privation	of	good,	a	 turning	away	 from	
that	which	 is	 towards	that	which	 is	not.	 It	 is	brought	about	not	by	God	but	by	
man’s	own	 free	 choice	 to	pursue	pleasure	 in	 the	place	of	 the	 true	good.	Thus,	
Gregory	 is	 able	 to	 safeguard	 the	 perfect	 goodness	 of	 God	 and	 the	 contingent	
																																																								




413	See,	 for	 example,	NE	1113a.10–11	 where	 Aristotle	 uses	 both	 terms	 defining	 the	 object	 of	
choice	 (προαίρεσις)	 as	 one	 of	 the	 things	 that	 are	 up	 to	 us	 (ἐφ'	 ἡμῖν).	 See	 also	 Origen,	Princ.	













adaptation	 of	 Platonist	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 Stoic	 thought	 to	 the	 biblical	
account	of	the	fall.	Before	closing	this	chapter,	I	will	show	that	Gregory	is	not	the	
first	author	to	attempt	such	a	synthesis.	I	have	already	alluded	to	some	parallels	
between	Gregory	and	earlier	 Jewish	or	Christian	writers,	 but	 a	 few	additional	
passages	will	reveal	the	full	extent	to	which	Gregory	is	working	with	a	fusion	of	
philosophical	 and	 biblical	 material	 that	 had	 been	 developed	 long	 before	 his	
literary	 career.	 I	 will	 proceed	 in	 reversed	 chronology,	 pointing	 out	 a	 brief	
passage	 in	 Clement	 of	 Alexandria	 and	 then	 offering	 a	 longer	 discussion	 on	
Philo’s	interpretation	of	the	fall.	
	




accompanying	 pleasure	 (τῇ	 δὲ	 περὶ	 αὐτὸ	 ἡδονῇ	 συναπαγόμενος),	 supposing	 it	 good	
(ἀγαθὸν	 ὑπολαβών),	 and	 he	 thinks	 it	 right	 to	 choose.	 In	 these	 circumstances	 it	 rests	





414	Eccl.	2.3	 (SC	 416,	 158);	 trans.	 Hall	 &	 Moriarty,	 50.	 Freedom	 from	 necessity	 is	 one	 of	 the	




This	 passage	 from	 Stromateis	 conveys	 concisely	 some	 of	 the	 key	 ideas	 that	
informed	Gregory’s	understanding	of	 the	 fall:	 the	Socratic	maxim	 ‘no	one	errs	
willingly’,	 the	 idea	 that	 pleasure	 is	 falsely	 perceived	 as	 good,	 the	 notion	 of	
‘deceptive	 fantasy’	 (Clement	also	employs	the	related	Stoic	concept	of	 ‘assent’,	
which	is	only	implicitly	present	in	Gregory),	and	the	focus	on	the	active	choice	
of	 the	 mind.	 For	 Clement,	 as	 for	 Gregory,	 sin	 results	 from	 ignorance	 as	 a	




is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 study	 to	 explore	 all	 the	 connections	 between	
Clement’s	and	Gregory’s	 respective	notions	of	pleasure	and	sin,	 I	would	argue	
that	 even	 this	 brief	 excerpt	 contains	 enough	 conceptual	 and	 terminological	





to	 Philo	 of	 Alexandria,	 from	 whom	 Clement	 may	 well	 have	 borrowed	 the	
serpent	allegory.	We	have	to	ask	to	what	extent	Gregory	himself	is	drawing	on	
Philo’s	allegorical	 reading	of	 the	 fall	 in	De	opificio	mundi	and	Legum	allegoriae	
1–2,	which	provide	 the	obvious	precedent	 in	 the	 Judaeo-Christian	 tradition.417	
Here,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 comment	 on	 the	 many	 links	 between	 Philo’s	
interpretation	of	the	whole	creation	story	and	Gregory’s	corresponding	account	
in	 De	 hominis	 opificio.418	I	 will	 limit	 my	 focus	 on	 three	 main	 topics:	 Philo’s	
account	 of	 the	 fall	 understood	 as	 a	 drama	 between	 the	 mind,	 sensation,	 and	
pleasure,	 vocabulary	 of	 deception,	 and	 references	 to	 the	 good.	 A	 proper	













The	 relationship	 between	mind	 and	 sensation	 is	 the	 defining	 topic	 of	 Philo’s	
Legum	allegoriae.	 It	 is	 introduced	in	the	opening	paragraph	of	Leg.	1,	 in	which	
heaven	and	earth	are	interpreted	as	analogies	of	the	original	ideas	of	mind	and	
sense-perception;	later	it	is	applied	to	the	relationship	of	Adam	(mind)	and	Eve	
(sensation).419	The	 events	 of	 the	 fall	 are	 preceded	 by	 Philo’s	 interpretation	 of	
the	 two	 creation	 stories,	which	 he	 famously	 reads	 as	 an	 account	 of	 a	 twofold	
creation:	 The	 first	 creation	 narrative	 recounts	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 perfect,	
intelligible	and	undivided	idea	of	humanity,	which	includes	both	the	idea	of	the	
mind	 and	 the	 unactualised	 potential	 of	 sensation.	 The	 mind	 holds	 a	 higher	
ontological	 status	 as	 it	 derives	 its	 being	 directly	 from	 God,	 whereas	 the	
irrational	 part	 of	 the	 soul,	 including	 sensation,	 speech	 and	 the	 power	 of	
generation,	 is	 inspired	and	vivified	by	 the	mind	 that	acts	 like	 its	god.420	In	 the	
second	creation,	 the	 idea	of	humanity	 is	 conjoined	with	matter	 and	particular	
human	beings	–	first	the	man	and	then	the	woman	–	are	created.	Consequently,	
the	human	being	who	receives	and	breaks	the	divine	commandment	is	not	the	
ideal	man	 in	 the	mind	 of	God,	 but	Adam,	 the	 ‘moulded	man’	whose	 ‘earthlike	
mind’	is	connected	to	matter.	This	‘earthly	man’	is	neither	virtuous	nor	wicked,	




of	 clay,	 Eve	 as	 the	 ‘active	 sense-perception.’	 He	 employs	 the	 latter	 term	 to	
denote	sensation	that	becomes	actualised	at	the	creation	of	the	material	world,	
which	 is	 by	 definition	 its	 sole	 object.422	Originally,	 the	 external	 sensation	 is	
intended	as	the	‘helper	and	ally’	for	the	mind	of	the	moulded	man	who	leads	an	








with	a	view	 to	 its	apprehension	of	objects	presented	 to	 it.’423	Thus,	an	explicit	
hierarchical	 model	 pertains	 to	 both	 gender	 and	 cognition.	 The	 feminine	
character	of	sensation	is	not	limited	to	its	lower	status,	but	it	is	also	reflected	in	




Although	 the	 external	 sense	 appears	 to	 have	 a	 useful	 original	 purpose,	 Philo	
quickly	 proceeds	 to	 discuss	 its	 tension-laden	 relationship	 with	 the	 mind.	 He	
interprets	Adam’s	sleep	during	 the	creation	of	Eve	 to	mean	that	 the	mind	and	
the	external	sense	can	only	be	active	at	each	other’s	expense:	the	mind	cannot	
turn	 to	 its	 proper	 objects	 when	 the	 external	 sense	 is	 busy	 enjoying	 sights,	
sounds	and	tastes.	When	the	mind	is	pulled	down	to	the	passions	by	sensation	




moral	 neutrality,	 for	 Philo	 the	 material	 creation	 is	 already	 removed	 from	
perfection	and	encloses	the	seeds	of	 the	 fall.426	Sin	becomes	 imminent	as	soon	
as	 the	 woman	 is	 created	 –	 in	 other	 words,	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 mind	 turns	 itself	
towards	the	material	world	through	external	sensation.427	Indeed,	for	Philo,	the	

















opificio	 mundi	 Philo	 describes	 the	 exchange	 between	 the	 serpent	 and	 the	
woman.	He	contends	that	the	woman,	who	had	first	hesitated	to	pick	the	fruit	of	
the	knowledge	of	good	and	evil,	believed	the	serpent	and	ate	the	fruit	‘without	
looking	 into	 the	 suggestion,	 prompted	 by	 a	mind	 devoid	 of	 steadfastness	 and	
firm	 foundation.’ 430 	He	 then	 concludes	 that	 the	 serpent	 is	 the	 symbol	 of	





does	 discuss	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 serpent.	 Again,	 the	 serpent	 is	 the	 symbol	 of	
pleasure,	 a	 third	 being	 that	 binds	 the	 mind	 and	 external	 sensation	 to	 each	




Like	 Gregory,	 Philo	 thinks	 that	 pleasure	 is	 a	 particularly	 widespread	 and	
troublesome	 passion.	 He	 calls	 it	 the	 most	 mischievous	 of	 all	 the	 passions	

















How	 does	 Philo’s	 interpretation	 of	 mind	 and	 sensation	 relate	 to	 Gregory’s	
account?	As	Warren	Smith	has	noted,	Gregory	forgoes	the	gendered	reading	of	
Genesis	2–3	we	find	in	Philo.	Smith	attributes	the	lack	of	gendered	symbolism	to	




to	 conceive	 of	 the	 intellect	 as	 something	 intrinsically	 masculine	 while	
identifying	 irrationality	 and	 sensuality	 with	 the	 feminine.437	Although	 Smith’s	
explanation	captures	an	essential	difference	in	tone	and	focus	between	the	two	




human	 genus	 before	 the	 creation	 of	 specific	 gendered	 individuals,	 he	
nonetheless	 spells	 out	without	 any	 ambiguity	 that	 the	 original	 human	nature,	
the	 image	of	God,	was	 indeed	asexual,	 ‘neither	male	nor	 female.’438	Thus,	even	
though	 Philo	 associates	 the	 woman	 with	 sensation,	 sex,	 and	 sin	 much	 more	
strongly	 than	 Gregory	 does,	 both	 espouse	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 image	 of	 God	 is	
ultimately	 asexual.	 Therefore,	 Gregory’s	 unitive	 notion	 of	 human	 nature	 does	
not	alone	explain	his	different	outlook.	Nonetheless,	we	can	certainly	argue	that	
Gregory	 is	 more	 consistent	 in	 adhering	 to	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 asexual	
starting	point	in	his	interpretation	of	Christian	perfection	primarily	in	terms	of	
a	return	to	the	asexual	state	rather	than	as	a	rejection	of	femininity	in	favour	of	
more	 perfect	 masculinity	 (though	 Smith	 does	 point	 out	 some	 ‘lapses’	 in	 his	
thought439).	
	
Another	 reason	 why	 Gregory	 does	 not	 adopt	 Philo’s	 gendered	 allegory	 may	
simply	be	that	in	De	hominis	opificio	he	is	altogether	less	concerned	with	a	one-
to-one	allegorical	correspondence	between	biblical	and	philosophical	elements.	









these	 inner	 faculties	 linked	 to	 the	 main	 characters	 of	 Gen.	 3.	 In	 De	 hominis	
opificio,	Gregory	associates	pleasure	with	the	properties	of	the	fruit,	rather	than	
with	 the	 serpent	 who	 acts	 in	 the	 background	 as	 a	 mastermind	 of	 sorts.	 An	
explicit	allegory	of	serpent-as-pleasure	does,	however,	occur	in	several	places	in	
Gregory’s	other	works,	 and	may	well	have	been	 inspired	by	Philo.440	But	even	
where	 the	 serpent-as-pleasure	 and	 Eve	 appear	 together	 in	 a	 clear	 allusion	 to	
Genesis	3,	Eve	is	never	equated	with	sensation,	let	alone	Adam	with	the	mind.		
	
What,	 then,	 of	 other	 points	 of	 contact?	 Both	 Philo	 and	 Gregory	 agree	 that	
pleasure	prompts	people	 to	 sin	 through	deceptive	 trickery.	The	vocabulary	of	
deception	 is	 particularly	 prominent	 in	 a	 passage	 from	 De	 opificio	mundi	LIX,	
where	Philo	begins	by	referring	 to	pleasure’s	 ‘wiles	and	deceptions’	 (γοητείας	
καὶ	ἀπάτας),	which	it	introduces	to	the	woman/sensation,	and	by	means	of	her	
to	 the	 man/mind.	 Philo	 accuses	 pleasure	 of	 cheating	 (φενακίζει)	 and	
subjugating	 the	 senses	 with	 her	 sorceries	 (τοῖς	 φίλτροις),	 which	 delight	
(χαίρουσαι)	 in	 its	 offerings.	 Next,	 he	 lists	 various	 things	 in	which	 each	 sense	
takes	 pleasure.	 The	 sight,	 for	 example,	 delights	 in	 ‘variegated	 (ποικιλίαις)	
colours	and	shapes.’	The	senses	then	approach	the	mind,	their	master,	pleading	
it	 to	accept	 the	gifts	of	pleasure.	This	 is	how	reason	 is	ensnared	(δελεασθεὶς),	




uses	 the	 senses	 as	 her	 panders	 to	 get	 him	 on	 her	 hook	 (ἀγκιστρεύσεται).	 As	
Philo	continues:	
	
When	 she	 has	 ensnared	 (δελεάσασα)	 these	 [the	 senses]	 she	 easily	 brings	 the	 Mind	
under	her	control.	To	it,	dwelling	within	us,	the	senses	convey	the	things	seen	without	











in	De	 opificio	mundi	LIX	 overlaps	 with	 the	 terms	 Gregory	 uses	 in	De	 hominis	
opificio	 and	 in	 the	 other	 works	 which	 I	 have	 discussed	 above.	 Gregory,	 too,	
makes	 use	 of	 derivatives	 of	 γοητεία,	 ἀπάτη,	 ποικίλος,	 δέλεαρ,	 and	 ἄγκιστρον.	




3.443	The	definition	 of	 an	 appearance	 (φαντασία)	 as	 an	 impression	 (τύπος)	 in	
the	 mind	 is	 well	 known	 from	 Stoicism.444 	And	 as	 we	 have	 already	 seen,	
φαντασία	is	a	recurrent	term	in	Gregory’s	discussions	on	pleasure	as	the	false	
good.	 However,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 above	 φαντασία	 appears	 in	 conjunction	
with	a	number	of	terms	that	refer	to	deception,	for	Philo,	it	is	primarily	a	neutral	
term	 that	 simply	 describes	 how	 sensory	 knowledge	 is	 attained.	 In	 Leg.	1,	 he	
argues	 that	 ‘the	 living	 creature	 excels	 the	 non-living	 in	 two	 respects,	 in	 the	
power	 of	 receiving	 impressions	 (φαντασίᾳ)	 and	 in	 the	 active	 impulse	 (ὁρμῇ)	
towards	the	object	producing	them.	The	impression	(φαντασία)	is	produced	by	
the	drawing	nigh	of	 the	 external	object,	 as	 it	 stamps	 the	mind	 through	 sense-
perception	 (τυποῦντος	 νοῦν	 δι᾿	 αἰσθήσεως).’445	Although	 one	 can	 argue	 that	
sensation	itself	is	a	tension-laden	topic	for	Philo,	for	him	φαντασία	is	a	neutral	
term	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 all	 sensory	 knowledge,	 rather	 than	merely	 the	 source	 of	















and	 the	 senses.	 However,	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 good	 does	 figure	 in	 Philo’s	








Even	more	 similar	 is	 the	way	 in	which	 Philo	 discusses	 the	 permitted	 trees	 of	
Paradise,	which	he	identifies	with	the	different	virtues	in	the	soul.	In	De	opificio	
mundi,	the	tree	of	life	is	said	to	stand	for	‘reverence	toward	God,	the	greatest	of	
the	 virtues,	 by	 means	 of	 which	 the	 soul	 attains	 to	 immortality.’	 In	 the	 same	
work,	the	tree	of	knowledge	of	good	and	evil	is	presented	in	a	fairly	neutral	light	
as	 a	 symbol	 of	 the	 virtue	 of	 prudence	 (φρόνησιν),	 which	 helps	 us	 discern	
opposites	 from	 each	 other.447	Also	 in	 Legum	allegoriae,	 Philo	makes	 a	 similar	
connection	between	Paradise	and	virtue,	and,	like	Gregory,	interprets	the	word	
‘Eden’	 as	 ‘delight’	 (τρυφή). 448 	Here,	 the	 tree	 of	 life	 stands	 explicitly	 for	
‘goodness’	 (ἀγαθότητα),	 which	 Philo	 calls	 virtue	 in	 the	 most	 comprehensive	
sense.449	The	rest	of	the	trees	symbolise	all	virtues,	for,	
	
[h]e	moves	 the	 soul	of	 the	man	 to	get	benefit,	not	 from	a	 single	 tree	or	 from	a	 single	
virtue	but	from	all	the	virtues:	for	eating	is	a	figure	of	soul-nourishment:	and	the	soul	is	










This	 is	 very	 similar	 to	Gregory’s	notion	of	prelapsarian	eating.	 In	Philo’s	 view	
the	trees	of	Paradise	demonstrate	that	‘what	is	good	ia	also	most	fair	to	be	seen	
and	 enjoyed’	 (τὸ	 ἀγαθὸν	 καὶ	 ὀφθῆναι	 κάλλιστόν	 ἐστι	 καὶ	 ἀπολαυσθῆναι).451	
Although	for	Philo	this	is	mainly	an	illustration	of	virtue	being	both	theoretical	
and	 practical,	 it	 is	 also	 a	 nod	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 true	 good	 is	 pleasing	 both	
aesthetically	 and	 ethically.	 The	 tree	 of	 life	 as	 ‘goodness’	 and	 the	 trees	 of	




In	 Legum	 allegoriae,	 Philo’s	 remarks	 concerning	 the	 tree	 of	 knowledge	 are	
limited	 to	 its	 location	 and	 highlight	 its	 ambivalent	 status.	 He	 argues	 that	 the	
forbidden	tree,	the	symbol	of	wickedness	(κακίας),	 is	both	in	the	Paradise	and	





to	 the	 non-existence	 of	 evil	 (though	 Philo	 does	 not	 shy	 away	 from	 using	 the	
word	 ‘essence’),	which	Gregory	 addresses	 in	 his	 discussion	on	 the	 ambiguous	
location	 of	 the	 tree	 in	 Cant.	 12.	 However,	 the	 other	 aspects	 of	 Gregory’s	
interpretation	are	not	present	 in	Philo’s	account,	 and	compared	 to	De	hominis	
opificio,	the	tree	of	knowledge	plays	a	minor	role	in	the	extant	version	of	Philo’s	
allegory.	 In	 terms	 of	 pleasure	 and	 sin,	 he	 is	 clearly	 more	 interested	 in	 the	
serpent.	While	Philo	attributes	the	fall	to	a	failure	to	remember	and	do	what	is	
good	 (τὰ	κάλα),	 in	 the	preserved	 text	 of	Legum	allegoriae	 he	 says	 little	 about	
what	this	means	in	relation	to	pleasure.453	In	Leg.	2,	we	do	find	Philo	enquiring	
whether	passions	exist	because	the	earthly	man	needs	them	for	his	survival	or	











of	 pleasure	 as	 the	 instigator	 of	 the	 fall	 and	 make	 use	 of	 the	 well-known	




of	 the	 fall	 is	 an	 allegory	 of	 the	 hierarchical	 interrelationship	 between	 mind,	
sensation,	and	pleasure,	and	he	lays	particular	emphasis	on	gender	and	sexual	
pleasure.	 Gregory,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 presents	 a	 much	 more	 free-form	
philosophical	 investigation	 into	 the	 differences	 between	 true	 and	 false	 goods.	
For	him,	pleasure	is	a	broad	aesthetic	and	ethical	problem,	which	culminates	in	
Eve’s	act	of	 judging	the	 fruit	as	good,	rather	 than	 in	 the	sexual	union	between	
Eve	and	her	husband.	Thus,	 I	 find	 little	 support	 for	Runia’s	 view	according	 to	




pleasure.	 Implicitly,	 sexuality	 is	 of	 course	 the	 root	 problem	 in	 the	 sense	 that	
earlier	 in	 the	 treatise	 Gregory	 explains	 the	 origin	 of	 pleasure	 as	 a	 necessary	
accompaniment	 of	 the	 postlapsarian	 human	 drive	 for	 self-preservation.	 But	
when	Gregory	 comments	on	 the	events	of	 the	 fall	 or	 the	general	pull	 towards	
sin,	 pleasure	 is	 always	 a	 broad	 aesthetic	 problem,	which	manifests	 itself	 as	 a	
multi-faceted	drive	towards	the	material	creation	and	its	ephemeral	goods.	
	
Thus,	 instead	of	adopting	Philo’s	 literary	 style,	 vocabulary,	 and	 focus,	Gregory	
offers	 his	 own	 reading	 of	 the	 text.	 Runia’s	 conclusion	 that	 the	 relationship	






in	 light	 of	 my	 analysis.456	In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 I	 will	 show	 that	 in	De	 hominis	
opificio	Gregory	 leans	 first	and	 foremost	on	a	conceptual	 framework	which	he	





My	 analysis	 has	 showed	 that	 in	De	hominis	opificio	19–20,	 Gregory	 interprets	
the	biblical	account	of	the	fall	as	a	sensory	deception	caused	by	pleasure.	On	his	
reading,	 the	 tree	 of	 the	 knowledge	 of	 good	 and	 evil	 produces	 a	 fruit	 whose	
sensually	 pleasing	 exterior	 conceals	 an	 evil	 core.	 For	 Gregory,	 the	 ambiguous	
character	of	the	fruit	as	a	bearer	of	good	and	evil	refers	to	the	mixed	character	
of	 all	 false	 goods,	which	 are	 always	 tainted	 by	 their	 opposites	 and	 ultimately	
dissolve	into	nothingness.	By	using	the	pleasurable	appearance	of	the	fruit,	the	
evil	 projects	 an	 illusionary	 ‘appearance	 of	 good’	 to	 the	 senses	 which	 are	





to	 attribute	 the	 fall	 to	 ignorance	 rather	 than	 wilful	 wickedness.	 Echoing	
Socrates’	remarks,	Gregory	argues	that	people	always	desire	what	they	think	is	
good.	 Thus,	 sin	 does	 not	 come	 into	 existence	 due	 to	 deliberate	 evil	 acts,	 but	
because	 people	 content	 themselves	 to	 superficial	 appearances	 and	 fail	 to	
understand	which	objects	are	good	in	their	nature.	Instead	of	reflecting	on	the	













discourse	 on	 pleasure	 as	 the	 false	 good.	 His	 arguments	 and	 vocabulary	 owe	
especially	 to	 Platonist	 philosophy,	 in	 which	 the	 universe	 is	 divided	 into	 the	
realm	of	intelligible	and	immutable	being	and	ephemeral	sensible	appearances,	
which	are	less	true,	less	good,	and	less	existent	than	the	intelligible	goods.	Plato,	




Philo	 employ	 similar	 concepts,	 a	 brief	 comparison	 has	 demonstrated	 that	
Gregory	makes	a	 creative	and	 transformative	use	of	Philo	 to	advance	his	own	
argument	 concerning	pleasure	as	 the	 false	good.	 In	Philo’s	allegorical	 reading,	
this	 aspect	 of	 pleasure	 remains	 rather	 marginal.	 His	 interest	 lies	 first	 and	
foremost	 on	 pleasure	 as	 the	 destroyer	 of	 prelapsarian	 hierarchy,	 both	 in	 the	
human	soul	and	in	the	realm	of	sex	and	gender	relations.	
	
While	 the	 Greek	 text	 of	Gen.	 3	 does	 include	 sensory	 and	 affective	 vocabulary	
that	 can	 direct	 the	 exegete	 towards	 the	 interpretation	 we	 find	 in	De	 hominis	
opificio	19–20,	it	is	striking	that	despite	the	shared	themes	of	sensation,	beauty	







The	 goals	 pursued	 by	 humans	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 bodily	 enjoyment	 (τῆς	 σωματικῆς	
ἀπολαύσεως	 ἕνεκεν)	 are	 pursuits	 of	 sinners	 and	 distraction	 of	 a	 soul	 dragged	 down	
from	the	things	above	to	the	things	below…	The	one	who	judges	(κρίνων)	this	as	good	
(τὸ	 ἀγαθόν)	 in	 the	 face	 of	 God	 does	 not	 know	 that	 he	 is	 fixing	 the	 good	 in	 what	 is	
futile.457	
	
The	 fallen	 human	 being	 finds	 herself	 in	 a	 moral	 situation	 that	 is	 radically	
different	 from	 that	 of	 Adam	 and	 Eve.	While	 Eve	 only	mistakenly	 thought	 she	
lacked	something	good,	the	fallen	soul	has	been	separated	from	the	fullness	of	
good	and	struggles	with	the	presence	of	sin.	It	is	truly	‘poor	in	the	beautiful’,	and	
this	 poverty	 leads	 it	 to	 seek	what	 it	 lacks.458	For	Gregory,	 this	means	 that	 the	
postlapsarian	 human	 is	 constantly	 facing	 a	 choice	 between	 the	 good	 and	 the	
evil;	 at	 all	 times,	 two	 different	 destinations	 compete	 for	 her	 desire.	 Thus,	 the	
challenge	does	not	lie	merely	in	adhering	to	the	known	good,	as	it	did	for	Adam	
and	Eve,	but	 in	rediscovering	and	reattaining	the	good,	which	has	been	 lost	 in	
the	fall.	This	is	a	complicated	process.	Due	to	the	presence	of	sin,	the	fallen	soul	
faces	 a	 number	 of	 challenges	 that	 actively	 hinder	 it	 from	 remembering	 and	
reaching	its	intended	goal.	However,	even	though	the	functioning	of	the	human	




In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 will	 turn	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 pleasure	 in	 the	 postlapsarian	
existence.	 To	 set	 the	 scene,	 I	 will	 examine	 the	 disordered	 state	 in	 which	 the	
fallen	 human	 being	 finds	 herself	 from	 birth	 and	 the	 role	 of	 pleasure	 as	 an	
obstacle	on	the	path	of	virtue.	I	will	draw	attention	to	the	way	in	which	Gregory	
argues	 that	 the	 order	 of	 human	 development	 favours	 a	 mistaken	 use	 of	






Then,	 I	 will	 turn	 to	 De	 virginitate	 in	 order	 to	 show	 that	 the	 vocabulary	 and	
concepts	found	in	De	hominis	opificio	19–20	arise	from	a	broader	discussion	on	
pleasure	as	the	false	good,	which	Gregory	develops	at	the	very	beginning	of	his	
literary	career.	 I	will	 take	this	early	work	as	my	starting	point	 to	analyse	how	
Gregory	 makes	 use	 of	 the	 idea	 in	 a	 general	 ascetical	 context,	 outside	 the	
immediate	 concerns	 of	Genesis	3.	We	 shall	 see	 that	 the	 same	 notions	 of	 false	
goodness,	 deception,	 and	 mixing	 are	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 Gregory’s	 apology	 of	
virginity.	In	my	analysis	of	De	virginitate,	I	will	also	show	that	Gregory	upholds	









Finally,	 with	 De	 virginitate	 as	 my	 starting	 point,	 I	 will	 examine	 Gregory’s	
understanding	of	the	relationship	between	pleasure	and	sensation,	arguing	that	
the	main	problem	with	pleasure	 lies	 in	 the	way	 in	which	 it	obscures	 the	non-
final	 character	 of	 the	 sensible	 realm.	 Gregory’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 fall	 has	
already	 brought	 to	 relief	 the	 close	 and	 problematic	 connection	 between	
pleasure	and	sensation.	Now,	I	will	go	on	to	show	that	the	problem	does	not	lie	
in	the	sensible	world	itself	but	in	the	way	in	which	ignorant	human	beings	turn	
the	offerings	of	 the	sensible	world	 into	the	 telos	of	 their	 lives,	 that	 is,	 the	 final	
goal	towards	which	all	their	thoughts,	emotions,	and	actions	are	directed.	Thus,	
they	 remain	 largely	 unaware	 of	 the	 intelligible	 reality,	 which	 permeates	 all	
sensible	things	but	is	not	accessible	to	mere	sense	perception.	Due	to	the	mixed,	
unstable,	and	penultimate	character	of	the	sensible	realm,	sensation	cannot	be	





Through	my	analysis	 I	 hope	 to	 show	 that	 in	 the	postlapsarian	world	pleasure	
plays	 a	 major	 disruptive	 role:	 it	 attaches	 people	 to	 the	 fleeting	 sensible	
phenomena,	and	by	offering	a	false	sense	of	satisfaction,	it	diverts	human	souls	
further	 and	 further	 away	 from	 intellectual	 enquiry	 and	 the	 true	 telos	 of	 the	
Christian	 life.	 The	 pursuit	 of	 bodily	 pleasure	 as	 the	 good	 hinders	 the	
development	 of	 our	 rational	 abilities	 and	 locks	 people	 in	 the	 sensible	 realm,	








the	sensible	world	and	 the	consequent	 futility	of	worldly	attachments.	 It	 is	no	
surprise	 that	 in	 this	 series	 of	 homilies	 pleasure	 is	 repeatedly	 cited	 as	 the	
passion	 that	 leads	 to	a	sinful	attachment	 to	ephemeral	sensible	objects.	 In	 the	
next	 chapter,	 I	 will	 come	 back	 to	 the	 topic	 of	 transiency	 which	 is	 Gregory’s	
overarching	concern	in	the	whole	work.	For	now,	I	want	to	draw	attention	to	a	
single	passage	that	comes	about	in	Homily	8,	 the	 final	homily	of	 the	collection,	
which	is	one	of	Gregory’s	most	complete	treatments	of	the	problem	of	pleasure	
and	the	good.459	As	I	will	show,	the	homily	contains	many	of	the	concepts	that	
we	can	recognise	from	Gregory’s	 interpretation	of	the	fall:	 the	 juxtaposition	of	
both	the	good	and	virtue	with	pleasure,	a	division	between	how	things	appear	
and	what	they	are	by	nature,	and	an	emphasis	on	the	activity	of	 the	mind	and	
the	necessity	of	 intellectual	 training.	However,	 the	homily	 interests	me	chiefly	
because	 here	 Gregory	 discusses	 the	 state	 in	 which	 infants	 are	 born	 into	 the	
postlapsarian	world	and	offers	an	explanation	 for	our	 seemingly	 intrinsic	pull	
towards	 pleasure.460	We	 should	 note	 that	 an	 interest	 in	 infant	 behaviour	was	
																																																								











In	 order	 to	 identify	 the	 possible	 points	 of	 contact	 between	 Gregory	 and	 the	
ancient	debate	on	infant	behaviour	and	the	final	human	good,	it	is	necessary	to	
recapitulate	first	the	two	main	positions:	Epicurus	had	called	pleasure	good	on	
the	 basis	 that	 humans	 had	 a	 ‘natural	 affinity’	 (διὰ	 τὸ	 φύσιν	 ἔχειν	 οἰκείαν)	 to	
it.461	The	word	οἰκεῖος	 is	difficult	 to	 translate,	 but	 it	 denotes	 a	natural	 affinity	
and	 belonging,	 and	 has	 been	 rendered,	 for	 example,	 as	 that	 which	 is	
‘appropriate’,	 ‘familiar’,	and	‘fitting’.	Later	Epicurean	commentators	added	that	
pleasure	was	 the	 first	 appropriate	 thing,	 the	 πρῶτον	 οἰκεῖον,	 that	 is,	 the	 first	
thing	to	which	human	infants	were	naturally	attracted.	On	the	Epicurean	view,	
this	 was	 an	 indication	 of	 the	 natural	 primacy	 of	 pleasure	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 of	





human	 good	 was	 not	 that	 which	 appeared	 first,	 but	 that	 which	 reflected	 the	
distinctive	nature	of	humans	as	rational	beings:	virtue.	Virtue	was	neither	given	
at	 birth	 nor	 did	 it	 unfold	 spontaneously,	 but	 required	 conscious	 intellectual	
training	to	be	adopted	and	internalised.	Even	if	the	Stoics,	too,	took	interest	in	
																																																																																																																																																													









honest	 verdict.’	 See	 also	 DL	10.137,	 and	 Cicero’s	 criticism	 of	 the	 Epicurean	 argument	 in	 Fin.	









the	 individual	gained	an	 increasing	understanding	and	command	of	 the	 things	
that	were	‘appropriate’.465	Mere	self-preservation	would	eventually	give	way	to	
more	 mature	 notions	 of	 οἰκεῖος,	 reaching	 its	 pinnacle	 in	 the	 awareness	 of	








created	 things.	 His	 interpretation	 seems	 natural	 in	 light	 of	 the	 broader	




functioning	 through	 pleasure	 and	 passionate	 feeling	 (ἡ	 ἐνδιάθετος	 περὶ	 τὸ	
καταθύμιον	σχέσις	δι’	ἡδονῆς	καὶ	προσπαθείας	ἐνεργουμένη),’	whereas	hate	is	
an	‘aversion	from	what	is	unpleasant,	and	turning	away	from	what	is	painful	(ἡ	






suggests	 that	 it	means	 a	 ‘recognition	 and	 appreciation	 of	 something	 as	 belonging	 to	 one’,	 but	
prefers	using	the	original	Greek	term.	(Ibid.,	281.)		




end	you	should	have,	and	how	you	should	–	 this	 is	what	 is	both	midway	and	best,	 and	 this	 is	
characteristic	 of	 virtue.’	 The	 themes	 of	 the	 primacy	 of	 pleasure	 and	 pain	 in	 infancy	 and	 the	
importance	 of	 rightly	 directed	 love	 and	 hate	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 virtue	 also	 resemble	 the	
discussion	on	education	in	Plato’s	Laws	2.653a–c.		
467	Gregory’s	 definition	 of	 love	 and	 hatred	 also	 resembles	 Aspasius’	 account	 in	 In	 ethica	
Nichomachea	 commentaria	 (46.19–26;	 trans.	 Konstan,	 46–47):	 ‘In	 addition	 to	 these,	 they	
customarily	 number	 as	 emotions	 (πάθη)	 love	 and	 hate	 (τὴν	φιλίαν	 καὶ	 τὸ	 μῖσος)…	 Loving	 is	
	 155	
customary	fashion,	Gregory	asserts	that	both	emotions	can	be	used	profitably	or	
unprofitably.	 Depending	 on	 their	 object,	 life	 is	 lived	 for	 either	 good	 or	 ill.	
Whereas	 the	 object	 of	 love	 (now,	 ῇ	 ἀγάπῃ)	 becomes	 blended	 (κατακιρνᾶταί,	
συγκραθείημεν)	 with	 the	 soul	 and	 results	 in	 familiarity	 (οἰκειούμεθα),	 hate	
brings	about	separation	(ἀλλοτριούμεθα).	This	is	true	regardless	of	whether	the	
object	 is	 good	 or	 bad	 –	 akin	 to	 Gregory’s	 remarks	 on	 desire	 in	 De	 hominis	
opificio.468	The	challenge,	then,	lies	in	discovering	what	is	by	nature	lovable	and	
what	 is	hateful,	which,	of	course,	correlates	with	 that	which	 is	by	nature	good	
(τῇ	 φύσει	 τῶν	 ἀγαθῶν)	 and	 that	 which	 is	 evil.	 But,	 just	 like	 in	 De	 hominis	
opificio,	Gregory	thinks	correct	discernment	is	difficult:	
	
If	 only	 human	 nature	 were	 trained	 (ἐπαιδεύετο)	 in	 this	 above	 all	 things	 –	 I	 mean	
discrimination	 between	 what	 is	 good	 and	 what	 is	 not	 (τὴν	 τοῦ	 καλοῦ	 λέγω	 καὶ	 μὴ	
τοιούτου	διάκρισιν469)!	The	passions	would	make	no	headway	throughout	our	lives,	 if	














thing	 loved.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 in	 hating	 there	 is	 an	 alienation	 (ἀλλοτρίωσις),	 and	 pain	 (λύπη)	
upon	seeing	and	hearing	 the	hated	 thing,	or,	 in	general,	upon	encountering	 the	hated	 thing	 in	
any	way	at	all.’	The	way	 in	which	Aspasius	couples	 love/pleasure	and	hate/pain	and	employs	
the	terms	οἰκείωσις	and	ἀλλοτρίωσις	is	similar	to	Gregory.	It	is	not	clear	who	Aspasius	is	citing	
as	 ‘they’,	 or	 if	 he	 is	 simply	 referring	 to	 a	 widespread	 definition.	 The	 excerpt	 comes	 from	 a	
passage	 in	 which	 he	 explains	 how	 schools	 and	 philosophers	 other	 than	 Aristotle	 define	
emotions.	 He	 has	 previously	 discussed	 Stoics	 and	 Plato,	 but	 it	 seems	 unlikely	 he	 is	 now	
returning	to	Stoic	thought	specifically,	for	he	has	just	mentioned	they	omitted	anger	from	their	
list	 of	 generic	 emotions,	 and,	 after	 the	 passage	 I	 have	 cited,	mentions	 anger	 and	 gratitude	 as	
being	‘also	numbered	among	emotions.’	
468	Eccl.	8.2	(SC	416,	390–392);	trans.	Hall	&	Moriarty,	129.	
469	Vinel	 (SC	 416,	 393,	 note	 3)	 notes	 the	 connection	 to	Hom.	op.	20,	where,	 as	we	 have	 seen,	




After	 sight,	 Gregory	 lists	 things	 that	 are	 beautiful	 (καλόν)	 to	 other	 senses,	




we	 tend	 to	 fail	 in	our	discernment	of	 the	good:	our	habituation	 to	pleasure	as	
the	good	begins	already	in	infancy.	
	
Since	 therefore	 the	 senses	 are	 engendered	 in	 us	 as	 soon	 as	we	 are	 born,	we	 become	
habituated	(συντρεφόμεθα)	to	them	from	the	beginning	of	our	life,	and	the	attachment	
(πρὸς	τὴν	ἄλογον	ζωὴν	ἡ	οἰκείωσις)	to	the	irrational	life	is	strong	in	our	sensual	power	
(for	 all	 this	 kind	 of	 thing	 is	 to	 be	 seen	 also	 in	 irrational	 creatures),	 and	 the	mind	 is	
hampered	 in	 its	 proper	 activity,	 being	 allowed	 no	 scope	 by	 its	 infant	 status,	 but	 is	
somehow	 cramped	 by	 the	 dominance	 of	 less	 rational	 sensation	 (τῇ	 ἐπικρατήσει	 τῆς	




The	 interest	 in	 infant	 behaviour	 does	 not	 have	 to	 entail	 that	 Gregory	 is	
commenting	directly	on	the	Epicurean	cradle	argument.	Although	he	agrees	that	
the	 infant	 is	 innately	 attracted	 to	pleasure,	 he	 implicitly	 rejects	 the	Epicurean	









why…	But	 there	 is	one	element	you	could	 isolate	 in	any	account	you	give	 [on	virtue],	












feels	 distress	 at	 pain.	 However,	 though	 Philo	 recognises	 the	 presence	 of	 this	
innate	drive,	he	appears	critical	of	people	who	praise	pleasure	and	‘tell	us	that	
every	living	creature	hastens	after	pleasure	as	its	most	necessary	and	essential	
end,	 and	 man	 above	 all.’474	In	 other	 words,	 the	 fact	 that	 an	 infant	 desires	





(συντρεφόμεθα)	 to	 their	 sense-based	 judgments	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	
behaviour	becomes	engrained	and	difficult	to	avoid.	The	focus	on	habituation	in	
the	 formation	 of	 a	 moral	 disposition	 –	 here,	 a	 negative	 one	 –	 calls	 to	 mind	
Aristotle,	 and	 indeed	 in	 Nicomachean	 Ethics	 Aristotle	 makes	 a	 very	 similar	
observation.	 Alluding	 to	 Plato’s	 comment	 in	 Laws,	 he	 comments	 on	 the	
importance	of	 learning	 to	delight	 in	and	be	pained	by	 the	right	 things,	 saying:	
‘[Pleasure]	has	grown	up	in	us	all	from	our	infancy:	this	is	why	it	is	difficult	to	
rub	off	 this	 phenomenon,	 engrained	 (συντέθραπται)	 as	 it	 is	 in	 our	 life.’475	We	
should	note	 that	Gregory	 employs	 the	 very	 same	verb	 (συντρέφω)	 to	 discuss	
the	 way	 in	 which	 infants	 are	 habituated	 to	 the	 sensual	 life	 from	 the	 very	
beginning.		His	choice	of	word	is	particurarly	striking	since	there	does	not	seem	
to	 be	 any	 significant	 trajectory	 of	 transmission	 relaying	 Aristotle’s	 words	 in	
their	 original	 form.	 A	 somewhat	 similar	 remark	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Origen’s	De	
pascha	where	a	criticism	is	levelled	at	the	Hebrews	for	having	grown	up	‘nursed	
by	 the	 earth’,	 habituated	 (συντραφέντες)	 to	 their	 bodies	 and	 the	 pleasurable	












predate	 the	 Epicurean	 ‘cradle	 argument’	 and	 the	 Stoic	 response,	 I	 think	 it	 is	
plausible	 that	 the	 account	 in	 Eccl.	 8	 also	 echoes	 this	 later	 development.	 We	
should	note	especially	that,	in	addition	to	the	verb	συντρέφω,	Gregory	employs	
the	 term	 οἰκείωσις	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 process	 of	 innate	 attraction	 and	
habituation.477	While	 the	 word	 can	 allude	 to	 any	 attachment	 or	 familiarity	
completely	outside	the	Stoic/Epicurean	debate	on	the	πρῶτον	οἰκεῖον,	it	seems	
unlikely	 that	 Gregory	 would	 coincidentally	 use	 it	 with	 reference	 to	 human	
development	and	our	attraction	 to	pleasure,	which	 is	 its	distinctive	context	 in	
this	 well-known	 ancient	 debate.	 Such	 a	 coincidence	 seems	 particularly	




which	 he	 uses	 to	 explain	 the	 conflicting	 interests	 of	 mind	 and	 sense.	 Just	 as	
human	 nature	 is	 double,	 divided	 into	 the	 intelligible	 and	 the	 sensible,	 human	
life,	too,	takes	a	double	form:	there	is	the	physical	life	of	the	sensing	part	and	the	
mental	 and	 non-physical	 life	 of	 the	mind.	 The	 notion	 of	 a	 good	 life	 is	 divided	




the	 right	 relationship	 is	 complicated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 sensation	 has	 a	 clear	
advantage	in	establishing	its	power	in	human	beings:	
	




478	Ilaria	 Ramelli,	 ‘Gregory	 of	 Nyssa’s	 Christianized	 Form	 of	 the	 Stoic	 Oikeiôsis’,	 in	 Three	




which	develops	 slowly,	 is	 for	 this	 reason	dominated	by	 the	 sense,	which	 is	 complete,	
and	by	compulsion	grows	habituated	to	the	perpetual	superiority,	so	that	it	submits	to	
sense,	 judging	 good	 or	 bad	 according	 to	 whatever	 sense	 selects	 or	 rejects	 (καλὸν	 ἢ	
φαῦλον	κρίνων	ὅπερ	ἂν	ἢ	προέληται	ἢ	ἀποβάλῃ	ἡ	αἴσθησις).’480			
	
Thus,	 as	 Gregory	 goes	 on	 to	 explain,	 the	 discernment	 of	 the	 true	 good	 (τοῦ	
ἀληθῶς	 ἀγαθοῦ	 κατανόησις)	 is	 hard	 to	 achieve	 because	 we	 find	 ourselves	
‘prejudiced	by	sensual	criteria’	(αἰσθητικοῖς	κριτηρίοις)	and	define	the	good	‘as	
what	 is	 enjoyable	 and	 pleasant	 (ἐν	 τῷ	 εὐφραίνοντί	 τε	 καὶ	 ἥδοντι	 τὸ	 καλὸν	




prevented	 by	 pleasure	 from	 looking	 towards	 virtue	 (νοῦς	 διὰ	 τῆς	 ἡδονῆς	 πρὸς	 τὴν	
ἀρετὴν	 ὁρᾶν	 ἐμποδίζεται),	 that	 is	 the	 beginning	 of	 evil	 (ἡ	 τῆς	 κακίας	 ἀρχή),	 because	
when	the	mind	is	dominated	by	sense	it	too	favours	the	irrational	judgment	of	what	is	
good	 (τὴν	 ἄλογον	 περὶ	 τοῦ	 καλοῦ	 κρίσιν),	 and	 if	 the	 eye	 says	 that	 goodness	 lies	 in	





the	 rule	 of	 sense	 and	 the	 resulting	 irrational	 judgment	 on	 the	 good	 the	
‘beginning	of	 evil.’	Also	 the	words	 ἔυχροια	 (which	Gregory	uses	 in	De	hominis	




The	 picture	 that	 emerges	 of	 Gregory’s	 view	 of	 early	 habituation	 and	 the	 final	
good	may	 be	 related	 to	 the	 originally	 Stoic	 notion	 of	 οἰκείωσις	 but	 it	 is	 also	
different	from	the	Stoic	position.	First	of	all,	Gregory	argues	that	the	infant	does,	
in	 fact,	 have	 an	 innate	 attachment	 to	 pleasure,	 rather	 than	 to	 mere	 self-
preservation	as	the	Stoics	had	argued.		However,	for	Gregory,	this	is	not	the	full	
																																																								





the	 sensible	 soul,	 which	 rules	 in	 pre-rational	 children.	 Since	 the	 true	 human	
nature,	that	which	distinguishes	us	from	animals,	is	rational,	that	which	is	truly	
οἰκεῖος	 for	 human	 beings	 is	 a	 life	 of	 virtue	 and	 the	 likeness	 of	 God.	 In	 fact,	
throughout	 Gregory’s	 corpus,	 this	 positive	 usage	 is	 more	 common	 when	 the	
terms	οἰκεῖος	and	οἰκείωσις	are	employed.482	The	 idea	that	 the	 life	of	virtue	 is	
the	highest	notion	of	οἰκείωσις	 is,	of	course,	 shared	by	Gregory	and	 the	Stoics	
alike.	 But	 while	 the	 monistic	 Stoic	 understanding	 of	 human	 beings	 entails	 a	
more	 linear	 development	 from	 the	 good	 of	 the	 body	 towards	 the	 good	 of	 the	
mind,	 Gregory’s	 two-tier	 anthropology	 sets	 the	 two	 goods	 against	 each	 other.	
For	him	the	‘habituation’	to	pleasure	as	the	first	known	good	is	not	the	first	step	






Gregory	 concludes	 the	discussion	on	early	habituation	by	arguing	 that	human	
beings	 would	 have	 avoided	 the	 submission	 to	 sensation	 if	 only	 ‘it	 had	 been	
possible	 for	 the	 true	 discernment	 of	 the	 good	 (τὴν	 ἀληθῆ	 περὶ	 τοῦ	 καλοῦ	
κρίσιν)	 to	 be	 present	 in	 us	 from	 the	 beginning,	 with	 the	 mind	 assessing	
goodness	(τὸ	ἀγαθόν)	by	itself.’	While	Gregory	elsewhere	makes	the	point	that	
goodness	predates	evil	and	is	thus	natural	and	familiar	to	human	beings,	in	the	











of	 ‘parts’	 but	 the	 Stoic	 language	 of	 ‘orientation’	 [sic]	 (oikeiôsis),	 Galen	 puts	 this	 as	 follows:	
“There	 are	 these	 three	 things	 towards	which	we	 feel	 a	 natural	 orientation,	 corresponding	 to	
each	form	of	the	soul’s	parts:	pleasure	through	the	appetitive	form,	victory	through	the	spirited	




the	 fall	 is	 our	 natural	 inclination	 towards	 the	 good,	 but	 due	 to	 our	 sensually	
dominated	 existence	 we	 will	 repeat	 Eve’s	 mistake	 and	 seek	 it	 in	 the	 wrong	
place.	 After	 setting	 the	 scene	 with	 this	 brief	 account	 of	 the	 state	 in	 which	
humans	are	born	into	the	fallen	world,	I	will	turn	to	De	virginitate	to	show	how	






(ἐπιθυμίαν	 τῆς	 κατ’ἀρετὴν	 ζωῆς),’	 Gregory	 opens	 his	 early	 work	 De	
virginitate.484	It	 is,	 then,	 no	 surprise	 that	 the	 right	 direction	 of	 both	 desire	
(ἐπιθυμία)	 and	 love	 (ἔρως)	 emerges	 as	 the	 key	 topic	 of	 the	 work	 in	 which	
Gregory	 tries	 to	persuade	his	 reader	 that	 a	 life	of	 virginity	 is	 the	most	 secure	
path	towards	virtue.	In	the	treatise,	Gregory	argues	that	a	single-minded	focus	
on	 the	 spiritual	 goods	 spares	 the	 monastic	 from	 the	 many	 distractions	 of	
marriage	and	ensures	 that	both	knowing	and	desiring	are	directed	exclusively	
towards	 that	which	 is	 truly	 good	 (καλόν).	While	 the	 focus	 on	 ἐπιθυμία,	 ἔρως,	
and	 sexual	 ethics	 makes	 pleasure	 an	 immediately	 relevant	 concern,	 in	 De	




In	De	 virginitate,	 ἡδονή	 is	 presented	 as	 the	 most	 pernicious	 of	 passions,	 the	
opposite	of	virtue,	and	the	enemy	of	the	good.	Its	primacy	as	a	passion	is	both	
psychological	 and	historical:	 In	 the	 human	 soul,	 it	 is	 the	 fundamental	 passion	
which	all	other	passions	follow.	However,	Gregory	also	alludes	to	 its	historical	
priority	 in	 Chapter	 12,	 where	 he	 argues	 that	 pleasure	 brought	 about	 by	
deception	(δι’	ἀπάτης)	became	the	beginning	of	the	fall.485	This	is	what	we	have	
read	 in	De	hominis	opificio,	 but	 in	De	virginitate	Gregory	does	not	expound	on	





discussion	 on	 pleasure,	 which	 includes	 similar	 terms	 and	 concepts	 as	 De	
hominis	 opificio,	 the	 remark	 gives	 us	 a	 good	 reason	 to	 suppose	 that	 the	





In	 De	 virginitate,	 the	 stark	 opposition	 between	 pleasure	 and	 the	 καλόν	 is	
evidenced	by	Gregory’s	repeated	insistence	that	a	desire	for	the	good	and	desire	
for	 pleasure	 are	 mutually	 exclusive.	 As	 Gregory	 argues,	 our	 desiring	
(ἐπιθυμητικόν)	 is	not	by	nature	such	that	 it	could	simultaneously	serve	bodily	
pleasures	 (σωματικαῖς	 ὑπηρετεῖν	 ἡδοναῖς)	 and	pursue	 the	 spiritual	marriage;	
‘no	one	can	serve	two	masters,’	he	remarks	in	allusion	to	Matt.	6:24.486	Gregory	
conceptualises	the	mutual	exclusivity	with	a	number	of	physical	analogies:	it	is	
impossible	 to	 use	 one’s	 hands	 for	 two	 different	 tasks	 at	 once,	 look	 into	 two	








Phaedo,	 Socrates	 discusses	 the	 mutual	 exclusivity	 between	 philosophy	 and	
sensual	 pleasure	 and	 argues	 that	 the	 ‘greatest	 and	most	 extreme	 evil’	 comes	
about	through	pleasure	that	nails	the	soul	to	the	body.489	Therefore,	the	lover	of	
knowledge	 must	 detach	 his	 desires	 from	 the	 deceptive	 visible	 reality	
																																																								
486	Virg.	20.3	 (SC	 119,	 496).	Matt.	 6:24	 reads:	 ‘No	 one	 can	 serve	 two	masters;	 for	 a	 slave	will	




489	Phaedo	83c–d.	The	 idea	of	mutual	 exclusivity	 is	preserved	 in	 later	Platonism.	Consider,	 for	
example,	Maximus	of	Tyre	who	argues:	 ‘Wisdom	and	Pleasure	have	nothing	at	 all	 in	 common	
(οὐδὲν	σοφίᾳ	καὶ	ἡδονῇ	κοινόν).	The	 lover	of	Pleasure	and	 the	 lover	of	Wisdom	are	different	
people	(ἄλλος	μὲν	ὁ	φιλήδονος,	ἄλλος	δὲ	ὁ	φιλόσοφος)…’	(Diss.	33.2;	trans.	Trapp,	262).	
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apprehended	 by	 the	 senses	 and	 focus	 on	 the	 things	 that	 are	 invisible	 and	
apprehended	 by	 the	mind.	We	 shall	 see	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	what	 is	
visible	 to	 the	 senses	 and	 what	 is	 visible	 to	 the	 mind	 appears	 frequently	 in	
Gregory’s	criticisms	of	pleasure	as	the	good,	although	for	him	the	dividing	line	is	
not	 one	 between	 the	 body	 and	 the	 soul,	 but	 between	 the	 sensible	 and	 the	








spiritual	 fulfilment	 ἡδονή:	 to	 be	 able	 to	 lift	 its	 eyes	 towards	 the	 ‘divine	 and	
blessed	pleasure’	 (τὴν	θείαν	 τε	 καὶ	 μακαρίαν	ἡδονήν),	 the	 soul	must	not	 turn	
towards	earthly	things	and	participate	in	pleasures	which	are	permissible	in	the	
common	 life	 (κατὰ	 τὴν	 τοῦ	 κοινοῦ	 βίου	 συγχώρησιν	 ἡδονῶν).491	As	 Gregory	
states,	 the	 ‘power	of	 love’	(ἐρωτικὴν	δύναμιν)	must	be	turned	from	the	bodily	
things	 (ἀπὸ	 τῶν	 σωματικῶν)	 towards	 an	 intellectual	 and	 immaterial	
contemplation	 of	 the	 Beautiful	 (ἐπὶ	 τὴν	 νοητήν	 τε	 καὶ	 ἄϋλον	 τοῦ	 καλοῦ	
θεωρίαν).492	
	
The	mutual	 exclusivity	 of	 virtue	 and	pleasure	 does	 not	 necessarily	 entail	 that	
also	 virtue	 and	 marriage	 are	 mutually	 exclusive.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 Gregory	























convince	 them	 that	 no	 greater	 good	 exists	 beyond	 pleasure	 of	 the	 flesh.	 We	
should	 keep	 in	 mind	 that	 although	 Gregory	 does	 not	 appear	 particularly	
focussed	on	sexuality	in	his	rebuttals	of	pleasure,	in	the	first	part	of	this	thesis	
we	saw	him	argue	 that	pleasure	was	given	as	an	 incentive	 to	procreate.	 In	 its	
original	function,	pleasure	does	not	have	to	imply	the	presence	of	sin.	However,	
even	 if	 pleasure	 originally	 serves	 as	 a	 natural	 incentive	 to	 ensure	 the	
continuation	of	the	human	race,	fallen	humans	who	are	inclined	towards	bodily	
enjoyment	will	 struggle	 to	keep	 it	within	 its	appropriate	 limits.	Only	a	person	
with	 sufficient	 knowledge	 of	 the	 true	 good	 is	 able	 to	 treat	 marriage	 as	 an	
institution	 for	procreation	 instead	of	 an	 instrument	of	 pleasure.	He	will	make	
appropriate	 use	 of	 marriage	 but	 understand	 that	 its	 pleasures	 pale	 in	
comparison	to	the	true	good.	Most	people,	however,	 lack	such	 insight	and	will	




However,	 even	 if	 the	 institution	of	marriage	 is	 used	properly,	 it	will	 lead	 to	 a	
scattering	 of	 desire.	 This	 is	 why	 Gregory	 ranks	 marriage	 only	 as	 the	 second	
choice	 after	 virginity	 which	 enables	 a	 single-minded	 focus	 on	 virtue.	 If	 the	
marital	union	is	misused	and	submitted	to	the	goal	of	pleasure,	the	scattering	of	








but	 disperses	 and	 loses	 its	 force	 when	 it	 is	 directed	 into	 a	 number	 of	 small	
streams.	Whereas	virtue	leads	to	unity,	pleasure	tends	to	fragmentation:	
	
It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 this	 is	 also	 true	with	 the	 human	mind	 (ὁ	 νοῦς	 ὁ	 ἀνθρώπινος);	 it	
flows	 in	 all	 directions,	 it	 scatters	 itself	 by	 running	 towards	 what	 is	 pleasing	 to	 the	
senses	 (πρὸς	 τὸ	 ἀρέσκον	 ἀεὶ	 τοῖς	 αἰσθητηρίοις),	 and	 has	 no	worthwhile	 force	 for	 its	
journey	 to	 the	 really	 good	 (τὸ	 ὄντως	 ἀγαθόν).	 But	 if	 it	were	 called	 in	 from	 all	 sides,	





itself	 with	 a	 number	 of	 earthly	 occupations.	 Gregory	 recommends	 the	 use	 of	
self-constraint	 (ἐγκρατεία)	 as	 the	 ‘pipe’	 that	 forces	 desire	 to	 rise	 upwards.496	
We	should	read	Gregory’s	requirement	of	single-mindedness	against	his	notion	
of	 the	 unity	 of	 goods.	 A	 person	 whose	 faculties	 are	 harmoniously	 aligned	
towards	 the	 one	 actual	Good	 imitates	 the	unity	 of	 her	divine	 goal	 in	 her	 very	
being.	 Since	 the	 true	 goods	 are	 limited	 by	 their	 opposites,	 no	 vice	 should	 be	
allowed	to	diminish	the	virtue	in	the	soul	of	a	person	who	strives	for	the	good.	
Instead,	knowledge,	desire,	and	enjoyment	must	all	be	focussed	on	the	virtues,	
which	 in	 their	 unity	 point	 towards	 the	 indivisible	 being	 of	 God.	 This	 inner	
simplicity,	 untainted	 by	 any	multiplicity	 of	 intent,	 is	 essentially	what	 Gregory	





De	 virginitate	 itself	 is	 a	 proposal	 for	 how	 the	 God-centred	 single-mindedness	
ought	 to	be	achieved.	 In	 the	 treatise,	Gregory	attempts	 to	 convince	his	 reader	








discover	 the	 true	 good.	How	does	 virginity	 achieve	 this,	 and	why	 is	marriage	
less	 ideal?	 Here,	 we	 should	 recall	 the	 concept	 of	 mixed	 and	 unmixed	 goods	
which	 we	 previously	 discussed	 in	De	 hominis	 opificio.	 One	 of	 Gregory’s	 main	
complaints	about	marriage	is	that	it	attaches	people	to	external	things	that	are	
beyond	 their	 control	 and	 provoke	 intense	 passions	 in	 untrained	 minds.498	
Marriage	can	lead	to	grief	when	one’s	spouse	or	children	die,	and	especially	to	
uncontrolled	 sexual	 desires	 if	 the	mind	 does	 not	manage	 them	 appropriately.	
Deep	down,	these	passions	are	motivated	by	the	idea	that	pleasure	is	desirable	
and	 pain	 is	 to	 be	 avoided:	 When	 bodily	 desires	 are	 gratified,	 the	 individual	
thinks	he	 is	happy.	But	when	he	 fears	a	 loss	of	 the	pleasing	companionship	of	
his	spouse,	worries	over	a	child,	or	grieves	the	death	of	a	loved	one,	he	becomes	
distressed	by	his	supposed	bad	lot	 in	 life.	 In	other	words,	the	good	things	that	
are	 conventionally	 associated	 with	 marriage	 reveal	 themselves	 as	 mixed	 and	
imperfect	 in	 their	 goodness.	 In	 this	way	marriage	 turns	 into	 a	 source	 of	 grief	
and	death.499	The	realisation	is	troubling:	
	
Can	anyone	 live	 joyfully	(ἐν	εὐφροσύνῃ)	when	such	thoughts	are	 in	his	mind?	Will	he	
believe	that	his	present	goods	(τοῖς	παροῦσιν	αὐτῷ	χρηστοῖς)	will	continue	forever,	or	
is	it	not	clear	from	this	that	he	will	be	at	a	loss	like	one	in	the	deceptions	of	dreams	(ἐν	
ταῖς	 τῶν	 ὀνείρων	 ἀπάταις)?	Will	 he	 not	 regard	 life	 with	 distrust	 and	 consider	 alien	




as	 some	 others,	 jesting	with	 the	 hopes	 of	 those	who	 gape	 in	 expectation	 and	 veiling	
itself	in	the	deceit	of	appearances	(διὰ	τῆς	τῶν	φαινομένων	πλάνης),	until	suddenly	in	
vicissitudes	 it	 is	 exposed	 to	 be	 something	 other	 than	 the	 human	 hope	 born	 through	
deception	 (διὰ	 τῆς	 ἀπάτης)	 of	 the	 fools.	 For	 what	 kind	 of	 pleasure	 (ἡδονῆς)	 do	 the	
pleasant	things	of	 life	(τὰ	ἡδέα	τοῦ	βίου)	seem	sufficient	to	the	person	who	considers	
these	 matters?	 When	 will	 the	 one	 who	 understands	 these	 things	 take	 true	 pleasure	
(ἡσθήσεται	κατὰ	ἀλήθειαν)	 and	enjoy	 the	goods	 that	 seem	present	 to	him	 (δοκοῦσιν	









In	 this	 passage,	 filled	 with	 vocabulary	 of	 appearing	 and	 deception,	 Gregory	
describes	 life	 in	 the	 sensible	 world	 as	 a	 sequence	 of	 dream-like	 appearances	
which	stir	up	deceptive	impressions	that	make	things	seem	different	from	what	
they	 are.501	The	 apparent	 goods	 of	 the	 present	 life	 are	 eagerly	 desired	 and	
enjoyed	by	those	who	lack	understanding,	until	in	a	sudden	turn	of	events	their	
true	nature	is	revealed.	The	passage	depicts	the	sensible	world	as	characterised	
by	 illusions,	 distress,	 ambiguity	 and	 change.	 It	 conceals	 the	 spiritual	 realm	
which	 is	 the	home	of	 truth,	goodness,	 simplicity,	and	stability.	This	 two-tiered	
worldview	with	a	discernible	Platonist	flavour	is	precisely	what	we	discovered	





mind	 and	 knowledge	 in	 assessing	 the	 nature	 of	 things.	 It	 brings	 to	 fore	 even	










Finally,	we	must	 take	 note	 of	 the	way	 in	which	 Gregory	 talks	 about	 attitudes	
towards	 ‘present	 goods’,	 first	 generally	 (τοῖς	 παροῦσιν	 αὐτῷ	 χρηστοῖς)	 and	









χρηστοῖς	εὐφρανθήσεται).	This	 is	significant	 if	we	keep	 in	mind	that	 the	well-
known	ancient	definition	describes	pleasure	as	a	positive	emotion	arising	from	








Gregory’s	 discourse	 in	 Chapter	 3	 of	De	virginitate	 paves	way	 to	 Chapter	 4,	 in	
which	he	addresses	an	important	ethical	topic:	the	sufficiency	of	virtue	and	the	
consequent	 unimportance	 of	 external	 goods	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 the	 good	 life.	
Having	explained	how	the	goods	of	the	sensible	world	always	fail	to	satisfy	and	
lead	 to	 outright	 suffering,	 Gregory	 reminds	 his	 reader	 that	 evil	 is	 powerless	
unless	 a	 person	 brings	 it	 on	 himself.	 Thus,	 the	 ‘one	 who	 perceives	 the	
deceitfulness	of	this	life	with	a	pure	eye	of	his	soul	and	rises	above	the	earthly	




freedom	 and	 peace,	 considering	 virtue	 his	 only	 valuable	 possession	 (μόνον	
τίμιον	 ἑαυτῷ	 κτῆμα	 νομίζωντὴν	 ἀρετήν).	 The	 possession	 of	 virtue	 can	 never	
lead	 to	 envy,	 greed,	 and	 discord	 which	 accompany	 material	 possessions,	
because	 virtue	 is	 not	 diminished	 by	 sharing	 but	 available	 to	 all	 according	 to	
their	 ability.504	As	 Gregory	 states,	 virtue	 is	 ‘always	 full	 for	 those	 who	 desire	
it.’505	Whereas	 all	 earthly	 goods	 eventually	 fade	 away,	 in	 death	 if	 not	 before,	
																																																								

















if	 their	 circumstances	 were	 not	 favourable.	 Although	 he	 emphatically	 agreed	
that	 the	 highest	 perfection	 lay	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 virtues,	 he	 granted	 that	 also	
external	goods,	such	as	wealth,	health,	and	good	birth,	played	their	part	 in	the	
happy	 life.507	The	 Stoics,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 held	 a	 view	 known	 as	 the	 ‘self-
sufficiency	 (αὐτάρκεια)	 of	 virtue’,	 contending	 that	 virtue	 alone	 sufficed	 for	 a	
happy	 life.508	Through	 philosophical	 training,	 the	 individual	 would	 learn	 to	
shape	his	or	her	attitude	in	such	a	way	that	all	external	circumstances	could	be	
met	with	equal	tranquillity	and	indifference.	The	Stoics	considered	bodily	health	
a	 ‘preferred	 good’,	 a	 goal	 which	 might	 be	 understandably	 and	 legitimately	
chosen	over	 its	 opposite,	 but	which	was	ultimately	 indifferent	 to	 the	 virtuous	
life	 and,	 consequently,	 to	 the	 attainment	 of	 happiness.509	If	 health	 was	 not	
available,	 the	 individual	 had	 no	 reason	 to	 be	 upset;	 he	 had	 been	 deprived	 of	
nothing	 of	 any	 value.	 This	 is	 clearly	 the	 view	 that	 Gregory	 espouses	when	 he	
states	 that	 the	 one	who	 acknowledges	 virtue	 as	 his	 only	 precious	 possession	
‘will	lead	a	life	that	is	untroubled	and	peaceful	and	without	dissension	(ἄλυπόν	
τινα	 καὶ	 εἰρηνικὸν	 καὶ	 ἄμαχον	 βιοτεύσει	 βίον).’510	Indeed,	 the	 Stoic	 view	was	
adopted	 by	many	 eclectic	 late	 ancient	 thinkers,	 such	 as	 Plutarch	 and	 Philo	 of	















honourable	or	dishonourable:	 lowly	and	noble	 lineage,	 glory	and	 fame,	power	
over	 and	 subjection	 to	 others.512	All	 these	 things	 are	 evaluated	 as	 positive	 or	
negative	 by	 those	 who	 are	 ‘dim-sighted	 in	 recognising	 delusion.’	 But,	 argues	
Gregory,	 in	 themselves	 they	 are	 nothing	 at	 all.513	And	 here,	 too,	 it	 is	 pleasure	
that	attaches	people	to	this	deceptive	unreality:		
	
Wealth,	 luxury,	 poverty,	want,	 all	 the	 irregularities	 of	 life	 seem	 something	 altogether	
different	 to	 the	 untaught	 (τοῖς	 μὲν	 ἀπαιδεύτοις	 πάμπολυ	 διαφέρειν	 δοκοῦσιν),	 since	
they	 make	 pleasure	 the	 criterion	 of	 such	 things	 (ἡδονὴν	 ποιῶνται	 τῶν	 τοιούτων	
κριτήριον).	But	to	the	one	who	is	elevated	in	thought	(τῷ	δὲ	ὑψηλῷ	τὴν	διάνοιαν),	all	
things	 appear	 to	 be	 of	 equal	 honor	 (πάντα	 ὁμότιμα	 φαίνεται),	 and	 none	 is	 more	















513	Virg.	4.4	 (SC	 119,	 312–316).	 Radde-Gallwitz	 argues	 that	 since,	 for	 Gregory,	 all	 things	 are	
characterised	either	by	good	or	its	opposite,	evil,	Gregory	at	least	implicitly	rejects	the	existence	
of	 the	Stoic	middle	 term,	 the	 ‘indifferent’	 (Radde-Gallwitz,	Transformation	of	Divine	Simplicity,	
188).	 While	 this	 is	 ontologically	 the	 case,	 seen	 from	 an	 ethical	 perspective	 the	 goods	 of	 the	





514	Here,	 we	 encounter	 again	 the	 view	 that	 the	 physical	 existence	 consists	 of	 alternation	 of	




Above,	Gregory	 argues	 that	 all	 external	 circumstances	 are	of	 equal	worth	 and	
equally	 suited,	 or	 unimportant,	 for	 the	 cultivation	of	 virtue.	 In	 all	 situations	 –	
seemingly	 honourable	 or	 dishonourable,	 pleasant	 or	 unpleasant	 –	 every	
individual	will	have	the	‘power	to	live	well	or	badly’	(εὖ	ἢ	κακῶς	ζῆν).	In	other	
words,	happiness516	depends	solely	on	the	individual’s	inner	disposition,	which	
can	 be	 rightly	 attuned	 to	 any	 situation.	 Gregory’s	words	 allude	 to	 the	 ancient	
formula	of	virtue	as	 that	which	 is	 ‘up	 to	us’	 (ἐφ᾽	ἡμῖν),	something	that	we	can	
and	ought	to	choose,	which	was	particularly	popular	in	Stoic	thought.517	Indeed,	
elsewhere	 Gregory	 explicitly	 incorporates	 this	 phrase	 in	 his	 definitions	 of	
virtue.518	Since	external	circumstances	are	accidental	and	unstable,	they	are	not	
within	our	control	and	should	not	be	our	focus	in	the	pursuit	of	the	good	life.519	
We	can	connect	Gregory’s	view	of	 the	external	goods	 to	his	notion	of	 the	 free	








For	our	present	 topic,	 it	 is	particularly	noteworthy	 that	physical	 enjoyment	 is	
not	 only	 one	 of	 the	 things	 that	 do	 not	 contribute	 to	 happiness,	 but	 in	 the	
passionate	form	of	pleasure	it	plays	a	role	in	making	humans	fixate	on	a	number	
of	 other	 externalities.520	Lineage,	 glory,	 fame	 and	 other	 external	 goods	 are	 all	
																																																								
516	In	 Greek	 philosophy,	 the	 phrase	 εὖ	 ζῆν	 is	 virtually	 synonymous	 with	 εὐδαιμονία.	 See,	 for	









520	We	 should	note	 again	 that	 the	Stoics	made	a	 conceptual	distinction	between	pleasure	 as	 a	
passion	and	pleasure	as	an	inevitable	bodily	sensation	that	occurs	as	the	by-product	of	certain	
activities,	i.e.	the	opposite	of	physical	pain.	It	is	crucial	to	note	that	only	the	latter	counts	as	an	
indifferent	 good;	 the	 former	 is,	 of	 course,	 a	 vice.	 (On	 this	 point,	 see,	 for	 example,	 the	 editors’	
comment	in	LS,	vol.	1,	421.).		
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evaluated	 and,	 consequently,	 pursued	or	 avoided	on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 pleasure	
they	 provide.	 As	 Gregory	 notes	 above,	 ‘the	 untaught’	 make	 pleasure	 the	
κριτήριον,	 the	 standard	 that	 guides	 their	 judgment	 of	 honourable	 and	
dishonourable	things.	In	other	words,	they	are	hedonists,	for	using	pleasure	as	
the	ethical	κριτήριον	was	precisely	what	Epicurus	was	known	to	have	endorsed	
and	what	non-hedonists	 rejected.521	Gregory	goes	on	 to	compare	 the	untaught	
hedonists	 with	 ‘the	 one	 who	 has	 purified	 his	 mind	 and	 rightly	 examined	 the	
truth	of	reality	(τῶν	ὄντων	ἀλήθειαν)’.	This	exemplary	individual	is	able	to	see	
things	 for	what	 they	are	worth.	Thus,	he	will	neither	be	 ‘spoiled	by	pleasures’	
(ὑπὸ	τῶν	ἡδέων	θρυπτόμενος)	nor	‘cast	down	by	austerity’	(ὑπὸ	τῶν	αὐστηρῶν	
ταπεινούμενος).	 Instead,	 he	 will	 proceed	 like	 travellers	 who,	 as	 Gregory	
recounts,	remain	unaffected	by	what	they	encounter	on	the	way	and	avoid	both	
attachment	 and	 resignation:	 ‘Pleasure	 does	 not	 delay	 them,	 nor	 does	 the	





looks	 downwards	 and	 hands	 his	 soul	 over	 to	 pleasures	 of	 the	 body	 (τὰ	 ἡδέα	 τοῦ	
σώματος),	as	cattle	to	pasture,	living	only	for	the	stomach	and	the	organs	nearby	(τοῖς	
μετὰ	γαστέρα),	being	alienated	from	the	life	of	God	and	a	stranger	to	the	promise	of	the	
















bodily	 pleasure	 into	 his	 good	 becomes	 an	 ‘inventor	 of	 evils’,524	among	 which	
Gregory	 lists	 such	 passions	 as	 greed,	 love	 of	 power,	 and	 desire	 for	 empty	
glory.525	In	other	words,	an	obsession	with	bodily	pleasure	as	the	good	is	simply	
the	first	link	in	the	chain	of	misjudged	goods;	deep	down,	all	evils	are	motivated	






topic	 of	 pleasure	 in	 Gregory’s	 thinking	 about	 the	 good	 life	 and	 its	 opposite.	
However,	my	claim	that	the	reading	of	the	fall	in	De	hominis	opificio	is,	in	fact,	a	
direct	 application	 of	 Gregory’s	 earlier	 thought	 to	 the	 text	 of	Genesis	 requires	
further	qualification.	The	most	 complete	parallel	 to	De	hominis	opificio	 can	be	
found	in	Chapter	11	of	De	virginitate,	in	which	Gregory	discusses	the	search	for	
the	 real	 beauty	 (τὸ	 ὄντως	 καλόν),	 ‘the	 only	 thing	 that	 is	 worth	 desiring’	 (τὸ	
μόνον	 ἐπιθυμίας	 ἄξιον).526	A	 closer	 reading	 reveals	 a	 remarkable	 similarity	 in	
the	terms	and	concepts	Gregory	uses	in	the	two	texts.	Furthermore,	the	text	is	
significant	 because	 it	 clarifies	 possible	 ambiguities	 related	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	
sensible	 realm.	 In	 Virg.	 11,	 Gregory	 states	 unequivocally	 that	 sensation	 and	
sensible	objects	can	play	a	positive	epistemic	role	if	they	are	used	rationally	and	
their	non-final	 role	 is	 recognised.	However,	 those	who	do	not	know	about	 the	







524	The	phrase	κακῶν	 ἐφευρετής	occurs	 in	plural	 in	Rom.	1:30	 in	 relation	 idolatry,	 sexual	 sin,	
and	depravity	of	mind	which	lead	to	the	invention	of	a	number	of	other	evils.		
525	Virg.	4.5	(SC	119,	318–320).	
526	Virg.	11.4	 (SC	 119,	 388).	 Here	 I	 have	 followed	 Aubineau	 and	 Callahan	who	 both	 translate	
καλόν	 as	 beauty.	 The	 translation	 is	 natural	 in	 light	 of	 the	 many	 visual	 metaphors	 and	
comparisons	 to	physical	beauty	which	appear	 in	 the	 text.	However,	 the	reader	should	keep	 in	




the	 invisible	 only	 through	 that	 which	 is	 familiar	 to	 the	 senses.	 As	 embodied	
beings,	humans	begin	to	approach	the	divine	via	an	embodied	form	of	knowing.	
However,	 Gregory’s	 concession	 is	 not	 unqualified,	 for	 he	 also	 highlights	 the	
‘weakness’	 of	 sensory	 knowledge,	 alluding	 to	 its	 limited	 scope	 and	 liability	 to	
error.527	Indeed,	the	epistemic	yield	of	sensation	depends	entirely	on	the	inner	
preparedness	 of	 the	 knower:	 Gregory	 compares	 people	 who	 look	 at	 things	
superficially	and	thoughtlessly	with	a	person	who	does	not	look	with	eyes	only	
(μὴ	 μόνοις	 ὀφθαλμοῖς)	 and	 stop	 at	 appearances	 (οὐ	 μέχρι	 τῶν	 φαινομένων	





thought	 is	 incomplete,	when	he	sees	something	on	which	 is	spread	 the	appearance	of	
some	beauty	(κάλλους	τινὸς	…	φαντασία),	will	think	that	the	thing	itself	is	beautiful	by	
of	 its	 own	 nature	 (καλὸν	 εἶναι	 τῇ	 ἑαυτοῦ	 φύσει),	 this	 very	 thing	 which	 attracts	 his	
sensation	through	pleasure	(τὴν	αἴσθησιν	αὐτοῦ	δι’	ἡδονῆς	ἐπισπάσηται),	and	he	will	
be	 concerned	with	 nothing	 beyond	 this.	 But	 the	 one	who	 has	 purified	 the	 eye	 of	 his	
soul528	(ὁ	δὲ	κεκαθαρμένος	τὸν	τῆς	ψυχῆς	ὀφθαλμὸν)	and	is	able	to	look	at	such	things,	





The	 passage	 describes	 two	different	ways	 of	 using	 the	 senses	 and	 interacting	
with	the	sensible	world.	The	first	is	to	stop	one’s	enquiry	at	the	level	of	sensible	
appearances,	assuming	that	things	which	appeal	to	the	senses	through	pleasure	

















of	 beauty	 in	Symposium,	 consists	 of	 an	 intellectual	 investigation,	 in	which	 the	
beauty	of	the	sensible	world	is	used	as	a	stepping	stone	to	grasp	the	intelligible	
form	of	 beauty	 (τοῦ	 καλοῦ	 ἰδέᾳ)	 that	 lies	 beyond	 it.530	By	 observing	 different	
beautiful	things	and	enquiring	about	what	they	have	in	common,	the	soul	gains	
an	 increasingly	refined	understanding	of	 the	 idea	of	beauty	 that	pervades	and	
sustains	all	that	is	beautiful.	This	is	something	else	than	using	sensation	as	the	
κριτήριον	 of	 truth	 against	which	 all	 derived	 ideas	 are	 to	 be	 checked;	Gregory	
rejects	 the	 latter	 practice	 explicitly	 later	 in	 the	 same	 chapter,	 referring	 to	 a	
‘misconception	 of	 beauty,	 because	 the	 senses	 have	 become	 the	 criterion’	 (ἡ	
αἴσθησις	κριτήριον	γίνεται).531		
	
Since	most	 humans	 are	 not	 aware	 of	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 their	 postlapsarian	
condition	 and	 do	 not	 actively	 seek	 to	 restore	 their	 fallen	 faculties,	 Gregory	




It	 seems	 to	 me	 difficult	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 men	 (τῶν	 πλείστων),	 who	 live	 in	 such	
dullness	of	thought	(παχύτητι	τῆς	διανοίας),	to	cut	through	the	matter	with	reasoning	
(τῷ	 λόγῳ)	 and	 separate	 it	 from	 the	 contemplated	 beauty	 (ἀπὸ	 τοῦ	 ἐπιθεωρουμένου	
κάλλους),	and	to	come	to	know	the	nature	of	beauty	itself	(τοῦ	καλοῦ	τὴν	φύσιν).	And	if	
anyone	 should	 want	 to	 determine	 exactly	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 misconceptions	 and	
fallacious	assumptions,	I	think	he	would	not	find	any	other	but	that	our	senses	have	not	
been	trained	to	discern	precisely	 the	good	from	that	which	 is	not	 it	 (ἢ	τὸ	μὴ	ἀκριβῶς	
ἡμῶν	«γεγυμνάσθαι	τὰ	αἰσθητήρια	πρὸς	τὴν	τοῦ	καλοῦ	καὶ	μὴ	τοιούτου	διάκρισιν»;	cf.	
																																																								
530	The	method	 of	moving	 from	 particular	 beautiful	 objects	 towards	more	 general	 notions	 of	
beauty	and	finally	to	the	entirely	intelligible	form	of	Beauty	is	how	Diotima	explains	the	use	of	
love	in	the	service	of	knowledge	in	Plato’s	Symposium	(210–212b).	Gregory	describes	the	ascent	









nature	of	 the	actual	beauty.	We	should	note	 the	 reference	 to	Heb.	5:14,	which	
appeared	in	a	similar	context	in	De	opificio	hominis.	Again,	the	notion	of	‘trained	
senses’	 alludes	 to	 the	 epistemic	 potential	 of	 sensation	 if	 used	 correctly.	 And	
here,	too,	the	failure	to	do	so	is	attributed	to	faulty	use	of	the	intellect,	not	to	the	
body	 itself.	Much	 like	 in	 his	 earlier	 discussion	on	 the	 external	 goods,	Gregory	
goes	on	to	describe	various	things	with	which	people	have	substituted	the	real	
good	 and	 beauty:	 while	 some	 turn	 to	 a	 love	 of	 the	 flesh	 or	 lifeless	 material	
things,	 others	 seek	 beauty	 in	 honour,	 glory,	 and	 power,	 even	 certain	 kinds	 of	
arts	 and	 knowledge	 (Gregory	 does	 not	 specify	 what	 the	 latter	 include).	 The	
lowest	group	consists	of	people	who	 ‘make	 their	palate	and	their	stomach	the	




appearances	 (περὶ	 τὰ	 φαινόμενα	 προσπαθειῶν),	 and	 sought	 after	 the	 simple,	
immaterial,	 and	 formless	 nature	 of	 the	 beautiful	 (τὴν	 ἁπλῆν	 τε	 καὶ	 ἄϋλον	 καὶ	
ἀσχημάτιστον	τοῦ	καλοῦ	φύσιν),	they	would	not	have	been	led	astray	in	their	choice	of	
the	desirable	(αἵρεσιν	τῶν	ἐπιθυμιῶν),	nor	would	they	have	been	swept	away	by	these	




Here	we	 see	 that	wrong	 thoughts	 concerning	 the	 beautiful	 lead	 to	 the	wrong	
choice	 of	 the	 desirable,	 as	 desire	 is	 motivated	 by	 mere	 appearances.	 Again,	


















true	 good,	 and	 the	 biblical	 reference	 to	 Heb.	 5:14	 and	 the	 ‘trained	 senses’.	
Furthermore,	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 in	 the	 preceding	 chapters	 of	 De	 virginitate,	
Gregory	highlights	 the	 fundamental	 role	 of	 pleasure	 among	 the	 passions	 and	
even	makes	a	passing	connection	between	pleasure	and	 the	 fall.	Thus,	we	can	
conclude	 that	 at	 a	 very	 early	 point	 of	 his	 career	 Gregory	 has	 established	 a	










to	 contemplation	 (θεωρία),	 cuts	 through	 matter	 with	 reason	 to	 discover	 the	
idea	 or	 nature	 of	 beauty,	 and	 is	 capable	 of	 proper	 discernment	 between	 the	
good	and	evil.	To	attain	a	complete	picture	of	the	difference	between	the	correct	
and	 the	 detrimental	 use	 of	 the	 senses,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 reflect	 briefly	 on	
Gregory’s	view	of	sense	perception	and	its	epistemic	role.	Here,	we	must	return	
to	De	hominis	opificio	and	also	draw	on	De	anima	et	resurrectione,	Gregory’s	two	
anthropological	 treatises.	A	 full	 account	of	Gregory’s	 theory	of	 sensation	 is,	 of	
course,	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 study,	 but	 the	 close	 connection	 between	
pleasure	 and	 sensation	 makes	 it	 vital	 to	 understand	 what	 the	 senses	 are	
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intended	 to	 do	 and	 where	 pleasure	 disrupts	 their	 functioning.	 I	 will	 first	









animals,	 and	 calls	 the	 senses	 an	 entrance	 for	 death	 because	 they	 let	 in	




limit,	 and	 the	sensual	nature	cannot	 reach	what	 is	beyond	 it	and	comprehend	
the	good	things	which	lie	above,’	Gregory	writes	in	In	Ecclesiastes.536	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Gregory	 admires	 the	 bodily	 senses	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 God’s	 or	
Nature’s	skilled	craftsmanship.537	A	particularly	high	opinion	is	expressed	in	De	
hominis	 opificio	 5	 where	 Gregory	 contends	 that	 the	 human	 ‘power	 of	
apprehension	of	things	by	means	of	sight	and	hearing’	does	in	some	way	mirror	
the	 Deity	who	 ‘beholds	 and	 hears	 all	 things.’538	However,	 this	 statement	 does	
not	 remain	 without	 qualification.	 Gregory	 is	 quick	 to	 note	 that	 it	 would	 be	




537	See,	 for	example,	Op.	hom.	30.	 In	 the	same	chapter,	Gregory	expresses	a	view	that	although	
the	 senses	 are	 not	 required	 for	 living	 –	 that	 is	 humans	 can	 survive	 without	 them	 –	 the	 are	
required	for	living	well	(εὖ	ζῇν).	We	have	already	seen	that	this	term	is	normally	synonymous	
with	eudaimonia,	which	Gregory	understands	as	a	life	of	virtue.	Therefore	it	is	startling	that	here	
Gregory	 conceives	 ‘living	 well’	 as	 participation	 in	 the	 pleasures	 of	 life	 (τῶν	 κατὰ	 τὴν	 ζωὴν	
ἡδέων	τὴν	μετουσίαν)	and	shows	no	sign	of	being	morally	alarmed	by	 the	 implications	of	his	






faculties.	No	such	diversity	 can	be	conceived	 in	 the	 simplicity	of	 the	Godhead.	
Moreover,	even	the	human	capacity	of	perception	is	ultimately	one	and	unified	
because	 it	 is	 one	 and	 the	 same	 faculty,	 namely	 the	mind	 itself,	 that	 operates	






fall:	 for	 him,	 human	 sensation	 is	 a	 distinctly	 intellectual	 matter,	 though	
mediated	through	the	body.	In	De	anima	et	resurrectione,	Macrina	discusses	the	
relationship	between	the	body	and	the	soul,	noting	that	the	soul	gives	 life	and	












Citing	 an	 ancient	 saying	 known	 also	 to	 other	 early	 Christian	writers,	Macrina	
names	the	intellect	(νοῦς)	as	the	agent	of	perception.542	She	gives	as	an	example	
the	sun	which	appears	small	to	the	eye	but	 is	revealed	in	 its	true	size	through	


















It	 could	 perhaps	 be	 said	 that	 it	 is	 the	 body	 that	 senses	 and	 the	 mind	 that	
perceives.	 Even	 though	 the	 sensitive	 soul	 connects	 the	 human	 being	 to	 other	




and	 accept	 or	 reject	 it.	 ‘[T]he	 mind	 is	 supreme,	 and	 sense	 ministers	 to	 it	
(ἐπικρατεῖ	 μὲν	 ὁ	 νοῦς,	 ὑπηρετεῖ	 δὲ	 ἡ	 αἴσθησις),’	 Gregory	 notes	 in	De	hominis	
opificio.545	For	him,	this	is	the	right	ordering	of	sense	perception.		
	
De	hominis	opificio	also	makes	 plain	 Gregory’s	 view	 that	 the	mind	 acts	 as	 the	
agent	of	perception	by	 inferring	different	 intelligible	 ideas	 (λόγος,	 or	 as	 in	De	
virginitate,	 ἰδέα)	 from	 the	material	 object.	 Among	 these,	 Gregory	 lists	 colour,	
weight,	 quantity,	 and	 a	 certain	 quality	 of	 touch.546	Although	 the	 intelligible	
principles	are	separate	from	matter,	Gregory	argues	that	a	material	body	results	





can	 to	 some	extent	use	 their	minds	 to	grasp	 some	of	 the	basic	principles	 that	
underlie	 the	sensible	world;	otherwise	they	could	not	make	any	sense	of	 their	














individual	 objects,	 they	 fail	 to	 grasp	 the	 big	 picture	 and	 penetrate	 beyond	
sensible	 appearances.	 This	 is	 precisely	 the	 criticism	 that	 Macrina	 levels	 at	
Epicurus	in	De	anima	et	resurrectione:	
	
To	 him	 the	 nature	 of	 things	 that	 exist	 (τῆς	 τῶν	 ὄντων	 φύσεως)	 is	 limited	 to	 the	





earthen	 walls	 which	 for	 that	 very	 reason	 barricade	 smaller	 souls	 from	 the	
contemplation	of	intellectual	realities	(πρὸς	τὴν	τῶν	νοητῶν	θεωρίαν).	Such	a	one	can	
only	see	the	earth,	and	water,	and	air,	and	fire.548	But	where	each	of	these	things	comes	
from,	 in	what	 it	 has	 its	 existence,	 and	by	what	 it	 is	 governed,	 he	 is	 unable	 to	discern	
because	of	his	smallness	of	soul	(μικροψυχίας).	Anyone	who	sees	a	garment	will	reason	
(ἀνελογίσατο)	to	the	weaver,	and	from	a	ship	one	comes	to	a	conception	(ἐνενόησεν)	of	
the	 shipwright,	 and	 again	 on	 seeing	 a	 building	 the	 hand	 of	 the	 builder	 comes	 to	 the	




As	 the	 passage	 illustrates,	 there	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 applying	 the	 mind’s	
reasoning	 power	 to	make	 a	 basic	 rational	 judgment	 concerning	 a	 perceptible	
object,	 and	 grasping	 the	 spiritual	 principle	 that	 sustains	 it.	 It	 is	 one	 thing	 to	
perceive	the	colour,	dimensions,	or	the	efficient	cause	of	an	object,	but	another	
to	 come	 to	 understand	 the	 divine	 power	 in	which	 it	 originates.550	The	 former	
qualities	 are	 accessible	 to	 the	 senses	 and	 directly	 present	 at	 the	 moment	 of	








be	 accessed	 with	 the	 presumed	 Epicurean	 epistemology	 is	 limited	 to	 the	
material	world.	Furthermore,	the	epistemic	attitude	which	Macrina	ascribes	to	
Epicurus	is	similar	to	the	one	that	Gregory	associates	with	pleasure	seeking	in	




On	Gregory’s	 epistemic	 continuum,	 the	 senses	 have	 a	 crucial	 but	 limited	 role.	
They	 are	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 all	 postlapsarian	 knowledge	 without	 which	
nothing	can	be	known	and,	paradoxically,	they	lead	us	to	understand	that	there	
is	a	reality	that	eludes	the	grasp	of	the	senses.551	In	the	Christian	narrative,	the	
incarnation	 of	 Christ	 is	 of	 course	 the	 supreme	manifestation	 of	 this	 dynamic,	
and	the	same	is	true	of	the	church	as	the	body	of	Christ	in	which	the	beauty	of	
individual	 members	 points	 towards	 Christ,	 the	 true	 Beauty.552	However,	 for	
Gregory,	 sensory	 knowledge	 is	 always	 partial	 and	 even	 concepts	 that	 are	
derived	 from	 a	 careful	 examination	 and	 evaluation	 of	 various	 sensory	
phenomena	will	ultimately	 fall	short	due	to	 the	profoundly	different	character	
of	the	intelligible	reality	they	seek	to	describe.	Thus,	there	comes	a	point	when	
the	 concepts	 derived	 from	 the	 sensible	 world	 must	 be	 set	 aside.	 The	 bodily	
senses	cannot	grasp	the	intelligible	reality	because	they	can	only	make	sense	of	
things	which,	 like	them,	are	material,	dimensional,	and	limited.	The	intelligible	
reality,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 none	 of	 these	 characteristics.	 In	 fact,	 Gregory	
usually	 defines	 the	 intelligible	 by	 means	 of	 negation,	 as	 that	 which	 is	 not	
perceptible.	 It	 lacks	 limits,	 weight,	 form,	 surface,	 colour,	 size,	 dimensions,	
location	 and	 all	 other	 things	 that	 characterise	 and	 help	 us	 make	 sense	 of	
matter.553	Thus,	 it	 can	 only	 be	 understood	 partially	 through	 negation,	 ‘by	 the	








knowledge,	 that	 ultimately	 provides	 the	 assurance	 of	 the	 goods	 that	 do	 not	
appear	to	the	senses.555	
	





unchanging	 intelligible	 principles	 (by	 using	 the	 mind	 as	 the	 κριτήριον).	
‘[S]ensation	 is	 not	 a	 sound	 criterion	 for	 the	 good	 (οὐκ	 ἀσφαλὲς	 τοῦ	 καλοῦ	
κριτήριον	 εἶναι	 τὴν	 αἴσθησιν),’	 Gregory	 warns	 in	 Eccl.	 5.556 	We	 can	 learn	





if	 the	sensible	realm	is	 the	gateway	to	all	knowledge,	 the	abstraction	from	the	
sensible	 to	 the	 intelligible	appears	 to	require	some	kind	of	a	priori	knowledge	
about	how	the	sensible	is	to	be	used	and	interpreted	as	a	means	for	reaching	the	
intelligible.	Without	 external	 guidance,	 the	 sensible	 realm	will	 not	 convey	 its	
own	‘user	 instructions’;	 if	we	do	not	know	that	 it	conceals	a	higher	reality,	we	
will	 pursue	 its	 offerings	 as	 our	 final	 good.	 This	 presents	 an	 obvious	 problem:	
how	can	our	fallen	minds	have	the	prerequisite	 insight	at	the	beginning	of	the	
spiritual	journey	before	we	gain	a	proper	first-hand	understanding	of	what	lies	
beyond	 the	sensible	world?	Or,	 in	Radde-Gallwitz’s	 formulation:	 ‘how	will	one	
recognise	 God	 if	 one	 does	 not	 already	 know	 him?’557	After	 identifying	 the	
problem	in	Gregory,	Radde-Gallwitz	traces	it	back	to	Plato’s	Meno	and	notes	its	









that	 it	 is	 lacking	 in	good,	manifested	 in	desire	that	constantly	seeks	fulfilment,	







Our	greatest	safeguard	 is	not	 to	be	 ignorant	of	oneself	and	not	 to	suppose	 that	one	 is	
looking	 at	 oneself	when	 in	 fact	 one	 is	 viewing	 something	 else,	 something	 that	 hangs	
about	 the	 outer	 edges	 of	 oneself.	 This	 is	 the	 affliction	 of	 those	who	 do	 not	 seriously	
appraise	 themselves	 (οἱ	 ἑαυτῶν	 ἀνεπίσκεπτοι).	 They	 see	 in	 themselves	 strength	 or	
beauty	or	glory	or	power	or	abundance	of	 riches	or	pride	or	dignity	or	bodily	size	or	
good	looks	or	some	other	such	thing,	and	the	take	it	for	themselves.	For	this	reason	they	
are	 unreliable	 keepers	 of	 themselves.	 With	 their	 interest	 fixed	 on	 what	 is	 alien	 (τὸ	
ἀλλότριον),	 they	 allow	what	 is	 their	 own	 (τὸ	 ἴδιον)	 to	 go	 unprotected.	 For	 how	 shall	
anyone	guard	what	he	has	no	knowledge	of	(ὃ	μὴ	ἐπίσταται)?	So	the	most	secure	watch	
over	the	good	things	within	us	(τῶν	ἐν	ἡμῖν	ἀγαθῶν)	is	not	to	be	ignorant	of	ourselves		
(τὸ	 ἑαυτοὺς	 μὴ	 ἀγνοῆσαι)	 and	 for	 each	 to	 know	 (τὸ	 γνῶναι)	 what	 he	 is	 and	 to	




self-knowledge	 and	 the	 good	 life:	 the	 education	 that	 trains	 us	 to	 judge	 things	
based	on	their	essence	rather	than	their	appearance	begins	from	our	own	being.	
In	 In	Canticum,	 Gregory	notes	 that	 in	 our	 fallen	 state	what	 is	 proper	 to	 us	 by	
nature	 is	 overruled	by	what	 is	 proper	 to	 human	 communities	 by	 habit.	 As	 an	
individual	grows	up,	her	tendency	to	pursue	virtue	is	obscured	both	due	to	the	
order	of	human	development,	in	which	the	pull	of	sensation	is	strong	from	birth	
whereas	 the	 mind	 develops	 later,	 and	 by	 the	 customs	 and	 values	 of	 human	
society,	which	lacks	a	collective	awareness	of	its	true	goal.	However,	neither	our	
identity	nor	our	final	goal	lies	in	the	fleeting	goods	of	the	material	creation.	By	
distancing	 ourselves	 from	 worldly	 values	 and	 turning	 our	 gaze	 inwards,	 we	
																																																								
559	Radde-Gallwitz,	Transformation	of	Divine	Simplicity,	196.	
560	Cant.	2	 (GNO	VI,	 63–64);	 trans.	 Norris,	 71.	 Radde-Gallwitz	 cites	 the	 passage	 in	Musurillo’s	
translation.	Ibid.,	193.	
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that	 is	 consonant	 with	 Hans	 Boersma’s	 main	 argument	 in	 Embodiment	 and	
Virtue	 in	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa:	 the	 sensible	 realm	 is	 intended	 as	 an	 aid	 of	 the	
progress	 in	 virtue,	 but	 it	 is	 instrumental	 and	 non-final.	 Understanding	 the	
penultimate	 character	 of	 the	 material	 world	 is	 a	 prerequisite	 of	 the	 good	
Christian	 life,	which	entails	an	ascent	 towards	 the	 intelligible	realm	actualised	
through	 the	 gradual	 rediscovery	 of	 the	 divine	 likeness	 of	 the	 soul.	 From	 this	
perspective,	we	 can	 begin	 to	 understand	why	 pleasure	 is	 not	 only	 one	 of	 the	
passions,	but	becomes	a	total	antithesis	of	the	good	life:	by	attaching	humans	to	
the	 sensible	 world,	 it	 makes	 them	 lose	 sight	 of	 their	 true	 telos.	 Gregory	
articulates	the	issue	with	remarkable	clarity	at	the	beginning	of	In	inscriptiones	
psalmorum	 where	 he	 discusses	 the	 notion	 of	 blessedness	 as	 the	 goal	 of	 the	
virtuous	life.	It	is	crucial,	he	says,	to	know	not	only	what	the	good	life	is	like,	but	
also	 to	 be	 able	 to	 distinguish	 (διακρῖναι)	 the	 good	 life	 from	 the	 one	 that	
deserves	 reproach	 ‘by	 observing	 each	 with	 its	 peculiar	 characteristics.’	 The	
fundamental	distinction	between	the	good	and	the	evil	life	goes	between	sense	
perception	and	intellectual	perception	(αἴσθησίν	τε	καὶ	διάνοιαν)	‘so	far	as	the	













562	Inscr.	 I.2	 (GNO	V,	 27);	 trans.	 Heine,	 85.	 For	 the	 two	 spheres	 of	 life	 and	 the	 corresponding	
twofold	joy,	see	also	Beat.	3	(GNO	VII/2,	109).	
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intellectual	 perception	 (διάνοιαν)	 of	 hearers	 away	 from	 what	 is	 inferior	 and	 to	
associate	 it	 with	 what	 is	 better	 by	 means	 of	 praise	 and	 censure,	 the	 censure	 of	 the	




But	when	these	matters	have	been	elucidated	 in	 this	way,	 then	 it	 is	difficult	 to	accept	
naturally	anything	which	is	alien	so	far	as	pleasure	is	concerned	(πᾶν	τὸ	πρὸς	ἡδονὴν	
ἀλλοτρίως	 ἔχον)	 (and	 by	 pleasure	 I	 mean	 that	 which	 is	 dear	 to	 the	 body	 (τὴν	 τοῦ	
σώματος	φίλην),	for	the	joy	of	the	soul	(τῆς	ψυχῆς	εὐφροσύνη),	which	differs	greatly,	is	
remote	 from	 irrational	 and	 abject	 enjoyment	 (ῆς	 ἀλόγου	 τε	 καὶ	 ἀνδραποδώδους	
ἡδυπαθείας)).	And	when	we	have	grasped	the	distinguishing	mark	(σημεῖον)	of	each	of	
the	 lives	 in	 advance,	 that	 is,	 the	 virtuous	 life	 and	 the	 evil	 life	 (τοῦ	 ἐν	 ἀρετῇ	 τε	 καὶ	
κακίᾳ),	 we	 recognize	 that	 our	 faculties	 that	 belong	 to	 the	 flesh	 (τὰ	 τῆς	 σαρκὸς	
αἰσθητήρια)	are	gratified	 (κολακεύεται)	by	means	of	evil,	but	virtue	brings	 joy	which	








holy	 and	 intellectual,	 the	 other	 abject	 and	 irrational.	 Crucially,	 Gregory	
conceives	enjoyment	as	an	accompaniment	and	a	distinguishing	mark	of	the	life	
lived:	If	a	person	leads	a	good	life,	he	finds	joy	in	virtue.	If	he	pursues	the	evil,	he	
takes	pleasure	 in	bodily	enjoyment.	This	echoes	 the	Aristotelian	view	that	 the	
actions	 in	 which	 one	 takes	 pleasure	 and	 pain	 are	 an	 indicator	 (here,	 too,	




Second,	 Gregory	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 key	 role	 of	 the	 Christian	





strive	 for	 good	 things	 and	 avoid	 what	 is	 evil.	 If	 we	 push	 the	 ‘Meno	paradox’	
further	 and	 enquire	 what	 engenders	 the	 realisation	 that	 the	 fallen	 soul	must	
turn	 its	 gaze	 inwards	 and	 seek	 the	 good	 of	 the	 mind,	 we	 realise	 that	 the	
provision	of	this	formative	knowledge	is	the	task	of	Christian	education,	which	
proclaims	 the	 truths	of	 the	Gospel	and	 instils	 the	practice	of	virtue.565	A	 fallen	
soul	with	 a	distorted	will	 requires	 an	 external	 impulse	 to	understand	 its	 own	
depravity	and	begin	the	introspection	that	 is	required	for	understanding	one’s	
place	 in	 the	 universe. 566 	It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 this	 education	 entails	 a	
realignment	of	emotions	based	on	the	knowledge	attained:	humans	must	learn	
to	 rejoice	 in	 the	 good	 instead	 of	 the	 evil.	 I	 will	 return	 to	 this	 affective	




this	happen?	 In	 In	inscriptiones	Gregory	answers	 that	since	only	known	things	
can	be	desired	–	a	point	 implicitly	made	also	 in	De	hominis	opificio	 –	we	must	









The	distinction	between	 the	 two	τέλεα	 in	 In	inscriptiones	 helps	us	articulate	a	
point	 that	has	been	 implicitly	present	already	 in	 the	other	works:	 It	 is	not	 the	




566	Gregory	states	explicitly	 that	human	desire	 is	misaligned	due	to	 the	 fall,	which	separates	 it	
from	the	will	of	God,	and	cannot	find	its	right	direction	without	divine	help.	We	will	easily	turn	





choice	 marked	 by	 the	 enjoyment	 taken	 in	 sensual	 pleasure:	 ‘[T]he	
distinguishing	mark	of	 the	specific	character	of	 the	pursuits	 is	revealed	by	the	
joy	which	occurs	in	us	from	them,’	Gregory	writes	later	in	the	same	treatise.568	
Here,	the	sensible	world,	our	body,	and	our	material	surroundings	–	given	to	us	
simply	 as	 a	 stepping	 stone	 towards	 a	 higher	 goal	 –	 become	 an	 end	 in	
themselves,	 while	 the	 true	 end	 remains	 unknown.	 People	 latch	 on	 to	 the	
material	 world	 although	 its	 offerings	 are	 mixed	 and	 fleeting,	 unaware	 that	
something	 better	 awaits	 beyond	 it.	 In	 Gregory’s	 view,	 such	 people	 suffer	 a	
double	loss:	they	will	not	only	miss	the	true	goal	of	their	lives,	but	also	lose	the	





a	vicious	cycle,	 for	once	pleasure	is	experienced	in	the	soul	 it	 further	weakens	
the	rational	capacity.	As	is	the	case	with	virtue,	one	is	gradually	transformed	in	




continues	 to	 lament	 that	 ‘people	 who	 enjoy	 present	 things	 (τοῖς	 παροῦσιν	
ἥδεςθαι),	do	not	 look	for	better	ones	(τὰ	βελτίω).’572	Gregory’s	words	bring	to	

















Of	 the	 fathers,	 Lewis’s	 essay	mentions	 only	Augustine,	 but	 above	 he	might	 as	
well	be	paraphrasing	Gregory	of	Nyssa.	
	
Finally,	 we	 should	 note	 that	 while	 the	 criticism	 that	 pleasure	 limits	 people’s	
focus	 to	 present	 sensible	 goods	 was	 widely	 shared	 in	 antiquity,	 it	 has	 some	
unique	 implications	 in	 light	 of	 the	 Christian	 worldview.	 Since	 the	 Christian	
salvation	narrative	 is	 suspended	on	 a	historical	 continuum,	 time	 is	not	 only	 a	
sign	 of	 fallen	 creation	 but	 also	 an	 instrument	 God	 uses	 to	 realise	 his	 plan	 of	
salvation.	 Thus,	 for	 a	 Christian	 thinker	 like	 Gregory,	 perfection	 is	 located	 not	
only	in	the	invisible,	but	in	a	future	invisible	reality	of	the	eschaton.	One	of	the	
crucial	 differences	 between	 grasping,	 say,	 colour	 or	 size,	 and	 the	 spiritual	
operation	 of	 the	 purified	 eye	 of	 the	 soul	 is	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 latter	 can	
capture	 ideas	 that	 are	 not	 part	 of	 one’s	 immediate	 surroundings.	 Intellectual	
perception	is	capable	of	extending	into	the	future	and	evaluating	present	things	
in	 light	of	 invisible	 realities	which	are	not	currently	at	hand.	This	ability	 is,	of	
course,	crucial	 for	the	formation	of	faith	and	hope,	which	adhere	to	something	
that	 is	not	directly	available	 to	 the	senses	and	will	be	 fulfilled	 in	 the	 future.574	





Without	 mentioning	 the	 Epicureans	 by	 name,	 Macrina	 tells	 Gregory	 to	 dismiss	 the	
pagan	 views	 of	 the	 soul	which	 are	 ultimately	 antithetical	 to	 the	 pursuit	 of	 virtue.	 By	
																																																								
573	C.	 S.	 Lewis,	 ‘The	Weight	 of	 Glory’,	Theology	 43,	 no.	 257	 (1	November	 1941):	 263.	 A	 partly	
overlapping	passage	from	the	same	work	is	cited	in	Judith	L.	Kovacs,	‘Clement	of	Alexandria	and	
Gregory	of	Nyssa	on	the	Beatitudes’,	 in	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	Homilies	on	the	Beatitudes:	An	English	
Version	 with	 Contemporary	 and	 Supporting	 Studies :	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 Eighth	 International	
Colloquium	 on	 Gregory	 of	Nyssa	 (Paderborn,	 14-18	 September	 1998),	 ed.	 Hubertus	 R.	 Drobner	
and	Alberto	Viciano	(Leiden:	Brill,	2000),	329.	









It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 although	 An.	 et.	 res.	 17B	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 Epicurus	














of	 the	 present	 life	 for	 the	 much	 less	 concrete	 goods	 of	 the	 life	 to	 come	 by	
relativizing	 the	 importance	 of	 what	 is	 presently	 available.	 By	 doing	 so,	 it	
motivates	 the	 soul’s	 detachment	 from	 the	 sensible	 world	 which	 would	
otherwise	seem	like	a	senseless	act.	This	makes	hope	a	precondition	of	virtue.577	
Smith	 argues	 that	 the	 close	 connection	 between	 hope	 and	 virtue	 differs	
radically	from	the	negative	view	of	hope	espoused	by	many	Stoic	thinkers	who	
regarded	 it	 as	 a	 failure	 to	 conform	 to	 one’s	 present	 circumstances	 and	
predetermined	 fate.578	However,	 a	 reworking	 of	 hope	 into	 the	 Stoic	 system	of	
positive	 emotions	 occurs	 already	 in	 Philo,	 who	 calls	 hope	 ‘some	 anticipatory	
emotion,	 a	 joy	before	 joy’	 (προπάθειά	 τις,	 χαρὰ	πρὸ	χαρᾶς,)	 and	a	 ‘joy	before	
joy,	 gladness	 before	 gladness’	 (τινὰ	 χαίρειν	 πρὸ	 χαρᾶς	 καὶ	 εὐφραίνεσθαι	 πρὸ	
																																																								
575	J.	Warren	 Smith,	 ‘Macrina,	 Tamer	 of	 Horses	 and	Healer	 of	 Souls:	 Grief	 and	 the	 Therapy	 of	







εὐφροσύνης).579	Although	 Gregory	 does	 not	 spell	 out	 the	 particulars	 of	 the	
relationship	between	hope	and	joy,	he,	too,	connects	the	two	by	arguing	that	the	
joy	(εὐφροσύνη)	of	the	life	to	come	is	‘presented	to	our	hope	(κατ´	ἐλπίδας	ἡμῖν	
προκειμένῳ).’580	I	will	 return	to	 the	notion	of	hope	as	an	anticipation	of	 joy	 in	
Chapter	7	 in	which	 I	 investigate	 the	 varieties	 of	 intellectual	pleasure.	There,	 I	
intend	 to	 show	 that	 although	 Gregory’s	 view	 of	 hope	 diverges	 from	 the	 Stoic	





In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 Gregory’s	 reading	 of	 the	 fall	 in	De	
hominis	opificio	 is	built	on	a	broad	ethical	discourse	on	pleasure	and	the	good.	
The	idea	that	pleasure	drives	people	to	sin	by	projecting	a	deceptive	appearance	




without	 any	 mixing	 with	 the	 evil,	 the	 fallen	 human	 being	 no	 longer	 single-
mindedly	 partakes	 in	 the	 fullness	 of	 good.	 Instead,	 her	 life	 is	 a	 mix	 of	 two	
possible	inclinations:	good	and	evil.		
	
The	 juxtaposition	 which	 Gregory	 creates	 between	 pleasure	 and	 the	 good	 is	
embedded	in	this	sharp	distinction	between	two	ways	of	life	and	two	different	
telea	towards	which	 the	human	being	 can	orient	his	 faculties.	The	good	 life	 is	
the	life	according	to	virtue,	which	is	achieved	through	an	understanding	of	the	
intelligible	 principles	 that	 underlie	 the	 whole	 creation	 and	 a	 gradual	
transformation	 in	 the	 likeness	 of	 the	 immaterial	 goods.	 We	 saw	 that	 in	 De	
virginitate	 Gregory	 subscribes	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 virtue	 and	
																																																								
579	QG	(frag.)	I.79;	Mut.	161.	Philo’s	usage	of	the	Stoic	term	προπάθειά,	which	normally	indicates	








external	 circumstances	 is	 required	 for	 human	 happiness.	 The	 bad	 life,	 on	 the	
other	hand,	is	the	life	according	to	flesh,	which	is	limited	to	the	lacking	goods	of	







way	 in	 which	 it	 both	 motivates	 the	 choice	 of	 evil	 by	 projecting	 a	 false	
appearance	 of	 goodness	 and	 signals	 that	 the	 wrong	 choice	 has	 taken	 place.	







Indeed,	 my	 analysis	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 acquisition	 of	 knowledge	 greatly	
impacts	 the	 way	 in	 which	 humans	 evaluate	 the	 pleasures	 of	 the	 present	 life.	
Throughout	his	 corpus,	Gregory	 contends	 that	 those	who	 lack	knowledge	will	
continue	in	the	footsteps	of	Adam	and	Eve	and	judge	the	good	simply	based	on	










he	blames	pleasure	 for	distorting	 the	 intended	relationship	between	 the	mind	
and	the	sensible	world.	This	is,	of	course,	akin	to	Philo’s	view	which	I	examined	
in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 but	 again	 Gregory	 largely	 ignores	 any	 gendered	 or	
markedly	 allegorical	 interpretations.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	most	 detrimental	
effect	of	pleasure	is	the	way	in	which	it	obscures	the	non-final	role	of	the	senses	
and	the	sensible	world	by	convincing	the	mind	that	no	good	exists	beyond	that	
which	 is	 available	 to	 the	 senses.	 People	who	 accept	 pleasure	 as	 the	 good	will	
simply	 stop	 their	 search	and	 fail	 to	 train	 their	 senses	 to	 lift	 the	mind	 into	 the	
intelligible	 world.	 Thus,	 the	 sensible	 goods	 and	 the	 enjoyment	 in	 the	 flesh	
become	a	final	end	instead	of	a	mere	instrument.581	This	results	in	an	increasing	
ignorance	 of	 and	 alienation	 from	 the	 true	 good,	 which,	 as	 we	 saw	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	is	the	mark	of	sin.	 	
																																																								











So	 far	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 Gregory	 condemns	 the	 life	 of	 pleasure	 because	 it	
revolves	 around	 the	 fleeting	 phenomena	 of	 the	 sensible	 world	 and	 thus	
distracts	humans	 from	 their	 true	goal	 in	 the	 intelligible	 realm.	However,	 even	
though	the	final	goal	of	the	human	life	is	intelligible	and	immaterial,	it	cannot	be	
fully	 actualised	 until	 the	 resurrection	 of	 the	 dead	 and	 the	 transformation	 of	
their	 earthly	 bodies.	 In	 this	 world,	 Christians,	 like	 all	 human	 beings,	 are	 still	
bound	 by	 the	 spatio-temporal	 limitations	 of	 their	 physical	 existence.	 Even	 a	
Christian	 must	 eat,	 drink,	 and	 go	 about	 her	 daily	 business	 tending	 to	 her	
physical	body	surrounded	by	material	objects.	Therefore,	a	question	arises:	how	
should	the	Christian	relate	to	her	material	surroundings	and	bodily	fluctuations	
without	 falling	 into	 the	 trap	 of	 pleasure	 seeking?	 What	 is	 the	 right	 way	 of	
interacting	with	 the	physical	creation	 if	we	 take	 into	account	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	
ultimate	level	of	being?		
	
Since	Gregory	 considers	 external	 goods	 insignificant	 for	 the	 attainment	of	 the	
good	 life,	 one	might	 imagine	 that	 he	 allows	 for	 complete	 negligence	 of	 bodily	
wellbeing.	While	this	might	theoretically	be	the	extreme	conclusion	of	the	self-
sufficiency	 of	 virtue,	 we	 shall	 see	 that	 he	 never	 explicitly	 adopts	 such	 an	
extreme	position	but	endorses	a	more	moderate	form	of	asceticism	in	which	the	
bodily	 needs	 are	 fulfilled.	 By	 doing	 so,	 he	 joins	 the	 mainstream	 of	 ancient	
thought	 where	 needs	 serve	 as	 the	 standard	 for	 bodily	 care	 and	 material	
consumption.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	will	 show	 that	 Gregory	 addresses	 the	 issue	 of	
inevitable	material	consumption	with	a	juxtaposition	between	need	(χρεία)	and	
																																																								
582	Benef.	 (GNO	 IX,	 104);	 my	 translation.	 Leuenberger-Wenger	 cites	 the	 passage	 in	 her	 brief	
discussion	 on	 the	 norms	 of	 food	 consumption	 in	 Gregory.	 While	 she	 notes	 the	 distinction	
between	measured	 and	 excessive	 enjoyment,	 her	 focus	 is	 on	 socially	 determined	 food	 norms	
and	fasting.	(Leuenberger-Wenger,	Ethik	und	christliche	Identität	bei	Gregor	von	Nyssa,	128–29.)	
She	returns	to	the	topic	at	the	end	of	the	chapter	noting	Gregory’s	focus	on	rationally	measured	






ephemeral	quality	of	 the	physical	 creation	will	 deliberately	make	only	 limited	
use	 of	 it	 for	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 physical	 needs	 and	 seek	 unlimited	 satisfaction	
from	higher,	immaterial	goods.	Just	as	bodily	knowing	is	the	first	step	towards	a	
higher	 intelligible	 reality,	 so	 also	material	 consumption	 is	 simply	 a	means	 to	
preserve	life	so	that	the	soul	may	strive	for	its	final	goal,	the	divine	likeness.	On	
the	other	hand,	a	person	who	has	 failed	 to	grasp	 the	penultimate	character	of	
matter	 will	 turn	 it	 into	 the	 object	 of	 his	 unlimited	 desires	 and	 find	 himself	





will	 not	 allow	me	 to	 discuss	 the	 ancient	 tradition	 extensively,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	
Clement	of	Alexandria’s	adoption	of	the	ancient	needs-discourse,	because	it	sets	




After	 a	 brief	 overiview	 of	 physical	 needs	 in	 ancient	 literature,	 I	will	 go	 on	 to	
show	how	Gregory	makes	use	 of	 the	notion	of	 need	 as	 a	 limited	desire	 and	 a	
product	of	nature,	drawing,	in	particular,	on	two	homilies	where	the	question	of	





the	 differences	 between	 needs-satisfaction	 and	 pleasure-seeking	 as	 two	 basic	
attitudes	towards	the	material	world.	 I	will,	however,	conclude	the	chapter	by	
noting	 their	 similarities:	both	need	and	pleasure	are	products	of	 the	 transient	
material	 world	 and	 reflect	 the	 endless	 cyclical	 change	 of	 the	 sensible	 nature.	
Thus,	neither	pleasure	nor	needs-satisfaction	suffices	as	a	substitute	for	the	true,	
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unchanging,	 and	 immaterial	 good.	 The	 crucial	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 is,	
then,	that	whereas	a	pleasure-lover	still	attempts	to	pursue	sensual	enjoyment	










25	 places	 the	 notion	 of	 bodily	 needs	 on	 the	 foreground	 of	 early	 Christian	
accounts	 of	 philanthropy,	 justice,	 and	 personal	 salvation.583	Considering	 that	
many	 ancient	 thinkers	 regarded	 external	 goods	 as	 insignificant	 or	 only	
marginally	 relevant	 for	 happiness,	 they	 produced	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 writings	
instructing	 how	 one	 should	 relate	 to	 this	 reality	 that	 was	 only	 of	 secondary	
importance.	However,	since	philosophical	works	were	a	product	of	elite	groups,	
it	 is	 hardly	 surprising	 that	 management	 of	 wealth	 and	 the	 correct	 attitude	
towards	material	goods	were	constant	concerns	of	the	ancient	writers.	Although	
the	authors	disagreed	on	the	overall	 importance	of	material	goods	in	the	good	
life,	 there	 was	 an	 overwhelming	 consensus	 that	 need	 and	 necessity	 –	 often	
conceptualised	 with	 the	 one	 word	 χρεία	 –	 should	 define	 the	 relationship	
between	humans	and	their	material	environment.	For	the	anti-hedonists,	need	
limited	man’s	concern	for	the	material	world,	allowing	him	to	focus	his	efforts	
on	 the	 pursuit	 of	 the	 true	 intelligible	 good.	 For	 Epicurus	 and	 his	 followers,	 a	










In	 modern-day	 discourse,	 the	 question	 of	 legitimate	 and	 superfluous	
consumption	is	often	conceptualised	with	the	juxtaposition	between	‘needs’	and	
‘wants’.	However,	 a	needs/wants	distinction	would	have	been	 ill	 fitting	 in	 the	
Graeco-Roman	ethical	framework.	While	the	difference	between	physiologically	
determined	 and	 legitimate	 needs,	 and	 unfounded	 individual	 whims	 was	
frequently	 cited	 in	 ancient	 philosophy,	 it	 was	 not	 conceptualised	 in	 terms	 of	




Many	ancient	 thinkers	 regarded	physical	needs	as	 ‘necessary’	and/or	 ‘natural’	
desires.586	The	 notion	 of	 naturalness	 was	 both	 descriptive	 and	 normative:	 it	
alluded	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 needs	 were	 an	 authentic	 and	 inavoidable	 part	 of	 the	
human	 constitution	 and,	 more	 importantly,	 endowed	 them	 with	 moral	
legitimacy.587	Nature,	understood	as	a	cosmic	principle	that	unfolded	in	the	lives	
of	 individual	 beings,	was	 famously	 the	key	 ethical	 guideline	of	 the	 Stoics	who	
argued	 that	 a	 life	 according	 to	 nature	was	 synonymous	with	 the	 virtuous	 life.	
However,	the	idea	became	widespread	in	ancient	ethics	and	was	employed	even	
by	 thinkers	 such	 as	 Plutarch	 who	 were	 vocal	 critics	 of	 Stoicism.588	Natural	
desires	were	conceived	of	as	limited	deficits	that	had	a	real	basis	in	the	human	
constitution	 and	 could	 be	 satisfied	with	 simple	means.	 They	were	 contrasted	
with	 unnatural	 desires,	 luxuries	 (τρυφή),	 which	 were	 a	 product	 of	 human	
																																																								
585	The	idea	that	both	universal	needs	and	individual	wants	were	considered	desires	should	not	
be	confused	with	 the	modern	economic	notion	of	 ‘preferences’	 that	has	blurred	the	difference	
between	 ‘needs’	 and	 ‘wants’	 by	 grouping	 them	 under	 one	 category	 of	 subjective	 desire	 and	
divesting	 need	 of	 its	 ethical	 primacy.	 Unlike	 most	 modern-day	 economic	 theorists	 who	 in	
principle	consider	all	preferences	equally	valid,	ancient	 thinkers	made	an	emphatic	point	 that	
some	desires	were	better	 founded,	more	 legitimate,	 and	more	beneficial	 than	others.	The	 fact	
that	 both	 needs	 and	whims	were	 considered	 desires	 did	 not	make	 them	 indistinguishable	 or	
equally	important.		
586	See,	 among	 others,	 Plato,	 Rep.	 8,	 558d–559d;	 Aristotle,	 NE	 1118b;	 Epicurus,	 Men.	 127;	
Seneca,	Ep.	16.8–9;	Plutarch,	Bruta	animalia	6,	989b–c;	Clement	of	Alexandria,	Paed.	2.1.16.4.	
587	Annas	 notes	 that	 the	 ethical	 relevance	 of	 nature	 has	 often	 been	 associated	 with	 later	










the	 individual,	 giving	 rise	 to	 insatiable	 greed. 589 	Indeed,	 limitedness	 vs.	
limitlessness	 was	 understood	 as	 a	 key	 criterion	 for	 determining	 whether	 a	
desire	 was	 natural	 or	 not.590	At	 times	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 needs	 of	






the	 ethical	 standard	 both	 for	 the	 ascetic	 community	 of	 the	 therapeutae	
described	in	De	vita	contemplativa	and	for	the	Jewish	people	as	a	whole.592	The	
notion	 of	 χρεία	 is	 also	 central	 to	 Clement’s	 moral	 teaching	 particularly	 in	
Paedagogus,	and	it	provides	the	norm	of	bodily	care	and	philanthropy	in	Basil	of	
Caesarea’s	monastic	writings	and	in	his	sermons	to	non-monastic	audiences.593	
Here,	 it	will	 suffice	 to	 turn	briefly	 to	Clement’s	 view	of	 the	 topic,	 for	 it	 shows	
well	 how	 the	 standard	 of	 need	 was	 applied	 in	 early	 Christian	 literature	 and	
provides	a	particularly	close	precursor	to	Gregory’s	thought.		
	
Of	 the	 earlier	 authors	 Clement	 is	 perhaps	 the	 one	 to	 form	 the	 most	 explicit	
contrast	 between	ἡδονή	 and	 χρεία,	which	we	will	 soon	 encounter	 in	Gregory.	
This	 is	 because	 Clement,	 too,	 pays	 a	 lot	 of	 attention	 to	 the	 aim	 of	 people’s	
actions	 and	 the	 correct	 use	 of	material	 objects.	 Addressing	 various	 situations	





University	 Press,	 1994),	 66.	 See	 also,	 for	 example,	Aristotle’s	 distinction	between	natural	 and	
unnatural	wealth-getting	in	Pol.	1256b–1257b.	
591	On	the	authenticity	of	need	and	its	role	as	a	standard	for	harmonious	community	life,	and	on	












In	 Paedagogus,	 Clement	 explains	 that	 the	 correct	 use	 of	 food	 and	 drink	 is	 to	
quench	 hunger	 and	 thirst,	 that	 is,	 to	 repair	 a	 deficit.595 	According	 to	 the	
‘Instructor’,	Christ	himself,	people	should	eat	to	live,	not	live	to	eat,	for	‘[e]ating	
is	 not	 our	main	occupation,	 nor	 is	 pleasure	 our	 goal	 (οὔτε	σκοπὸς	ἡδονή).’596	
The	simplest	fare	will	suffice	for	this	purpose.	Like	the	earlier	writers,	Clement	




indifference	 as	 simple	 ones,598	the	 main	 advice	 of	 Paedagogus	 is	 to	 renounce	




Clement	 compares	 it	 with	 pleasure	 as	 he	 seeks	 to	 explain	 the	 difference	
between	medically	beneficial	and	luxurious	use	of	ointments.	Telling	people	to	
ignore	the	bait	of	perfume	(τῆς	εὐωδίας	δέλεάρ),	Clement	urges	his	audience	to	
assign	 no	 place	 for	 pleasure	 ‘not	 connected	 with	 a	 necessity	 of	 life’	 (πρὸς	














wider	 ethical	 emphasis	 on	 metriopatheia. 601 	In	 Stromateis,	 he	 makes	 a	
distinction	 between	 the	 spiritually	 advanced	 life	 of	 complete	 apatheia,	 which	






accounts	 of	 the	 first	 human	 communities,	 Clement	 anchors	 it	 in	 the	 perfect	
humanity	 of	 Christ.	 By	partaking	 in	 food	 and	drink,	 Christ	 showed	 that	 needs	
were	a	legitimate	and	inevitable	part	of	the	human	existence.	At	the	same	time,	
he	also	set	an	example	as	to	how	needs	ought	to	be	satisfied.	Clement	points	out	
that	 even	 the	 ‘Lord	 of	 the	 universe’	 did	 not	 require	 luxuries,	 but	 ate	 from	 a	
simple	bowl	and	drank	 from	 the	Samaritan	woman’s	 clay	bucket,	 ‘making	use	
his	 aim	 (σκοπὸν	 γὰρ	 τὴν	 χρείαν	 ἐτίθετο)’.604	However,	 ultimately	 Clement	
seems	to	think	that	Christ	only	appeared	to	have	needs.	Whereas	in	Paedagogus	
the	 figure	 of	 Christ	 serves	 as	 the	 perfect	 example	 of	 a	 person	 who	 does	 not	
desire	 anything	 beyond	 his	 needs,	 in	 Stromateis	 Clement	 presents	 an	 entirely	
impassible	Christ,	 claiming	 that	 it	would	be	 ludicrous	 to	 suppose	 that	Christ’s	
body	 would	 have	 required	 ‘necessary	 aids’	 for	 its	 preservation.	 In	 Clement’s	
view,	the	body	of	Christ	was	held	together	by	‘holy	energy’,	but	he	ate	to	prove	
his	 true	 humanity.	 Advanced	 Christians,	 in	 Clement’s	 words	 ‘gnostics’,	 must	
however	 eat	 and	 drink	 to	 sustain	 their	 bodies,	 but	 they	 are	 able	 to	 do	 it	
completely	 rationally.605 	They	 are	 capable	 of	 distinguishing	 rational	 desire	
(ὄρεξις)	 from	 irrational	 lust	 (ἐπιθυμία),	 assigning	 the	 latter	 to	 ‘pleasures	 and	
licentiousness	(ἡδοναῖς	καὶ	ἀκολασίᾳ)’,	the	former	to	the	‘necessities	of	nature’	
																																																								
601	Lilla	writes:	 ‘The	πάθη,	 in	 this	 ethical	 stage,	 are	not	 completely	eradicated	but	kept	by	 the	





















never	 find	 satisfaction.	 Another	 recurring	 feature	 in	 the	 sources	 is	 the	 link	
between	 need,	 nature	 and	 limit.	 In	 Graeco-Roman	 ethics,	 limitedness	 and	
limitlessness	 are	 presented	 as	 crucial	 criteria	 that	 can	 help	 the	 individual	 to	
determine	whether	 his	 desires	 are	 natural	 or	 not.	 	 Although	Nature	 demands	
that	needs	be	satisfied,	its	demand	is	ultimately	easy	to	bear	and	requires	little	





The	 ancient	 ideal	 of	 physical	 needs	 as	 the	 limit	 of	 bodily	 care	 and	 material	
consumption	 runs	 through	 Gregory’s	 corpus.	 Practically	 speaking,	 it	 seems	
unlikely	 that	 an	 extreme	 emphasis	 on	 physical	 denial	 would	 have	 won	 him	
many	 fans	 in	 front	 of	 a	 mixed	 crowd	 of	 churchgoers.	 However,	 even	 in	 the	
monastic	 context	 of	 De	 virginitate	 Gregory	 opposes	 strict	 encratism	 which	
harbours	 the	danger	 of	 spiritual	 pride,	 and	 argues	 for	moderate	 asceticism	 in	
which	 the	 bodily	 necessities	 are	 provided.	 While	 he	 occasionally	 mentions	
exceptional	 individuals,	 such	 as	Moses,	 who	may	 at	 times	 be	 so	 dedicated	 to	
contemplation	 that	 they	 appear	 to	 transcend	 the	 limits	 of	 their	 embodied	
																																																								
606	Strom.	4.18.117.5.	 This	 is	 based	 on	 the	 Stoic	 distinction	 between	 ὄρεξις	 as	 a	 neutral	 and	
rational	 category	 of	 desire	 and	 the	 passion	 ἐπιθυμία	 as	 its	 excessive	 and	 irrational	
manifestation.	
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existence,	 such	 passages	 describe	 brief	 moments	 of	 exceptional	 holiness,	
glimpses	 into	 the	 reality	 of	 resurrection,	 rather	 than	 an	 overall	 ascetic	
programme	 for	 this	world.607	In	 this	 life,	 a	 Christian,	 too,	must	 eat,	 drink,	 and	




For	 Gregory,	 physical	 neediness	 is	 a	 strictly	 postlapsarian	 matter.	 Whereas	
some	 non-Christian	 authors	 would	 long	 for	 a	 mythical	 Golden	 Age	 when	
humans	 shared	 everything	 and	 only	 took	 what	 was	 required	 to	 satisfy	 their	
bodily	needs,	Gregory	makes	it	clear	that	the	paradisiac	existence	was	free	from	
physical	deficits	and	material	consumption.608	Instead,	the	prelapsarian	humans	
were	sustained	by	 the	divine	gift	of	 immortality.	All	 this	changes	 in	 the	 fall	as	
humans	 become	 subject	 to	 death	 and	 decay	 and	 are	 cast	 away	 from	 the	
abundance	 of	 Paradise	 to	 support	 themselves	with	 their	 own	 labour.	Without	
the	divine	gifts	of	immortality	and	incorruptibility,	humans	are	subjected	to	the	








Like	 many	 ancient	 authors,	 Gregory	 locates	 need	 in	 ‘nature’	 and	 endows	 the	
concept	 with	 the	 traditional	 double	 meaning	 of	 cosmic	 order	 and	 individual	
essence.	 Put	 simply,	 need	 is	 a	 manifestation	 of	 the	 cyclical	 order	 of	 Nature,	
which	 is	actualised	 in	 the	particular	 instance	of	human	nature.	 In	Chapter	2,	 I	
pointed	out	 that	at	 times	Gregory	 is	so	anxious	 to	emphasise	 the	 fundamental	






see	 something	 of	 the	 opposite:	 when	 Gregory	 refers	 to	 ‘nature’	 without	 any	
specific	 qualifications,	 he	 is	 not	 talking	 about	 all	 aspects	 that	 make	 humans	
human,	 but	 specifically	 about	 the	 corporeal	 part	 which	 connects	 them	 to	 the	
whole	 material	 creation.	 Where	 needs	 are	 concerned,	 being	 human	 becomes	
largely	 synonymous	 with	 being	 corporeal,	 as	 opposed	 to	 God	 and	 the	 angels	
who	are	by	nature	incorporeal	and,	importantly,	ἀνενδεεῖς,	without	any	lack.	In	
one	of	his	Homilies	on	the	Beatitudes,	Gregory	writes	about	 ‘the	neediness	of	a	
nature	 that	 is	 not	 self-sufficient	 in	 regard	 to	 its	 sustenance,	 but	 whose	
deficiency	has	 to	be	 filled	up	by	 the	abundance	of	 the	 irrational	creatures’	 (τὸ	
πενιχρὸν	 τῆς	 φύσεως,	 τὸ	 μὴ	 εἶναι	 αὐτὴν	 αὐτάρκη	 δι’	 ἑαυτῆς	 πρὸς	 τὴν	 ἰδίαν	
σύστασιν,	 εἰ	μὴ	τῇ	περιουσίᾳ	τῶν	ἀλόγων	τὸ	ἐνδέον	ἀναπληρώσειεν).609	Here	






all	created	beings.	Gregory	understands	change	as	a	part	of	 the	 ‘diastema’,	 the	
radical	ontological	difference	that	separates	spatio-temporally	limited	creatures	
from	the	 infinite,	 immutable,	and	non-spatial	Creator.611	But	while	 the	created	
intelligible	nature,	such	as	an	angel	or	the	human	intellect,	is	characterised	by	a	
linear	 movement	 towards	 good	 or	 evil	 actualised	 through	 the	 free	 will,	 the	
corporeal	nature	is	inherently	prone	to	cyclical	change,	which	begins	and	ceases	
in	a	continuous	pattern.612	In	creation,	the	latter	can	be	seen	in	the	way	in	which	
the	 sun	 rises	 and	 sets	day	 after	day	 and	 the	 sea	 receives	 a	 constant	 inflow	of	






611	For	 a	 survey	 of	 this	 central	 notion,	 see	 Scot	Douglass,	 ‘Diastêma’,	 in	The	Brill	Dictionary	of	











is	 to	seek	harmony	with	 the	 flux	of	Nature.	However,	 for	Gregory	 it	 is	not	 the	
whole	human	nature,	but	 specifically	 the	 corporeal	part	 that	harmonises	with	
the	visible	universe.	In	human	beings	the	cycle	of	Nature	is	primarily	manifested	
in	 the	passing	 of	 generations	 as	 human	 lives	 begin	 and	 end	 in	 an	unchanging	
pattern.614	But	humanity	undergoes	fluctuations	also	on	a	smaller	scale:	bodily	
needs	 and	 functions	 occur	 in	 a	 similar	 cyclical	 fashion.	 Gregory’s	 consolatory	
discourses	convey	this	cycle	particularly	well:		
	
Therefore,	 the	 life	 of	 our	 body	 entails	 a	 double	 activity	 of	 filling	 and	 emptying	
(πλήρωσίς	τε	καὶ	κένωσις),	on	the	one	hand,	through	food	and	drink,	and	on	the	other,	
through	 the	 inhalation	 and	 exhalation	 of	 air,	 without	 which	 the	 life	 of	 flesh	 cannot	
maintain	 its	 nature.	 For	 the	 human	 being	 ceases	 to	 live	 whenever	 the	 succession	 of	
these	opposites	no	longer	troubles	his	nature.615		
	
Do	we	 not	 go	 round	 the	mill	 of	 life	 like	 beasts	 toiling	 in	 the	mill	 with	 covered	 eyes,	
always	passing	 through	 the	 same	 things	 and	 turning	 again	 towards	 them?	 Shall	 I	 tell	
















are	secondary	to	 their	spiritual	purpose,	Gregory	 is	anxious	to	emphasise	 that	
change	is	something	one	should	accept	as	natural	–	be	it	in	death,	or	simply	in	
the	 fluctuation	 of	 daily	 needs.	 In	 a	 subsequent	 passage,	 which	 includes	 a	
resounding	affirmation	of	the	bodily	needs,	Gregory	highlights	the	goodness	of	
the	 body	 and	 notes	 that	 passions	 are	 not	 caused	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 flesh	
such.617	As	we	have	already	seen,	virtue	can	be	limited	and	undermined	only	by	
its	 opposite,	 and	 Gregory	 is	 emphatic	 that	 bodily	 filling	 and	 emptying	 are	






Thus,	 even	 though	 the	 impermanence	 of	 all	 physical	 pursuits	makes	 Gregory	
lament	the	futility	of	human	life,	he	also	accepts	the	circularity	as	an	inherent,	
‘natural’	 property	 of	 all	 corporeal	 beings	 that	 should	 neither	 be	 completely	
ignored	 nor	 dwelled	 on.	 ‘The	 debt	 caused	 by	 your	 nature	 (τὸ	 τῆς	 φύσεως	
ὄφλημα)	 is	 small;	 you	 owe	 food	 to	 your	 flesh	 –	 a	 trivial	 thing	 and	 easily	
procured,	 if	 you	 consider	what	 is	 needed	 (πρὸς	 τὴν	 χρείαν	 βλέπεις),’	 Gregory	
writes	 in	Homily	4	 on	 the	Lord’s	 Prayer.620	This	 view	 reflects	 the	 ancient	 idea	
that,	as	demands	of	nature,	physical	needs	are	minor	and	easy	to	bear	and	thus	
serve	 as	 a	 safeguard	 against	 excess.	 In	 the	 same	 homily,	 Gregory	 argues	 that	
needy	 humans	 can	 attain	 the	 same	 level	 of	 purity	 as	 angels	who	 do	 not	 have	
bodily	 needs.	 A	 human	 who	 ‘gives	 service	 to	 nature’	 (πρὸς	 τὴν	 τῆς	 φύσεως	
ὑπηρεσίαν	βλέπων)	and	does	not	 let	his	desires	extend	beyond	necessity	(ἔξω	
τοῦ	 ἀναγκαίου),	 is	 not	 far	 below	 the	 angelic	 state,	 but	 imitates	 their	 need	 of	
nothing	 by	 being	 content	with	 little.’621	In	 other	words,	 it	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	
become	ontologically	angel-like,	but	to	become	an	equal	of	angels	in	status	and	











People,	 let	 yourselves	 no	 longer	 be	 distracted	 by	 vain	 desires	 (περὶ	 τὰ	 μάταια	 ταῖς	
ἐπιθυμίαις);	stop	heaping	toil	upon	toil	for	yourselves.	The	debt	caused	by	your	nature	
(τὸ	τῆς	φύσεως	ὄφλημα)	is	small;	you	owe	food	to	your	flesh	–	a	trivial	thing	and	easily	
procured,	 if	 you	 consider	what	 is	 needed	 (πρὸς	 τὴν	 χρείαν	 βλέπεις).	Why	do	 you	 lay	
yourselves	under	so	much	tribute?	Why	do	you	submit	to	the	yoke	of	paying	so	many	
fines?	Mining	silver,	digging	gold,	and	searching	 for	 transparent	stones	–	 for	no	other	
purpose	save	that	your	stomach,	this	perpetual	tax	collector,	may	live	daintily	through	
all	this.	Yet	its	only	debt	is	bread	which	fills	up	the	deficiency	of	the	body	(ὁ	ἀναπληρῶν	










humans	who	 lead	an	embodied	 life.	The	standard	 for	bodily	care	and	material	
consumption	must	be	found	elsewhere.	It	is	no	surprise	that	here	the	incarnated	
Christ	 serves	 as	 the	 primary	 example	 of	 the	 perfect	 embodied	 life.	 The	
normative	 role	 of	 Christ	 is	 particularly	 evident	 in	Homily	4	 on	 the	Beatitudes,	
which	 comments	 on	 the	 verse	 ‘Blessed	 are	 those	 who	 hunger	 and	 thirst	 for	




He	 who	 had	 everything	 in	 common	 with	 us	 except	 sin,	 and	 who	 shared	 all	 our	
sufferings,	did	not	think	hunger	a	sin.	Therefore	He	did	not	refuse	Himself	to	undergo	









into	 things	 outside	 nature	 (τοῦτο	 δέ	 ἐστι	 τὸ	 παρατρέψαι	 τὴν	 ἐπιθυμίαν	 ἐκ	 τῆς	 κατἁ	
φύσιν	τροφῆς	έπὶ	τὰ	ἔξω	τῆς	φύσεως).624	
	
Above,	 Gregory	 inserts	 the	 ancient	 ideal	 of	 ‘life	 according	 to	 nature’	 into	 a	




turn	 stones	 into	 bread	was	 an	 attempt	 to	 ‘pervert	 the	 desire	 for	 natural	 food	
into	 things	 outside	 nature.’625	While	 in	 this	 passage	 Christ’s	 human	 nature	
remains	the	main	reference	point	for	what	is	‘natural’,	the	phrases	‘natural	food’	
and	 ‘things	 outside	 nature’	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 stemming	 from	 a	 broader	
concept	of	nature	that	pertains	to	the	whole	order	of	being.		
	
From	 the	 biblical	 account	 of	 Christ’s	 temptation,	 Gregory	 extracts	 a	 general	
moral	teaching.	He	argues	that	people	should	not	make	stones	into	bread,	that	
is,	 let	 their	 desire	 grow	 beyond	 the	 necessary	 limits	 of	 need	 (ἐκβαίνῃ	 τοὺς	
ἀναγκαίους	ὅρους	τῆς	χρείας	ἡ	ὄρεξις)	and	beyond	the	limits	of	nature	(ἐπὶ	τὰ	
ἔξω	 τῆς	 φύσεως).	 He	 rebukes	 people	 for	 procuring	 expensive	 dishes	 and	
luxurious	 dining	 implements	 that	 go	 ‘beyond	 the	 necessities	 of	 life’	 (ἔξω	 τῶν	
ἀναγκαίων	τῇ	 ζωῇ),	 having	no	 relation	 to	 the	 ‘needs	of	 nature’	 (πρὸς	 τὴν	 τῆς	
																																																								
624	Beat.	4	(GNO	VII/2,	114);	Graef,	121.	




going	against	 the	nature	seem	to	 indicate	 that	 the	 focus	on	nature	and	bodily	balance	 is	more	
than	 ‘a	 simple	 rhetorical	ploy’.	However,	 although	Mateo-Seco	notes	 the	 importance	of	bodily	
balance	 in	 ancient	 medical	 theories,	 he	 does	 not	 investigate	 the	 matter	 further	 or	 make	 a	
connection	 to	 non-Christian	 ascetic	 ideals	 in	which	 adhering	 to	 nature	was	 seen	 as	 the	 right	
measure	of	bodily	care.	See	Lucas	Francisco	Mateo-Seco,	 ‘Gregory	of	Nyssa,	De	Beatitudinibus,	
Oratio	 IV:	 “Blessed	 Are	 Those	 Who	 Hunger	 and	 Thirst	 for	 Righteousness,	 for	 They	 Shall	 Be	
Satisfied”	 (Mt	 5,6)’,	 in	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa,	 Homilies	 on	 the	 Beatitudes:	 An	 English	 Version	 with	
Contemporary	 and	 Supporting	 Studies :	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 Eighth	 International	 Colloquium	 on	















Nature	wants	 to	drink	 –	but	 you	prepare	 costly	 tripods,	 tankards,	mixing	bowls,	 jars,	
and	a	thousand	other	things	which	have	nothing	to	do	with	the	need	in	question.630	
	
Here,	 nature’s	 reasonable	 voice	 serves	 as	 a	 corrective	 to	 the	 individual’s	
excessive	 desires.	 It	 is	 the	 voice	 of	 the	 redeemed	 human	 nature	 revealed	 in	
Christ.	The	purifying	role	of	the	incarnated	Christ	is	highlighted	soon	afterwards	






To	 sum	 up,	 in	 Gregory’s	 works	 physical	 need	 emerges	 as	 a	 cyclical	 but	
legitimate	 desire	 that	 is	 inherent	 to	 the	 embodied	 human	 condition.	 As	 is	
generally	 true	 of	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 desire	 and	 passions,	 the	 underlying	
impulse	 is	not	to	be	quenched	but	moderated	and	redirected.	Needs	belong	to	
the	 make-up	 of	 human	 nature,	 a	 combination	 of	 an	 immaterial	 soul	 with	 a	













desire,	 in	 contrast	 to	 many	 other	 ancient	 authors	 he	 does	 not	 distinguish	
between	two	kinds	of	desires.	For	him,	there	is	only	one	desire,	interchangeably	
denoted	with	 ἐπιθυμία	 or	 ὄρεξις,	 which	 originates	 in	 the	 sensible	 part	 of	 the	
human	nature.	 In	 the	next	 section	of	 this	 chapter	 I	will	 show	that	 for	Gregory	






In	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 we	 have	 seen	 how	 pleasure	 replaces	 the	 final	 good	
primarily	 in	our	 attempts	 to	perceive	and	understand	what	 is	 truly	 good	and,	
simply,	what	 truly	 is.	 Now,	 I	will	 show	 that	 that	 this	 epistemological	 concern	
finds	a	parallel	in	a	more	practical	problem	of	consumption.	Just	as	in	perceiving	
material	 things	humans	should	understand	that	they	are	simply	 looking	at	 the	
first	 stepping	 stone	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 virtue,	 so	 also	 all	material	 consumption	
ought	 to	be	 informed	by	 the	penultimate	 character	of	matter	 and	our	present	




In	 what	 follows,	 I	 will	 introduce	 a	 number	 of	 passages	 in	 which	 Gregory	
juxtaposes	 ‘need’	 (χρεία)	 and	 ‘pleasure’	 (ἡδονή)	 as	 two	 conflicting	 goals	
(σκοποί)	 that	 motivate	 material	 consumption.	 The	 pairing	 is	 sufficiently	
recurrent	 and	 distinctive	 that	 we	 can	 assume	 it	 is	 intentional	 and	 somewhat	
technical.	 In	 this	 context,	 χρεία	 does	 not	 only	 denote	 a	 physical	 lack	 but	
becomes	 a	 marker	 of	 aim	 and	 intent,	 that	 of	 having	 one’s	 needs	 satisfied.	
Consequently,	 the	 legitimacy	 of	material	 desires	 and	 the	 potential	 enjoyment	
that	 follows	are	determined	by	 the	aim	of	 the	 act:	What	 are	people	hoping	 to	
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attain	when	they	eat,	seek	shelter,	or	otherwise	make	use	of	the	material	world?	





passions	born	of	 satiety	 (ἐκ	 τοῦ	κόρου	παθημάτων),	we	must	 take	 care	 that	 it	 is	 not	




Above,	 Gregory	 sets	 need	 (χρεία)	 and	 pleasure	 (ἡδονή)	 against	 each	 other,	
arguing	that	the	former	ought	to	be	both	the	measure	of	the	self-disciplined	life	
and	 the	 limit	 of	 enjoyment.	 The	 word	 for	 enjoyment,	 ἀπόλαυσις,	 can	 be	
understood	 both	 as	 the	 partaking	 of	 a	 good	 and	 as	 the	 pleasurable	 affective	
response	 that	 follows.	 In	 short,	 Gregory	 rejects	 a	 hedonistic	 lifestyle	 in	which	
bodily	pleasure	is	pursued	as	an	independent,	final	goal,	but	allows	enjoyment	
as	 a	 by-product	 of	 needs-satisfaction.	 In	 the	 passage	 above,	 the	 words	 ‘limit’	






The	 passage	 from	 Virg.	 21	 touches	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 needs-satisfaction	 may	
inadvertently	 bring	 enjoyment	 and	 one	 should	 master	 the	 right	 attitude	
towards	 any	 enjoyment	 that	 may	 ensue:	 it	 is	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 simple	 by-
product	 of	 needs-satisfaction,	 not	 as	 a	 driving	 force	 and	 an	 end	 in	 itself.	 We	
should	also	recall	that	Gregory	explains	the	origin	of	pleasure	in	terms	of	needs	
and	self-preservation.	Pleasure	motivates	us	to	fulfil	our	needs	and	thus	ensures	








replenishment	 of	 a	 lack,	 using	 hunger	 and	 thirst	 as	 paradigmatic	 examples.	








shared	 by	 ancient	 authors.	 In	 Chapter	 1,	 I	 cited	 Seneca’s	 and	 Clement	 of	
Alexandria’s	views	on	 the	 topic.634	However,	Gregory	makes	 less	of	enjoyment	
as	 a	 legitimate	 by-product	 of	 needs-satisfaction	 than	 many	 other	 ancient	
authors.	 It	 is	 only	 a	 later	 editor	 of	De	virginitate	 who,	 in	 the	 paragraphs	 that	
follow,	 elaborates	 on	 Gregory’s	 own	 remark	 and	 spells	 out	 the	 ancient	







Most	 of	 Gregory’s	 own	 remarks	 on	 need	 and	 pleasure	 do	 not	 centre	 on	
legitimate	 enjoyment	 that	 overlaps	with	 needs-satisfaction,	 but	 on	 intentional	
and	 illicit	 pleasure-seeking	 that	 perverts	 and	 exceeds	 physical	 needs.	 In	 De	
mortuis	non	esse	dolendum	Gregory	affirms	again	the	legitimacy	of	bodily	needs,	














mark	 at	 which	 desire	 should	 be	 aimed,	 a	 limit	 that	 keeps	 it	 within	 right	
proportions.	Desire,	however,	 is	not	Gregory’s	only	concern.	The	warning	 that	





ἐποίησεν):	 instead	 of	 nourishment,	 he	 seeks	 delicacy,	 instead	 of	 clothing,	 he	 prefers	




If	 the	 individual	 lets	his	desires	grow	beyond	need,	 the	acquisition	of	material	
goods	 can	no	 longer	be	 justified	by	 the	natural	demands	of	 the	body.	 Instead,	
pleasure	becomes	the	driving	force	of	consumption,	an	end	in	itself.	By	arguing	






The	 fluidity	between	need	and	pleasure	becomes	 literal	 in	one	of	 the	Homilies	
on	Ecclesiastes	 in	which	 Gregory	 compares	 pleasure	 to	water	 that	 flows	 from	
one	source	into	many	channels	by	mixing	itself	into	the	‘needs	of	life’	(ταῖς	τοῦ	
βίου	χρείαις).638	Starting	from	housing,	Gregory	gives	detailed	examples	of	how	















source	 of	 pleasure.	 Gregory	 goes	 on	 to	 list	 various	 exotic	 and	 extravagant	
luxuries	that	pleasure-driven	people	use	to	embellish	their	houses.	He	sketches	
caricatures	 of	 licentious	 individuals	 whose	 feet	 luxuriate	 in	 the	 brilliance	 of	
their	shiny	floors	and	eyes	fornicate	on	forbidden	things	represented	in	works	
of	 art.	 This,	 for	 Gregory,	 is	 not	 required	 by	 the	 ‘needs	 of	 life’,	 but	 by	 ‘desire,	
which	extends	through	useless	things	to	invent	what	is	not	opportune.’640	
	
Finally,	 Gregory	 contrasts	 the	 luxurious	 pleasure-driven	 lifestyle	 with	 the	




not	 deprived	 of	 anything	 necessary	 (μὴ	 στερῆσαι	 τῶν	 ἀναγκαίων	 τινός).641	
Here,	 housing,	 clothing,	 and	 nourishment	 constitute	 the	 basic	 needs	 that	 one	
must	 fulfil.	Aware	 that	people	may	 seek	 to	 justify	 their	 excessive	 spending	by	

















feast	 in	 which	 music	 and	 ornately	 dressed	 servants	 stimulate	 pleasures	 of	
hearing	and	sight.	To	protect	his	listeners,	Gregory	says	it	is	best	to	refrain	from	
giving	too	much	detail	about	the	situation	in	which	man	has	made	pleasure	the	
end	 (σκοπὸν	 –	 τὴν	 ἡδονὴν	ποιούμενος)	 of	 all	 his	 actions	 and	 surpassed	 need	
(χρείαν)	 with	 vanities.643	Nonetheless,	 he	 elaborates	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 pleasure	




slip	 into	 the	 joint	 in	 the	 soul,	 turning	need	 into	extravagance.	First	 it	 seeks	 to	
make	the	house	beautiful,	then	it	moves	on	to	vineyards,	pools,	and	gardens.	As	
its	 tail	 it	drags	along	a	whole	host	of	other	vices,	which	are	 impossible	 to	pull	
out	 once	 the	 serpent	 has	 made	 its	 way	 in	 because	 its	 scales	 resist	 any	
movement.	Therefore	one	should	not	let	the	head	–	pleasure	–	enter	at	all.645		
	
For	 Gregory,	 the	 slithering	 serpent	 is	 an	 apt	 symbol	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	
pleasure	gradually	creeps	into	all	aspects	of	life,	appropriating	God-given	things	
for	 selfish	 enjoyment.	 Houses,	money,	 food,	 plants,	 clothes	 –	 anything	 can	 be	
divorced	 from	 its	 original	 beneficial	 purpose	 and	 turned	 into	 a	 vehicle	 of	
pleasure.	Gregory	explains	how	pleasure	seeking	perverts	natural	processes	by	
creating	hybrid	fruits	and	plants	that	bloom	outside	their	normal	season.	Even	
the	natural	 elements,	 earth,	 air,	 and	water,	 are	not	 spared	 from	 the	pleasure-
lover	who	harnesses	 them	 to	provide	bodily	 comfort	 and	 visual	 delight	 at	 his	
estate,	which	has	evolved	from	a	simple	shelter	to	a	place	of	luxurious	leisure.646		
	






















‘passion	 of	 pleasure	 is	 but	 one	 animal’,	 ‘the	 many	 various	 forms	 of	 pleasure	
which	are	 intermingled	with	 the	human	 life	 through	 the	 senses	are	 the	 scales	
surrounding	 the	 serpent,	 speckled	 by	 various	 passion-provoking	 incidents.’649	
He	warns:	
	
Do	not	give	access	to	the	reptile	 [of	pleasure]	creeping	 into	the	 inner	chamber,	 for	 its	
whole	trail	enters	with	it	 immediately.	Abide	by	your	need	(μεῖνον	ἐπὶ	τῆς	χρείας);	 let	
the	repletion	of	deficiency	(τοῦ	ἐνδέοντος	πλήρωσις)	by	what	is	obtainable	be	the	limit	
(ὅρος)	 of	 your	 care	 for	 your	 livelihood.	 If	 with	 you,	 too,	 Eve’s	 counsellor	 converses	
about	what	 is	pleasing	 to	sight	and	sweet	 to	 taste,	you	will	 seek	over	and	above	your	
own	bread	this	or	that	flavour,	making	it	more	tasty	by	all	manner	of	seasonings.	And	
through	 these	 things	 you	 will	 lead	 desire	 beyond	 the	 limit	 of	 necessities	 (ἔξω	 τῶν	
ἀναγκαίων	 ὅρων	 τὴν	 ἐπιθυμίαν	 ἄγοις),	 and	 presently	 you	 will	 see	 the	 reptile	
clandestinely	 creeping	 towards	 greediness	 (πλεονεξίαν).	 For	 having	 once	 crept	 from	




647	The	 idea	 that	 luxury	 is	 artificial	 is	 widely	 held	 in	 ancient	 literature	 and	 stems	 from	 the	







Here,	 the	 theme	 of	 pleasure	 and	 the	 Fall	 grows	 into	 a	 spiritual	 metaphor	
applicable	to	the	life	of	every	Christian.	Giving	access	to	the	serpent	of	pleasure	
is	juxtaposed	with	abiding	by	one’s	need,	which	Gregory	defines	as	a	repletion	
of	 a	 deficiency.	 The	 familiar	 notion	 of	 ‘limit’	 is	 also	 present	 in	 the	 passage:	
Filling	 up	 a	 deficiency	 should	 be	 the	 limit	 that	 one	 sets	 for	 bodily	 care.	 And,	
conversely,	 giving	 in	 to	 pleasure	 will	 lead	 to	 a	 life	 ‘beyond	 the	 limit	 of	
necessities’,	which	 sets	 off	 uncontrolled	 desire	 and	 leads	 to	 greed.	 The	 image	
that	Gregory	evokes	is,	again,	that	of	single	desire	(ἐπιθυμία)	that	trespasses	the	
limits	of	need	aiming	for	pleasure.	The	passage	continues	with	a	flamboyant	list	
of	 objects	 towards	 which	 the	 serpent	 of	 pleasure	 continues	 to	 creep	 after	
exchanging	need	for	luxury:	 ‘silver	couches,	soft	divans,	and	transparent,	gold-
embroidered	 veils,	 magnificent	 chairs	 and	 tripods,	 washing	 vessels,	 mixing	
bowls,	 drinking	 horns,	 wine	 coolers	 and	 pitchers;	 water	 stoups,	 candlesticks,	
censers	 and	 similar	 things.’ 651 	Such	 lists,	 which	 paint	 a	 scene	 of	 almost	
suffocating	 abundance,	 appear	 frequently	 in	 Graeco-Roman	 critiques	 of	
luxury.652	‘And	all	this	serves	only	to	increase	the	desire	for	more	(διὰ	τούτων	
γὰρ	 ἡ	 ἐπιθυμίατῆς	 πλεονεξίας	 εἰςέρχεται),’	 Gregory	 concludes.653	Once	 desire	
has	been	released	from	the	 limits	of	need,	 it	grows	without	end,	never	 finding	
permanent	satisfaction.		
	
It	 is	not	 surprising	 that	 the	 sumptuous	objects	 that	Gregory	 lists	all	belong	 to	




why	 desire	 for	 luxurious	 objects	 only	 results	 in	more	 desire	 is	 that	 one	must	












neighbour	 must	 sorrow,	 many	 who	 are	 deprived	 of	 their	 property	 must	 be	
miserable,	in	order	that	their	tears	may	contribute	to	enhance	the	ostentatious	
display	 of	 his	 table,’	 Gregory	 laments.655 	Gregory’s	 remark	 illustrates	 how	
pleasure	 seeking	 drives	 people	 to	 greed,	 which	 in	 turn	 brings	 about	 social	
problems,	putting	a	strain	on	relationships	and	undermining	a	just	distribution	
of	goods.	In	the	world	of	the	homily,	and	perhaps	in	Gregory's	social	world	more	
broadly,	 the	 distribution	 of	 goods	 is	 a	 zero-sum	 game,	 in	which	 one	 person’s	
exceeding	the	limits	of	his	need	makes	it	difficult	for	another	to	fulfil	his	own.656	
Thus,	 pleasure	 not	 only	 transgresses	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 individual’s	 need	 but	
threatens	the	wellbeing	of	the	whole	community.	
	
Finally,	Or.	dom.	4	addresses	 the	 issue	of	 need	 and	 legitimate	 enjoyment	with	
which	 I	opened	my	analysis	at	 the	beginning	 in	 this	 section.	Having	described	
how	greed	leads	to	injustice,	Gregory	notes	that	all	this	can	be	avoided	if	people	
let	 life	be	limited	(περιόριζε)	by	easily	obtainable	bread.	For	this	simple	bread	
one	 may	 seek	 a	 seasoning	 provided	 by	 Nature	 (φυσέως)	 itself.657	Although	
Gregory	moves	primarily	on	a	figurative	level	contending	that	such	seasoning	is	
the	 good	 conscience	 that	 people	 get	 when	 they	 eat	 bread	 that	 has	 been	
produced	justly,	there	is	also	a	secondary,	physical	level:	‘But	if	you	want	to	take	
pleasure	 also	 in	 the	 physical	 sense	 of	 taste	 (εἰ	 δὲ	 καὶ	 τὴν	 κατὰ	 τὸν	 λαιμὸν	
αἴσθησιν	ἥδεσθαι	θέλοις),	 let	the	 lack	be	your	seasoning	(ὄψον	σοι	γενέσθω	ἡ	
ἔνδεια);	do	not	add	to	satiety	with	satiety	(ὸ	μὴ	ἐπιβαλεῖν	κόρον	τῷ	κόρῳ),	nor	
dull	 your	 appetite	 with	 intoxication	 (μηδὲ	 ἀπαμβλύνειν	 τῇ	 κραιπάλῃ	 τὴν	
ὄρεξιν).’658	Gregory’s	words	echo	a	common	ancient	trope	of	hunger	as	the	best	









659	See	 Cicero’s	 famous	 remark	 in	De	 finibus	 (2.90;	 trans.	 Rackham,	 LCL	 40,	 181–183):	 ‘I	 will	
listen	to	Socrates,	who	holds	pleasure	of	no	account,	when	he	says	that	the	best	sauce	for	food	is	
hunger	 and	 the	 best	 flavouring	 for	 drink	 thirst.’	 See	 also,	 for	 example,	 Seneca,	Ep.	123.2,	 and	
Basil,	De	ieiunio	1	(PG	31,	176)	which	offers	many	interesting	parallels	to	the	present	discussion.	
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and	 is	 not	 extended	 to	 the	 point	 of	 satiety.	 The	 term	 ‘satiety’	 has	 already	
appeared	in	some	of	our	readings	as	the	opposite	of	healthy	enjoyment.	Next,	I	
will	 take	a	 look	at	 this	 term	and	 investigate	what	happens	 if	warnings	are	not	








a	pleasure	 seeker	will	never	 find	a	way	 to	 the	greater	 spiritual	 truths,	 so	also	
her	seemingly	limitless	enjoyment	will	be	revealed	sorely	lacking	compared	to	
the	 enjoyment	 provided	 by	 the	 divine	 goods.	 Regardless	 of	 how	 reckless	 and	
boundless	it	may	appear	in	the	moral	sense,	sensual	pleasure,	too,	is	bound	by	





Gregory's	 ethical	 thought	 and	 his	 understanding	 of	 the	 spiritual	 progress.660	
Broadly	speaking,	 ‘satiety’	denotes	the	point	at	which	desire	has	fully	obtained	
its	object	and	 the	pleasurable	sensation	 fades	away.	 In	other	words,	 it	 follows	
from	pleasure	seeking	taken	to	 its	very	extreme.	Since	pleasure	results	 from	a	
replenishment	of	a	 lack,	real	or	 imagined,	no	pleasure	can	occur	once	the	 lack	
has	been	remedied.	Thus,	in	the	spiritual	life	κόρος	refers	to	a	state	in	which	the	
soul	 is	 saturated	with	 earthly	 concerns	 to	 the	 point	 of	 having	 no	 capacity	 for	
spiritual	matters,	or	to	a	boredom	of	sorts	that	results	when	the	soul	 thinks	 it	
																																																								







I	 have	 already	 cited	Homily	4	on	the	Beatitudes	 in	which	Gregory	 defends	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 hunger	 based	 on	 the	 example	 of	 Christ.	 The	 general	 aim	 of	 the	
homily	 is	 to	 argue	 that	 a	 healthy	 appetite	 (ὄρεξις)	 is	 beneficial	 not	 only	






enjoy	 it	 (οὐκ	 ἀεὶ	 τὸ	 ἥδεσθαι	 πάρεστιν).	 For	 satiety	 (κόρος)	 stops	 the	 greed	 of	 the	
glutton,	 and	 the	 drinker’s	 pleasure	 (ἡ	 τοῦ	 πίνοντος	 ἡδονὴ)	 is	 quenched	 at	 the	 same	
time	as	his	thirst.	And	so	it	is	with	other	things.	They	all	require	some	time	to	rekindle	




aversion,	 even	 disgust.	 It	 is	 the	 point	 at	 which	 pleasure	 becomes	 dull	 or	
sickening	and	desire	dissipates.	But	why	do	we	reach	satiety	at	all?	Why	does	





(πρὸς	 τὸ	 παρὸν	 δελεάζῃ	 τὴν	 αἴσθησιν),	 gratify	 only	 for	 an	 instant	 (ἐν	 ἀκαρεῖ	 τὸ	
εὐφραῖνον	ἔχει);	for	there	is	no	bodily	activity	which	can	give	lasting	pleasure	(οὐ	γὰρ	
ἔστιν	 ἐπ’	 οὐδενὶ	 τῶν	 ἐν	 τῷ	 σώματι	 γινομένων	 διαρκῶς	 ἡσθῆναι).	 The	 pleasure	 of	
drinking	(ἡ	τοῦ	πίνειν	ἡδονὴ)	comes	to	an	end	in	satiety	(τῷ	κόρῳ),	and	likewise,	after	
eating	food,	fullness	quenches	the	appetite	(ἡ	πλησμονὴ	τὴν	ὄρεξιν	ἔσβεσε);	and	in	the	
same	 way	 every	 other	 desire	 fades	 in	 the	 participation	 of	 what	 is	 desired	 (τῇ	 τοῦ	
																																																								








body:	 no	bodily	 activity	 can	 give	 lasting	pleasure.	 This	 is	where	 the	notion	of	
diastema	 becomes	 indispensable	 for	 interpreting	 Gregory’s	 thought.	 As	 a	
material	 object,	 the	 body	 is	 limited	 both	 by	 its	 physical	 dimensions	 and	 its	





in	 the	body.	Suspended	 in	 time,	 the	human	body	operates	 in	a	cyclical	 fashion	
with	desires	arising,	withering,	and	then	requiring	‘some	time’	to	be	rekindled,	
as	 Gregory	 notes	 in	 Beat.	4.	 While	 overeating	 and	 drinking	 are	 the	 standard	




Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 satiety	 is	 thus	 implicitly	 underpinned	 by	 the	 notion	 of	
pleasure	as	a	replenishment:	pleasure	requires	a	deficit	and	once	the	deficit	 is	
filled,	no	pleasure	can	occur.	In	In	Ecclesiasten,	Gregory	compares	human	nature	
to	 the	 sea,	which	 does	 not	 grow	without	 limit	 despite	 the	 numerous	 streams	
that	 flow	 into	 it:	 ‘enjoyment	 cannot	 exceed	 the	 amount	 fixed	 by	 nature	 (τὸ	
μέτρον	τῆς	φύσεως),’	Gregory	asserts,	wondering	why	people	nonetheless	keep	
amassing	possessions.665	Our	bodily	nature	is	a	limited	receptacle	that	does	not	





664	‘En	effet,	pour	Grégoire,	 l’esprit	créé	est	toujours	enfermé	dans	des	 limites.	C’est	en	effet	 la	




However,	 also	 the	 Aristotelian	 notion	 of	 activity	 or	 activation	 can	 help	 us	
understand	why	pleasure	withers.	In	In	Ecclesiasten,	Gregory	compares	sensual	
pleasures	 to	 writing	 on	 water	 and	 children’s	 sand	 creations,	 both	 of	 which	
disappear	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 activity	 comes	 to	 an	 end.666	In	 the	 same	 way,	 the	
enjoyment	 of	 pleasure	 is	 contingent	 upon	 activity;	 once	 the	 activity	 ceases,	








For	Gregory,	 then,	 satiety	reveals	 the	 true	 face	of	bodily	pleasure.	Despite	our	
frantic	 pursuit	 of	 material	 goods,	 the	 pleasure	 they	 yield	 is	 always	 bound	 to	
dissipate	and	turn	into	frustration	because	our	bodily	nature	is	at	once	a	limited	
vessel	 and	a	 leaky	 jar.668	It	 can	only	 accommodate	 a	 certain	 amount	of	 goods;	
then	 it	 requires	 a	 period	 of	 rest	 during	 which	 the	 pleasure	 attained	 will	
disappear	without	leaving	a	trace.	Thus,	a	pleasure	seeker	finds	herself	trapped	





















is	need	fundamentally	different	 from	pleasure?	Does	 it	not,	 too,	arise	 from	the	
temporal	 changeable	 body	 that	 is	 liable	 to	 fluctuation	 and	 deficit?	 Before	 the	







telos	of	 the	 human	 life.	 I	 will	 show	 that	 what	 ultimately	 separates	 need	 and	
pleasure	 is	not	 their	outward	character;	both	are	tied	to	the	 impermanence	of	
the	 sensible	 nature,	 and	 consequently	 neither	 can	 substitute	 the	 true	 good,	
which	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 immutability	 of	 God.	 I	 will,	 instead,	 suggest	 that	 the	
fundamental	difference	between	need	and	pleasure	lies	in	the	different	attitudes	
they	foster	towards	the	material	creation:	For	a	pleasure-seeker,	the	cyclical	life	
of	 the	 body	 and	 the	 ever-changing	 material	 creation	 are	 matters	 of	 primary	
concern.	 But	 a	 person	who	 knows	 to	 limit	 her	 desires	 to	 need	will	 attend	 to	
them	 simply	 as	 a	 subordinate	 goal.	 This	 requires	 knowledge	 of	 the	 transitory	
nature	of	the	sensible	creation	and	a	solid	practice	of	the	virtue	of	temperance.	
	
Let	 us	 first	 see	what	Gregory	has	 to	 say	 about	 the	 relationship	between	need	
and	the	good.	In	De	mortuis	non	esse	dolendum,	Gregory	investigates	the	nature	
of	 the	good	 to	 convince	his	 audience	 that	physical	death	does	not	 lead	 to	 any	
deprivation	of	goodness.	Using	the	standard	turn	of	phrase,	he	defines	the	good	




670	Mort.	(GNO	 IX/1,	 30).	 See	 also,	 for	 example,	Eccl.	 2.8	 (SC	 416,	 180–182);	Op.	hom.	 (PG	 44,	
184C).	
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cannot	 be	 the	 true	 good.	 Then	 Gregory	 asks	whether	 the	 physical	 life	 can	 be	
called	good	on	 these	 conditions.	 ‘The	 life	of	our	body	consists	 at	once	of	both	
filling	and	emptying’,	he	notes.	As	we	have	already	seen,	the	cycle	of	filling	and	
emptying	is	a	common	image	that	Gregory	uses	to	discuss	the	bodily	life.	In	De	
mortuis	he	notes	that	 the	body	takes	 in	 food	and	drink;	 it	 inhales	and	exhales,	
sleeps	and	wakes.	Since	the	actual	good	is	unmixed	and	unchangeable,	it	follows	




the	 case	 since	 both	 are	 needed	 to	 sustain	 the	 bodily	 life.	 Based	 on	 this	 logic,	





on	 its	 relation	(πρός	τι),	 timing	(ποτε),	quantity	 (ποσόν),	and	quality	 (ποιόν),’	
Gregory	concludes.671	
	
Gregory	 is	 driving	 towards	 the	 conclusion	 that	we	 should	not	 fear	 the	 loss	 of	
physical	life,	but	realise	that	it	frees	us	from	the	pressure	of	opposing	activities	
and	brings	us	closer	to	the	good.	But	what	is	of	particular	interest	to	the	present	








We	 can	 thus	 suggest	 that	 needs-satisfaction	 is	 a	 legitimate	 goal	 and	 an	





in	 the	 good	 life;	 virtue	 alone	 suffices,	 and	 the	 good	 or	 the	 bad	 life	 are	 both	
attainable	regardless	of	external	conditions.672	Elsewhere	Gregory	explains	that	
securing	‘necessities’	ensures	a	sufficient	level	of	physical	well-being,	so	that	the	
person	 can	 give	most	 of	 his	 attention	 to	 the	 care	 of	 the	 soul.673	The	 ultimate	
purpose	of	human	life	is	to	grow	in	virtue	to	restore	the	divine	likeness.	This	is	
primarily	 an	 inner	 intellectual	 process,	 one	 of	 learning	 to	 make	 correct	





even	clearer	 that	 the	role	of	need	must	be	secondary.	At	 the	beginning	of	 this	
chapter	I	noted	that	while	Gregory	regards	need	as	a	legitimate	part	of	human	
existence,	he	also	considers	 it	a	vulnerability	and	a	passion.	God,	on	 the	other	
hand,	 is	 completely	 self-sufficient	 and	 free	 of	 all	 passion	 and	 lack.	 Thus	









Fortunately,	 we	 do	 not	 have	 to	 content	 ourselves	 with	 mere	 inferred	










lies	beyond	us	and	 is	apprehended	by	hope	belongs	to	 the	soul.	Yet	men	 in	their	 folly	
are	quite	wrong	about	the	use	of	either;	they	would	extend	their	physical	lives	by	hope,	
and	 draw	 the	 life	 of	 the	 soul	 towards	 enjoyment	 of	 the	 present	 (πρὸς	 τὴν	 τῶν	
παρόντων	ἀπόλαυσιν).	[--]	Let	us	therefore	learn	from	the	counsel	under	consideration	
what	 one	 must	 ask	 for	 today,	 and	 what	 for	 later.	 Bread	 is	 for	 our	 need	 today	 (τῆς	
σημερινῆς	 χρείας);	 the	 Kingdom	 belongs	 to	 the	 beatitude	 for	 which	 we	 hope	 (τῆς	
ἐλπιζομένης	 μακαριότητος)	 (Ὁ	 ἄρτος	 τῆς	 σημερινῆς	 χρείας	 ἐστίν,	 ἡ	 βασιλεία	 τῆς	
ἐλπιζομένης	 μακαριότητος).	 By	 bread	 He	means	 all	 our	 bodily	 requirements	 (πᾶσαν	
τὴν	σωματικὴν	περιλαμβάνει	χρείαν).	If	we	ask	for	this,	the	man	who	prays	will	clearly	
understand	 (δῆλον	 ἔσται	 τῇ	 διανοίᾳ)	 that	 he	 is	 asking	 for	 something	 transitory	
(ἐφήμερόν);	 but	 if	 we	 ask	 for	 something	 of	 the	 good	 things	 of	 the	 soul	 (τι	 τῶν	 τῆς	
ψυχῆς	ἀγαθῶν)	 it	will	be	clear	 that	 the	petition	concerns	 the	everlasting	realities,	 for	
which	He	commands	us	to	be	most	concerned	in	our	prayers.	Thus	the	first	necessity	is	
put	 in	 its	 right	 place	 by	 the	 greater	 one	 (ὡς	 τῷ	 μείζονι	 καὶ	 τῆς	 πρώτης	
συγκατορθουμένης	χρείας).675	
	
The	 text	 leaves	 no	 doubt	 that	 both	 pleasure	 and	 need	 are	 phenomena	 of	 the	




implication	 that	 the	 individual	grasps	 the	 transitory	character	of	his	need	and	
does	 not	 even	 attempt	 to	 search	 final	 satisfaction	 from	 limited	 bodily	 things;	






does	 not	 merit	 praise	 or	 rebuke;	 what	 counts	 is	 the	 individual’s	 inner	









virtue	 is	 commonly	 depicted	 as	 an	 antidote	 to	 sensual	 pleasure.678	Gregory	
defines	σωφροσύνη	as	the	 ‘well-ordered	management	of	all	movements	of	 the	
soul	 with	 wisdom	 and	 good	 sense’	 (ἡ	 πάντων	 τῶν	 ψυχικῶν	 κινημάτων	 μετὰ	
σοφίας	καὶ	φρονήσεως	εὔτακτος	οἰκονομία).679	Further	in	the	same	chapter,	he	
argues	 that	 ‘true	 temperance’	 helps	 people	 to	 choose	 ‘that	which	 is	 pure	 and	
beneficial’	(τὸ	καθαρόν	τε	καὶ	ὠφέλιμον)	among	all	pursuits	and	reject	all	that	
is	useless	(τὸ	ἄχρηστον).680	Although	here	Gregory’s	main	focus	is	on	the	utility	
of	 immaterial	 things,	 another	 passage	 in	 the	 same	 work	 confirms	 that	
temperance	 serves	 to	 distinguish	 the	 useful	 from	 the	 superfluous	 also	 on	 a	
physical	level.	In	fact,	it	is	the	very	virtue	that	helps	people	heed	the	boundary	
between	 need	 and	 pleasure.	 In	 Virg.	 21,	 Gregory	 discusses	 the	 dangers	 of	
pleasure	and	then	suggests	temperance	as	a	remedy.	The	passage	below	comes	
right	 after	 he	 has	 laid	 down	 the	 principle	 that	 need,	 not	 pleasure,	 must	
determine	the	limit	of	enjoyment681:	
	
We	 see	 farmers	 skilfully	 separating	 (διακρίνοντας)	 the	 chaff	 from	 the	wheat,	 so	 that	
each	of	them	is	put	aside	for	a	special	use,	the	one	for	the	use	of	human	beings	and	the	
other	 for	 fuel	 or	 the	 nourishing	 of	 irrational	 animals	 (τῶν	 ἀλόγων).	 Therefore,	 the	
cultivator	of	 temperance	(τῆς	σωφροσύνης)	distinguishes	 the	need	 from	the	pleasure	
(διακρίνων	τῆς	ἡδονῆς	τὴν	χρείαν)	like	the	wheat	from	the	chaff:	the	one	he	will	throw	
aside	 for	 the	 less	 intelligent	 (τοῖς	 ἀλογωτέροις),	 ‘whose	 end	 is	 to	 be	 burnt,’	 as	 the	
																																																								





















is	 discerned	 as	 a	 suitable	 goal,	 pleasure	 is	 left	 to	 the	 ‘irrational’,	 which	 here	
denotes	 both	 animals	 and	 the	 people	 who	 by	 implication	 resemble	 them.	 By	
helping	 people	 separate	 need	 from	 pleasure,	 the	 virtue	 of	 temperance	 also	
establishes	 the	 right	 attitude	 towards	 the	 transient	 and	 cyclical	 bodiliness	 of	








adopting	 need	 as	 an	 ethical	 principle,	 Gregory	 follows	 the	 mainstream	 of	
Graeco-Roman	ethics	and	retains	the	key	principles	of	ancient	needs-discourse:	
need	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 limited	 desire	 and	 a	 product	 of	 nature.	 In	 his	works,	
these	principles	are	often	evoked	in	a	distinctively	Christian	context.	Thus,	the	
topic	of	need	 is	brought	 into	conversation	with	biblical	exegesis	and	doctrinal	














Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 need	 and	 pleasure	 brings	 to	 the	 fore	 the	 ontological	
underpinnings	of	his	 ethical	 thought.	For	Gregory,	 ‘nature’	which	gives	 rise	 to	
needs	is	markedly	the	bodily	nature,	in	other	words	the	sensible	creation,	which	
is	 radically	 different	 from	 the	 immaterial	 and	 immutable	 God.	 The	 cyclical	
processes	of	 the	bodily	nature	do	not	offer	a	 reliable	ground	 for	 the	Christian	
life.	Not	only	do	they	differ	from	the	immutable	God	himself,	but	also	from	the	
life	 of	 virtue,	 which	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 a	 never-ending	 linear	 progression	
towards	 the	 good.684	However,	 we	 should	 avoid	 Daniélou’s	 suggestion,	 which	





In	 Gregory’s	 thought,	 the	 Graeco-Roman	 notion	 of	 need	 as	 limited	 desire	
acquires	 a	 further	 significance:	 It	 is	 not	 immoral	 to	 be	 greedy	 only	 because	
greed	 leads	 to	 licentious	 behaviour	 and	 deprives	 other	 people	 from	material	
goods.	 But	 on	 a	 deeper,	 ontological	 level,	 the	 attempt	 to	 find	 unlimited	
satisfaction	 from	 limited	 objects	 is	 a	 denial	 of	 their	 very	 being.	 Thus,	 need	
serves	 as	 a	 corrective,	 entailing	 a	 rational	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	
boundedness	 of	 the	 creation.	 Here,	 virtue	 does	 not	 lie	 simply	 in	 needs-
satisfaction	 itself,	 but	 in	 the	 conscious	and	 reasoned	act	 of	 needs-satisfaction,	
guided	by	the	virtue	of	temperance.	Even	if	a	sinner	does	not	acknowledge	the	
limitedness	of	creation,	a	frenetic	pursuit	of	created	pleasure	can	never	lead	to	
permanent	 satisfaction	 due	 to	 the	 diastemic	 character	 of	 created	 beings.	 All	
desire	 directed	 at	 creaturely	 objects	 will	 eventually	 wither,	 and	 all	 pleasure	
experienced	in	and	through	the	body	will	fade	in	satiety.	
	
It	 is	 thus	 vital	 to	 understand	 that	 while	 needs-satisfaction	 is	 preferable	 to	






pleasure,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 a	 mere	 reflection	 of	 a	 higher,	 spiritual	
desiring.686	In	the	earthly	realm,	desire	must	be	kept	within	the	bounds	of	need;	
its	 primary	 object	 lies	 in	 spiritual	 things,	most	 importantly	 the	 attainment	 of	
virtue.	 As	 long	 as	 people	 live	 in	 the	 material	 world,	 these	 two	 aspects	 are	
allowed	 to	 coexist.	 There	 is	 no	 requirement	 to	 sublimate	 the	 natural	 physical	
hunger	 to	 a	 mere	 spiritual	 desire,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	 latter	 is	












After	 illustrating	 how	 pleasure	 leads	 people	 to	 judge	 the	 good	 solely	 on	 the	
basis	 of	 bodily	 sensation,	 I	want	 to	make	 a	 final	 point	 to	 show	 that	Gregory’s	
argument	works	also	in	the	reverse:	something	that	is	perceived	as	unpleasant	
and	 painful	 can,	 in	 fact,	 reveal	 its	 goodness	 on	 a	 closer	 inspection.	 Beneficial	
pain	is	a	vast	and	complex	topic	in	ascetic	literature,	and	here	I	can	only	address	
it	 briefly.	 However,	 the	 idea	 is	 part	 and	 parcel	 with	 Gregory’s	 rejection	 of	
pleasure	 as	 the	 good	 and	 thus	 merits	 some	 attention.	 I	 will	 begin	 from	 a	
doctrinal	reflection	in	Oratio	catechetica,	and	then	show	that	the	statement	that	
pain	 is	not	evil	has	major	 implications	 for	 the	ascetical	 life:	 in	Gregory’s	view,	
pain	 can	 be	 beneficial	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 virtue.	 My	 focus	 will	 be	 on	 three	
kinds	 of	 pain:	 first,	 the	 sensation	 of	 physical	 pain	 (derivatives	 of	 ἄλγος,	
sometimes	πόνος,	and	rarely	λύπη);	second,	the	quasi-athletic	toil	required	for	
the	 development	 of	 virtue	 (πόνος);	 and	 finally,	 the	 spiritual	 equivalent	 of	
distress	 (λύπη).	 In	 all	 three	 categories,	 knowledge	 of	 the	 true	 good	 will	
determine	the	right	direction	of	our	emotions:	pain	felt	in	relation	to	the	good	–	




The	 notion	 that	 pain	 is	 not	 evil	 occurs	 as	 a	 general	 ethical	 and	 doctrinal	
statement	 in	 Oratio	 catechetica	 where	 Gregory	 argues	 that	 the	 labelling	 of	
pleasure	as	good	and	pain	as	evil	can	lead	to	unsound	conceptions	of	God.	I	have	
already	cited	the	long	discussion	on	the	nature	of	good	and	the	origin	of	evil	that	
appears	 in	 this	 treatise.	 In	 the	 same	 context,	 Gregory	 also	 warns	 that	 when	
people	who	‘in	their	definition	of	good	(ἀγαθόν)…	look	to	the	pleasure	of	bodily	
enjoyment	(τὸ	ἡδὺ	τῆς	σωματικῆς	ἀπολαύσεως)’	observe	the	painful	sensation	








bodily	 pains	 (σωματικὰς	 ἀλγηδόνας)	 which	 of	 necessity	 result	 from	 the	 unstable	
character	of	man’s	nature	or	to	imagine	that	He	is	in	no	way	the	creator	of	man,	so	as	to	
avoid	 conceiving	 of	 Him	 as	 the	 author	 of	 those	 experiences	which	 give	 us	 pain	 (τῶν	
ἀλγυνόντω),	 is	 a	 proof	 of	 the	 extreme	 short-sightedness	 (μικροψυχίας)	 of	 those	who	
distinguish	 good	 and	 evil	 by	 the	 senses	 (τῇ	 αἰσθήσει	 τὸ	 καλὸν	 καὶ	 τὸ	 κακὸν	
διακρινόντων),	 and	 do	 not	 know	 that	 that	 alone	 is	 in	 its	 own	nature	 good	 (τῇ	φύσει	
μόνον	ἐστὶν	ἀγαθὸν),	which	is	not	embraced	by	sense-perception	(αἴσθησις),	and	that	
that	alone	 is	evil	which	consists	of	 the	alienation	 from	the	 true	good	(ἡ	τοῦ	ἀληθινοῦ	
ἀγαθοῦ	 ἀλλοτρίωσις).	 To	 judge	 good	 and	 its	 opposite	 (τὸ	 καλὸν	 καὶ	 τὸ	 μὴ	 καλὸν	
κρίνειν)	based	on	pains	and	pleasures	(πόνοις	δὲ	καὶ	ἡδοναῖς)	is	a	characteristic	of	the	
























the	 eudaimonistic	 framework	as	proclamations	 about	 the	nature	of	happiness	
or	blessedness	 (μακαριότης).	Thus,	 the	purpose	of	Homily	8	 is	 to	explain	how	
happiness	 and	 goodness	 can	 be	 hidden	 within	 the	 outwardly	 painful	 acts	 of	
persecution. 690 	In	 Beat.	 8,	 Gregory	 defines	 persecution	 both	 as	 actual	
martyrdom	and	as	ascetic	struggle	against	the	evil.	While	in	the	case	of	martyrs	
the	happiness	that	follows	pain	awaits	in	the	life	to	come,	for	other	exemplary	




[T]he	 fact	 that	 the	persecution	 the	 tyrants	 inflict	on	 the	 faithful	brings	much	sensible	
pain	(κατὰ	τὴν	αἴσθησιν	τὸ	ἀλγεινὸν),	makes	it	difficult	 for	the	more	carnally-minded	
to	accept	the	hope	of	 the	Kingdom	that	 is	 to	be	realized	through	these	pains	(διὰ	τῶν	
ἀλγεινῶν).	 But	 the	 Lord,	 who	 looks	 down	 upon	 the	 infirmity	 of	 our	 nature,	 tells	 the	
weak	beforehand	what	is	to	be	the	goal	of	the	struggle	(τῆς	ἀγωνίας	τὸ	πέρας),	so	that	






stoned	 from	all	 sides’,	 as	 ‘his	body	eagerly	 receives	 the	showers	of	 fast-falling	
stones	 like	 a	 pleasant	 dew	 (δρόσον	 ἡδεῖαν).’	 Typically	 of	 ancient	 accounts	 of	
martyrdom	and	asceticism,	Gregory	depicts	Stephen	as	an	athlete	engaging	in	a	
contest	 under	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 divine	 Judge.693	In	 his	 outward	 struggles	
Stephen	is	consoled	by	the	hope	embedded	in	the	Beatitude	and	a	vision	of	the	
Divine.	We	 should	 note	 how	 here,	 too,	 hope,	 a	 positive	 anticipation	 of	 future	
																																																								
690	In	his	 exposition	of	Beat.	8,	Wilken	notes	 that	 the	beatitude	presents	 a	 particular	 problem	
since	in	the	Greek	moral	tradition	the	good	life	could	not	be	divorced	from	faring	well.	This	 is	
true,	 of	 course,	 of	 Aristotle,	 whom	Wilken	 goes	 on	 to	 cite.	 See	Wilken,	 ‘Gregory	 of	 Nyssa,	 De	
Beatitudinibus,	Oratio	VIII:	 “Blessed	Are	Those	Who	Are	 Persecuted	 For	Righteousness’	 Sake,	
for	Theirs	Is	the	Kingdom	of	Heaven”	(Mt	5,10)’,	253.	However,	by	focussing	solely	on	Aristotle,	
Wilken	creates	all	 too	wide	a	gap	between	Gregory	and	 the	Greek	 tradition.	 In	 fact,	Gregory’s	
notion	of	 the	 ‘athletic’	 endurance	of	 the	persecuted	bears	many	 similarities	 to	 the	Cynic-Stoic	






invisible	 things,	 is	 cited	 as	 the	 opposite	 of	 instant	 sensory	 evaluation	 of	 the	
present	 situation.694	For	 Gregory,	 the	 account	 of	 Stephen’s	 martyrdom	 shows	
that	 pain	 is	 not	 only	 to	 be	 endured,	 but	 to	 the	 rightly	 disposed	 it	 will	 be	
transformed	 into	 –	 or	 at	 least	 accompanied	 by	 –	 a	 higher	 pleasure	 which	
anticipates	the	future	joy.	I	will	investigate	this	affective	transformation	further	













φαινόμενον	ἀγαθόν)	 to	 the	visible	pleasant	 things	of	 this	 life	 (κατὰ	τὴν	 ζωὴν	ταύτην	
ἡδέων	τὸ…	τῶν	φαινομένων),	so	as	easily	to	choose	things	like	being	driven	from	one’s	
home	or	 separated	 from	wife	 and	 children,	 brothers,	 parents	 and	 friends,	 and	 all	 the	
pleasant	 things	 of	 life	 (πάντων	 τῶν	 κατὰ	 τὸν	 βίον	 ἡδέων),	 unless	 the	 Lord	 Himself	
helps	him	to	attain	to	this	Good	(πρὸς	τὸ	ἀγαθόν),	because	he	has	been	called	according	
to	His	purpose	…	Now	 the	 soul	 is	 in	 some	way	attached	 to	 the	pleasant	 things	of	 life	
(πρὸς	 τὰ	 ἡδέα	 τοῦ	 βίου)	 through	 the	 senses	 of	 the	 body	 (διὰ	 τῶν	 σωματικῶν	
αἰσθήσεων).	 Through	 the	 eyes	 it	 delights	 in	 material	 beauty	 (τῇ	 εὐχροίᾳ	 τῆς	 ὕλης),	






694	Beat.	 8	 (GNO	 VII/2,	 165–166);	 trans.	 Graef,	 170.	 Similar	 ideas	 regarding	 the	 virtuous	













thesis	 I	 will	 show	 that	 the	 reevaluation	 and	 reorientation	 of	 both	 pain	 and	
pleasure	begins	as	a	mere	intellectual	acceptance	of	facts,	which	only	gradually	




is	 good,	 but	 simply	 that	 it	 can	 and	 should	 be	 tolerated	 for	 the	 attainment	 of	
good.	The	blessing	of	the	beatitude	is,	then,	that	it	helps	one	to	achieve	‘so	great	
a	good	by	means	of	apparent	suffering.’699	Pain	assists	in	the	actualisation	of	the	
higher	 good	 particularly	 so	 far	 as	 it	 acts	 as	 an	 antidote	 against	 pleasure.	
Pleasure	made	 the	 entrance	 for	 sin,	 but	 its	 opposite	will	 drive	 sin	 away	 since	



















intended	 as	 spiritual	 instruction	 for	 a	 wider	 audience,	 not	 simply	 as	 an	
exhortation	to	martyrdom.	Gregory’s	other	works	provide	further	perspectives	
on	 the	 pains	 of	 the	 ascetic	 struggle.	 In	 In	 inscriptiones	 psalmorum,	we	 find	
precisely	 the	 same	 framework	 of	 athleticism,	 contest,	 and	 training,	 with	 the	
hope	of	 future	victory	which	 is	not	present	 to	 the	 senses.	But	here	Gregory	 is	
referencing	the	ascetic	life	rather	than	the	pains	of	martyrdom.	He	presents	life	
as	 a	 stadium	 where	 ‘evil	 contends	 against	 the	 wrestlers	 with	 all	 sorts	 of	
deceitful	 tricks.’	 Thus,	 Word,	 ‘the	 good	 trainer	 of	 souls’	 encourages	 the	
contestants	to	look	at	the	end	(εἰς	τὸ	τέλος	βλέποντες)	–	victory	–	to	help	them	
‘lighten	 the	 labour	 (πόνον)	 in	 the	 contests	 by	 the	 hope	 (ἐλπίδι)	 of	 attaining	
crowns.’	 Gregory	 argues	 that	 passions	 (πάθη)	 result	 from	 the	 attacks	 of	 evil,	
which	 can	 only	 be	 resisted	 through	 careful	 preparation	 by	 exercise	 (διὰ	
μελέτης).702	In	other	words,	steadfast	endurance	of	pain	in	the	struggle	against	
the	evil	 is	a	prerequisite	 for	attaining	apatheia	and,	 finally,	 the	rewards	of	 the	





The	 concept	 of	 toil	 or	 effort	 (πόνος)	 required	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 virtue,	 is	
common	 in	 Cynic	 and	 Stoic	 ascetic	 literature,	 and	 it	 is	 also	 a	 favourite	 of	










Congr.	164–167,	 and	174	 for	 οἱ	πολλοί	who	 lack	wisdom	and	 fail	 to	 recognise	 the	blessing	 in	
suffering;	Leg.	3,	135–137;	Sacr.	39–42.	
705	Clement’s	account	of	the	life	of	the	gnostic	bears	many	similarities	to	Gregory’s	depiction	of	
toil.	For	Clement,	the	gnostic	 is	the	 ‘true	athlete’	who	engages	in	a	contest	arranged	by	God,	 is	
crowned	 for	 victory	 over	 the	 passions,	 and	 obtains	 the	 prize	 of	 immortality	 (Strom.	7.3.17.5–




thinkers,	 πόνος	 has	 a	 noble	 character	 and	 resembles	 the	 pains	 of	 athletic	
practice.706	Thus	 it	 fits	 seamlessly	 in	 the	 semantic	 field	 of	 asceticism,	 which	




arise	 from	 the	 sensible	world	 and	 the	 endurance	 of	 difficult	 circumstances.	 It	
can	 also	 denote	 the	 strenuous	 intellectual	 activity	 which	 is	 required	 for	 the	
formation	of	 knowledge.	This	 aspect	 is	 highlighted	 in	Homily	2	on	Ecclesiastes	
where	Gregory	comments	on	Eccl.	1:18708	and	argues	for	the	necessity	of	effort	
(πόνος)	 in	obtaining	wisdom	and	knowledge.709	This	 is	not	how	most	modern	
people	would	 interpret	 the	Ecclesiastic	 idea	 that	knowledge	 increases	sorrow.	
For	us,	 the	crux	 is	not	on	 the	pains	of	attaining	knowledge,	but	on	 the	way	 in	
which	knowledge	reveals	the	sad	state	of	ourselves	and	the	world	in	which	we	




The	 wholesome	 pain	 of	 πόνος	 should	 be	 conceptually	 separated	 from	 the	






706	For	 illuminating	 non-Christian	 parallels,	 see,	 for	 example,	 Cicero,	 Tusc.	 2,	 and	 Seneca,	 De	
providentia.	Cicero	 treats	 the	 topic	at	 length	and	offers	a	critique	of	 the	Epicurean	notion	 that	
pain	 is	 evil.	 Seneca	 explains	 why	 good	 men	 have	 to	 endure	 adversities,	 arguing	 that	 even	
difficult	circumstances	are	ultimately	providential	because	they	can	be	made	into	instruments	of	
virtue.	Both	works	 espouse	 the	 ideals	 of	manliness,	 athleticism,	 and	military	 life,	 and	provide	
examples	of	physical	and	mental	toil.	
707	In	 Latin	 usage,	 there	 is	 a	 clearer	 distinction	 between	 labor	 (toil)	 and	 dolor	 (pain).	 Cicero	
explains	 the	 difference	 in	 Tusc.	 2.15	 (LCL	 141,	 182;	 trans.	 King):	 ‘There	 is	 some	 difference	
between	toil	and	pain;	they	are	certainly	closely	related,	but	there	is	a	difference:	toil	is	a	mental	
or	 physical	 execution	of	work	or	 duty	 of	more	 than	usual	 severity;	 pain	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 is	















positive	 equivalent	of	 λύπη	exists;	 he	does	 after	 all	 argue	 consistently	 that	 all	
things	 created	 by	 God	 –	 including	 human	 impulses	 –	 are	 good	 if	 used	
correctly.712	Since	this	is	true	of	ἐπιθυμία,	it	is	also	true	of	all	passions	that	are	
related	 to	desiring.	But	what	makes	Gregory’s	view	particularly	striking	 is	 the	
fact	 that	 the	 Stoic	 system	 of	 bad	 and	 good	 emotions	 –	 widespread	 in	 late	
antiquity	–	regards	λύπη	as	the	only	one	of	the	four	generic	passions	that	does	
not	have	a	positive	equivalent.713	The	rationale	behind	the	Stoic	lack	of	positive	
distress	 is	 that	 there	 is	no	room	for	any	aversion	or	perceived	present	 lack	 in	




et	 resurrectione,	 in	 which	 Macrina	 ‘brings	 the	 pain	 of	 human	 loss	 within	 the	
pedagogy	of	the	spirit.’	On	Williams’s	interpretation,	the	positive	role	of	λύπη	of	
bereavement	is	to	teach	us	otherwise	inaccessible	truths	about	the	nature	of	the	
soul.715	He	 argues	 that	 grief	 highlights	 our	 fixation	 on	 other	 human	beings	 by	
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cited	 as	 the	 fruit	 of	 ‘godly	 grief’	 (κατὰ	 θεὸν	 λύπη).719	Philo	 offers	 another	
parallel	 which	 also	 centres	 on	 repentance.720 	Since	 Smith	 treats	 Gregory’s	
understanding	 of	 spiritual	 λύπη	 in	 his	 article	Macrina,	 Tamer	 of	 Horses,	 it	 is	
sufficient	to	draw	attention	to	a	few	central	points.721	
	
Similarly	 to	 πόνος,	 an	 orientation	 towards	 the	 good	 gives	 λύπη	 a	 spiritual	
legitimacy.	Whereas	 the	 earthly	 λύπη	 is	 caused	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 some	perceived	
good,	its	spiritual	counterpart	signals	the	lack	of	the	true	good.	As	Smith	rightly	













Stoic	 theory	 of	 emotions	 and	 the	 biblical	 references	 to	 Jesus’	 grief	 is	 the	 topic	 of	 Gitte	 Buch-
Hansen,	 ‘The	 Emotional	 Jesus:	 Anti-Stoicism	 in	 the	 Fourth	 Gospel?’,	 in	 Stoicism	 in	 Early	




Medieval	 Philosophy,	 124–25.	 For	 an	 exploration	 of	 spiritual	 grief	 in	 Syriac	 and	 Byzantine	




not	 being	 able	 to	 enjoy	 that	 which	 one	 rightly	 and	 genuinely	 desires.’722	The	
emotion	is	best	described	in	Homily	3	on	the	Beatitudes	on	the	verse	‘Blessed	are	
those	who	mourn,	for	they	will	be	comforted’	(Matt.	5:4).	Gregory	explains	that	
the	 verse	 speaks	 of	 no	 ordinary	 mourning,	 quoting	 again	 Paul	 who	 makes	 a	
distinction	between	the	sorrow	of	the	world	and	that	brought	about	by	God	(2	
Cor.	7:10).	The	latter,	which	produces	repentance,	occurs	as	the	‘soul	bewails	its	
wicked	 life	 because	 it	 feels	 its	 bad	 effects’	 in	 light	 of	 the	upcoming	 Judgment.	
Like	 πόνος,	 this	 sorrowful	 realisation	 acts	 as	 a	 ‘pungent	 medicine’	 against	
pleasures	of	sense.723		
	
But,	 Gregory	 emphasises,	 mourning	 for	 sin	 is	 not	 the	 whole	 meaning	 of	 the	
blessed	distress.	For	him,	this	must	be	the	case	since	even	exemplary	believers,	
whom	he	considers	sinless,	can	be	called	blessed	on	account	of	their	mourning.	
Therefore	 Gregory	 suggests	 that	 we	 must	 look	 for	 another,	 more	 profound	
definition.724	First,	he	reminds	his	reader	of	the	general	definition	of	mourning	
as	a	‘sorrowful	disposition	of	the	soul	which	arises	from	being	deprived	of	some	
of	 the	 things	 that	 one	 desires	 (σκυθρωπὴ	 διάθεσις	 τῆς	 ψυχῆς,	 ἐπὶ	 στερήσει	
τινὸς	τῶν	καταθυμίων725	συνισταμέν),	a	sorrow	which	finds	not	place	in	people	












725	Gregory	employs	again	 the	word	καταθύμιος	 (lit.	 ‘something	 that	 is	on	one’s	mind’)	which	








grieve	 over	 what	 we	 are	 missing. 728 	These	 comments	 point	 again	 to	 the	
necessity	 of	 knowledge	 in	 inciting	 and	 directing	 desire	 and	 the	 subsequent	





For	 he	will	 consider	 that	 the	 present	 life	 is	 spent	 in	mourning	 (πένθος	 ποιούμενος),	
because	it	is	removed	from	this	true	good	(τῷ	ἀγαθῷ).	Therefore	I	would	say	that	the	






its	 blessedness	 is	 contingent	 upon	 the	 good	 towards	 which	 it	 leads	 the	 soul.	
Knowing	the	good	does	not,	of	course,	entail	that	we	know	what	it	is	in	its	very	
essence.	 The	 mere	 awe	 of	 its	 great	 imperceptibility	 and	 incomprehensibility,	
combined	with	an	awareness	that	we	once	were	able	to	share	in	all	goods	found	






























of	 the	 human	 existence,	 Gregory	 argues	 that	 ‘we	 should	 think	 it	 blessed	 to	
reserve	our	share	of	joy	for	the	truly	good	things	in	eternal	life,	and	to	fulfil	the	
duty	of	sorrow	in	 this	short	and	transitory	 life.’732	To	partake	 in	 the	 joy	of	 the	
life	to	come,	we	must	tolerate	its	opposite	in	this	life.	This	applies	to	both	grief	
and	 physical	 pain.733	And	 conversely,	 since	 delight	 in	 the	 sensible	 things	 is	 a	
sign	that	one’s	life	is	headed	in	the	direction	of	the	evil,	no	joy	in	the	good	will	




To	 sum	up	our	 findings,	Gregory	defends	a	view	 that	 a	knowledge	of	 the	 true	
good	will	help	people	to	re-evaluate	the	notion	that	pain	is	evil.	In	fact,	both	the	
pleasures	and	the	pains	of	this	life	appear	relatively	minor	when	seen	from	an	
eschatological	 perspective.	 Furthermore,	 both	 reveal	 themselves	 to	 be	
something	 else	 than	 conventionally	 expected:	 pleasure	 becomes	 tainted	 with	
pain,	 whereas	 pain	 becomes	 an	 instrument	 for	 the	 good.	 For	 this	 reason,	
																																																								
731	Beat.	3	 (GNO	 VII/2,	 104;	 trans.	 Graef,	 107.	 The	 right	 moments	 for	 joy	 and	 grief	 are	 also	
extensively	 discussed	 in	 Eccl.	 6.9–10	 (SC	 416,	 330–336)	 with	 similar	 conclusions.	 For	 the	









does.735	Thus,	 the	 basis	 of	 one’s	 judgment	 must	 be	 the	 future	 end,	 not	 the	
present	situation	available	to	the	senses:	
	
The	means	 of	 judging	 these	matters	 is	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 ends,	 not	 on	 the	 basis	 of	




παρὸν),	 and	 has	 passed	 over	 in	 his	 soul	 everything	 which	 appears	 to	 the	 senses	





Furthermore,	 the	 rejection	 of	 pain	 as	 evil	 enables	 Gregory	 to	 strengthen	 the	
argument	that	virtue	alone	suffices	for	human	happiness.	The	prosperity	of	the	
evildoers	 is	 not	 a	 sign	 that	 they	 have	 chosen	 a	 better	 lot	 than	 the	 righteous	
person	who	fares	badly	in	this	life.	 ‘[G]ood	fortune	in	this	life…	does	not	occur	
for	 people	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 worth	 of	 their	 choices,’	 Gregory	 states	 with	 no	
hesitation.	 For	 him,	 only	 virtue	merits	 praise,	 whereas	 vice	 is	 to	 be	 despised	
regardless	 of	 the	 enjoyment	 it	 yields.737 	Thus,	 Gregory	 can	 conclude	 that	
material	 rewards	 are	 not	 God’s	 gift	 to	 those	who	 lead	 a	 godly	 life,	 neither	 do	













Various	 passages	 in	 the	 course	 of	 this	 thesis	 have	 already	 alluded	 to	 the	
possibility	of	spiritual	pleasure.	We	have	seen	how	Gregory	appeals	to	the	hope	
of	 future	 enjoyment	 in	 the	 eschaton	 to	 change	 his	 audience’s	 perspective	 on	
earthly	 pleasures	 and	 motivate	 them	 to	 renounce	 a	 comfortable,	 pleasure-




The	 fact	 that	pleasure	 can	be	both	 sinful	 and	virtuous	 should	not	 surprise	us.	





flesh	 is	 bound	 up	 with	 sensual	 pleasure,	 whereas	 the	 life	 of	 virtue	 yields	 an	
intellectual	 joy,	 which	 is	 able	 to	 transcend	 one’s	 present	 circumstances.	
Furthermore,	 particularly	Homilies	 on	 the	Song	of	 Songs	 show	with	 numerous	
examples	 that	delight	and	enjoyment	 figure	prominently	 in	Gregory's	spiritual	
vision.	 It	 is	 a	 work	 in	 which	 the	 passion	 of	 erotic	 love,	 ‘the	 most	 intense	 of	
pleasurable	activities’	(τὸ	σφοδρότατον	τῶν	καθ᾽ἡδονὴν	ἐνεργουμένων),	‘is	set	
as	 a	 figure	 at	 the	 very	 fore	 of	 the	 guidance	 that	 the	 teachings	 give.’739	Such	 a	
focus	inevitably	leads	to	situations	in	which	Gregory	must	clarify	the	dangers	of	
reading	 the	Song	 as	an	exaltation	of	corporeal	pleasure	and,	at	 the	same	time,	
explain	 in	 what	 way	 sensual	 pleasure	 can	 serve	 as	 an	 image	 of	 the	 soul’s	






The	 scope	 of	 this	 part	 is	 twofold:	My	main	 aim	 is	 to	 investigate	 how	Gregory	
envisions	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 spiritual	 pleasure740	at	 different	 stages	 of	 the	
spiritual	 progress	 and	 offer	 some	 remarks	 on	 how	 his	 view	 fits	 within	 the	
ancient	discourse	on	intellectual	pleasures.	I	will	particularly	draw	attention	to	
certain	problems	 later	Platonist	 thinkers	 faced	when	they	sought	 to	 transpose	
Plato’s	conception	of	pleasure	onto	the	intellectual	plane	and	show	how	Gregory	












for	 the	 topic	 of	 the	 present	 chapter:	 Smith,	who	 discusses	Gregory’s	 vision	 of	
spiritual	fulfilment	in	Passion	and	Paradise,	rightly	identifies	enjoyment	as	a	key	
component	 of	 Gregory’s	 spiritual	 vision.	 Coakley,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 offers	 a	
reappraisal	 of	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 the	 ‘spiritual	 senses’,	 which	 is	 of	 course	
closely	linked	to	the	mode	of	spiritual	enjoyment.	Although	Smith	and	Coakley	
pinpoint	 different	watershed	works	 (In	Canticum	and	De	anima,	 respectively),	
both	 argue	 that,	 in	 the	 course	 of	 his	 career,	 Gregory	 moves	 from	 an	
intellectualist	 notion	 of	 spiritual	 perfection	 towards	 a	 more	 holistic	 –	 even	
bodily	–	conception.	For	Smith,	this	entails	the	inclusion	of	ἐπιθυμία	in	the	final	
																																																								
740	In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 will	 for	 variety’s	 sake	 freely	 alter	 between	 the	 terms	 ‘spiritual’	 and	
‘intellectual’	 to	 denote	 enjoyment	 which	 occurs	 entirely	 in	 the	 mind	 and	 is	 drawn	 from	
intelligible	objects.	I	will	also	at	times	refer	to	this	enjoyment	as	‘pleasure’,	keeping	in	mind	its	
differences	 from	 the	 passion	 of	 pleasure	 and	 Gregory’s	 own	 reservations	 to	 use	 the	 term	 for	
spiritual	delight.	





formulation	 of	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 epektasis,	 for	 Coakley,	 ‘a	 developing	 and	
systematic	 account	 of	 how	ordinary	 perception	 and	 the	 gross	 physical	 senses	
are	capable	of	a	progressive	transformation	 in	this	life	 into	spiritual	senses.’742	




account	 implies;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 seen	 against	 Gregory’s	 epistemological	
understanding	 of	 bodily	 perception,	 I	 do	 not	 find	 it	 plausible	 that	 ‘the	 older	
Gregory’	 would	 have	 conceived	 spiritual	 sensation	 in	 terms	 of	 transformed	
bodily	senses.	Instead,	I	will	suggest	that	we	should	look	for	continuity	between	
bodily	and	spiritual	sensation	and,	consequently,	bodily	and	spiritual	enjoyment	
in	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 mind.	 However,	 before	 assessing	 the	 plausibility	 of	
Smith’s	 and	 Coakley’s	 readings,	 I	 want	 to	 highlight	 some	 peculiarities	 in	






reluctance	 to	 call	 spiritual	 pleasure	 ἡδονή.	 While	 the	 spiritual	 equivalent	 of	
pleasure	 appears	 frequently	 in	 his	 works,	 he	 prefers	 such	 words	 as	 ‘joy’	
(εὐφροσύνη,	 χαρά),	 ‘delight’	 (τρυφή),	 or	 simply	 ‘enjoyment’	 (ἀπόλαυσις).	 Of	
these,	 εὐφροσύνη,	 ‘joy’,	 is	 the	 most	 common	 term	 Gregory	 employs	 in	 the	
context	 of	 spiritual	 enjoyment.	We	 have	 already	 encountered	 it	 in	 one	 of	 the	
previous	 chapters	 where	 Gregory	 contrasted	 it	 with	 ἡδονή,	 and	 this	
juxtaposition	is	common	in	Gregory’s	works.743	χαρά,	which	also	denotes	‘joy’	or	
‘delight’,	 is	 famously	 one	 of	 the	 Stoic	 eupatheiai	 and	 constitutes	 the	 positive	
																																																								
742	Coakley,	‘Gregory	of	Nyssa’,	42.	
743	See	 Inscr.	I.2	 (GNO	V,	27–28)	and	my	discussion	on	p.	186.	 In	Mort.	(GNO	XI/1,	55.11–12),	
Gregory	sets	against	each	other	the	notions	of	ὑλικὴ	ἡδονή	and	ψυχικὴ	εὐφροσύνη.	
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as	an	echo	of	 the	biblical	 text.746	At	 times,	 εὐφροσύνη	and	χαρά	occur	side	by	
side.747	It	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 this	 is	 mainly	 a	 literary	 device	 Gregory	 uses	 for	
emphasis	 rather	 than	 a	 reference	 to	 two	 distinct	 categories	 of	 spiritual	
enjoyment.	Τρυφή,	 for	 its	part,	highlights	 the	opulent	and	abundant	quality	of	
spiritual	 enjoyment	 and	 a	 return	 to	 the	 Paradisiac	 state	 in	 the	 eschatological	
fulfilment.748	As	we	have	already	seen,	it	is	frequently	a	negative	term	in	Graeco-
Roman	 literature	 where	 it	 carries	 the	 meaning	 of	 irrational	 and	 excessive	
desiring.	However,	also	a	positive	usage	exists.749	ἀπόλαυσις	 is	a	general	 term	
for	 enjoyment,	 which	 Gregory	 employs	 frequently	 both	 positively	 and	
negatively	 to	 denote	 the	 partaking	 of	 something	 pleasurable.750	None	 of	 these	
words	 are	 marked	 off	 to	 denote	 spiritual	 pleasure	 exclusively,	 but	 they	 are	
clearly	 Gregory’s	 terms	 of	 choice	when	 he	 discusses	 enjoyment	 as	 a	 positive,	
intellectual	matter.	
	
Gregory’s	 desire	 to	 avoid	 the	 term	ἡδονή	 is	 understandable	 and	by	no	means	
unique.	 ἡδονή	 is	 the	 loaded	 term	 of	 ancient	 discourse	 on	 hedonism,	 and	 in	























carries	 the	 connotation	 of	 ‘pleasure-as-the-good’.	 As	 I	 will	 go	 on	 to	 show,	
spiritual	enjoyment	is	neither	a	matter	of	the	body	and	its	senses	nor	pursued	
as	 the	 final	 good.	 The	 desire	 to	 avoid	 the	 base	 connotations	 of	 ἡδονή	 by	





for	 the	 more	 noble	 intellectual	 matters,	 notes	 in	 Timaeus	 that	 a	 musical	
harmony	gives	ἡδονή	 to	 the	 fools	and	ἐυφροσύνη	 to	 the	wise	who	are	able	 to	
see	it	as	an	expression	of	the	divine	harmony.752	The	difference	is	between	mere	




And	 then,	 too,	 we,	 your	 audience	 would	 be	 most	 cheered	 (εὐφραινοίμεθα),	 but	 not	
pleased	 (οὐχ	 ἡδοίμεσθα),	 for	 to	 be	 cheered	 (εὐφραίνεσθαι)	 is	 to	 learn	 something,	 to	




Later,	 Aristotle	 relates	 a	 somewhat	 different	 version	 of	 Prodicus’s	 distinction	
reporting	that	the	latter	divides	pleasures	into	joy	(χαρά),	delight	(τέρψις),	and	
good	 cheer	 (ἐυφροσύνη).754	In	 the	 fifth	 century	 CE,	 Hermias	 of	 Alexandria	
echoes	 Aristotle’s	 report	 and	 supplements	 it	 with	 more	 information	 on	 the	
different	categories:	τέρψις	 is	pleasure	of	 fine	things	through	the	ears,	χαρά	is	
pleasure	 of	 the	 soul,	 and	 ἐυφροσύνη	 is	 pleasure	 through	 the	 eyes. 755 	A	




753 	Prot.	 337c;	 trans.	 Lombardo	 &	 Bell,	 Complete	 Works,	 769.	 Wolfsdorf	 argues	 that	 the	
distinction	 is	 actually	 Plato’s	 own	 rather	 than	 Prodicus’s	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 it	 appears	 also	 in	
Timaeus	 where	 no	 mention	 is	 made	 of	 Prodicus.	 See	 Wolfsdorf,	 Pleasure	 in	 Ancient	 Greek	
Philosophy,	11–12.	





Platonists,	 including	 Clement	 of	 Alexandria,	 who	 again	 forms	 a	 probable	 link	
between	 Gregory	 and	 the	 Greek	 philosophical	 tradition.756	The	 later	 Platonist	
avoidance	 of	 ἡδονή	 for	 the	 highest	 forms	 of	 enjoyment	 can	 also	 at	 times	 be	
explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 Plato’s	 ἡδονή	 operates	 by	 definition	 on	 a	 lack-and-
replenishment	basis,	which	many	Neoplatonist	writers	deem	inappropriate	for	
describing	the	perfect	satisfaction	attained	in	contemplation.	In	other	words,	if	
there	 is	 enjoyment	 that	 does	 not	 stem	 from	 the	 lack-and-replenishment	














he	 uses	 different	 terms	more	 or	 less	 interchangeably	 and	 the	 distinctions	 he	
makes	in	one	passage	do	not	necessarily	apply	in	another.	At	any	rate,	it	is	clear	
that	Gregory	is	wary	of	the	sinful	and	sensual	connotations	of	ἡδονή	and	prefers	




In	De	mortuis	non	esse	dolendum,	 an	 early	work	 to	which	 I	will	 return	 in	 due	
course,	 Gregory	 argues	 that	 pleasure	 is	 at	 times	 beastly	 and	 irrational	
																																																								
756	Clement	attributes	 ‘pleasure’	(ἡδονή)	to	the	Gentiles,	 ‘wrangling’	(ἔρις)	to	the	heretics,	 ‘joy’	




(κτηνῶδες	 καὶ	 ἄλογον)	 and	 at	 times	 pure	 and	 immaterial	 (καθαρόν	 τε	 καὶ	
ἄϋλον).758	Here,	 Gregory	 appears	 to	 take	 the	 double	 character	 of	 ἡδονή	 for	
granted	since	he	uses	it	as	the	more	familiar	example	to	argue	that	also	pain	can	
be	directed	towards	both	vice	and	virtue.	Similarly,	in	De	anima	et	resurrectione	
Macrina	 and	 Gregory	 conclude	 that	 when	 reason	 rules	 in	 the	 soul	 and	 the	
passionate	 impulses	 are	 turned	 towards	 virtue,	 the	 impulse	 of	 desire	
(ἐπιθυμητικῆς	 ὁρμῆς)	will	 procure	 a	 ‘divine	 and	undefiled	pleasure’	 (θείαν	 τε	
καὶ	ἀκήρατον…	ἡδονήν).759	I	have	already	alluded	to	a	passage	in	De	virginitate,	
which	and	speaks	of	a	‘divine	and	undefiled	pleasure’	(θείας	τε	καὶ	ἀκηράτου...	
ἡδονῆς),	 and	 in	 the	 same	work	 Gregory	 refers	 to	 ‘the	most	 beautiful	 and	 the	
purest	 pleasure’	 (ἡδονὴν	 τὴν	 καλλίστην	 καὶ	 καθαρωτάτην),	 which	 will	
eventually	ease	 the	ascetic	struggle	of	 the	 individual	who	has	 let	go	of	wordly	
pleasures.760	Similar	phrases	are	scattered	throughout	Gregory’s	corpus.761	It	is	
striking	 that	 in	 the	 spiritual	 context	 the	 word	 ἡδονή	 is	 almost	 always	
accompanied	 by	 a	 qualifying	 adjective:	 ‘pure’,	 ‘undefiled’	 or	 ‘divine’.	 These	




‘pure	 pleasures’	 to	 which	 I	 will	 soon	 return.762 	While	 it	 is	 probable	 that	
Gregory’s	terminology	owes	to	the	Platonist	tradition,	later	in	this	chapter	I	will	
suggest	 that	we	must	understand	Gregory’s	notion	of	 ‘undefiled	pleasure’	 in	a	
somewhat	 different	 sense.	 For	 now,	 it	 is	 sufficient	 to	 explain	 briefly	 what	
Gregory	 intends	 with	 the	 term	 ‘undefiled’	 or	 ‘pure’.	 The	 word	 alludes	 to	 an	
important	characteristic	of	spiritual	pleasure	that	sets	it	in	sharp	contrast	with	
earthly	 sensual	 pleasure:	 the	 perpetual	 and	 stable	 enjoyment	 offered	 by	 that	
which	 is	 essentially	 good.	 A	 number	 of	 passages	 would	 suit	 to	 illustrate	 this	








Plato	 uses	 for	 his	 ‘pure	 pleasures’,	 ἀκήρατος	 ἡδονή	 appears	 to	 be	 Gregory’s	 own	 term	 and	
indeed	the	one	he	uses	more	frequently.	 		
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intellectual	 pleasure	 as	 it	 presents	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 satiety	 that	
burdens	earthly	pleasure	seeking.	For	now	it	will	suffice	to	cite	a	passage	from	





The	 enjoyment	 (ἀπόλαυσις)	 of	 these	 things	 does	 not	 undergo	 changes	 like	 the	
enjoyment	 of	 this	 life	 which	 enters	 and	 is	 done	 away	 depending	 on	 possession	 or	
deprivation	 of	 goods,	 but	 it	 is	 always	 full	 and	 its	 fullness	 is	 never	 circumscribed	 by	
satiety	 (κόρῳ).	 For	 the	 spiritual	 delight	 (ἡ	 νοερὰ	 τρυφή)	 is	weightless	 and	 insatiable	
(ἀπλήρωτος),	 always	 exceeding	 (ἐπιπλημμυροῦσα,	 lit.	 ‘overflowing’)	 the	 desires	
(ἐπιθυμίαις)	 of	 the	partakers	without	 satiety	 (ἀκορέστως).	 For	 this	 reason	 this	 life	 is	
blessed	(μακαρία)	and	undefiled	(ἀκήρατος),	no	 longer	 led	astray	by	 the	pleasures	of	
sense	(τῶν	αἰσθητηρίων	ἡδοναῖς)	in	the	judgment	of	the	good	(τοῦ	καλοῦ	κρίσιν).763	
	
Here,	 Gregory	 describes	 a	 stable	 enjoyment,	 which	 will	 always	 exceed	 the	
desires	 of	 the	 contemplative	 and	 thus	 never	 wither	 in	 satiety.	 This,	 for	 him,	
leads	to	a	‘blessed’	and	‘undefiled’	life,	which	he	contrasts	with	earthly	pleasure	
seeking	based	on	a	mistaken	 judgment	of	 the	good.	As	Lampe	notes,	 the	 term	
ἀκήρατος	refers	in	patristic	literature	to	both	God’s	uncompounded	essence	and	
unfading	 goods. 764 	Here,	 the	 two	 meanings	 converge,	 as	 it	 is	 the	 simple,	
unmixed	being	of	God	that	secures	the	unfading	enjoyment	of	the	divine	goods.	
This	 stands	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 earthly	 pleasures	which	 are	derived	 from	 the	
mixed	phenomena	of	the	created	realm	and	thus	ebb	and	flow	without	stability.		
	
Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 insatiable	 enjoyment	 has	 roots	 in	 the	 earlier	 patristic	










of	 the	 truth,	 and	 to	 be	 filled	 with	 the	 vision	 of	 that	 which	 really	 is,	 which	 is	
inexhaustible	 (τῆς	τοῦ	ὄντως	ὄντος	ἀπληρώτου	ἐμπίμπλασθαι	θέας),	 tasting	pleasure	






‘pure	 pleasure’,	 Clement	 does	 not	 allude	 to	 Plato’s	 technical	 definition	 of	 the	
term,	to	which	I	shall	soon	turn.	Instead,	the	defining	factor	of	a	pure	pleasure	










prevails	 over	 the	other.	Thus	 if	 one	 focuses	 attention	on	 sense	perception	 (αἴσθησιν)	
and	 seeks	 for	oneself	 the	pleasure	 (ἡδονήν)	 it	 grafts	 into	 the	body,	 one’s	 life	 is	 spent	



















Although	 here,	 too,	 Gregory	 eventually	 veers	 towards	 equating	 spiritual	
pleasure	 with	 ἐυφροσύνη,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 he	 understands	 the	 term	 as	 a	
subcategory	 of	 ἡδονή.	 The	 passage	 reveals	 some	 important	 characteristics	 of	
intellectual	pleasure,	which	shed	 light	on	how	 it	differs	 from	the	 false	good	of	
sensual	 pleasure	 and	 remind	 us	 of	 Gregory’s	 discourse	 on	 pleasure	 and	 the	
good.	 The	 discussion	 comes	 about	 in	 a	 context	 where	 Gregory	 highlights	 the	
importance	of	closing	the	bodily	senses	and	detaching	oneself	from	the	world.	It	
is	the	senses	of	the	soul	that	act	both	as	the	receptors	and	mediators	of	spiritual	
pleasure.	 Thus,	 as	 ‘judgment	 flees	 everything	 that	 bewitches	 the	 senses’,	









Both	 Plato	 and	Aristotle	 argue	 that	 learning	 to	 take	 pleasure	 and	 feel	 pain	 at	
correct	matters	is	the	purpose	of	education.	As	the	mind	learns	new	truths	and	
puts	 them	 in	 practice	 by	 directing	 desire	 to	 strive	 for	 its	 appropriate	 objects,	
also	 the	 matters	 in	 which	 one	 takes	 pleasure	 undergo	 a	 shift.770	Thus,	 one’s	
moral	 character	 determines	what	 one	 derives	 pleasure	 from	 and,	 conversely,	
what	 one	 takes	 pleasure	 in	 is	 an	 indicator	 of	 one’s	 moral	 status,	 as	 we	 have	
already	seen	Gregory	argue	in	In	inscriptiones.	Aristotle,	in	particular,	highlights	
that	one	has	 to	have	a	certain	disposition	 to	have	certain	pleasures;	only	 then	
can	 the	 disposition	 be	 activated	 without	 impediment	 and	 the	 supervenient	








In	Chapter	6,	 I	 traced	the	 implications	that	 the	education	of	desire	has	 for	our	
understanding	of	pain.	I	have	also	already	showed	how	right	knowledge	enables	
us	to	evaluate	the	worth	of	sensual	pleasure	and	thus	helps	us	detach	ourselves	
from	 what	 previously	 appeared	 good	 and	 beautiful.	 However,	 the	 positive	
aspect	of	this	transformation	remains	to	be	discussed:	How	do	we	learn	not	only	







can	detect	 at	 least	 three	kinds	of	 spiritual	pleasures	 in	Gregory:	pleasure	 that	






a	 longer	 discussion	 to	 the	 spiritual	 fulfilment	 as	 Gregory	 presents	 it	 in	 two	




spiritual	 enjoyment	 occurs	 in	 In	 inscriptiones	 psalmorum,	 which	 offers	 a	
progressive	 account	 of	 spiritual	 maturation. 772 	In	 In	 inscriptiones,	 Gregory	
envisions	 the	 spiritual	 progress	 as	 a	 separation	 from	 the	 evil,	 an	 increasing	
blessedness	achieved	through	meditation	on	things	that	are	‘sublime	and	more	
divine’,	and	 finally	 the	 likeness	of	God	 in	 those	who	are	perfected	through	the	
																																																								
772	This	overall	purpose	is	similar	to	De	Beatidinibus,	De	vita	Moysis	and	In	Canticum	canticorum,	
although	 the	 stages	 of	 the	 spiritual	 progress	 do	 not	 always	 overlap	 seamlessly	 and	 the	main	




plays	 a	 major	 part:	 as	 the	 soul	 renounces	 the	 evil,	 sensual	 pleasures	 are	 left	
behind	 and	 on	 the	 subsequent	 stages	 the	 soul	 rejoices	 in	 ever	 greater	
discoveries	of	the	divine	things.774		
	
How	 does	 one	 leave	 behind	 one’s	 previous	 life	 and	 its	 joys	 and	 come	 to	 an	




the	 biblical	 story	 of	 God’s	 on-going	 involvement	 with	 the	 world,	 which	
culminates	in	the	life,	death,	and	resurrection	of	Christ.	Once	basic	knowledge	of	
this	 fundamental	 reality	 is	made	available,	 it	 becomes	possible	 to	direct	one’s	
desire	 towards	 it.775	The	 appeal	 of	 virtue	 is	 not	 intuitive	 to	 someone	 who	 is	
habituated	to	seeking	satisfaction	from	the	sensible	world.	This	is	why	Gregory	
emphasises	 the	 difficulty	 of	 detachment	 and	 argues	 that	 the	 reorientation	 of	
desire	results	in	hard	lessons	of	virtue	for	the	beginners.776	Initially,	it	is	simply	
the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 goodness	 of	 the	 Good	 and	 a	 firm	 resolve	 to	 pursue	 the	
worthy	 goal	 that	 sustain	 the	 ascetic	 effort;	 a	 deeper	 change	 of	 sensibilities	
follows	only	once	desire	is	fully	detached	from	worldly	distractions.		
	
While	 Gregory	 is	 generally	 wary	 of	 any	 pleasure	 generated	 by	 the	 sensible	
world,	In	inscriptiones	psalmorum	contains	an	unusual	suggestion	as	to	how	the	
human	inclination	towards	sensual	pleasure	can	be	transformed	into	a	vehicle	













of	 a	 higher	 good.	 The	 idea	 that	 a	 sensible	 phenomenon	 can	 direct	 a	 fledgling	
Christian	 soul	 towards	 the	 intelligible	 realm	 is,	of	 course,	 entirely	 in	 line	with	
what	we	have	already	seen	Gregory	argue	about	the	role	of	the	sensible	creation	
in	 general.	 However,	 Gregory’s	 works	 describe	 few	 instances	 where	 physical	
enjoyment	 serves	 as	 a	 concrete	 vehicle	 of	 spiritual	 maturation	 rather	 than	
simply	points	towards	a	higher	reality	as	an	analogical	(but	different)	sign.	The	
latter	 connection	 forms	 the	 basis	 of	 Gregory’s	 allegorical	 exegesis	 the	Song	of	
Songs	and	his	theory	of	contemplation,	but	–	compared	to	many	later	Byzantine	
and	 Syriac	 writers	 –	 he	 has	 little	 to	 say	 about	 sensible	 things	 as	 tangible	
sacramental	mediators	of	the	divine	sweetness.	This	is	perhaps	due	to	the	fact	
that	he	 is	generally	apprehensive	about	pleasure	 that	arises	 from	the	sensible	
realm,	even	if	it	serves	a	higher	purpose.	Nonetheless,	even	a	passing	suggestion	
on	the	sweetening	of	spiritual	 things	 through	the	 intuitively	attractive	sensual	
pleasure	provides	an	interesting	link	in	the	transformation	of	pleasure.	
	
For	Gregory,	 then,	spiritual	enjoyment	 is	a	product	of	 the	ascetic	struggle	 that	
begins	 to	 emerge	 as	 desire	 is	 detached	 from	 worldly	 distractions.	 Since	 it	 is	
difficult	 to	 leave	 behind	 the	 pleasures	 of	 the	 world,	 Gregory	 encourages	 his	
reader	 by	 promising	 that	 the	 redirection	 of	 desire	will	 eventually	 turn	 into	 a	
habit	 (συνήθεια),	 which,	 he	 argues,	 ‘produces	 pleasure	 (ἡδονήν)	 through	
steadfastness	 in	what	 appears	 the	most	 difficult.’778	This	 new	 pleasure	 is	 ‘the	




In	 his	Homilies	on	Ecclesiastes,	 Gregory	 argues	 that	 ‘the	 perpetual	 joy	 in	 good	
things’	(ἐπὶ	τοῖς	καλοῖς	εὐφροσύνη)	is	‘the	child	of	good	deeds’	(ἐκ	τῶν	ἀγαθῶν	









For	 Gregory,	 the	 extent	 and	 intensity	 of	 spiritual	 enjoyment	 increases	 as	 the	











envisions	 some	 form	 of	 direct	 participation	 in	 the	 life	 to	 come	 as	 the	 soul	 is	
temporarily	afforded	a	 foretaste	of	perfection.	However,	 a	 joy	 in	 future	 things	
can	 also	 take	 a	 less	 tangible	 form.	As	philosopher	 James	Warren	notes	 in	The	
Pleasures	of	Reason,	one	of	the	key	differences	between	humans	and	animals	is	
our	ability	 to	derive	pleasure	 from	mere	 thought,	either	by	remembering	past	
pleasures	or	anticipating	future	ones.	Our	‘ability	to	look	forward	and	backward	





we	 are	 also	 able	 to	 improve	 our	 present	 state	 by	 ‘reliving’	 or	 ‘pre-living’	 a	
pleasure.782	In	Beat.	4,	 the	 same	homily	 that	 contains	 the	metaphor	of	 a	 leaky	




The	desire	of	virtue	 is	 followed	by	 the	possession	of	what	 is	desired;	and	 the	 interior	






soul.	 For	 such	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 wonderful	 thing	 that	 it	 not	 only	 delights	 in	 the	




future	 reward	 (τῆς	ἀντιδόσεως	προσδοκία).	This,	 I	 suppose,	 is	none	other	 than	again	
virtue	 itself,	which	 is	both	 the	work	and	 the	 reward	of	 those	who	have	accomplished	
it.783	
	




I	 have	 already	 noted,	 Warren	 Smith	 argues	 that	 here	 Gregory	 presents	 a	
departure	 from	 the	 Stoic	 system	 of	 emotions	 in	 which	 hope	 is	 seen	 as	 a	




means	 a	 uniquely	 Gregorian	 characteristic.	 Many	 ancient	 thinkers	 consider	
hope	the	opposite	of	sensual	pleasure	not	only	because	hope	enables	people	to	
fix	 their	 gaze	 on	 that	 which	 is	 not	 currently	 present	 to	 the	 senses,	 but	 also	
because	 hope	 itself	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 pleasure	 or	 joy	 derived	 from	
future	goods	rather	than	present	ones.786	For	Plato	and	others,	the	moral	value	
of	hope	and	the	pleasure	it	yields	depends	on	the	rationality	of	the	underlying	
belief,	 which	 in	 turn	 depends	 on	 the	 moral	 and	 intellectual	 maturity	 of	 the	
individual.	Hope	can	be	a	virtuous	disposition	that	yields	good	pleasure,	but	 it	
can	also	be	based	on	a	false	belief	and	thus	entail	a	false	joy.787	In	fact,	we	should	


















τις,	 χαρὰ	 πρὸ	 χαρᾶς,)	 and	 a	 ‘joy	 before	 joy,	 gladness	 before	 gladness’	 (τινὰ	
χαίρειν	 πρὸ	 χαρᾶς	 καὶ	 εὐφραίνεσθαι	 πρὸ	 εὐφροσύνης).789	Although	 Gregory	




the	 one	 who	 promotes	 good	 deeds,	 but	 hereafter	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 good	 things	 (ἡ	





to	 a	 grape	 cluster	 that	 gradually	matures	 from	a	blossom	 to	 a	 ripe	 fruit.	As	 it	









from	the	smell	of	anticipation	 to	 the	 taste	of	 fulfilment.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	both	of	







by	 hope	 turns	 into	 ‘trustworthy	 and	 unambiguous	 enjoyment’,	 as	 the	 soul	 no	






As	we	 have	 already	 seen,	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 spiritual	 progress	 desire	 turns	
more	 and	 more	 fully	 towards	 the	 divine,	 leading	 to	 increasing	 spiritual	
enjoyment.	However,	even	a	virtuous	human	being	will	inevitably	be	distracted	
by	matters	that	are	not	God	as	long	as	she	continues	her	earthly	existence:	there	
will	be	needs	 to	 fulfil	 and	bodily	weaknesses	 to	grapple	with.	 It	 is	only	 in	 the	
eschaton	 that	 the	 soul	 enters	 into	 a	 full	 communion	 with	 God,	 free	 from	 all	
external	distractions.	This	is	the	state	towards	which	Gregory	points	in	all	of	his	









be	 said	 to	 yield	 anything	 like	 pleasure.792	Here	 we	 should	 keep	 in	 mind	 that	
Plato	 defined	 pleasure	 as	 a	 replenishment	 of	 a	 lack.	 Thus,	 a	 problem	 ensued:	





as	 Van	 Riel’s	 study	 demonstrates,	 they	 had	 to	 relinquish	 Plato’s	 lack-and-
replenishment	 model	 and	 conceptualise	 the	 highest	 form	 of	 enjoyment	 in	 a	
different	way.	Van	Riel	suggests	that	the	solution	to	this	problem	was	found	in	












the	 notion	 of	 ‘pure’	 or	 ‘undefiled’	 pleasure	 suggests	 that	 Gregory’s	
understanding	 of	 intellectual	 pleasure	 was	 at	 least	 indirectly	 influenced	 by	
Platonist	 terminology.	 Thus,	 the	 Platonists’	 problem	 of	 pleasure	 in	 a	 state	 of	
fulfilment	 looms	 in	 the	 background	 as	 Gregory	 discusses	 enjoyment	 in	 the	
eschatological	union.	
	
Of	 all	 topics	 related	 to	 Gregory’s	 understanding	 of	 pleasure,	 eschatological	
enjoyment	has	probably	received	the	most	thorough	scholarly	treatment.	Thus,	
in	 this	 section	 I	will	make	 use	 of	Warren	 Smith’s	 existing	 analysis	where	 the	
author	presents	two	different	models	of	spiritual	fulfilment	in	which	enjoyment	
plays	 a	 key	 role.793 	In	 the	 opening	 paragraphs	 of	 his	 investigation,	 Smith	
introduces	the	two	models	in	the	following	manner:	
	




Two	strikingly	different	answers	 to	 these	questions	 come	 in	 the	different	accounts	of	
epectasy	 in	On	the	Soul	and	Resurrection	and	 in	Commentary	on	the	Song	of	Songs	and	
Life	 of	 Moses.	 In	 the	 earlier	 view	 of	 epectasy	 from	 On	 the	 Soul	 and	 Resurrection	 the	





finite	creature	who	 loves	and	the	eternal	and	 infinite	one	who	 is	 the	eternal	object	of	















Fusing	 the	 key	 arguments	 of	 Van	 Riel’s	 and	 Smith’s	 analyses,	 I	 will	 go	 on	 to	
suggest	that	Gregory’s	two	models	of	enjoyment	in	the	eschatological	union	turn	
on	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘lack’	 and,	 implicitly,	 the	 Platonist	 notion	 of	 pleasure	 as	 a	
replenishment.	In	De	anima,	Gregory	envisions	an	actualised	spiritual	fulfilment,	
which	is	not	far	from	what	we	find	in	Plotinus	and	Proclus.	Since	the	soul	lacks	
nothing,	 Gregory	 cannot	 employ	 the	 notion	 of	 pleasure	 as	 a	 replenishment	 to	
describe	spiritual	enjoyment.	 Instead,	he	presents	an	alternative	model,	which	
is	not	without	Aristotelian	undertones.	In	Canticum,	on	the	other	hand,	Gregory	
presents	 a	 more	 radical	 interpretation	 of	 the	 soul’s	 union	 with	 God:	 here	
enjoyment	and	desire	grow	eternally	side	by	side	as	the	soul	grasps	new	aspects	
of	 its	 Beloved,	 yet	 realises	 it	 will	 never	 grasp	 him	 entirely.	 Since	 Gregory	
includes	desire	in	the	pinnacle	of	the	spiritual	life,	the	pursuit	of	the	Beloved	can	
be	 easily	 understood	 as	 a	 perpetual	 sequence	 of	 lack	 and	 fulfilment.	 Thus,	
Gregory	 is	 able	 to	 build	 his	 notion	 of	 spiritual	 pleasure	 after	 the	 lack-and-
replenishment	 model	 with	 much	 greater	 ease	 than	 his	 pagan	 Neoplatonist	
counterparts.	 However,	 I	 will	 also	 argue	 that	 Gregory’s	 understanding	 of	
spiritual	 pleasure	 in	 In	 Canticum	 contains	 features	 which	 represent	 a	 clear	









De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione	 presents	 an	 early	 vision	 of	 perfection	 whereas	 In	
Canticum	 canticorum	 puts	 forth	 a	 later	 mature	 view.	 I	 will	 challenge	 this	
interpretation	 by	 showing	 that	 Smith’s	 focus	 on	 the	 two	 works	 –	 the	 works	
which	undoubtedly	say	the	most	about	the	role	of	enjoyment	in	the	eschaton	–	






Before	 discussing	 the	 place	 that	 Gregory	 gives	 to	 enjoyment	 at	 the	 highest	
stages	of	 the	spiritual	 life,	 I	will	 turn	my	attention	 to	 the	earlier	philosophical	
tradition	to	highlight	a	few	peculiarities	that	have	characterised	ancient	notions	
of	 positive	 pleasure.	 Above	 all,	we	must	 gain	 a	 basic	 understanding	 of	 Plato’s	
conception	of	‘pure	pleasures’	and	the	difficulties	this	notion	caused	to	some	of	
the	 later	 Platonists.	795	Although	 Plato	 rejects	 pleasure	 as	 the	 highest	 good,	 at	
the	 end	 of	 Philebus,	 his	 most	 important	 dialogue	 on	 pleasure,	 Socrates	 and	
Protarchus	come	to	the	conclusion	that	a	good	human	life	is	a	mix	of	the	truest	
form	of	knowledge	with	 the	 truest	 form	of	pleasure,	 though	 the	 latter	holds	a	
much	 lower	 status	 than	 the	 former.	 The	 relevance	 of	 pleasure	 is	 mainly	






people	 are	 in	 fact	 false	 pleasures	 because	 they	 are	 mixed	 with	 pain.	 False	
pleasures	 are	 products	 of	 false	 opinion	 and	 should	 be	 avoided.	 As	 I	
demonstrated	in	Part	II,	this	concern	about	‘mixed	pleasures’	is	evident	also	in	
																																																								




Gregory’s	 works;	 different	 manifestations	 of	 pain,	 such	 as	 anxiety,	 repulsion,	
and	 sorrow,	 accompany	 most	 occasions	 of	 pleasure	 seeking.	 But,	 argues	





pleasures	 that	 actually	 merit	 their	 name	 are	 ‘based	 on	 imperceptible	 and	
painless	 lacks	 (τὰς	 ἐνδείας	 ἀναισθήτους	 ἔχοντα	 καὶ	 ἀλύπους),	 while	 their	
fulfilments	 are	 perceptible	 and	 pleasant	 (τὰς	 πληρώσεις	 αἰσθητὰς	 καὶ	
ἡδείας).’796	Here,	we	should	note	 that	while	 the	pure	pleasures	do	not	 involve	
any	perceptible	pain,	Socrates	nonetheless	assumes	that	they	follow	a	lack-and-




For	 Socrates,	 this	 class	 of	 pleasures	 does	 not	 pertain	 exclusively	 to	 high	
intellectual	matters.	Most	smells	and	sounds	will	yield	true	pleasure,	as	do	pure	
colours	 and	 geometric	 shapes.	 However,	 we	 should	 note	 that	 even	 these	
pleasures	 of	 the	 perceptible	 world	 are	 truly	 pleasant	 because	 ‘they	 are	 not	
beautiful	 in	a	relative	sense	(οὐκ	εἶναι	πρός	τι	καλά),	as	others	are,	but	are	by	
their	 very	 nature	 forever	 beautiful	 by	 themselves	 (ἀεὶ	 καλὰ	 καθ’	 αὑτὰ	
πεφυκέναι).’797	The	close	proximity	to	the	form	of	beauty	separates	a	geometric	
shape	and	a	pure	musical	note	from	the	multiform	appearance	of	a	living	being.	











learning	 are	 true	 so	 far	 as	 ‘there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 hunger	 for	 learning	
connected	 with	 them,	 nor	 any	 pains	 that	 have	 their	 source	 in	 a	 hunger	 of	
learning.’798	Furthermore,	 if	 people	 lose	 the	 filling	 they	 have	 attained	 through	
learning	 by	 forgetting	 the	 learned	 content,	 they	 do	 not	 experience	 any	 pain	
either.	 In	 other	 words,	 pain	 neither	 precedes	 nor	 follows	 learning.799	This	
definition	 raises	 an	 obvious	 question:	 are	 not	 Plato’s	 dialogues	 themselves	 a	
prime	 example	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 learning	 does	 not	 come	 easily	 but	 requires	
conscious	 effort	 and	 comes	 with	 many	 troubling	 realisations?	 Furthermore,	
forgetting	could	surely	be	conceived	as	a	source	of	annoyance.800	In	fact,	Plato	is	
by	no	means	dismissive	of	the	pains	related	to	learning.	Here,	Socrates	aims	for	
a	 narrow	 definition	 that	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 masses	 but	 only	 to	 a	 small	
number	 of	 people.801	It	 is	 conceivable	 that	 we	 can	 obtain	 knowledge	 without	
striving	 for	 it	 and	 thus	 spontaneously	 enjoy	 the	 pleasure	 of	 learning	 that	
accompanies	 it.	As	regards	 forgetting,	Socrates	argues	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	 loss	of	
knowledge	itself	but	our	reflection	on	this	loss	that	causes	pain.802		
	
In	 Philebus,	 Socrates	 contends	 that	 the	 pure	 and	 simple	 (καθαρόν	 τε	 καὶ	
εἰλικρινές)	 pleasures	 are	 greater	 than	 those	 that	 are	 violent,	 multiform,	
enormous,	 and	 reckless	 (τὸ	 σφόδρα	 τε	 καὶ	 τὸ	 πολὺ	 καὶ	 τὸ	 μέγα	 καὶ	 τὸ	
ἰταμόν).803	Even	 if	 the	 pleasures	 of	 the	 latter	 kind	 may	 seem	 particularly	
significant	since	they	are	unlimited	and	can	strike	with	a	great	 force,	even	the	
smallest	pleasure	of	the	pure	kind	will	be	‘pleasanter,	truer,	and	more	beautiful’	
(ἡδίων	 καὶ	 ἀληθεστέρα	 καὶ	 καλλίων)	 than	 a	 seemingly	 larger	 quantity	 of	 the	


















previously	discussed	pure	pleasures,	pleasures	of	health,	 and	 those	 that	allow	
for	 the	 development	 of	 virtue	 –	 that	 is,	 pleasures	 that	 can	 be	 appropriately	
moderated	by	reason.	Violent	and	intense	pleasures,	i.e.	unbridled	pleasures	of	
the	lower	parts	of	the	soul,	do	not	belong	to	the	good	life	because	they	disturb	
the	 appropriate	 hierarchy	 of	 the	 soul,	 submitting	 reason	 to	 the	 irrational	










control,	 victory	 and	 honour,	 while	 the	 highest	 part	 loves	 learning	 and	
philosophy.	 Based	 on	 the	 part	 that	 rules	 in	 each	 individual,	 people	 can	 be	
divided	 into	 three	 groups:	 profit-loving,	 victory-loving,	 and	 philosophic.	 All	 of	
these	groups	have	their	own	pleasures	derived	from	what	they	love,	and	each	of	
them	would	claim	their	pleasures	 to	be	 the	highest.	Thus,	Socrates	sets	out	 to	
enquire	which	of	the	groups	actually	enjoys	the	most	pleasant	life.806		
	
Socrates	argues	 that	 the	philosopher	 is	 the	soundest	 judge	of	which	pleasures	
are	 the	most	 pleasant	 since,	 despite	 enjoying	 the	 pleasures	 of	 learning	 in	 his	
present	life,	he	alone	has	tasted	all	the	other	pleasures	in	childhood	before	his	
ability	 to	 reason	 was	 fully	 developed.	 Furthermore,	 rational	 argument,	 the	
instrument	of	 judging,	 is	the	instrument	of	the	philosopher,	whereas	the	other	











In	 Republic,	 Plato	 offers	 a	 more	 detailed	 discussion	 on	 how	 the	 lack-and-
replenishment	 model	 applies	 to	 pleasures	 of	 learning.	 Here,	 Socrates	 argues	
that	just	as	hunger	and	thirst	are	empty	states	(κενώσεις)	of	the	body,	ignorance	
is	 an	 empty	 state	 of	 the	 soul.	 Thus,	 intellectual	 pleasures	 result	 from	 the	
replenishment	 (πλήρωσις)	 of	 this	 lack	 with	 true	 belief	 (δόξης	 τε	 ἀληθοῦς),	
knowledge	 (ἐπιστήμης),	 understanding	 (νοῦ),	 and	 ‘in	 sum,	 with	 all	 of	 virtue	
(πάσης	ἀρετῆς).’808	In	 Socrates’	 view,	 this	 intellectual	 filling	 and	 the	 following	
pleasure	 are	 truer	 and	 more	 substantial	 than	 any	 bodily	 filling.	 The	 former	
pertains,	after	all,	to	things	that	are	always	the	same,	immortal,	and	true.	Since	
the	 filling	 itself	 is	 greater	 and	 truer	 than	 mere	 material	 filling	 of	 the	 body,	
Socrates	 argues	 that	 also	 the	 pleasure	 that	 follows	must	 be	 greater	 and	 truer	
than	 any	material	 pleasure,	 even	 if	 pleasure	 as	 such	 belongs	 to	 the	 realm	 of	
becoming.	Those	who	do	not	 lead	a	virtuous	 life	will	 only	 content	 themselves	




The	 fact	 that	 Plato	 uses	 the	 notion	 of	 pleasure-as-replenishment	 to	
conceptualise	pleasures	of	 the	good	 life	has	 caused	a	number	of	difficulties	 to	
later	 interpreters.	One	of	 the	main	challenges	 is	pointed	out	by	Gerd	Van	Riel,	
who	draws	attention	to	later	Platonist	thinkers	who	envision	the	beatific	union	
as	 a	 state	 of	 rest.	 The	 question	 then	 becomes	 whether	 a	 state	 of	 attained	
fulfilment	 can	 be	 said	 to	 yield	 anything	 like	 pleasure	 if	 pleasure	 implies	 the	
presence	of	a	lack	and	is,	furthermore,	by	definition	a	process	that	belongs	to	the	











definition	 of	 pleasure	 so	 far	 as	 bodily	 matters	 are	 concerned,	 the	 lack-and-
replenishment	model	proves	insufficient	for	describing	enjoyment	derived	from	
intellectual	 perfection.	 To	 explain	 how	 attained	 fulfilment	 can	 yield	 pleasure,	
the	later	Platonists	turn	to	Aristotle.812		
	
As	 I	 noted	 in	 the	 opening	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis,	 for	 Aristotle	 pleasure	 results	
from	unimpeded	natural	activity.	In	other	words,	when	an	activity	is	performed	
perfectly	 according	 to	 nature,	 pleasure	 follows	 suit.	 In	 his	 ethical	 works,	
Aristotle	 examines	 different	 sorts	 of	 pleasures	 and	 explicitly	 criticises	 Plato’s	
notion	of	pleasure	as	a	replenishment	and	as	a	process.813	In	his	view,	the	purest	






remarks	 that	 the	 continued	possession	 of	 knowledge	 is	 likely	 to	 yield	 greater	
pleasure	 than	 merely	 the	 pursuit	 of	 it. 815 	Whereas	 for	 Plato,	 the	 highest	





no	 change	 occurs.817	This	 is	 why	 it	 becomes	 the	 preferred	 model	 of	 spiritual	











emphasise	 their	 loyalty	 to	 Plato.818	While	 Van	 Riel	 focuses	 on	 Neoplatonist	
philosophers,	 we	 can	 see	 a	 similar	 awareness	 of	 the	 potential	 pitfalls	 of	 the	
Platonic	definition	 and	a	preference	 for	 the	Aristotelian	model	 for	 example	 in	
Gregory’s	 Christian	 contemporary	 Nemesius	 of	 Emesa	 who	 argues	 explicitly	
that	the	replenishment	model	is	only	suited	to	describe	bodily	pleasures	related	
to	hunger	and	thirst;	pleasures	of	contemplation	do	not	arise	 from	a	deficit	or	






lack:	 if	 ignorance	 is	 a	 lack	 and	 knowledge	 yields	 pleasure	 by	 filling	 it,	 it	 is	
unclear	 how	 the	 continued	 possession	 of	 knowledge	 alone	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	
pleasurable.	Even	if	we	assume	that	the	philosopher	continues	to	discover	new	
things	 after	 he	 has	 become	 a	 qualified	 ruler	 by	 discovering	 essential	 moral	
truths,	 James	 Warren	 notes	 that	 there	 is	 no	 guarantee	 of	 ‘an	 infinitely	 large	
number	of	Forms	to	learn	such	that	a	philosopher	will	never	run	out	of	potential	
new	sources	of	the	pleasures	of	 intellectual	discovery.’820	Scholars	 like	Warren	
have	 both	 attempted	 to	 resolve	 the	 tension	 and	 simply	 noted	 that	 Plato’s	
explanation	 is	 unsatisfactory.	 The	 specifics	 of	 Plato’s	 shortcomings	 and	 their	
potential	solutions	do	not	concern	us	here.	But	we	should	keep	this	tension	in	













In	Canticum	would	 seem	 to	 indicate	 that	 he	was	 not	 aware	 of	 the	 specifics	 of	
Plato’s	 discussion	 of	 true	 and	 false	 pleasures.821 	However,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	
Gregory,	too,	grapples	with	the	notions	of	pain,	lack,	and	becoming	that	inform	
the	 general	 Platonist	 discourse	 on	 pleasure.	 We	 can	 see	 this	 in	 his	 frequent	




different	 models	 of	 spiritual	 perfection	 which	 Warren	 Smith	 identifies	 in	
Passion	and	Paradise	offer	two	different	conceptions	of	spiritual	pleasure:	In	De	
anima	et	 resurrectione,	Macrina	 describes	 a	 beatific	 union	 in	which	 no	 lack	 is	
present	 and	 thus	 the	 enjoyment	 gleaned	must	be	understood	differently	 from	
the	 lack-and-replenishment	 model	 that	 characterises	 bodily	 pleasure.	 In	 In	








Let	 us	 first	 turn	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 spiritual	 perfection	 which	 Gregory	
attributes	 to	Macrina	 in	De	anima	et	resurrectione.	We	have	already	discussed	
the	 long	passage	on	 the	place	of	passions	 in	 the	human	constitution,	 in	which	
Macrina	argued	that	the	lower	parts	of	the	soul	and	their	product,	the	passions,	
exist	 on	 the	margins	 of	 the	 soul	 and	do	not	 reflect	 the	 image	of	God	which	 is	
located	in	the	mind.	However,	it	also	became	apparent	that	in	their	current	state	
humans	cannot	attain	intellectual	perfection	unless	they	make	use	of	the	lower	
parts	 of	 the	 soul	 and	 submit	 their	 passions	 to	 the	 control	 of	 the	mind,	which	
directs	 the	 impulses	 towards	 the	 good.	 This	 is	 where	 we	 encounter	 the	 first	
																																																								
821	See	especially	Cant.	8	(GNO	VI,	251–252;	trans.	Norris,	265)	and	my	discussion	on	pages	64–
65.	 Other	 patristic	 writers	 from	 the	 same	 period	 demonstrate	 a	 more	 explicit	 awareness	 of	
Plato’s	notion	of	mixed	pleasures.	See	especially	Nemesius,	De	natura	hominis	18	(BT,	77).	
	 271	
comment	 on	 the	 possibility	 of	 spiritual	 pleasure	 as	 Macrina	 concedes	 to	
Gregory’s	remark	that	the	impulses	for	passions	can	be	put	to	good	use	if	they	
are	 governed	 by	 reason.	 One	 of	 the	 examples	 of	 redirected	 impulses	 is	 the	
‘impulse	 of	 desire’	 (ἐπιθυμητικῆς	 ὁρμῆς)	 which,	 according	 to	 Macrina,	 will	
sponsor	 ‘the	 divine	 and	 undefiled	 pleasure’	 (τὴν	 θείαν	 τε	 καὶ	
ἀκήρατον…ἡδονἠν).822 	As	 we	 have	 already	 seen,	 the	 qualifiers	 ‘divine	 and	
undefiled’	are	common	in	Gregory’s	allusions	to	spiritual	ἡδονἠ.	Since	‘undefiled	
pleasure’	 results	 from	a	conscious	pursuit	of	 the	good,	 it	 seems	 likely	 that	 the	
soul	 acutely	 feels	 the	 lack	 of	 God,	 which	 results	 in	 active	 and	 perceptible	
desiring.	Thus,	 ‘undefiled	pleasure’	cannot	be	read	as	a	full	synonym	of	Plato’s	
‘pure	 pleasure.’	 It	 is	 more	 likely,	 as	 I	 have	 already	 suggested,	 that	 Gregory	








all	 irrational	 movements	 are	 removed	 from	 the	 soul	 in	 the	 process	 of	
purification,	 which	 restores	 the	 soul	 to	 its	 original	 state.	 Here,	 the	 Platonist	
notion	 of	 desire	 and	 pleasure	 as	 lack	 and	 replenishment	 becomes	 central	 to	
Macrina’s	 argument	 and	 is	 found	 insufficient	 as	 a	 description	 of	 the	
eschatological	union.	Desire,	as	Macrina	has	previously	explained,	results	from	
seeking	 what	 one	 lacks	 or	 yearning	 for	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 some	 pleasure	
(ἔφεσιν…	 τοῦ	 ἐνδέοντος	 ἢ	 πόθον	 τῆς	 καθ’	 ἡδονὴν	 ἀπολαύσεως).823	Now	 she	
presents	the	other	central	definition	of	desire	as	an	appetite	for	what	is	missing	
which	 seeks	 to	 remedy	 the	 lack	 of	 beauty	 in	 the	 human	 nature.	824	In	 other	
words,	 desiring	 is	 by	 definition	 lacking,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 beauty	 is	 the	 driving	
																																																								
822	An.	 et	 res.	 (PG	 46,	 61C);	 trans.	 Silvas,	 195.	 I	 do	 not	 see	 any	 necessity	 to	 follow	 Silvas	 and	
translate	 the	 participle	 προξενούσης	 in	 the	 conditional	 (‘would	 sponsor’),	 which	 makes	 the	











longer	 lacks	 anything. 825 	In	 the	 eschatological	 union,	 the	 soul	 attains	 the	
likeness	of	God	who	encompasses	all	goods	and	 ‘has	no	need	of	anything	 that	
can	 be	 regarded	 as	 good	 (μηδενὸς	 ἐνδεῶς	 ἔχουσα	 τῶν	 πρὸς	 τὸ	 ἀγαθὸν	
νοουμένων).’826	Since	God	who	possesses	all	goods	 lacks	nothing,	 the	soul	that	
attains	 the	divine	 likeness	by	 regaining	possession	 of	 the	divine	 goods	 is	 also	
without	 lack.	 And	 since	 the	 soul	 finds	 itself	 completely	 surrounded	 and	
permeated	by	the	Beautiful,	it	no	longer	needs	desire	whose	main	task	is	to	lead	
it	towards	beauty	to	remedy	a	lack.	When	the	soul’s	faculties	are	fully	directed	
towards	 God,	 evil,	 which	 Gregory	 conceives	 as	 a	 separation	 from	 the	 good,	
vanishes	and	God	becomes	‘all	in	all’	(1	Cor.	15:28).827	The	soul	is	not	only	free	
from	 sin,	 but	 it	 also	 rids	 itself	 of	 all	worldly	 necessities	 that	 are	 not-God	 and	
impede	a	single-minded	focus	on	the	divine	during	the	earthly	existence	even	if	
the	 person	 is	 advanced	 in	 virtue.	 The	 elimination	 of	 all	 lack	 results	 in	 the	
complete	extirpation	of	desire:		
	
[S]ince	 there	 is	 no	 desire	 (ἐπιθυμίας)	 in	 that	 nature	 [of	 which	 the	 soul	 attains	 a	
likeness]	because	there	is	no	lack	of	the	good	(τινος	τῶν	ἀγαθῶν	ἔνδειαν)	in	it,	it	would	
follow	 that	 the	 soul	 also	becomes	 free	 of	 any	 lack	 (ἐν	 τῷ	ἀνενδεεῖ)	 and	hence	 expels	
from	 itself	 the	movement	 and	 disposition	 of	 desire	 (τὴν	 ἐπιθυμητικὴν	 κίνησίν	 τε	 καὶ	
διάθεσιν),	 for	 this	 arises	 only	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 something	 yearned	 for	 (μὴ	 παρῇ	 τὸ	
ποθούμενον).828	
	
However,	 it	 is	 striking	 that	 despite	 the	 demise	 of	 desire	 Macrina’s	 vision	 of	
spiritual	 fulfilment	 is	 markedly	 focussed	 on	 enjoyment.	 In	 De	 anima	 et	











the	 soul.829	As	 the	 soul	 attains	 the	 true	 Beauty	 and	 is	 transformed	 into	 its	
likeness,	 it	 also	 puts	 aside	 both	 memory	 and	 hope,	 focussing	 entirely	 on	 the	
enjoyment	of	good	things	(τὴν	ἀπόλαυσιν	τῶν	ἀγαθῶν)830.	The	hope	of	 future	
enjoyment	which	has	inspired	the	soul	during	the	earlier	stages	of	the	spiritual	
progress	 becomes	 redundant	when	 the	 thing	 hoped	 for	 is	 at	 hand.	 Neither	 is	
there	 any	 need	 for	 the	 grief	 and	 regret	 which	 previously	 have	 resulted	 from	
remembering	the	original	blessed	state	of	humanity	and	the	separation	caused	
by	subsequent	evil-doing,	for	the	soul	is	now	restored	to	a	full	communion	with	
the	 divine.	 Even	 faith	 becomes	 redundant	 because	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 required	 to	
sustain	 the	 hope	 for	 that	 which	 one	 cannot	 see.831	What	 remains	 is	 a	 loving	






We	should	note	how	Gregory	refrains	 from	using	 the	 term	ἡδονή	 in	Macrina’s	
description	of	the	eschatological	union,	and	instead	systematically	employs	the	
word	ἀπόλαυσις	to	denote	the	highest	state	of	spiritual	enjoyment.	As	we	have	
seen,	disuse	of	ἡδονή	 is	not	atypical,	 but	 the	 complete	absence	of	 the	word	 is	
likely	 further	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 earlier	 in	 the	 same	 work	 Macrina	
explicitly	 associates	 it	 with	 ἐπιθυμία. 833 	In	 other	 words,	 in	 De	 anima	 et	
resurrectione,	 the	 ‘divine	and	undefiled’	ἡδονή	and	spiritual	ἀπόλαυσις	are	not	











development	 occurs	 in	 Plotinus	 and	 Proclus	who,	 as	 Van	 Riel	 notes,	 formally	
accept	 Plato’s	 definition	 of	 pleasure	 (ἡδονή)	 as	 a	 replenishment	 and,	 to	
safeguard	 its	 viability,	 apply	 different	 terms	 (εὐπάθεια,	 εὐφροσύνη)	 to	
intellectual	enjoyment	that	does	not	follow	the	same	pattern.834	
	
While	 it	 is	easy	 to	grasp	 the	meaning	of	 the	 ‘divine	and	undefiled	pleasure’	 so	
long	as	the	soul	is	chasing	beauty,	it	is	legitimate	to	ask	how	the	very	pinnacle	of	
the	 spiritual	 life	 can	 yield	 any	 enjoyment	 if	 desire	 and	 all	 passions	 springing	
from	 ἐπιθυμία	 are	 extinguished.	 How	 can	 we	 talk	 about	 enjoyment	 that	
continues	 after	 desire	 has	 reached	 its	 goal?	 Simply	 put,	 Gregory	 and	Macrina	
now	 face	 the	 same	 challenge	 that	 the	 later	Platonists	 grappled	with:	 the	 lack-
and-replenishment	 cannot	 account	 for	 the	 lasting	 enjoyment	 that	 is	 derived	
from	 stable	 and	 permanent	 satisfaction.	 We	 should	 keep	 in	 mind	 that	 even	




goods.	 What	 is	 this	 enjoyment	 like?	 And	 what	 ensures	 the	 soul’s	 continued	
attraction	to	the	good	if	it	is	not	propelled	on	by	desire?	
	
I	 have	 already	 cited	 Smith	 who	 notes	 that	 in	 Macrina’s	 conception	 of	 the	
eschatological	 union	 desire	 gives	 way	 to	 dispassionate	 love	 (ἀγάπη)	 which	
ensures	 the	 soul’s	 continued	 attachment	 to	 God.	 Love	 is,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	
natural	response	to	beauty,	and	on	the	other,	the	defining	characteristic	of	the	




who	 recognize	 it	 (τὸ	 καλὸν	 ἀγαπητὸν	 πάντως	 ἐστὶ	 τοῖς	 γινώσκουσι),	 and	 the	 divine	
recognizes	 itself	 (γινώσκει	 δὲ	 αὐτὸ	 τὸ	 Θεῖον).	 But	 then	 knowledge	 becomes	 love	







In	other	words,	Macrina	understands	 the	divine	 life	as	a	perpetual	 act	of	 self-




offers	 potential	 for	 endless	 recognition	 and	 love.	 In	 a	 corresponding	manner,	
also	 in	 the	 soul	 the	 process	 of	 coming	 to	 know	 the	 Beautiful	 will	 inevitably	




things	 that	 the	soul	 is	yet	 to	discover.	And	since	 the	divine	beauty	 is	essential	
and	perfect,	it	never	turns	into	its	opposite.	Instead,	it	offers	a	lasting	experience	
of	pure	 love,	unlike	the	 imperfect	mixed	goods	of	 this	world.837	While	Macrina	
does	not	explicitly	articulate	how	enjoyment	is	related	to	love,	we	should	keep	
in	mind	that	love	and	pleasure	generally	share	a	close	connection.	In	Homilies	on	




Thus,	we	 can	 conclude	 that	 although	 the	 soul	 finds	 a	 complete	 satisfaction	 in	
God,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 it	 remains	 entirely	 static.	 A	 number	 of	 times	
Macrina	refers	to	the	‘activity	of	love’		(ἀγάπην	ἐνεργείας)	which	characterises	
the	 divine	 life	 itself	 and	 in	 which	 the	 soul	 participates	 in	 the	 eschatological	
union. 839 	While	 it	 would	 be	 exaggerated	 to	 claim	 that	 here	 Gregory	 is	
deliberately	 applying	 an	 Aristotelian	 model	 of	 contemplation	 and	 its	
corresponding	 pleasures	 to	 bypass	 the	 problems	 of	 Plato’s	 definition,	 the	
language	 of	 activity	 certainly	 lends	 itself	 well	 to	 Aristotelian	 interpretations:	







which	 is	 accompanied	 by	 the	 highest	 possible	 enjoyment.	 Whereas	 Aristotle	
contends	 that	 constant	 pleasure	 is	 impossible	 because	 no	 human	 activity	 can	







the	 soul	 does	 not	 reach	 its	 natural	 limits	 and	 become	 satiated	 by	 the	 divine	
goods.	It	is	easy	to	accept	that	as	an	infinite	being	God	can	engage	in	perpetual	
self-contemplation,	but	 it	 is	 less	obvious	how	a	created	and	thus	 limited	being	
can	do	the	same.	Thus,	 it	becomes	necessary	to	discuss	the	soul’s	 ‘dimensions’	
and	 its	 capacity	 for	 the	 infinite,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 soul	 is	 of	 course	 not	
confined	by	spatio-temporal	 limitations	 in	the	same	way	as	the	material	body:	
Macrina	argues	that	the	soul	avoids	satiety	by	continuously	expanding	its	limits.	
Although	 the	 soul	 is	 limited	 as	 a	 created	 being,	 it	 grows	 indefinitely	 to	
accommodate	the	beauty	it	discovers.	In	an	implicit	reference	to	the	metaphor	
of	a	leaky	vessel,	Macrina	envisions	a	mode	of	spiritual	filling	which	seeks	to	set	





that	 sustains	 the	 universe	 fashioned	 certain	 vessels	 (ἀγγεῖά)	 as	 it	 were,	 receptacles	
with	 free	 wills	 consisting	 of	 souls	 (προαιρετικὰ	 τῶν	 ψυχῶν	 δοχεῖα),	 for	 this	 very	




For	 such	 is	 the	 participation	 in	 the	 divine	 good	 (ἡ	 τοῦ	 θείου	 ἀγαθοῦ	 μετουσία):	 it	
renders	 one	 in	 whom	 it	 comes	 about	 greater	 and	 more	 capacious	 (μείζονα	 καὶ	
δεκτικώτερον),	since	 it	allows	 into	the	recipient	an	addition	of	power	and	magnitude,	






the	 entire	 inflow	 an	 addition	 to	 its	 own	 proportions,	 since	 nothing	 it	 receives	 is	
superfluous	 and	 useless	 (μηδὲν	 τοῦ	 λαμβανομένου	 περιττωματικόν	 τε	 εἶναι	 καὶ	
ἄχρηστον).	It	becomes	at	the	same	time	more	attractive	of	the	better	and	more	able	to	
contain	 it	 (πολυχωρητοτέρα),	 each	 aspect	 growing	 along	 with	 the	 other,	 both	 the	
power	which	 is	nourished	by	the	abundance	of	 the	good	so	 that	 it	grows	greater,	and	




Above,	 Macrina	 depicts	 the	 human	 soul	 as	 an	 expanding	 vessel	 that	 grows	
infinitely	to	make	room	for	the	divine	riches.	Here,	the	soul	is	not	the	leaky	jar	of	
earthly	 pleasure	 seeking,	 but	 retains	 what	 it	 receives	 and	 expands	 to	
accommodate	any	new	addition.	We	should	note	how	Gregory’s	depiction	of	the	
soul	 –	 or	 more	 specifically	 the	 rational	 nature	 –	 as	 a	 secure	 and	 expanding	
receptacle	differs	from	his	view	of	the	bodily	nature,	which	has	fixed	limits	and	
cannot	 grow	 indefinitely	 to	 accommodate	 a	 constant	 influx	 of	 goods. 842	





Since	 Macrina	 has	 already	 emphatically	 stated	 that	 the	 soul	 united	 to	 God	
suffers	no	lack,	the	inflow	of	blessings	does	not	fill	a	pre-existing	deficit.	To	use	
a	 rough	modern	analogy,	 the	soul	 is	 less	 like	a	half-empty	 jar	and	more	 like	a	
water	balloon	with	unlimited	capacity;	it	expands	at	the	very	moment	of	being	
filled.	 The	 only	 ‘lack’	 we	 can	 conceive	 exists	 so	 far	 as	 the	 soul	 acquires	
something	 it	 did	 not	 possess	 before.	 This	 is	 inevitable	 since	 due	 to	 divine	
infinity	 there	 are	 always	 goods	 that	 remain	 outside	 the	 current	 grasp	 of	 the	
soul.	 However,	 as	 Van	 Riel	 notes	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 last	 Neoplatonist	
philosopher	Damascius,	the	idea	of	lack	as	mere	absence	is	rather	different	from	

















by	 showing	 that	 also	 in	 In	 Canticum	 enjoyment	 plays	 a	 role	 even	 before	 the	
actualisation	of	the	eschatological	union	as	a	foretaste	of	the	life	to	come.	I	have	
already	 discussed	 his	 remarks	 on	 hope	 and	 anticipatory	 enjoyment.	 As	 Smith	
notes,	Gregory’s	depiction	of	anticipatory	enjoyment	 is	not	 in	conflict	with	the	
comparable	 account	 of	 De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione. 844 	In	 both,	 desire	 and	
enjoyment	increase	side	by	side	as	desire	anticipates	its	fulfilment.	The	conflict	
concerns	 only	 Gregory’s	 vision	 of	 the	 eschatological	 union	when	 the	 soul	 has	
been	purified	and	fully	united	to	God.	Whereas	Macrina	argues	that	desire	will	
eventually	 be	 extinguished	 when	 the	 soul	 reaches	 its	 goal,	 in	 In	 Canticum	
Gregory	 defends	 a	 more	 dynamic	 vision:	 here,	 ἀπόλαυσις	 drives	 ἐπιθυμία	 to	
strive	for	ever	greater	goods.	
At	the	beginning	of	the	work	Gregory	argues	that	the	words	of	the	Song	of	Songs	
and	 the	 perfection	 they	 describe	 are	 comprehensible	 only	 to	 those	who	 have	
relinquished	 every	 corporeal	 disposition	 and	 reached	 freedom	 from	passions,	
which	 is	 here	 understood	 as	 a	 state	 where	 the	 bodily	 impulses	 are	 fully	
submitted	 to	 the	 control	 of	 the	mind	 and	 do	 not	 pull	 the	 soul	 into	 opposing	
directions.	Instead,	they	exist	in	harmony	with	the	mind,	fully	directed	towards	














is	 truly	pleasant	and	rightly	 judged	as	good.	But	 in	the	passage	above	Gregory	
presents	another	characteristic	that	he	associates	with	spiritual	enjoyment	in	In	
Canticum,	 which	 clearly	 diverges	 from	 the	 view	 presented	 by	 Macrina	 in	 De	
anima:	the	desire	for	the	Good	is	not	extinguished	but	expanded	by	enjoyment.	
The	more	the	soul	delights	in	God,	the	more	its	desire	grows	beyond	what	it	is	
presently	 enjoying.	 In	 In	 Canticum,	 spiritual	 perfection	 does	 not	 entail	 the	









others	 in	 whom	 the	 divine	 yearning	 was	 deeply	 lodged	 never	 ceased	 from	 desire;	
everything	that	came	to	them	from	God	for	the	enjoyment	of	the	Object	of	yearning	they	
made	into	the	material	and	fuel	for	a	more	ardent	desire.	And	just	as	now	the	soul	that	
is	 joined	 to	 God	 is	 not	 satiated	 by	 her	 enjoyment	 of	 him	 (ἀκορέστως	 ἔχει	 τῆς	










down	 their	 throats	 and	 became	 ‘sweetness’,	 which	 was	 consumed	 by	 other	
people	to	their	benefit.	This	enjoyment	(ἀπόλαυσις)	caused	by	the	divine	honey	






it	 longs	 to	 grasp.	 Unlike	 bodily	 desire	 which	 is	 bound	 to	 wither	 in	 satiety,	










the	 divine	 in	 the	 eschatological	 union	 is	 in	 some	 ways	 different	 from	 the	
foretaste	 that	 is	 given	 to	 us	 on	 earth.	 Despite	 the	 continuity	 between	 the	
anticipatory	enjoyment	in	this	life	and	the	eschatological	fulfilment	in	the	life	to	
come,	Gregory	highlights	that	 in	the	eschaton	we	will	comprehend	the	form	of	
ineffable	 beauty	 through	 a	 different	 mode	 of	 enjoyment	 (ἄλλος	 τρόπος	 τῆς	
ἀπολαύσεως)	which	has	not	yet	entered	the	human	heart.	What	was	previously	
known	 indirectly	 through	 ‘the	 workings	 of	 things	 that	 appear’	 (διὰ	 τῆς	 τῶν	





849	Cant.	11	 (GNO	VI,	 336).	 See	 also	 Smith,	Passion	and	Paradise,	 211.	 Following	McCambley’s	
translation	 (p.	 208),	 Smith	 reads	 Gregory	 to	 say	 that	 in	 the	 eschatological	 fulfilment	 God’s	
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The	 model	 which	 Gregory	 presents	 in	 In	 Canticum	 is	 in	 many	 ways	 highly	
compatible	with	his	general	notion	of	epektasis,	the	eternal	progress	of	the	soul	
in	 the	 infinite	 God.	 Since	 ἐπιθυμία	 is	 fuelled	 by	 a	 lack	 and	 the	 infinite	 and	
radically	Other	God	can	never	be	fully	grasped,	it	is	logical	that	human	desiring	
continues	 even	 in	 the	 eschaton.	There	will	 always	be	more	 to	 love	 and	 enjoy.	
But	if	we	consider	Gregory’s	view	in	light	of	the	ancient	tradition,	we	encounter	
a	peculiar	difficulty:	if	spiritual	enjoyment	is	driven	by	ἐπιθυμία,	which	Gregory	
conceptualises	 as	 a	 lack	 that	 causes	 pain,	 does	 this	 not	 mean	 that	 spiritual	








Let	 us	 begin	 by	 noting	 that	 Gregory	 does	 not	 only	 implicitly	 suggest	 the	
presence	 of	 pain	 by	 including	 desire	 at	 the	 highest	 stages	 of	 the	 spiritual	
progress,	 but	 refers	 explicitly	 to	 a	 soul	 that	 is	 lacking	 and	 hurting	 even	 as	 it	
enters	 into	 a	 communion	with	 the	 divine.	 In	Homily	6,	 Gregory	 describes	 the	
moment	 at	 which	 the	 soul	 is	 united	 to	 God,	 using	 phrases	 which	 state	 in	 no	
uncertain	 terms	 that	 he	 is	 referring	 to	 a	 fully	 actualised	 union,	 not	 to	 pre-
eschatological	 longing.850	As	the	soul	 is	 ‘in	 the	One	who	is	 the	object	of	desire’	
and	receives	 ‘the	object	of	desire	within	 itself’,	 it	appears	 to	have	attained	 the	
highest	 good.	 But	 the	 union	 comes	with	 a	 troubling	 realisation:	 the	 soul	 now	






of	 enjoyment.	 The	 parallel	 structure	 reads	 simply	 that	 the	 ineffable	 Blessedness	 ‘shall	 be	
apprehended	 in	 another	 fashion,	 and	 the	 mode	 of	 its	 fruition	 will	 be	 different’	 (ἀλλ’	 ἑτέρως	






lack	 and	 dissatisfaction	 felt	 by	 the	 soul	 after	entering	 into	 a	 union	 with	 God	
could	not	be	more	explicitly	worded.		
	
Furthermore,	Gregory	does	not	 limit	himself	 to	 imagery	of	 lack	 and	need,	 but	
also	conceptualises	the	soul’s	longing	for	God	as	a	pain	and	wound.	In	the	fourth	















and	depicts	 the	advanced	spiritual	 state	as	bittersweet	 love	sickness,	which	 is	
characterised	by	intense	longing	for	the	Beloved.	
	
This,	 however,	 is	 not	 the	 whole	 story.	 Two	 fundamental	 realisations	 will	




bridal	 soul,	 she	will	 soon	understand	 that	 there	 is	no	 reason	 to	 feel	hopeless:	
																																																								
851	Cant.	6	(GNO	VI,	179);	trans.	Norris,	191.	

















between	 desiring	 and	 pain	 is	 still	 present,	 this	 is	 a	 different	 sort	 of	 pain,	 a	
source	of	joy.	The	idea	is	reminiscent	of	the	sweetened	pain	of	the	martyrs	who	























that	 even	 at	 the	 height	 of	 intimacy	 she	 can	 never	 possess	 the	 divine	 Beloved	
completely.	 Despite	 abundant	metaphors	 of	 pain	 and	 violence,	 Gregory	 states	
explicitly	that	the	verses	do	not	allude	to	any	earthly	notion	of	suffering.	While	
he	 admits	 that	 the	 expressions	 ‘will	 seem	 to	 be	 suited	 more	 to	 one	 who	 is	
bewailing	 her	 lot’	 and	 indicate	 ‘something	 repellent’	 by	 suggesting	 suffering	
(ἄλγημα),	he	is	quick	to	specify	that	they	are,	in	fact,	‘the	utterances	of	a	person	
who	 is	 glorying	 in	 things	 of	 the	 greatest	 beauty.’858	The	 bride,	 he	 says,	 ‘is	 not	
occasioned	any	 suffering	 (ὀδύνην)	by	 the	blow	she	 receives	but	 glories	 in	 the	
freedom	 of	 access	 accorded	 her	 by	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 curtain,	 which	 is	 here	









For	 the	 soul	 that	 goes	 out	 at	 his	word,	 seeking	 the	One	who	 is	 not	 found	 and	 calling	
upon	the	One	whom	words	cannot	attain,	is	taught	by	the	watchmen	that	she	is	in	love	
with	 the	 Unattainable	 and	 is	 directing	 herself	 toward	 the	 Incomprehensible	 (τοῦ	
ἀνεφίκτου	ἐρᾷ	καὶ	τοῦ	ἀκαταλήπτου	ἐφίεται).	At	their	hands	she	is,	in	a	certain	sense,	
struck	and	wounded	 (πλήσσεται	καὶ	 τραυματίζεται)	by	 the	hopelessness	of	what	 she	
yearns	for,	judging	that	her	desire	for	the	good	(τοῦ	καλοῦ	τὴν	ἐπιθυμίαν)	is	imperfect	
and	 falls	 short	 of	 its	 fruition	 (ἀτελῆ	 τε	 καὶ	 ἀναπόλαυστον).	 But	 the	 veil	 of	 her	 grief	
(λύπης)	 is	 removed	when	 she	 learns	 that	 the	 true	 fruition	 of	what	 she	 yearns	 for	 (ἡ	
ἀληθὴς	 τοῦ	 ποθουμένου	 ἀπόλαυσις)	 is	 ever	 to	 make	 progress	 in	 seeking	 (τὸ	 ἀεὶ	
προκόπτειν	 ἐν	 τῷ	 ζητεῖν)	 and	 never	 to	 halt	 on	 the	 upward	 path,	 since	 her	 fulfilled	
desire	 ever	 generates	 a	 further	 desire	 for	 what	 is	 beyond	 her	 (τῆς	 πάντοτε	
πληρουμένης	 ἐπιθυμίας	 ἑτέραν	 ἐπιθυμίαν	 τοῦ	 ὑπερκειμένου	 γεννώσης).	 As,	 then,	 the	












Above,	 Gregory	 describes	 the	 soul’s	 transformation	 as	 she	 is	 first	 ‘struck	 and	
wounded’	by	the	apparent	hopelessness	of	her	pursuit	but	then	has	the	‘veil	of	
her	 grief’	 lifted	 and	 understands	 that	 her	 truest	 fruition	 (or	 enjoyment,	
ἀπόλαυσις)	 lies	 in	 the	 never-ending	 pursuit	 itself.	 As	 Gregory	 recounts,	 this	








(τρωθεῖσα)	by	 the	 incorporeal	 and	 fiery	 arrow	 of	 love,	 for	 agapê	when	 intensified	 is	
called	love	(ἐπιτεταμένη	γὰρ	ἀγάπη	ὁ	ἔρως	λέγεται).861	
	
What	 comes	 about	 is	 a	 desiring	 that	 still	 implies	 the	 presence	 of	 pain	 –	 a	
radically	different	 ‘sweet	pain’	–	but	 is	divested	of	hopelessness	and	grief,	 the	
side	 effects	 of	 earthly	 desire	 that	 fails	 to	 attain	 its	 goal.	 The	 crucial	 epiphany	
that	accompanies	the	lifting	of	the	veil	is	that	it	is	different	to	desire	the	divine	
and	 desire	 a	 created	 object.	 Here,	 the	 object	 of	 love	 is	 infinite	 and	 knows	 no	
bounds,	 and	 as	 such	 it	 can	never	 be	 fully	 grasped.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 soul	
already	rests	in	what	it	desires,	and	what	has	been	attained	will	never	be	taken	
away;	the	Beloved	is	at	once	secure	and	elusive.	Thus,	the	enjoyment	does	not	
result	 from	 any	 final	 capture	 of	 the	 object	 of	 love,	 but	 from	 an	 infinite	
succession	of	novel	manifestations	of	 the	Beloved.	As	 the	soul	 reaches	what	 it	
has	previously	desired,	it	will	be	met	with	a	new	revelation	to	entice	its	desire.	












without	 defect.	 In	 such	 a	 context,	 the	 soul,	 even	 if	 it	 cannot	 experience	 all	 of	 God’s	
goodness	 at	 once,	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 experience	 the	 poverty	 and	 want	 (save	 in	
comparison	 with	 the	 divine	 nature	 itself)	 that	 breeds	 the	 frustrated	 longing	of	 erôs.	




This,	 argues	 Smith,	 is	 what	 ultimately	 makes	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 a	 peaceful,	




in	 the	 unsteady	 flux	 of	 the	 sensible	 realm,	 but	 arises	 from	 the	 defining	
characteristic	 of	 creaturely	 existence	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 unchanging	 being	 of	
God.864	However,	 as	 Smith	 explains,	 since	 the	 resurrected	 becoming	 occurs	
entirely	 in	 the	presence	of	God,	God’s	perfectly	good,	 stable,	 and	ever-present	
being	 grants	 it	 a	 special	 certainty	 and	 continuity,	 which	 prevents	 it	 from	
withering	 in	 satiety.	 There	 is	 no	 risk	 that	 the	 source	of	 divine	 enjoyment	will	
suddenly	turn	into	its	opposite	and	frustrate	the	soul’s	search.	In	other	words,	
the	 resurrected	 becoming	does	 not	 entail	 an	 alternation	 of	 good	 and	 evil,	 but	
simply	an	increasing	intimacy	with	the	ever-present	perfect	good.	According	to	
Smith,	 this	 movement	 is	 best	 described	 as	 an	 ascent	 that	 takes	 place	 ‘fully	
within’	God,	rather	than	as	a	‘striving	toward’	him.865	However,	so	far	as	God	is	







becoming	 ‘all	 in	 all’.	 Thus,	 there	 will	 always	 be	 an	 ontological	 gap	 which	
separates	the	soul	from	its	divine	Beloved,	enabling	erôs	to	flourish.866	As	Smith	
shows,	 the	 true	enjoyment	of	 the	soul	 lies	 ‘in	 the	realization	 that	 the	goods	of	
God	will	never	grow	old	but	will	continue	to	excite	the	soul	and	eternally	arouse	




To	 sum	 up	 our	 findings,	 in	 De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione	Macrina	 and	 Gregory	
explicitly	deny	 the	presence	of	 any	 lack,	pain,	or	 striving	 in	 the	eschatological	
union.	In	In	Canticum,	on	the	other	hand,	Gregory	is	happy	to	include	desire	and	
pain	even	at	the	pinnacle	of	spiritual	perfection,	though	he	underscores	that	the	




filling,	 even	 if	 the	 soul	 is	 at	 all	 times	 fully	 satisfied	and	 suffers	no	 lack.	 I	have	
suggested	that	this	filling	is	best	understood	as	a	gift	from	a	supernatural	order.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 that	 even	 in	 In	Canticum	Gregory	 argues	 explicitly	
that	 the	 perfected	 soul	 suffers	 no	natural	 lack.	 He	 states	with	 clarity	 that	 the	
soul	does	not	lack	anything	either	in	Paradise	or	after	being	purified	and	united	
to	 God;	 the	 latter	 state	 is,	 of	 course,	 a	 restoration	 of	 the	 former.868	There	 is,	
however,	 a	 supernatural	 lack,	 which	 Gregory	 notes	 for	 example	 in	Homily	11	




In	 the	 former,	 the	 goods	 are	 conveyed	 as	 gratuitous	 gifts	 without	 conscious	









active	 striving	 and	 God’s	 surprising	 action	 which	 surpasses	 the	 soul’s	
expectation.	Despite	the	differences,	both	of	these	models	highlight	the	absence	








keep	 in	 mind	 that	 Gregory	 applies	 the	 criterion	 of	 unity	 chiefly	 to	 the	 Good	
itself,	while	 the	 enjoyment	 derived	 from	 the	Good	 is	 a	 secondary	matter.	 The	




Good	 but	 by	 the	 infinity	 of	 the	 Good	 itself.	 Since	 everything,	 including	 the	
human	will,	is	fully	in	the	good,	there	is	no	risk	of	slipping	into	its	opposite.	Our	
only	options	are	goodness	and	more	goodness.	While	the	enjoyment	offered	by	







caused	by	any	mixing	with	evil.	 If	enjoyment	 itself	were	accepted	as	 the	good,	
the	presence	of	pain	would	be	a	problem.	However,	the	Good	does	not	lie	in	the	
enjoyment	itself;	enjoyment	is	merely	a	by-product	of	attaining	the	likeness	of	
God,	which	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 stability	 of	 the	divine	being.	 Since	pleasure	 is	 not	
good	and	pain	is	not	evil,	both	of	them	can	continue	to	exist	even	at	the	highest	




By	 accepting	 desire	 and	 its	 companions,	 lack	 and	 pain,	 into	 the	 spiritual	
fulfilment,	Gregory	is	able	to	apply	the	model	of	 lack	and	replenishment	to	his	
conception	 of	 spiritual	 enjoyment	 much	 more	 confidently	 than	 the	 non-
Christian	 Neoplatonists	 or	 even	 Macrina	 in	 De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione.	 The	
Neoplatonists	 would,	 of	 course,	 dismiss	 Gregory’s	 solution	 altogether	 as	 the	
eluding	perfection	implies	that	the	soul	is	in	a	constant	process	of	becoming,	a	
state	 that	Platonists	 consider	 lower	 than	being.	But,	 as	Smith	and	others	have	
noted,	for	Gregory	becoming	is	not	antithetical	to	human	perfection	but	intrinsic	
of	a	being	that	has	been	created	from	nothing.	This	coming-to-be	characterises	
its	 existence	 even	 in	 the	 eschaton	 and	 serves	 as	 a	 vehicle	 of	 perfection	 and	
perpetual	self-transcendence.	 It	 is	becoming	that	 forever	separates	 the	human	
being	from	God’s	absolute	being.	
	
The	 model	 of	 spiritual	 enjoyment	 put	 forth	 in	 In	 Canticum	 also	 has	 certain	
advantages	 over	 Plato’s	 own	 conception	 of	 intellectual	 pleasure.	 First,	 by	
asserting	 that	 intellectual	 enjoyment	 can	 be	 preceded	 by	 a	 perceptible	 lack,	
Gregory	is	able	to	create	a	much	broader	notion	of	intellectual	enjoyment	than	
Plato	 does	 with	 his	 notoriously	 limited	 definition	 of	 pure	 pleasure.	 And	 by	
assuming	the	 infinity	of	divine	goods,	Gregory	can	accept	at	once	that	 it	 is	 the	
act	of	coming	to	know	rather	than	the	continued	possession	of	knowledge	that	
yields	 pleasure,	 and	 that	 intellectual	 pleasure	 can	 offer	 never-ending	















a	noticeable	 shift	 in	his	 thinking	 about	 the	 role	 of	 desire	 and	 the	nature	of	 the	 soul’s	
enjoyment	 of	 the	 God	with	whom	 it	 is	 united.	Whereas	On	 the	 Soul	 and	Resurrection	
dispenses	 with	 the	 erotic	 model	 of	 participation	 when	 describing	 the	 soul’s	
eschatological	movement	to	God,	his	homilies	on	the	Song	of	Songs,	while	retaining	the	
language	 of	 apolausis	 to	 describe	 the	 soul’s	 beatific	 communion	 with	 God,	 view	
enjoyment	as	the	beginning	of	desire,	rather	than	its	end.870	
	
Further,	 Smith	 argues	 that	 in	 In	 Canticum	 Gregory	 makes	 ‘two	 necessary	
corrections’	 to	De	anima,	which	challenge	 the	view	 that	a	progressive	 journey	
into	 God	 can	 be	 made	 without	 desire.871	First,	 ‘Nyssen	 in	 the	 later	 works	








This	 linear	 reading	 is	 attractive	 and	 in	 harmony	 with	 Daniélou’s	 influential	
suggestion	that	Gregory’s	attitude	towards	the	human	body	and,	by	implication,	
the	 irrational	 parts	 of	 the	 soul	 acquires	 a	 more	 positive	 tone	 in	 his	 mature	
works.874	In	 Chapter	 9,	 I	 will	 turn	 to	 an	 article	 on	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 the	
spiritual	 senses	 where	 Sarah	 Coakley	 presents	 a	 similar	 account.	 However,	
certain	passages	in	Gregory’s	corpus	complicate	Smith’s	developmental	reading.	













explained	 the	problem	of	 satiety	and	 the	 impermanence	of	bodily	pleasure.875	




ἐστιν)	 at	 any	 age	 and	 at	 every	 time	 of	 life,	 and	 of	which	 satiety	 is	 not	 expected,	 nor	
fullness	 found	 (οὗ	κόρος	οὐκ	ἐλπίζεται	καὶ	πλησμονὴ	οὐχ	εὑρίσκεται).	Appetite	 for	 it	








day	 and	by	night,	 on	 land	 and	on	 the	 sea,	 active	 and	 at	 rest,	 ruling	 and	 serving	 –	 for	
every	person	alive	 it	 is	 equally	 absolutely	 good	 (ἐπ’	 ἴσης	ἀγαθόν)	 since	 the	 accidents	
inflicted	on	one	by	chance	make	it	neither	worse	not	better,	nor	smaller	nor	larger.	
	
This,	 as	 I	 understand	 it,	 is	 the	 Good	 that	 truly	 is	 (τὸ	 ὄντως	 ὂν	 ἀγαθόν),	 the	 thing	
Solomon	sought	to	see,	which	people	will	do	under	the	sun	throughout	all	the	number	





exactly	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 in	 Homilies	 on	 the	 Song	 of	 Songs:	 when	 the	 soul	
enjoys	 that	 which	 is	 truly	 good,	 delight	 ignites	 desire	 instead	 of	 seeing	 it	
dwindle	 in	 satiety,	 and	 the	 ontological	 stability	 and	 fullness	 of	 the	 true	 good	
ensures	 that	 it	 is	 desirable	 and	 enjoyable	 for	 all	 people	 at	 all	 times.	












Canticum	 is	 generally	 accepted	 to	 be	 a	 late	work	written	 after	 390.	 Following	
Daniélou,	Smith	dates	the	homilies	between	391	and	394.878	Gregory’s	Homilies	
on	Ecclesiastes	clearly	predate	those	on	the	Song	of	Songs.	Most	scholars	place	In	
Ecclesiasten	before	 the	Council	 of	Constantinople	 and	 the	death	of	Meletius	 in	
381,	with	379–380	as	 a	possible	bracket.879	While	 the	 exact	 time	of	writing	 is	
impossible	 to	 ascertain,	 none	 of	 the	 surveyed	 commentators	 suggest	 a	
significantly	later	date.	It	appears,	then,	that	the	homilies	were	written	around	




mutually	 enforcing	 cycle	 of	 spiritual	 desire	 and	 spiritual	 delight	 already	 at	 a	
relatively	 early	 point	 of	 his	 career.	 This	 calls	 into	 question	 Smith’s	
interpretation	of	 an	 ‘early’	 and	a	 ‘late’	model.	However,	 it	 is	possible	 to	argue	
that	in	the	passage	above	Gregory	does	not	talk	specifically	about	the	climax	of	
the	 spiritual	 life	 in	 the	 eschaton	 but	 merely	 about	 a	 lower	 state	 in	 which	
epithumia	is	still	active.	Smith’s	 focus	 is,	after	all,	on	the	 fate	of	desire	and	the	
nature	of	enjoyment	 in	 the	eschatological	 fulfilment	when	God	becomes	 ‘all	 in	
all’,	 a	 state	which	Gregory	describes	as	different	 from	our	 relationship	 to	God	
during	the	earthly	life.	In	the	Solomonic	trilogy,	Ecclesiastes	precedes	Canticum	
canticorum	and	prepares	the	soul	for	the	union	with	the	divine	by	detaching	it	
from	 the	 pleasures	 of	 this	 world.880 	Indeed,	 in	 Eccl.	 2,	 Gregory	 is	 clearly	
describing	how	humans	can	relate	 to	God	 in	 the	midst	of	 the	different	phases,	
circumstances,	 and	 turmoils	 of	 this	 life.	 The	 text	 is	 interesting	 for	 the	 very	
																																																								
877	Pierre	Maraval,	 ‘Chronology	of	Works’,	 in	The	Brill	Dictionary	of	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	 ed.	Lucas	












continues	 in	 the	 kingdom	 of	 God.881	Thus,	 if	 the	 cycle	 of	 desire	 and	 delight	
eventually	 gave	 way	 to	 a	 higher	 fulfilment	 consisting	 only	 of	 enjoyment,	 one	
would	 think	 that	 Gregory	 had	 noted	 this	 limitation	 when	 he	 discusses	 the	
enjoyment	 derived	 from	 the	 true	 Good	 in	 the	 present	 life.	 However,	 such	
remarks	are	entirely	absent	from	the	passage	and	Gregory’s	description	of	the	
spiritual	 delight	 is	 laudatory,	 a	 noble	 counter-example	 to	 the	 fleeting	 and	
unsatisfying	pursuit	of	earthly	pleasure.		
	
Thankfully,	we	do	not	have	 to	argue	only	from	silence.	 It	 is	possible	 to	 find	at	
least	 one	 early	 text	 where	 the	 eschaton	 is	 explicitly	 described	 with	 desire-
centred	 terms.	 The	 passage	 occurs	 in	 Gregory’s	 consolatory	 discourse	 De	
mortuis	non	esse	dolendum	where	he	examines	the	fate	of	bodily	existence	after	
the	 resurrection.	 The	 work	 is	 dated	 around	 379–380;	 many	 consider	 it	 a	
(possibly	 younger)	 contemporary	 of	 De	 hominis	 opificio	 and	 De	 anima	 et	
resurrectione,	while	Daniélou	proposes	an	even	earlier	date.882	If	In	Ecclesiasten	
may	 refer	 to	 the	 earthly	 existence,	 here	 the	 context	 is	 unequivocally	
eschatological.	Gregory	notes	 that	after	death	purifies	us	 from	all	 the	passions	













θησαυρῶν	 πλεονεξία),	 the	 beautiful	 and	 good	 love	 of	 glory	 (ἡ	 καλή	 τε	 καὶ	 ἀγαθὴ	
φιλοδοξία)	set	right	in	the	communion	of	the	kingdom	of	God,	and	the	beautiful	passion	
of	 insatiability	(τὸ	καλὸν	πάθος	τῆς	ἀπληστίας),	whose	yearning	(πόθον)	towards	the	





directed	 towards	 our	 one	 heavenly	 goal.	 This,	 to	 Gregory,	 is	 a	 sign	 that	 the	
workings	 of	 the	 body	 and	 the	 lower	 faculties	 of	 the	 soul	 do	 not	 have	 to	 be	
extinguished	 but	 simply	 remodelled	 in	 such	 a	 manner	 that	 they	 are	 entirely	
directed	towards	and	reflective	of	the	Good.	This	is	what	Macrina	argues	in	De	
anima,	but	in	De	mortuis	Gregory	is	referring	to	the	afterlife.	The	passage	speaks	
clearly	about	 the	activity	of	desire	 in	 the	 life	 to	 come.	Although	here	ὄρεξις	 is	
Gregory’s	term	of	choice,	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter	that	Gregory	employs	
it	as	a	synonym	of	ἐπιθυμία.	Furthermore,	the	words	ἐπιθυμητὸν	καὶ	ἐράσμιον	
and,	 later,	 ἔρως	 reveal	 that	 here	 Gregory	 is	 placing	 a	 form	 of	 desiring	 and	
grasping	 love	 at	 the	 very	 pinnacle	 of	 the	 spiritual	 life,	 just	 as	 he	 does	 in	 In	
Canticum.	 Above,	 Gregory	 does	 not	 discuss	 enjoyment	 explicitly,	 but	 I	 have	
already	shown	that	earlier	in	the	same	work	he	affirms	the	existence	of	spiritual	
ἠδονή.884	Furthermore,	the	notion	of	κόρος,	cited	in	the	text,	is	generally	tightly	




The	 examples	 from	 In	Ecclesiasten	and	De	mortuis	signal	 that	we	 should	 treat	
with	 caution	 a	 neat	 developmental	 account	 of	 spiritual	 enjoyment	 proceeding	
from	an	‘early’	view	in	De	anima	to	a	‘late’	view	in	In	Canticum.	Here	I	can	only	
raise	 a	 concern	 about	 such	 an	 interpretation;	 another	 investigation	would	 be	









that	 throughout	 the	work	Macrina	appears	 reluctant	 to	accept	 the	notion	 that	
the	passionate	impulses	can	be	transformed	into	impulses	for	the	good,	despite	
the	fact	that	Gregory	himself	expresses	this	idea	already	at	the	very	beginning	of	
his	career	 in	De	virginitate.	Thus,	 it	 is	possible	 that	 the	 literary	Macrina	 is,	 for	





885	Barnes	 suggests	 that	 De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione	 ‘is	 best	 understood	 not	 as	 an	 example	 of	
Gregory's	own	thought,	but	as	his	reception	of	a	traditional,	ascetical	anthropology’	reflected	in	
the	character	of	Macrina.	He	notes,	 furthermore:	 ‘I	understand	On	the	Soul	and	Resurrection	 to	
be	Gregory's	restatement	of	a	moral	anthropology	that	he	has	received	–	and	with	which	he	is	
not	 altogether	 comfortable,	 as	 his	 comments	make	 clear.’	 See	 Barnes,	 ‘The	 Polemical	 Context	
and	Content	of	Gregory	of	Nyssa’s	Psychology',	4,	including	footnote	10.	
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latter	 they	 remain	 fully	 closed	 as	 the	 mind	 explores	 and	 evaluates	 a	 higher,	
interior	 reality.	 Furthermore,	 in	 Chapter	 4	 we	 saw	 how	 the	 human	 mind	




However,	 this	 seemingly	 straightforward	 reading	 is	 complicated	 by	 the	 most	
recent	 analysis	 of	Gregory’s	 notion	of	 the	 spiritual	 senses	presented	by	 Sarah	
Coakley	 in	The	 Spiritual	 Senses:	 Perceiving	God	 in	Western	Christianity	 (2011),	
which	is	the	first	comprehensive	attempt	to	recount	the	history	of	the	spiritual	
senses	 in	 Christian	 theology.	 Here,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 offer	 a	 full	 critique	 of	
Coakley’s	interpretation,	let	alone	a	complete	discussion	on	Gregory’s	notion	of	
spiritual	 sensation.	 A	 brief	 engagement	 with	 the	 article	 is	 nonetheless	
necessary,	 because	 Coakley’s	 main	 argument	 directly	 undermines	 my	




of	 his	 career,	 Gregory	 departs	 from	 his	 earlier	 ‘Platonic’,	 ‘Origenistic’	 and	
‘disjunctive’	approach	to	the	spiritual	senses	which	presents	the	bodily	and	the	
spiritual	senses	as	two	separate	sets	of	faculties.	Instead,	he	crafts	‘a	developing	
and	 systematic	 account	 of	 how	 ordinary	 perception	 and	 the	 gross	 physical	
senses	 are	 capable	 of	 a	 progressive	 transformation	 in	 this	 life	 into	 spiritual	
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senses	 via	 a	 purgative	 process	 of	 ”death”	 and	 regeneration.’ 886 	Coakley	
attributes	the	development	to	a	process	of	maturation,	even	an	outright	change	
of	 mind,	 ‘about	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 bodily	 transformation	 could	 be	 possible	 –	
through	 the	 power	 of	 the	 Spirit	 and	 in	 union	 with	 Christ.’887	We	 can	 already	
notice	a	similarity	to	Smith’s	account	of	desire	in	the	eschaton	and,	ultimately,	
Daniélou’s	 argument	 that	 Gregory’s	 mature	 works	 present	 a	 more	 optimistic	
view	of	the	human	body.888	
	
In	 the	 relatively	 brief	 analysis	 that	 follows,	 Coakley	 sets	 out	 to	 answer	 two	
questions:	‘how	does	the	transfiguration	of	the	bodily	sense	occur,	according	to	
Gregory?’	and	‘how	are	we	to	explicate	the	continuum	in	Gregory	between	fallen	
sensuality	 and	 redeemed	 sensuality?’889	In	 other	 words,	 Coakley	 envisions	 a	
transformative	 process	 in	which	 the	bodily	senses	 are	 purified	 and	made	 into	
receptacles	of	the	divine	presence.	This,	for	her,	is	what	Gregory	talks	about	in	




earlier	 accounts	 of	 Gregory’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 spiritual	 senses.	 The	main	
target	 of	 her	 criticism	 is	Daniélou’s	Platonisme	et	théologie	mystique,	 in	which	
Daniélou	presents	the	bodily	and	the	spiritual	senses	as	merely	analogous	and	
separate	 sets	 of	 faculties.890	Coakley	 finds	 Daniélou’s	 account	 fundamentally	
shaped	 by	 nouvelle	 théologie	 and	 the	 post-Enlightenment	 tradition	 of	 Jesuit	
spiritual	 direction.	 She	 argues	 that	 both	 intellectual	 trajectories	 present	 the	
spiritual	senses	as	a	‘“purely	intellectual	imitation”	of	the	bodily	senses	specially	
capable	 of	 “perceiving	 the	 presence	 of	 God”.’891	As	 a	 result,	 Daniélou	 ends	 up	
with	a	voguish	‘modern’	reading	of	the	spiritual	senses	that	fails	to	do	justice	to	






890	See	 the	 section	 entitled	 ‘Les	 sens	 spirituels’	 in	 Daniélou,	 Platonisme	 et	 théologie	mystique,	
235–66.	





Coakley’s	 critique	 stands	 out	 even	 within	 contemporary	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa	
scholarship.	Two	years	after	the	publication	of	her	article,	Boersma	comments	
on	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 spiritual	 sensation	 arguing	 that	 ‘Gregory	 regards	 the	
various	 bodily	 sensations	 that	 he	 finds	 described	 in	 the	 Song	 not	 as	 literal	
descriptions	 of	 physical	 pleasure	 but	 instead	 as	 references	 to	 spiritual	
perception.	 A	 spiritual	 transposition	 is	 required	 to	 interpret	 properly	 the	
biblical	 allusions	 to	 physical	 perception	 and	 to	 the	 pleasure	 that	 it	 yields.’893	
Boersma’s	comment	makes	it	clear	that	an	investigation	of	Gregory’s	notion	of	
pleasure,	and	especially	spiritual	pleasure,	is	not	complete	without	a	discussion	




of	 the	 physical	 senses.895	Boersma	does	 not	 engage	with	 Coakley’s	 article	 and	
takes	for	granted	the	exclusion	of	the	body	from	spiritual	sensation.	This	 is,	of	
course,	 in	 line	 with	 his	 anagogical	 view	 of	 embodiment	 and	 general	 aim	 to	
challenge	the	inflated	spiritual	relevance	of	the	body	in	much	of	contemporary	
Gregory	 scholarship.	 However,	 since	 Boersma	 represents	 the	 traditional	 view	




on	double	pleasure	 in	which	Gregory	 appears	 to	 argue	 that	 spiritual	 pleasure	
occurs	without	the	involvement	of	the	bodily	senses,	and	that	this	is,	in	fact,	the	
safeguard	which	ascertains	that	our	judgment	is	free	from	fleeting	appearances	










cannot	 be	 sufficiently	 backed	 up	 with	 actual	 passages	 from	De	 anima	 and	 In	






of	 Coakley’s	 interpretation	 –	 vis	 à	 vis	 Daniélou’s	 earlier	 account	 –	 lies	 in	
drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 continuity	 that	 binds	 together	 bodily	 and	 spiritual	




Furthermore,	 I	 will	 again	 question	 the	 broad	 assumption	 (which	 incidentally	
has	its	roots	in	Daniélou’s	scholarship,	an	irony	Coakley	does	not	fail	to	note896)	
that	 Gregory’s	 later	 works,	 especially	 In	 Canticum,	 present	 a	 radically	 more	
holistic	and	bodily	worldview	than	his	earlier	works.	 I	 think	Coakley	is	 far	too	
quick	 to	 brush	 off	 significant	 passages	 in	 In	 Canticum	 which	 state	 in	 no	
uncertain	terms	a	two-tier	worldview	where	the	intelligible	is	placed	above	the	
sensible.	The	appearance	of	what	Coakley	 labels	as	a	 ‘disjunctive’	approach	 to	
reality	 is	by	no	means	uncharacteristic	of	 the	 late	stage	of	Gregory’s	career	or	
simply	 an	occasional	 strategic	 return	 to	 ‘Origen’s	more	disjunctive	 rhetoric	 to	
make	 a	 special	 point	 of	 ethical	 caution.’897	On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 notion	 of	 two	
levels	of	reality,	which	Gregory	explicitly	extends	to	two	kinds	of	sensation	and	
two	kinds	of	pleasure,	is	fundamental	to	Gregory’s	hermeneutic	in	In	Canticum:	






898	On	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 clear	 distinction	 between	 the	 intelligible	 and	 the	 sensible	 for	
Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 the	 spiritual	 senses	 and	 his	 view	 of	 salvation	 on	 the	 whole,	 see	 also	
Boersma,	Embodiment	and	Virtue	in	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	96–98.	
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To	 substantiate	 my	 critique,	 I	 will	 first	 turn	 to	 some	 textual	 evidence	 that	
supports	my	view	that	the	‘senses	of	the	soul’	are,	indeed,	properties	of	the	soul	
rather	 than	 spiritualised	 faculties	 of	 the	 body.	 The	 most	 significant	 passage	
occurs,	 in	 fact,	 just	before	Gregory’s	allusion	 to	 ‘double	pleasure’	 in	Homily	10	
on	 the	 Song	 of	 Songs.	 We	 have	 already	 seen	 that	 one	 of	 the	 characteristics	
Gregory	associates	with	the	pleasure	of	the	soul	is	the	fact	that	it	is	based	on	a	
judgment	that	‘flees	everything	that	bewitches	the	senses’	and	belongs	to	a	soul	
that	 ‘wakens	 to	 none	 of	 the	 pleasurable	 stirrings	 of	 the	 senses.’899	However,	
these	 remarks	 follow	 a	 longer	 discussion	 in	which	 Gregory	 plainly	 states	 the	
importance	of	putting	 the	senses	 to	sleep.	Puzzlingly,	Coakley	argues	 that	 it	 is	




does	 not	 spell	 out	 how	 sensation	 (αἴσθησις)	 in	 the	 ordinary,	 physiological	 sense	 can	








Sleep	 is	 an	 image	 of	 death,	 for	 in	 death	 every	 perceptive	 activity	 of	 bodies	 (πᾶσα	




any	 distraction	 from	 the	 organs	 of	 sense	 perception	 (οὐδενὶ	 τῶν	 αἰσθητηρίων	
παρενοχλούμενος),	 the	 bodily	 nature	 becomes	 inactive,	 as	 in	 slumber	 or	 profound	
sleep,	 and	 it	 is	 truly	 possible	 to	 say	 that	 through	 disuse	 the	 capacity	 to	 see	 all	 those	
shameful	objects	that	regularly	trouble	childish	eyes	is	put	to	sleep…	When	vision	of	the	
truly	 good	 leads	 us	 to	 look	 beyond	 all	 such	 things,	 the	 bodily	 eye	 (ὁ	 τοῦ	 σώματος	







τῶν	 ὁρατῶν	ὑπερκείμενα),	 is	 not	 drawn	 to	 any	 of	 the	 things	 to	which	 eye	 directs	 its	
attention.	In	the	same	way	too	the	faculty	of	hearing	becomes	a	dead	thing	and	goes	out	
of	 operation	when	 the	 soul	 occupies	 itself	with	 things	 beyond	 speech	 (πρὸς	 τὰ	 ὑπὲρ	
λόγον).	
	
As	 to	 the	 more	 bestial	 (κτηνωδεστέρας)	 of	 the	 senses,	 they	 are	 hardly	 worth	
mentioning.	Long	since,	like	some	graveyard	stench	attached	to	the	soul,	they	have	been	
put	away:	 the	sense	of	 smell,	 scenting	out	odors;	and	 the	sense	of	 taste,	bound	 to	 the	
belly’s	service;	and	the	sense	of	touch	as	well,	 the	blind	and	servile	organ	that	nature,	
we	may	think,	created	only	for	the	sake	of	the	blind.	When	all	these	are	as	it	were	bound	
in	 sleep	 by	 disuse	 (δι’	 ἀπραξίας),	 then	 the	working	 of	 the	 heart	 is	 pure	 (καθαρὰ	 τῆς	
καρδίας	 ἐστὶν	 ἡ	 ἐνέργεια),	 and	 its	 discourse	 is	 focused	 on	what	 is	 above	 it	 (πρὸς	 τὸ	






is	 its	 ‘understanding’	 (διάνοια),	 which	 Gregory	 regards	 as	 a	 property	 of	 the	






Gregory	 adheres	 to	 the	 traditional	 hierarchy	 of	 the	 senses,	 beginning	 from	
vision	and	finishing	with	a	markedly	low	opinion	of	touch.	Second,	the	disuse	of	
the	 senses	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 precondition	 for	 the	pure	working	of	 the	heart,	which	
implies	that	the	heart	 is	not	 located	in	or	equated	with	the	human	body	but	is	
rather	 a	 synonym	 for	 the	 soul.903	Both	 of	 these	 observations	 run	 counter	 to	






to	 the	 ‘heart’	 as	 the	 location	of	 spiritual	 sensation	 and	 touch,	 taste,	 and	 smell	
over	vision	which	is	obscured	by	the	divine	darkness.904		
	





off,	 are	 indeed	 the	 bodily	 senses	 transformed,	 for	 nothing	 in	 the	 homily	 itself	
seems	to	warrant	such	a	conclusion.	Instead,	Gregory	spells	out	clearly	that	the	
closing	 of	 the	 physical	 senses	 is	 final	 and	 a	 necessary	 precondition	 for	
approaching	the	divine	with	the	powers	of	the	intellect.		
	
Can	Coakley’s	point	 of	 view	be	 explained	by	other	passages	 in	 In	Canticum	or	
perhaps	in	De	anima	et	resurrectione,	which	she	considers	the	watershed	work	
in	Gregory’s	understanding	of	 spiritual	 sensation?	 In	my	view,	 it	 seems	highly	
improbable	that	Gregory’s	strong	opinion	on	the	necessity	of	closing	the	senses	
in	Homily	10	could	be	held	 simultaneously	with	 the	opposite	view	 that	would	
make	the	bodily	senses	the	privileged	receptacle	of	the	divine	presence.	We	can,	





text	 in	 which	 Gregory	 also	 presents	 his	 notion	 of	 double	 sensation,	 which	
Coakley	dismisses	 as	 atypical	 of	Gregory	 at	 this	 later	 stage	 of	 his	 career.905	In	
																																																								
904	Concerning	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 the	 senses,	 see	 Coakley,	 ‘Gregory	 of	 Nyssa’,	 50–51.	 For	 the	
language	 of	 the	 ‘heart’,	 see	 Ibid.,	 45,	 50.	 The	 superiority	 of	 sight	 is	 confirmed	 also	 in	Cant.	7	
where	 Gregory	 enquires:	 ‘[W]hich	 among	 our	 members	 is	 worthy	 of	 greater	 honor	 than	 the	
eyes…	Their	location	above	the	other	sense	organs	manifests	the	fact	that	their	usefulness	to	us	
for	 the	conduct	of	 life	 is	of	 the	greatest	worth.’	 (GNO	216	–217;	 trans.	Norris,	227–229).	Soon	
after,	 he	 refers	 to	 the	 church	 as	 the	 body	 of	 Christ	 arguing,	 tellingly,	 that	 all	 those	who	were	
chosen	to	be	leaders	played	the	role	of	eyes,	gazing	upon	‘nothing	material	and	corporeal’	(GNO	
VI,	217–219;	trans.	Norris,	229–231).	
905	‘…only	 very	 occasionally	 does	he	 still	 utilize	 the	 rhetorical	 disjunction	between	bodily	 and	
divine	 sense	with	which	 he	would	 have	 been	 familiar	 from	 the	 dominant	 strands	 in	 Origen’s	
treatment.	One	such	example	does	come	in	the	first	homily,	as	we	noted	above,	when	Gregory,	
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Cant.	1,	 Gregory	 places	 the	 Song	 of	 Songs	 among	 the	 other	 Solomonic	 works,	
Proverbs	and	Ecclesiastes.	Alluding	to	the	latter,	he	explains	that	Wisdom	herself	





and	 having	 in	 this	 way	 purified	 the	 heart	 of	 its	 bent	 toward	 appearances	 (περὶ	 τὰ	









(again,	 διάνοια).	 For	Gregory,	 the	purificatory	work	 is	 initiated	 in	 the	book	of	
Ecclesiastes	and	its	fruits	are	collected	in	Canticum	canticorum.	It	seems	unlikely	
that	the	key	assumptions	on	the	structure	of	reality	and	the	spiritual	life	would	
vary	 significantly	 between	 Gregory’s	 homilies	 on	 the	 two	 works.	 Indeed,	 the	






this	 book,	 that	 there	 is	 in	 us	 a	 dual	 activity	 of	 perception	 (διπλῆ	 τίς	 ἐστιν	 ἐν	 ἡμῖν	 ὴ	
αἴσθησις),	 the	 one	 bodily,	 the	 other	 more	 divine…	 For	 there	 is	 a	 certain	 analogy	
(ἀναλογία	γάρ	τίς)	between	the	sense	organs	of	the	body	and	the	operations	of	the	soul.	
For	 both	 wine	 and	 milk	 are	 discerned	 by	 the	 sense	 of	 taste,	 but	 when	 they	 are	
intelligible	 things,	 the	 power	 of	 the	 soul	 that	 grasps	 them	 is	 a	 fully	 intellectual	power	
																																																																																																																																																													





(νοητὴ	 πάντως	 …	 τῆς	 ψυχῆς	 ἐστι	 δύναμις).	 And	 a	 kiss	 comes	 through	 the	 sense	 of	
touch,	for	in	a	kiss	lips	touch	each	other.	There	is	also,	though,	a	”touch”	that	belongs	to	
the	 soul	 (τῆς	 ψυχῆς),	 one	 that	 makes	 contact	 with	 the	 Word	 and	 is	 actuated	 by	 an	
incorporeal	and	intelligible	touching	(διά	τινος	ἀσωμάτου	καὶ	νοητῆς	ἐπαφήσεως)…	In	
the	 same	way,	 too,	 the	 scent	 of	 the	divine	perfumes	 is	 not	 a	 scent	 in	 the	nostrils	 but	
pertains	 to	 a	 certain	 intelligible	 and	 immaterial	 faculty	 (τινος	 νοητῆς	 καὶ	 ἀΰλου	
δυνάμεως)	that	inhales	the	sweet	smell	of	Christ	by	sucking	in	the	Spirit.’907	
	
Here,	 Gregory	 presents	 the	 senses	 of	 the	 body	 and	 those	 of	 the	 soul	 as	 two	
different	 sets	 of	 faculties	 and	 allocates	 the	 latter	 to	 a	wholly	 incorporeal	 and	
intelligible	 level	of	being.908	Since	the	passage	does	not	fit	with	Coakley’s	main	
thesis	 of	 transformed	 bodily	 senses,	 she	 labels	 it	 as	 an	 isolated	 return	 to	 an	
older	framework	which	Gregory,	in	her	view,	had	largely	outgrown.909	However,	
her	 dismissal	 is	 too	 hasty	 if	 we	 consider	 the	 prominent	 place	 in	 which	 the	
passage	appears	in	the	wider	work.	It	his	here	that	Gregory	explains	the	correct	
way	 of	 interpreting	 the	Song	of	Songs	as	 a	whole,	 and	 gives	 a	 foretaste	 of	 the	
lessons	that	the	book	will	offer	to	the	rightly-disposed	reader.	The	notion	of	two	
kinds	of	sensation	is	intimately	bound	up	with	the	two	levels	of	meaning,	literal	
and	 allegorical	 (though	 Gregory	 cares	 little	 about	 nomenclature),	 which	 are	
conveyed	by	the	biblical	text.	Both	in	the	biblical	text	and	in	the	world	around	
us	material	 objects	 can	point	us	 towards	a	deeper,	 immaterial	 reality.	And,	 as	







ὀπτικῆς	 ἐνεργείας).	 Now,	 he	 distinguishes	 between	 an	 ‘operation	 that	 sees	 the	 truth’	 and	




but	 the	act	of	 seeing	 is	 firmly	 located	 in	 the	soul	and	bears	 the	usual	meanings	of	 intellectual	
contemplation	and	understanding.	Although	the	wrong	way	of	seeing	God	is	also	located	in	the	
soul,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 distortion	 ultimately	 comes	 from	 a	 false	 association	








against	 Coakley,	 that	 the	 anthropological	 hierarchy	 between	 the	 soul	 and	 the	
body	 is	 not	 reversed,	 even	 if	 God	 remains	 beyond	 the	 grasp	 of	 the	 mind.910	
These	 include	 discussions	 in	 which	 Gregory	 equates	 our	 true	 being	 with	 the	
immaterial	 properties	 of	 the	 soul,	 much	 like	 he	 does	 in	 his	 earlier	
anthropological	works,	De	hominis	opificio	and	De	anima	et	resurrectione.911	On	
the	 whole,	 In	 Canticum	 rests	 on	 much	 of	 the	 same	 ontological	 and	
epistemological	 assumptions	 that	 inform	 Gregory’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 true	
good	 which	 I	 discussed	 in	 Part	 II.	 Although	 Gregory’s	 tone	 is	 perhaps	 less	
forceful,	even	in	this	late	work	he	characterises	material	things	as	transient	and	
illusory:	 they	 ‘flow	 away	 with	 time’	 and	 ‘have	 their	 being	 in	 their	 seeming’	
(φύσει	ἐν	τῷ	δοκεῖν	ἔχει	τὸ	εἶναι).	With	this	he	contrasts	the	vision	of	the	eye	of	
the	soul	that	grasps	the	‘true	and	substantive	realities.’912	Even	though	the	soul	
is	 initially	 guided	 towards	 the	 invisible	 ‘by	 way	 of	 what	 appears’	 (διὰ	 τῶν	
φαινομένων),	 in	 the	 darkness	 ‘everything	 that	 appears	 and	 is	 comprehended		
(τοῦ	φαινομένου	τε	καὶ	καταλαμβανομένου	παντός)	has	been	left	outside,	only	








from	 the	 sensible	 realm	 which	 is	 radically	 different	 from	 God’s	 intelligible	
uncreated	being.	In	In	Canticum,	Gregory	describes	the	intelligible	by	means	of	
																																																								







912 	Cant.	 11	 (GNO	 VI,	 316–317);	 trans.	 Norris,	 335.	 Other	 passages	 that	 display	 a	 dual	
understanding	 of	 reality	 include	 Cant.	 11	 (GNO	 VI,	 333–334)	 where	 Gregory	 argues	 that	 the	







The	 nature	 of	 things	 that	 exist	 is	 divided,	 at	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 generality,	 into	 two	
kinds:	On	 the	one	hand,	 there	 is	 that	which	 is	perceptible	and	material	 (αἰσθητὸν	καὶ	
ὑλῶδες);	on	the	other,	that	which	is	intelligible	and	nonmaterial	(νοητόν	τε	καὶ	ἄϋλον).	
Hence	we	reckon	something	to	fall	into	the	category	of	the	perceptible	to	the	extent	that	
it	 is	 grasped	 by	 sense	 perception	 (τῇ	 αἰσθήσει	 καταλαμβάνεται),	 but	 we	 reckon	 as	
intelligible	 that	which	 falls	 beyond	 the	observation	of	 the	 senses	 (τὸ	ὑπερπῖπτον	 τὴν	
αἰσθητικὴν	κατανόησιν).914	
	








for,	 as	 Gregory	 remarks,	 ‘even	 if	 the	 Lord	 “smelled”	 this	 or	 that	 one	 of	 the	
aforementioned	 spices	 as	 a	 “sweet	 smell,”	 he	 judged	 each	 of	 them	 to	 be	
acceptable	because	of	 the	principle	(λόγον)	manifested	 in	what	was	done,	and	
not	 because	 of	 the	 superficial	 and	 perceptible	 appearance	 of	 what	 was	 done	
(κατὰ	τὸ	πρόχειρόν	τε	καὶ	σωματικὸν	εἶδος	τῶν	γινομένων).’916	
	
It	 seems,	 then,	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 sense	 perception	 is	 by	 definition	 linked	 to	
various	 notions	 of	 boundedness,	 including	 space,	 time,	 materiality,	
dimensionality	 and	 the	 like.	 For	 Gregory,	 both	 the	 body	 and	 the	 sensible	
creation	 are	 inherently	 bound	 to	 these	 parameters.	 Even	 as	 the	 spiritual	 life	
																																																								
914	Cant.	6	(GNO	VI,	173);	trans.	Norris,	185.	See	also	An.	et	res.	(PG	46,	40C)	where	the	definition	
of	 the	 intelligible	 by	 negation	 and	 exclusion	 as	 that	 which	 is	not	 sensible	 is	 articulated	 even	
more	clearly.	Also	Boersma	turns	briefly	to	the	former	passage	to	highlight	the	sharp	disjunction	
between	 the	sensible	and	 the	 intelligible	 in	Gregory’s	notion	of	 spiritual	 senses.	 See	Boersma,	
Embodiment	and	Virtue	in	Gregory	of	Nyssa,	96.	
915	See	Cant.	6	(GNO	VI,	173–174.)	




progresses,	 the	 divide	 between	 the	 material	 and	 the	 intelligible	 retains	 its	
fundamental	 character;	 there	 is	 little	 talk	 about	 transformed	 matter	 or	
transfigured	physicality	–	at	least	not	in	this	life.	As	a	consequence,	it	becomes	




call	 to	mind	that,	 for	Gregory,	boundedness	 is	precisely	the	reason	why	bodily	
pleasure	 cannot	 offer	 lasting	 satisfaction. 917 	Due	 to	 its	 spatio-temporal	
limitations,	the	human	body	is	not	able	to	accommodate	limitless	enjoyment:	its	
fixed	physical	dimensions	hinder	a	limitless	addition	of	enjoyable	substance	and	




This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 Gregory	 does	 not	 employ	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 bodily	






It	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 bodily	 images	 are	 meant	 to	 be	 read	 as	 allusions	 to	 an	
intelligible	reality.	Furthermore,	a	clear	two-tier	understanding	of	 the	sensible	
and	the	intelligible	order	is	far	too	widespread	in	the	work	to	warrant	Coakley’s	
conclusion	 that	 Gregory	 works	 ‘Origenistic’	 and	 ‘Platonic’	 material	 into	 his	
exegesis	only	sporadically	 ‘to	make	a	special	point	of	ethical	caution’,	 let	alone	
merely	 ‘out	 of	pietas’.918	On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 notion	 of	 two	 levels	 of	 reality	 –	








What,	 then,	 of	 De	 anima	 et	 ressurectione?	 This	 text	 –	 which	 Daniélou	 in	 his	
influential	 chronology	dates	 at	 least	 a	decade	before	 In	Canticum	–	marks,	 for	
Coakley,	 the	moment	when	Gregory	begins	 to	 break	 free	 from	 the	disjunctive	
Origenistic	 tradition	 of	 the	 spiritual	 senses,	 which	 he	 has	 previously	 ‘fairly	
unthinkingly	 replicated	 in	 his	 own	 writings.’920	In	 support	 of	 her	 argument,	
Coakley	 cites	 the	 passage	 in	 which	Macrina	 rebukes	 Epicurus	 for	 closing	 the	
‘senses	of	 the	soul’	and	 failing	 to	 ‘look	at	any	of	 the	bodiless	 things	which	are	
known	 by	 the	 intellect.’921	Initially,	 Coakley	 simply	 suggests	 that	 the	 passage	
refers	to	the	transformative	capacity	of	the	bodily	senses	which	can	be	used	to	
grasp	a	deeper	reality	or	left	inactivated	due	to	sin,	laziness,	and	ignorance.	This	
remark	on	the	 transformative	potential	of	sensation	 is	sound,	and,	 indeed,	 the	
greatest	merit	of	Coakley’s	interpretation	lies	in	her	focus	on	the	continuity	that	
binds	 together	 bodily	 and	 spiritual	 sensation.	 However,	 Coakley	 presses	 the	
point	 further,	 asking	 how	 we	 can	 know	 that	 Macrina’s	 words	 refer	 to	 the	
‘transfigured	 workings	 of	 ordinary	 perception’	 rather	 than	 the	 Origenistic	
model	 of	 the	 spiritual	 senses	 as	 ‘utterly	 separate	 sets	 of	 cognitive	 faculties	
parallel	 to,	 and	 infinitely	 better	 than,	 the	 bodily	 ones.’922	Coakley’s	 question	
signals	 that	 even	 after	 presenting	 the	 passage	 from	 De	 anima,	 she	 remains	
conscious	 of	 the	 elusive	 character	 of	 her	 evidence	 and	 the	 novelty	 of	 her	
interpretation.923	Nonetheless,	 she	 finds	 support	 for	 her	 own	 view	 from	 two	
further	points	voiced	by	Macrina:	First,	that	‘by	the	very	operation	of	our	senses	
we	 are	 led	 to	 conceive	 of	 that	 reality	 and	 intelligence	 which	 surpasses	 the	
senses.’924	And,	second,	that	‘the	rational	power	cannot	enter	into	the	bodily	life	
																																																								
919	The	passages	 that	 display	 a	 dual	 understanding	of	 reality,	 one	 that	we	 can	 recognise	 from	




921	Ibid.,	48.;	An.	et	res.	(PG	46,	21B–C).	Here,	Coakley	cites	 the	work	 in	Roth’s	 translation.	See	










that	this	 is	merely	the	first	step	and	that,	all	along,	 it	 is	 the	mind	that	remains	
the	 primary	 agent	 of	 knowing.	 Perhaps	 the	 most	 problematic	 feature	 of	
Coakley’s	 reading	 of	De	 anima	 et	 resurrectione	 is	 the	 curious	 omission	 of	 the	
passage	 in	 which	 Macrina	 embraces	 the	 ancient	 notion	 that	 it	 is,	 in	 fact,	 the	
mind,	not	 the	body,	 that	sees	and	hears.926	This	comment	 follows	shortly	after	




Yes,	 the	 senses	 form	 the	 crucial	 channel	 through	which	we	come	 to	know	 the	
world;	 but	without	 the	mind	 that	 perceives	 the	world	 through	 the	 senses	we	
will	not	be	able	to	 form	any	coherent	 ideas	 from	the	sensory	data.	Thus,	what	
Epicurus	fails	to	do	is	to	apply	the	power	of	the	mind	to	deduce	a	greater	truth	

















increasing	 weight	 on	 the	 transformed	 physicality	 of	 the	 Resurrection	 body.	
However,	the	conjuncture	of	the	two	topics	is	largely	Coakley’s	own.	We	should	
note	 that	 Gregory	 never	 alludes	 to	 any	 actual	 transformation	 of	 the	 physical	
senses	 while	 discussing	 the	 Resurrection	 body,	 let	 alone	 discusses	 a	
transformation	that	could	happen	already	in	this	 life.	This	does	not	have	to	be	
due	 to	 outright	 hostility	 towards	 physical	 sensation	 but	 rather	 to	 Gregory’s	
understanding	 that	 the	 senses	merely	 play	 a	 preliminary	 role	 in	 knowing	 the	
divine	 and	 are	 unnecessary	 when	 God	 is	 known	 directly	 in	 the	 life	 to	 come.	
While	the	‘perfection	of	bodies’	undeniably	features	in	Gregory’s	conception	of	
the	Resurrection	 in	De	anima,	 he	 cautions	 against	 speculation	 as	 to	what	 this	
transformed	 reality	 might	 be	 like.	 The	 fate	 of	 the	 physical	 senses	 is	 only	
implicitly	discussed	in	this	context,	and	the	conclusions	remain	ambiguous:	On	
the	one	hand,	Macrina	seems	to	think	that	the	Resurrection	body	will	have	a	set	
of	 senses	 to	 retain	 its	 identity	as	a	body.927	On	 the	other	hand,	 she	also	 states	
that	in	the	Resurrection	the	human	being	will	shed	the	characteristics	which	are	
shared	with	irrational	animals;	this	would	also	imply	material	sensuality.928	It	is	
therefore	 unclear	 how	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 the	 Resurrection	 body	 could	 offer	
any	 substantial	 framework	 for	 ‘a	 developing	 and	 systematic	 account	 of	 how	
ordinary	perception	and	the	gross	physical	senses	are	capable	of	a	progressive	
transformation	 in	 this	 life	 into	 spiritual	 senses...’,	 which	 Coakley	 seeks	 to	
delineate.929	
In	my	view,	then,	Gregory’s	discussion	on	the	epistemological	role	of	the	senses	
in	De	anima	and	 In	Canticum	 can	be	 fully	 explained	 in	 light	 of	 the	 framework	
which	I	laid	out	in	Chapter	4	of	this	thesis	and	which	remains	rather	consistent	
throughout	his	corpus	–	as	does,	 indeed,	his	treatment	of	pleasure	as	the	false	
good	 to	 which	 he	 alludes	 also	 in	 In	 Canticum.	 Consider,	 for	 example,	 this	
familiar-sounding	excerpt	from	Homily	4:	
	
”From	 this	 point,	 nothing	 else	 seems	 lovely	 to	 me,	 but	 I	 have	 turned	 away	 from	 all	
things	that	were	thought	noble	before.	My	judgment	of	what	is	noble	no	longer	errs	so	
																																																								









in	 this	 world,	 after	 all,	 has	 its	 being	 only	 in	 the	 heads	 of	 the	 people	 who	 make	 the	
judgment,	but	you	are	 truly	beautiful	–	not	only	beautiful,	but	 the	very	essence	of	 the	
Beautiful,	existing	forever	as	such…”930	
	
If	 the	soul	 is	 to	rise	above	 the	world	of	appearances	and	grasp	 the	 intelligible	
good	instead	of	the	sensible,	it	will	ultimately	have	to	leave	behind	the	world	of	
the	 senses.	 This	 entails	 that	 the	 highest	 forms	 of	 spiritual	 pleasure,	 which	
belong	 to	 the	very	pinnacle	of	 the	spiritual	 life,	 are	not	grasped	by	 the	senses	





If	 there	 is	 –	 as	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 –	 a	 certain	 continuity	 between	 physical	
sensation	and	spiritual	sensation,	I	would	suggest	we	look	for	the	unifying	and	
overarching	principle	 in	 the	 intellectual	component	of	 the	human	person:	 it	 is	
the	mind	 that	 perceives	 and	 gradually	 progresses	 from	 the	 immediate	 causes	
behind	perceptible	objects	to	the	spiritual	 logoi,	which	are	both	present	in	and	




sensation	 a	 pedestal	 which	 lifts	 the	 mind	 towards	 the	 spiritual	 reality.	 Thus	
there	may,	in	fact,	be	more	continuity	in	the	development	of	Gregory’s	theology	
of	sensation	than	Coakley’s	analysis	seems	to	suggest.	
Finally,	we	 can	 ask	whether	 Coakley’s	 broader	 theological	mission	 to	 recover	
the	 importance	 of	 the	 body	 in	 the	 Christian	 ascetical	 theology	 is	 the	 implicit	











932	Here	we	must	mention	 especially	 Coakley’s	 recent	work	The	New	Asceticism,	which	makes	
use	 of	 Gregory’s	 view	 of	 the	 body	 as	 a	 corrective	 to	 modern-day	 ideas	 on	 embodiment	 and	





The	 central	 place	 of	 enjoyment	 in	 Gregory’s	 vision	 of	 the	 spiritual	 fulfilment	
raises	 an	 obvious	 question:	 can	 we	 say	 that,	 despite	 hostility	 towards	 bodily	
pleasure,	 Gregory	 is	 nonetheless	 a	 spiritual	 hedonist?	 	 Smith	 ponders	 this	 in	
Passion	and	Paradise,	offering	the	following	answer:	
	
Nyssen’s	aesthetic	 language	and	 the	corresponding	 language	of	aroused	desire	has	an	
erotic	element	from	which	one	could	mistakenly	assume	that	he	urges	on	the	struggling	
Christian	with	a	 spiritually	hedonistic	 vision	of	heaven.	Yet	one	must	 remember	 that,	
although	Nyssen	uses	 an	 erotic	motive	 to	 describe	 the	 dynamic	motivating	 the	 soul’s	
ascent	to	God,	the	divine	beauty	that	affords	the	soul	maximal	blessedness	corresponds	
with	God’s	agapê.	Because	the	goods	that	constitute	God’s	aretê	are	 intelligible	goods,	





a	hedonist,	 conventionally	understood.	 In	 its	most	basic	definition,	 ‘hedonism’	
denotes	an	ethical	framework	in	which	pleasure	is	regarded	as	the	highest	good	
which	is	pursued	for	its	own	sake	and	for	which	all	other	things	are	pursued.	To	
my	 mind,	 Smith	 does	 not	 enquire	 whether	 Gregory	 considers	 pleasure	 the	
highest	good,	but	whether	his	vision	of	heaven	is	erotic,	perhaps	to	the	point	of	
arousing	 the	 human	 body.	 Smith	 rescues	 Gregory	 from	 what	 he	 considers	
hedonism	by	appealing	to	the	fact	that	the	eschatological	fulfilment	stems	from	
intelligible	goods	which	lead	to	an	intellectual	fascination.	In	other	words,	Smith	
defines	 pleasure	 on	 narrow	 quasi-sexual	 terms	 and	 dismisses	 the	 charge	 of	
hedonism	 by	 noting	 the	 exclusively	 intellectual	 character	 of	 the	 spiritual	
fulfilment.	We	can	challenge	this	point	by	noting	that	a	‘hedonist’	does	not	have	
to	 espouse	 bodily	 pleasure	 as	 the	 highest	 good.	 We	 have	 already	 seen	 that	
pleasure	 can	 be	 intellectual,	 and	 even	 Epicurus,	 a	 notorious	 hedonist,	 would	
agree	 that	 pleasure	 of	 the	 soul	was	 the	 highest	 form	 of	 pleasure.	 And,	 as	we	









these	 standards	Gregory	 is	not	a	hedonist.	At	 the	 same	 time,	his	 thought	does	
contain	 some	hedonist	elements.	The	 reason	why	Gregory	 is	not	a	hedonist	 is	
not	the	fact	that	his	spiritual	vision	is	exclusively	intellectual;	we	have	already	
seen	 that	 intellectual	 pleasure	 exists.	 However,	 it	 seems	 that	 in	 Gregory’s	
understanding	 of	 intellectual	 enjoyment,	 enjoyment	 is	 something	 that	
accompanies	 the	 good	 rather	 than	 is	 the	 good.	 For	 Gregory,	 the	 human	 telos	












This	 does	not,	 of	 course,	 eliminate	 the	problem	 that	 even	 if	 Gregory	does	not	
explicitly	 hold	 that	 spiritual	 pleasure	 is	 the	 good,	 the	 divine	 goods	 may	 be	
sought	 chiefly	 for	 the	 enjoyment	 they	provide.	Gregory	would	probably	 reject	
this	 kind	 of	 approach	 as	 a	 misunderstanding	 which	 would	 prevent	 the	










vision	 of	 heaven	 in	 which	 the	 blessed	 life	 is	 also	 the	 most	 pleasant	 life.	 His	
audiences	would	 have	 surely	 found	 this	 appealing,	 and	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	
effect	 is	 accidental.	 As	 a	 teacher	 and	 rhetorician,	 Gregory	 seeks	 to	 direct	 the	
emotions	of	his	audience	by	using	the	promise	of	the	immense	future	joy	as	an	
inspiration	 for	 renouncing	 the	 limited	 goods	 of	 the	material	world.	 The	 hope	
that	he	promises	in	his	works	must	be	ignited	in	the	souls	of	his	hearers.	Thus,	
we	 can	 suggest	 that	 while	 Gregory	 does	 not	 subscribe	 to	 full-blown	 ethical	
hedonism,	 his	 writings	 do	 nonetheless	 imply	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 more	 limited	
motivational	hedonism.			
	
A	 further,	 related	 hedonistic	 element	 lies	 in	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 Gregory	
encourages	his	audience	to	act	in	a	way	that	maximises	the	overall	enjoyment	in	
their	lives.	We	have	already	looked	at	a	passage	from	Homilies	on	the	Beatitudes	
in	 which	 Gregory	 argues	 that	 since	 grief	 and	 joy	 are	 both	 part	 of	 human	
existence,	it	is	better	to	choose	the	griefs	of	the	present	life	and	the	joys	of	the	





beautiful	 fruit	 of	 knowledge	 of	 good	 and	 evil.	 A	 number	 of	 ancient	 thinkers,	
from	Plato	 to	 Epicurus,	 recommend	 appropriate	 ‘hedonic	 calculus’	 in	which	 a	




for	 different	 reasons.	 For	 Gregory,	 spiritual	 pleasure	 or	 enjoyment	 is	 not	 the	
highest	 good	 in	 itself,	 but	 it	 accompanies	 the	 highest	 good,	 which	 should	 be	
pursued	 even	 if	 it	 does	 not	 presently	 yield	 any	 enjoyment.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
Gregory’s	 delightful	 depictions	 of	 the	 eschaton	 are	 hardly	 intended	 only	 as	






by	 the	 Gospels.	 Therefore,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 Gregory	 makes	 use	 of	
motivational	hedonism,	if	only	in	the	name	of	the	greater	goods	of	immortality	



















3)	Psychologically,	 it	 is	 our	drive	 for	pleasure	 that	motivates	 all	 impassionate	
behaviour	and	leads	to	a	sinful	attachment	to	a	number	of	external	goods.	
4)	From	a	broad	ethical	perspective,	a	life	of	pleasure	does	not	allude	simply	to	





that	 falsely	 approaches	 the	 non-final	 realm	 of	 sensation	 as	 the	 only	 and	 final	






two-way	 street:	 At	 one	 end,	 lies	 an	 intellectually	 informed	 attitude	 that	
understands	 that	 the	 material	 world	 is	 simply	 the	 first	 step	 in	 the	 ascent	
towards	 the	divine.	At	 the	other	 end,	 lies	pleasure,	 the	 false	 alternative.	 Since	
humans	 can	 only	 choose	 what	 they	 know,	 right	 knowledge	 becomes	 the	
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prerequisite	of	right	choice,	right	desire,	and	right	enjoyment.	At	the	same	time,	
ignorance	of	 the	purpose	of	 the	human	 life	and	 the	higher	 spiritual	principles	
that	underpin	it	 leads	to	an	uncritical	attachment	to	the	only	good	available	to	
the	senses:	pleasure.	At	the	level	of	rhetoric,	this	binary	model	is	evidenced	and	






that	 the	 creation	 is	 useless;	 it	 is	 useless	 only	when	 taken	 at	 face	 value	 as	 the	





By	 drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 ephemeral	 quality	 of	 sensual	 pleasure	 and,	more	
broadly,	to	pleasure	seeking	as	a	failure	to	recognise	the	non-final	character	of	
the	sensible	realm,	I	have	agreed	with	and	built	on	Hans	Boersma’s	critique	of	
the	 recent	 trend	 in	 Gregory	 of	 Nyssa	 scholarship	 which	 highlights	 Gregory’s	
strikingly	positive	attitude	towards	embodiment	and	the	sensible	realm.	While	





fullness	of	good	 in	God.	 In	my	view,	Gregory’s	discourse	on	pleasure	shows	 in	
clear	 terms	 that	 the	 goods	 of	 the	 sensible	 realm	 are	 only	 intended	 as	
instruments	 and	 that	 our	 final	 communion	 with	 the	 divine	 occurs	 on	 the	
intelligible	 plane.	 The	 spatio-temporally	 limited	 objects	 of	 the	 sensible	 realm,	
including	 the	 human	 body,	 simply	 cannot	 offer,	 accommodate,	 or	 access	 the	
limitless	 spiritual	 enjoyment	 provided	 by	 the	 infinite	 God.	 The	 non-finality	 of	





In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 have	 approached	 Gregory’s	 notion	 of	 pleasure	 within	 the	
framework	of	ancient	eudaimonistic	ethics	and,	in	particular,	the	ancient	debate	
on	pleasure	as	the	good.	I	have	showed	that,	especially	as	regards	the	norms	of	
the	 life	 on	 earth,	 Gregory	 follows	 general	 trends	 of	 ancient	 ethics:	 instead	 of	
advocating	a	complete	withdrawal	and	renunciation,	Gregory	defends	an	 ideal	
of	rational	moderation	and	a	level	of	physical	care	that	ensures	the	health	of	the	
body	but	 enables	 the	 individual	 to	 direct	most	 of	 her	 efforts	 towards	 interior	
and	 intelligible	 matters.	 At	 various	 points,	 Gregory	 echoes	 notable	 topics	 in	
ancient	 ethics,	 such	 as	 the	 self-sufficiency	 of	 virtue,	 an	 interest	 in	 infant	
behaviour,	 nature	 as	 a	norm,	 and	 the	notion	 that	no	one	errs	willingly.	 In	my	
view,	this	is	neither	a	sign	of	Gregory’s	deliberate	affiliation	with	any	one	of	the	
ancient	 schools	 of	 philosophy,	 nor	 an	 indication	 that	 he	 is	 a	 particularly	
unoriginal	 thinker.	 As	we	 have	 already	 seen,	 despite	 underlying	metaphysical	
differences,	 ancient	 authors	 were	 reasonably	 like-minded	 about	 the	 lifestyle	
that	 constituted	 a	 good	 human	 life.	 I	 have	 provided	 ample	 examples	 to	 show	
that	these	concerns	were	evident	already	in	earlier	Christian	ethics,	such	as	the	
writings	 of	 Clement	 of	 Alexandria	 whose	 reception	 in	 Cappadocian	 theology	
remains	largely	uncharted.	
	
Gregory’s	 originality	 is	 perhaps	best	 showcased	by	his	 conception	of	 spiritual	
pleasure,	 which	 is	 profoundly	 shaped	 by	 his	 theological	 commitment	 to	 the	
creation/Creator	 divide	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 infinite	 progress.	 For	 him	 the	
difference	 between	 limited	 and	 unlimited	 pleasure	 is	 intertwined	 with	 the	
difference	 between	 the	 limited	 creation	 and	 its	 unlimited	 Creator.	 In	 my	
analysis,	 I	 showed	 that	Gregory	differs	 from	many	of	 the	 late	ancient	 thinkers	
who,	 like	him,	 conceptualise	pleasure	 as	 a	 replenishment	of	 a	 lack	but,	 unlike	




By	highlighting	 the	 centrality	of	pleasure	 in	Gregory’s	notion	of	 the	 sinful	 life,	
this	 study	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	 scholarly	 discussion	 on	 early	 Christian	
hamartiology.	My	investigation	has	cast	light	both	on	Gregory’s	notion	of	sin	as	
an	 intellectual	 failure	 and	 on	 the	 points	 of	 contact	 between	 ancient	 anti-
hedonist	discourse	and	early	Christian	hamartiology.	So	far,	the	scholarship	on	
the	 late	4th	and	early	5th-century	notions	of	sin	has	 tended	to	 focus	heavily	on	
the	writings	of	Augustine.	 It	 is	my	hope	 that	 this	 thesis	 can	open	up	a	 further	
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